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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an attem pt to understand how Mexico's democratisation process transformed budget 
accountability and the relationship between the federal, state and municipal governments. W ith the decline of 
presidentialism, tw o major changes occurred: the federal Congress became a more powerful regulator of 
public expenditure; and a large share of the budget was decentralised to subnational governments. The 
research objective is to produce an empirical analysis of how it came about that the president lost control over 
a m ajor share of discretionary budgetary spending while state and municipal authorities increased their 
financial capacities w ithout strong local systems of checks and balances. The work then evaluates the  
unintended consequences of the process including uneven mechanisms of accountability among different 
levels o f government. The dissertation uses original survey material in order to do this.
This is a piece of empirical research that aims to fill a gap in the literature on the budgetary process in 
contem porary Mexico. This work contributes to the literature about decentralisation in both Mexico and the 
rest of Latin America. In particular, it is part of a new wave of studies that look at processes of institutional 
change related to democratisation and decentralisation within the region.
The dissertation is based on the assumption that the congressional election of 1997 was the threshold of 
democratic change in Mexico. The results of that election changed the political conditions that perm itted the 
existence of Mexico's presidentialism. The emergence of an opposition majority in the Chamber of Deputies 
triggered the transformation from a metaconstitutional to a constitutional presidency. In this transformation, 
an Executive with unwritten and overreaching powers evolved into a presidency bound by written laws and 
the institutions in charge of enforcing them . The active presence of opposition parties inside the Chamber of 
Deputies triggered several reforms that forced the President to the unprecedented practice of rendering 
accounts.
As these changes were occurring at federal level, subnational politics were transformed through an 
unprecedented combination of political and financial autonomy for state governors and municipal presidents. 
On December 2002, a Mexican newspaper reported that the Municipal President of Tultitlan, a municipality 
with 432,000 inhabitants, had a higher salary than the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. According to the  
secret payroll of the municipal government, the Mayor received at least US$213,000 a year. That newspaper
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report triggered the question that inspired this empirical research: which de jure  and de fac to  institutional 
mechanisms allowed a mayor from a small Mexican town earn a higher wage than head of governm ent from a 
G-8?
The dissertation is focused on two reforms related to budgetary policy: 1) The creation of a new Supreme 
Audit Institution (SAI) at federal level; and 2) The decentralisation of federal spending to states and 
municipalities. The creation of a new SAI, the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF), improved the political 
autonom y and technical capability of the congressional bureau in charge of ex post budgetary oversight. 
Through the ASF, the Congress improved its capability to demand an accountable presidency.
The second reform was the decentralisation of an im portant share of government expenditure to state and 
municipal authorities. This implied the creation of clear norms and transparent formulas for the distribution of 
public resources among the three levels of government. In the form er political system, the President had the 
unwritten prerogative to decide the geographical allocation of public expenditure, according to unaccountable 
criteria. The federal Executive had deep pockets and full political power to determ ine the fiscal surplus or 
financial bankruptcy of a subnational government. The decentralisation process created rules that forced the 
President to render financial accounts to subnational governments. For the first tim e, the Federal Executive 
had to follow transparent and stable criteria for the transfer of resources to states and municipalities. The 
decentralisation process rested on the premise that local authorities would allocate public expenditure more 
efficiently and would maximise social welfare.
The decentralisation of public expenditure increased the accountability of the federal government to states 
and municipalities. However, a central claim in my thesis is that an unforeseen consequence of this process 
was a lack of accountability of political leaders at subnational levels. W ith the dusk of presidentialism and the  
decentralisation of expenditure, governors and municipal presidents gained ample margins of political and 
financial power.
Thorough a census of state SAIs and an Index of Budget Information, the thesis will provide empirical evidence 
on the importance of accountability institutions in the transfer of spending responsibilities to subnational 
governments. With weak accountability mechanisms at the local level, there are no guarantees that 
decentralisation will deliver its theoretical expectations of efficiency and welfare.
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This is not a dissertation against the general premises of decentralisation. However, through the analysis of 
Mexico's case study, the research offers a word of caution about the consequences of a mechanical 
application of the decentralisation policy, with disregard of the political context and accountability 
infrastructure of subnational governments.
This thesis consists of 92,497 words (excluding references).
&
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DECENTRALISATION AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TWILIGHT
OF MEXICAN PRESIDENTIALISM
INTRODUCTION
The 1997 legislative election ended the 68-year congressional monopoly of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). For the first time in modern history, the Executive 
had to face a divided Congress. A unified government, with the ruling party controlling 
both houses of the Legislative Branch, had been one of the pillars of Mexico's 
presidentialism.
The essential purpose of this dissertation is to offer an empirical analysis of both the 
changes and consequences of the reform in budgetary law during the first decade 
(1997-2007) of democratic government in Mexico. The research uses the emergence of 
a divided Congress as the independent variable, which explains the series of reforms 
that transformed the Mexican presidency into an accountable institution. The 
Congress, with no control from a single party, was the political catalyst of both 
decentralisation and increased budget accountability. A new Supreme Audit Institution 
(SAI) created the basis for budget accountability from the Executive to the Legislature. 
The decentralisation process fostered the accountability of the Executive towards the 
lower levels of government. However, this accountability did not always extend to 
local office holders
The dissertation sets out some significant new evidence about the complex 
relationship between the transition to democracy, the decline of presidentialism and 
the emergence of a new breed of powerful local office-holders with weak 
accountability: state governors and municipal presidents. The interaction of 
democratisation and decentralisation, within the context of declining presidential 
power, has brought about unprecedented political and financial autonomy for 
subnational authorities. The dissertation ends with an analysis of the 2007 
constitutional amendment that authorises the Federal Congress to legislate over the 
homogenisation and transparency of state and municipal budgets. This Constitutional
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amendment implied the re-centralisation of federal authority, to dictate the financial 
disclosure criterion of subnational accounts.
The research belongs to the 'second generation' literature on decentralisation, which 
focuses on the accountability and incentives of government officials (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2005:4). The 'first generation' literature on decentralisation was 
conceived within the context of developed countries, with functional accountability 
environments and longstanding democratic traditions. The thesis also contributes to 
the literature on transition to democracy and the challenges for institutional reform 
within a political system in state of flux.
The case study indicates that we need to go beyond the existing literature on 
accountability to consider further questions. The dissertation tests the limits of the 
concept of Horizontal Accountability coined by Guillermo O'Donnell. For the study of 
Mexico's decentralisation, Horizontal Accountability has to take into consideration the 
variations in local political systems. Mexican states offer a diversity of political contexts 
that produce a wide range of accountability outcomes. In several cases, the informal 
practices of the local political system determine the success or failure of institutions 
for Horizontal Accountability. A research limited to the formal sphere of the Horizontal 
Accountability is in itself incomplete. The enforcement of Horizontal Accountability is 
constrained by de jure and de facto realms.
The thesis makes eight central claims:
1. Democratisation has largely undermined the arbitrary financial power of Mexican 
Presidentialism. It has reduced discretionary criteria in the allocation of the federal 
budget and improved expenditure accountability (See chapter 2).
2. With the creation of a more effective Supreme Audit Institution and a new legal 
framework for the approval of the federal budget, the Executive was forced to render
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accounts to an empowered Legislative Branch. Through decentralisation, the federal 
Executive was forced to render accounts to subnational authorities (See chapters 2 and 
3).
3. The unintended result of decentralisation was to make additional financial resources 
available to state and municipal office holders, who did not have effective institutional 
mechanisms to enforce budget accountability (See chapters 3 ,4  and 5).
4. The centralisation of tax collecting responsibilities in the federal government 
reflected the uneven economic development and institutional asymmetries of 
Mexico's regions. However, the decentralisation of spending treated all Mexican states 
as legal equivalents, despite their deep disparities in administrative and accountability 
infrastructures (See chapters 3 and 5).
5. The modernisation of accountability institutions at the federal level did not, in 
general, trickle down to subnational governments during the first decade (1997-2007) 
of a divided Congress in Mexico (See chapters 2 and 5).
6. The performance of Mexico's subnational governments provides empirical evidence 
that the presence of a credible and functioning electoral system does not guarantee 
the existence of governmental accountability (See chapter 5).
7. Without adequate institutions for financial accountability at the local level, the 
decentralisation process may not have led to the improved expenditure efficiency at 
these levels of government (See chapter 4).
8. The concept of Horizontal Accountability has to take into account the importance of 
informal political practices on the behaviour of accountability institutions (See chapter 
5).
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OF MEXICAN PRESIDENTIALISM
I. The emergence of a constitutional presidency in Mexico
During almost all of the 20th century, the President was the central figure of Mexico's 
political system, and presidential power the main source of political stability. Under a 
single party system, disputes within the political arena were resolved through a 
general acknowledgment of the president's overreaching authority. Presidential 
pronouncements served as the guiding light in deciding the professional future of 
politicians, and the last word on conflict resolution.
Weldon (1997:227) sets out the four conditions that allowed the existence of Mexican 
presidentialism: "1) a presidentialist system based in the Constitution; 2) unified 
government where the ruling party controls the presidency and both houses of 
Congress; 3) discipline within the ruling party; 4) a President who is the acknowledged 
leader of the ruling party." Two additional conditions could be added: Until 1989, the 
President controlled the 31 state governors1 who ruled over the subnational political 
machines of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); and, until 1999, the 
President had the unwritten authority to appoint his successor.
For Weldon (1997:227), the constitutional "authority granted to the President was 
insufficient in creating stability and efficiency through centralisation." It was the risk of 
political instability that legitimised the metaconstitutional authority (Carpizo, 
1977:190) of the president. One of the main sources of this metaconstitutional 
authority was that the President was accountable to almost no one, apart from himself 
and the historians who would record his legacy. "There is virtually no constitutional 
check on the power of the Mexican president" (Philip, 1992:167). Since the 
Constitution of 1917, Mexican presidents have been allowed to remain in power only
1 Governors acted as local filters to prevent regional political conflicts from  escalating to  the national 
agenda.
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for a single six year term. Through the "no re-election" clause, the only obvious 
limitation to his power was time.2
The premises that linked presidential authority and political stability began to erode 
with the emergence of a competitive party system. In the mid-1980s, the PRI 
monopoly over electoral outcomes began to crack as opposition parties gained a 
significant presence through the polls. As a result of the elections, a new political class 
emerged to question the metaconsitutional and unaccountable authority of the 
Executive. The new breed of politicians was outside the sphere of influence of the 
President and the PRI.
In striking contrast with other democratic transitions in Latin America or Eastern 
Europe, Mexico's path to democracy did not fracture its political institutions. There 
was no sudden collapse of the previous regime, nor was there a collective demand for 
a new constitutional framework. Moreover, the legal basis of presidentialism was 
never challenged by any serious propositions for alternative models, such as 
parliamentarianism (Lujambio, 1995:11-12).
The main criticisms of the previous regime concerned the unwritten powers of the 
President and the lack of credibility of the electoral system. The critics made a simple 
demand: democracy through a President bound by law and institutions, plus fair and 
free suffrage. The constitutional structure of the ancient regime would provide the 
foundations for the new era. A quasi-single party system with almost absolute control 
over election results evolved into a competitive multiparty structure with legitimate 
electoral institutions. This change in the political system transformed 
metaconstitutional presidentialism into a new political order, where the Executive is 
accountable to the state institutions, the law and its citizens. Most academic research 
on political change in Mexico has directed its attention to the development of a 
multiparty political system. My research is framed on the post-transition democracy
2 The role o f Am paro  as a lim it to  presidential authority will be discussed in chapter 1.
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period, after the 1997 congressional election3. The dissertation will examine the 
characteristics of budget accountability and decentralisation in the aftermath of 
presidentialism.
The birth and death of Mexico's overreaching presidentialism can be represented by 
two speeches. In 1928, Plutarco Elias Calles announced that Mexico would have to 
evolve from a country of caudillos (strongmen) to a country of institutions. To meet 
such a challenge in the aftermath of the revolutionary wars, there was a need for a 
central figure to hold all the reins of political power. In 1936, when President Lazaro 
Cardenas (1934-1940) used the instruments of the Executive Office to dismiss Plutarco 
Elias Calles, then-boss of the party, the office of the presidency gained control over the 
entire political system. Sixty years later, in his 1996 State of the Union address, 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) claimed "I will only use the powers of my office 
that are given by the law (Zedillo, 1996:23)."
An Executive limited by the restrictions stated in the law meant the end of 
presidentialism as we knew it. In an interview for the dissertation, Roque Villanueva, 
leader of the PRI majority in the Chamber of Deputies (1994-1996) and National leader 
of the PRI (1996-1997), explained that "Ernesto Zedillo marked the end of 
presidentialism for two fundamental reasons: first, he was not a man with ambitions 
for power, in the conventional terms of Mexico's political system. In second place, the 
fact that the PRI did not obtain an absolute majority in the 1997 election, forced him to 
negotiate with Congress under very different circumstances from the other presidents 
in Mexican history" (Villanueva, 2008).
3 There is open debate over the date when Mexico completed its transition to democracy. For some 
observers, th e  transition to  democracy was completed in the year 2000, when Vicente Fox, m em ber of 
the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), became the first non-PRI president in 7 decades (Vargas Llosa, 2000; 
Bartra, 2000; Calderon Hinojosa, 2000; Lagos, 2006.). I assume th at the end of the transition and the  
beginning o f a democratic regime began in 1997, when the  PRI lost control of the Chamber of Deputies. 
The main institutional features of the  new political order w ere already functioning by the 1997 election.
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Every area and state entity that had previously been overshadowed by the president's 
meta-authority needed to forge institutional mechanisms to replace the decision­
making processes embedded in the old political regime. The new plural Congress 
promoted reforms of an entire institutional structure that was accustomed to follow 
presidential orders. The country of the presidential-caudillo was forced to evolve in a 
few years into a country of institutions.
The discretionary powers of the President had formed the basis of political stability. 
The challenge of Mexico's new plural political system was to create the foundation for 
stability without these discretionary powers. Political stability now had to be based on 
rules accepted by all political actors. The institutions charged with enforcing these 
rules needed the collective acquiescence of diverse political interests. These new 
institutions shared a common source of legitimacy: political autonomy from the 
presidential sphere of influence.
During the 1990s, Mexico embarked on an intensive process of institutional reform in 
several arenas of public life. Regarding the economy, in 1993-94 the President granted 
the right to the Central Bank to set interest rates, the Mexican currency was allowed to 
float freely, and the Executive lost its capability to influence the exchange rate. In 1994 
the Supreme Court was restructured under the premise of gaining independence from 
political pressures from the president's office (Domingo, 2000). Most of the 
institutional reforms that marked the transition to a constitutional presidency required 
major reforms through secondary legislation, and several Constitutional changes. In 
the electoral arena, in 1996 the Instituto Federal Electoral4 (IFE) and the electoral 
courts also gained political leverage and independence from the Executive (Becerra & 
Woldenberg, 2000). At state level, most local conflicts came to be resolved through 
institutional channels instead of via the ousting of governors through presidential
4 For a detailed study o f Mexico's transition to democracy through the construction of credible electoral 
institutions, see Jose W oldenberg, and Becerra (2000), La mecanica del cambio politico en Mexico.
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pressures5. Results of local elections were respected, and the PRI was allowed to select 
candidates who had not been appointed directly by the president's inner circle.
This study analyses two reforms that adapted the presidential powers to t(ie context of 
a polyarchy (Dahl, 1971) with dispersed centres of power: the emergence of stronger 
budget accountability at the federal level, and the decentralisation of spending to state 
and municipal governments. One of the key sources of previous presidential power 
had been its control over a large share of the federal budget that was transferred to 
subnational authorities without either formal rules or predictable criteria. With the 
docile consent of the Federal Congress, the President had the ability to 'make or break' 
the equilibrium of state and municipal treasuries.
The plurality of political forces in Congress transformed its formal rubberstamp 
function into a real check and balance of presidential power. In the states, governors 
from all political parties, including the PRI, were unwilling to quietly accept the 
presidential prerogatives of discretionary budgets. The transition to democracy 
created a new political establishment that was willing and able to ask uncomfortable 
questions from the President about the way that public expenditure was being 
geographically distributed. "Political decentralisation then generated incentives for 
subnational political leaders to push for fiscal decentralisation (Beer, 2004:191)." The 
pressure from Congress and the State Governors ultimately led the President to 
relinquish a large share of federal expenditures, along with his unwritten prerogative 
to allocate the budget according to his preferences.
In 1997, Congress created formulas to clarify the transfer of resources from the federal 
budget to states and municipalities. At the beginning of the 1990s, close to 70% of all 
public spending had been under the control of the federal government. With 
decentralisation, that pattern changed radically: By 2007, this had reduced to 39%,
5 An analysis of the ousting of governors during the  presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-994 ) can be found  
in Amezcua and Pardinas (1997), Todos los gobernadores del Presidente.
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with 61% of public expenditure under the control of either state or municipal 
governments.
Finkel (2005:108) argues that in the case of the 1994 judicial reform, the President 
consented to give more independence to the Supreme Court as an "insurance policy" 
to hedge against the risk of losing office and the PRI becoming an opposition party. It is 
impossible to be completely certain about the prime motivation that drove the 
institutional reforms of the 1990s, be they the redesign of the Supreme Court, the 
decentralisation of spending, or the powers of the new Supreme Audit Institution6 
(SAI). However, the insurance policy hypothesis reflects a long-term concern over an 
uncertain electoral outcome. The risk of political instability due to budget disputes 
within the Congress and an open conflict between state governors and the federal 
government was not just a possibility on the horizon, but a clear and present danger 
for the Zedillo administration.
Decentralisation thus became a mechanism for political survival (Cox & Rodriguez, 
1999:53). The theoretical benefits of decentralisation were aligned with the political 
need to resolve the political and financial dispute between the central government and 
state governors. The decentralisation reforms promised to deliver better governance 
of budget resources and to ease the tensions with subnational authorities, as they 
would reduce their financial dependence to their relationship with the President.
In addition to decentralisation, budget accountability became attractive to actors 
across the political spectrum: everybody got a share of the fiscal pie and everybody 
knew the portion of their neighbours. With presidential power shrunk to constitutional 
size, budget accountability became not only a prerequisite for good governance but 
one of the foundations of the new political stability. To emphasise the role of 
overseeing Executive finances, the Chamber of Deputies redesigned the congressional 
supporting agency in charge of ex post budget accountability. The Auditoria Superior
6 SAI is a generic term  that covers audit agencies in all countries, and each nation coins its own specific 
name for its respective organisation.
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de la Federacion (ASF), Mexico's SAI, launched its activities in January 2000. As will be 
explained in chapter 2, the reform strengthened the organisational and operative 
autonomy of the ASF. However, these institutional improvements did not spill over in a 
homogeneous way to the subnational level. One of the main issues motivating this 
research is that although the spending capabilities of state governments and 
municipalities have been substantially strengthened, their financial accountability has 
not.
Each of the 31 state congresses, and the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City, has a 
technical bureau dedicated to supervising the financial accountability of the three 
branches of government and the municipalities. The audit institutions do their 
oversight work at the end of the budget cycle, once public money has been spent. 
These institutions are the last link in the accountability chain of public expenditure. 
The SAI has to corroborate the work of the government internal audit and, in the 
process, review "the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions which when 
aggregated, make up the financial statements" (Power, 1997:24). The diversity of 
political environments at the subnational level in Mexico has produced an equivalent 
institutional range of congressional supporting agencies in charge of budget 
accountability. This diversity reflects the variable nature of the capacity and will of 
policy makers to deal with the common challenge of budget accountability at the local 
level.
The interaction between the decline of presidentialism and financial decentralisation 
has triggered a new dynamic of subnational politics in Mexico: Political autonomy, 
increasing financial capabilities, and relatively weak systems of checks and balances 
have bolstered the power of state governors and municipal presidents. The academic 
research of the post-transition political system in Mexico must include the study of 
these new players who were formerly ignored by the field of political science.
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II. Purpose of the Research
The President's untrammelled powers were not compatible with Mexico's new 
political system. The present research starts with the observation that accountability 
and decentralisation interacted with other factors to create a new basis of political 
stability for an emerging multiparty political system. Free and fair local elections 
produced a new breed of regional leaders who owed their political triumphs not to 
their relationship with the Federal Executive, but to their success at the polls. 
Decentralisation of expenditure acknowledged the political power of state governors 
who were not subordinated to the President's will. This research will demonstrate 
how, why, and with what results budget accountability and expenditure 
decentralisation were both institutional consequences of Mexico's transition to 
democracy.
As a result of expenditure decentralisation and a President with limited powers, state 
governors emerged as new central actors in the political arena. In some cases, state 
governors reproduced the unaccountable powers of the former presidentialism. Weak 
budget accountability at subnational level was an unforeseen consequence of Mexico's 
transition to democracy.
III. The research in the context of the political science literature
Studies of the transition to democracy represent the point of departure for this 
dissertation. Here I will present a general review on the most relevant references in 
the study of Mexico's transition to democracy, which is a strong body of literature. 
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (1965), La democracia en Mexico is an outdated 
monographic study of the former political system, but is one the founding studies of 
political science in Mexico.
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For the study of the presidency from a constitutional and political view, the key 
reference is Jorge Carpizo (1977), El Presidencialismo Mexicano. Carpizo was the first 
to use the term metaconstitutional capabilities o f the President. His research framed 
the analysis and created the basic semantic definitions for studying the Mexican 
Executive. For a biographical perspective of the Mexican Presidency from 1940 to 
2000, Enrique Krauze (1997), La Presidencia Imperial gave one of the few accounts of 
the lives of the men who had occupied the presidency. Jorge G. Castaneda (1999), La 
Herencia gives a first hand account of the Tapado (the covered-one), the unwritten 
prerogative of Mexican president's to appoint (and uncover) his heir. George Philip 
(1992) The Presidency in Mexican Politics provides an institutional framework to study 
the central figure of the Mexican Political System. Jeffrey Weldon (1997), Political 
Sources of Presidentialism in Mexico presents a relevant analysis of the relationship 
between the presidency and the PRI.
As the listing in the previous paragraph suggests, the towering presence of the 
presidency within the political system was mirrored by the attention and interest of 
political scientists in Mexico. The Congress and state powers were seen as merely 
supporting actors within the political system, and therefore the attention given to 
them was a collateral result of the interest in the Mexican presidency. The first 
generation of research on these institutions emerged only a few years ago.
In the study of the Mexican Congress from a perspective of political science, the work 
of Alonso Lujambio (1995), Federalismo y Congreso en el cambio politico de Mexico 
opened a new field of research on the Legislative Branch. Lujambio highlighted the 
need to broaden the field of political science studies beyond the presidency. Ugalde 
(2000:2) stated in his literature review of the Mexican Congress that, with the 
exception of "legal and historical analyses, bibliography on the topic was almost 
nonexistent." For Lujambio (1995), there was a "systematic neglect" of the study of the 
legislative branch at the state and federal level. The title of Ugalde's book The Mexican 
Congress: Old Player, New Power reflected succinctly the novel condition of the
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legislative branch in Mexico. Ugalde's book did for the Mexican Congress what Jorge 
Carpizo had accomplished twenty years earlier with his categorisation of 
Presidencialismo Mexicano. Ugalde's research is a comprehensive study of the evolving 
role of the Mexican legislature, from a passive accomplice of the presidency to the 
centre of power in Mexican politics.
However, Ugalde's book was published in 2000, just a few months before the 
enactment of the law that restructured the Supreme Audit Institution as an agency of 
the Chamber of Deputies. The creation of the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion has 
strengthened the audit capacity of the Congress over the Executive. This thesis follows 
up on Ugalde's research into the new oversight capabilities of the legislative branch, 
focusing on the new role of the ASF. A comparative study of the Ministry in charge of 
the internal audit of the Executive and the ASF shows how some of the institutional 
designs of the former regime survived the transition to a new political system (chapter 
2 ).
Within the field of political science, the study of state executives suffered the same 
fate as studies of other institutions, apart from that of the presidency. Research that 
takes state governors as its subject of study is rare indeed. In the words of Diaz 
Cayeros (2003:1) "most of a half-century's research on Mexico suggested that all 
politics was national." If state executives were overlooked by political scientists, local 
congresses met with even greater neglect. A recent exception to this rule is El Poder 
Legislativo Estatal en Mexico (State's Legislative Power in Mexico), edited by Robert 
Balkin (2004), the first broad institutional analysis of state congresses in Mexico. I 
wrote the accountability chapter of Balkin's book La rendicion de cuentas a nivel local 
(Accountability at local level), based on findings and ideas from the study reported 
here. This dissertation focuses on federal and state institutions that thus far had 
eluded political research in Mexico. Decentralisation and accountability provide 
excellent lenses through which to study the interaction of the constitutional President 
with a divided Congress and state governors. Decentralisation was the result of a
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diverse combination of forces, upon which the dual pressure exerted by the Congress 
and the state governors played a relevant role.
The study of budget accountability offers a platform from which to analyse the legal 
and institutional diversity of subnational political systems in Mexico. In his study of the 
methodology of subnational comparative analysis, Snyder (2001:94) affirms: 
"Processes such as democratisation and economic reform often have varied effects 
across the territorially-defined subunits of a political system (...) the subnational 
comparative method makes it easier to see this within-nation variation, it contributes 
to a more adequate description of complex processes of change." Through the study of 
budget accountability, this dissertation provides a case study to support Snyder's 
claims on the varied effects of democratisation across the territorially-defined subunits 
of a country or a political system. The institutional diversity of Mexico subnational SAIs 
shows the varied effects of democratisation on subnational accountability. If the 
weaknesses and strengths of budget accountability are a by-product of the 
democratisation process, this research reveals the unevenness (O'Donnell, 1999:139) 
of democratic change in Mexico.
The difficulty of obtaining homogeneous data from the 31 states and the Federal 
District has limited the sample of subnational comparative studies in Mexico. There are 
several studies that apply subnational comparative methods to analyse the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation, although the sample is restricted to a limited number of states. 
Martinez (2003:236) used a sample of 12 states to review the powers of local 
congresses over municipal governments. Cabrero and Carrera (2000) used three 
anonymous states to measure the institutional capacities of fiscal authorities at 
subnational level.
The results of the surveys (chapter 5) are the first academic effort to measure the 
institutional capabilities and the legal design of budget and accountability institutions 
in Mexico. Although decentralisation increased the financial relevance of subnational
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governments, budget procedures and legislative audit offices at state level were 
absolutely ignored by previous political science analysis.
Each Mexican state has its own criteria for disclosure or concealment of budget 
information. As late as August 2008, there were no statutory guidelines to determine 
the minimum level of transparency and data that ought to be included in the budget 
decrees. As an example, the budget decree of the state of Baja California Sur for 2008 
contains one single Article, which establishes the total pool of state resources, with no 
disaggregated data to explain how the public money is distributed among various 
expenditures. From reading the budget, it is impossible to know basic expenditure 
information, like the amount of resources allocated to the three branches of 
government, to state pensions, or public debt. In contrast, the state of Aguascalientes 
offers a budget with a totally different legal structure and disclosure policy. In 104 
Articles, the state budget provides detailed financial information of each of the 
government ministries, subsidies and expenditure programs. Naturally, a budget with 
more Articles is not necessarily a more transparent or informative document. 
However, the structure of the two state budgets mentioned above exemplifies the 
heterogeneous composition of state budgets in Mexico.
In order to analyse the diversity of budget information at state level, the thesis 
introduced a Budget Heterogenity and Transparency Index (Bll) for Mexican states. The 
Index presented in chapter 5 is based on an analysis of the actual content of state 
budget documents. The Bll provides evidence that each state government has its own 
methodology and unique standard of classification on how and by whom public money 
is spent. The present study examined the contents of the budgets approved by the 31 
state congresses and the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City for the fiscal year of 
2008.
O'Donnell defined Horizontal Accountability (HA) (1999:38) as the existence of 
institutions "that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to
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take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions... in relation to 
actions and omissions by other (State) agents or agencies." O'Donnell argues that 
weak HA is one of the possible characteristics of young or unstable democracies. 
Following this line of argument, a case study of HA can be framed as post-democratic 
transition research. The SAIs survey and the Bll present original evidence to analyse 
how the local peculiarities of political systems could determine the outcomes of 
Horizontal Accountability institutions in Mexico, specifically in audit and budget 
matters.
The federal status of the Mexican Constitution has been a crucial factor in the outcome 
of the decentralisation process. Shah (1998) and Proud'homme (1995) have underlined 
the risk of a decentralisation process without strong accountability mechanisms. 
Through the Bll and the survey of Mexico's subnational SAIs, the research provides 
empirical evidence to support Shah and Proud'homme's claim that weak financial 
accountability could derail the original purposes of a decentralisation process.
There is a large academic literature on the issue of decentralisation in Mexico. Alberto 
Diaz Cayeros has worked for over ten years on the issues of democratisation, 
federalism and decentralisation. His three chapters in the book Achievements and 
Challenges of Fiscal Decentralisation: Lessons from Mexico, edited by The World Bank, 
give an historical framework to the evolution of Mexico's fiscal federalism. Diaz 
Cayeros and Martinez (2003) offer a wide range of studies of the fiscal, political and 
public policy impacts of decentralisation at the state and municipal level.
Cabrero et. al. (2000) offer a general view of the institutional constraints on fiscal 
decentralisation. Rodriguez (1997,1999) provides a political history of decentralisation 
from the sexenio7 of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) to the first half of Ernesto's 
Zedillo's government (1994-2000). For the political implications of decentralisation 
during the sexenio of Carlos Salinas, the best starting point is Merino (1996). For a
7 Sexenio is the  six-year presidential term .
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comparative analysis of political determinants of decentralisation in Latin America, 
there are the studies of Haggard (1999), Haggard et. al. (1999) and Rojas (1999).
Despite the robust body of academic literature about the process of decentralisation, 
there is no academic research on the institutions in charge of the audit and oversight 
of federalised funds in states and municipalities. Most studies have focused on the tax 
revenue implications of the process for the three levels of government. However, 
there are no empirical or theoretical analyses that have used budget accountability as 
one of the factors influencing the success of decentralisation in Mexico.
IV. Budget Information Index and the research method
Academic research on budget information and accountability in Mexico is a novel 
exercise. The secrecy of budget data was one of the unwritten prerogatives of the 
President. The lack or non-existence of disaggregated data over government 
expenditure was additional evidence of the preeminence of the Executive over the 
Legislative branch. Budget information was inaccessible not only to citizens and 
academic researchers, but also to members of the opposition in the Congress. Until 
1997, when the PRI was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies elections, the Executive 
did not have any legal or political incentives to disclose budget information. As other 
democratic deficiencies of Mexico's political system, the absence of budget 
transparency at federal level spilled over to state and municipal authorities.
Until a few years ago, it was impossible to construct a budget transparency index at 
national or subnational level, because there was not enough information to design the 
ranking. The emergence of multiparty representation in federal and state congresses 
promoted different degrees of openness in budget transparency, which allowed the 
first steps of research on the topic.
One of the pioneer studies was the 2002 Latin American Budget Transparency Index 
(LABII) (Hoffbauer & Guerrero), which focused on national government budgets in five
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countries of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). The initiative 
studied the opportunities for citizen participation, ensuring adequate accountability 
and offering accessible and timely information to the public. The 2002 LABII was 
divided into two parts: a survey that was conducted in the five countries and a study of 
the legal framework for the budget processes in each country. The 78 questions of the 
survey were distributed among 792 continental experts and key users of budget 
information, with 320 of them responding. The survey asked about the expert's 
perception of budget transparency in his country. Then the sample of experts gave a 
grade to measure the budget transparency on a scale from 0 to 100. One of the 
shortcomings of the Index is that the methodology is not based on the original sources, 
which are the budget decrees, but on the opinions of consumers of budget 
information. The LABII had the merit of highlighting the problem of the absence of 
budget information, but it is a perception index and not a measurement of the actual 
contents of budget documents.
The lack of access to state information made it difficult to further research the budgets 
of Mexico's subnational authorities. However, by 2001, most of the states had their 
budget decrees for that fiscal year on the Internet sites of the local Congress or the 
state government. This unprecedented accessibility to budget information allowed me 
to make the first effort to create a benchmark for budget heterogeneity and 
transparency at state level in Mexico. To measure the diversity of the information 
provided in state budgets, I designed the Budget Information Index (Bll).
For the construction of the Bll, a survey was applied to each state budget. The survey 
was based on the best transparency practices of the 32 budgets. Each state budget 
was read twice. The first reading focused on finding the best disclosure practices of 
state budgets. If a state budget decree presented more detailed information or a 
better breakdown of the financial data, these aspects were used as a benchmark to 
measure the other state budgets. For example, if a state provided detailed information 
about the public resources allocated to finance political parties, that became a
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criterion to measure the rest of the states. The first reading of the state budgets 
allowed me to create a 43 question survey (See chapter 5). Then through the second 
reading, the survey was applied to all subnational budgets for the year 2008.
The questionnaire was divided into ten sections: 1) Legislative and Judicial Branches, 2) 
Autonomous State Institutions, 3) Executive Branch, 4) Subsidies and transfers of State 
Governments, 5) Budget Management, 6) Public Debt, 7) Government employment, 8) 
Municipal governments, 9) Federal transfers and 10) Internet Availability.
In Mexico, state budgets are constructed with varying methodologies. The Bll was 
designed to highlight the different disclosure criteria in each state. The states with the 
higher marks were those that presented clearer and more accessible budget 
information according to the 43 question survey.
In addition, chapter 5 includes the first academic effort to measure the institutional 
capabilities and the legal design of subnational Supreme Audit Institutions in Mexico. 
Although decentralisation increased the financial relevance of subnational 
governments, legislative audit offices at state level were absolutely ignored by political 
science analysis. Before this dissertation, there was no known academic research on 
local accountability institutions in Mexico. The research is based on a 16 questions 
census applied to the 32 subnational legislative audit offices in Mexico. I designed the 
census (See chapter 5) as a tool for assessing the institutional capabilities and 
performance of each SAI. The census is divided into four sections: 1) Budget; 2) Human 
Resources; 3) Audits; 4) Sampling. The census was completed in October 2003.
Despite the fact that institutions in charge of budget accountability in states and 
municipalities were not accustomed to rendering accounts of their performance to 
academic or journalistic research, the questionnaire was answered by 27 out of 32 
subnational SAIs. Additional information about the institutional design of the SAIs was 
obtained through a review of the legal framework of each audit supporting agency of
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the state congresses. The 2003 census is complemented by a new questionnaire sent 
to all SAIs in October 2007 (Pardinas & Rios Cazares, 2008). This new census helped to 
see the evolution of these congressional supporting agencies in the last five years. The 
2007-08 census was based in a 40 question instrument, divided in four sections, and 
was answered by 20 of the 32 state SAIs.
As an additional research tool, 27 interviews were performed with subnational and 
federal public servants. Two former governors, as well as municipal presidents, state 
legislators and public servants of state governments gave their testimony about the life 
of public officials during Mexico's presidentialism. Current and former members of the 
Congress were interviewed about the decisions that led to the creation of the new SAI 
and the decentralisation process. Two former ministers of Finance and three high 
ranking employees of the federal Executive Branch in charge decentralisation and 
budgeting also shared their testimony for this dissertation (See Bibliography for 
details).
V. Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the definition of the 
concept of accountability, with special emphasis in the horizontal and vertical 
accountability concepts coined by Guillermo O'Donnell. The chapter then discusses the 
concepts of good governance and transparency. Every political system, without regard 
to whether or not it is a democracy, has some mechanism where the agents render 
accounts to the principal. In its final part, the chapter then analyses the relationship 
between corruption and two recurring concepts in the dissertation: audit and 
decentralisation. The policy embodiment of concepts like decentralisation or 
accountability has to be analysed in the specific context of Mexico. The meanings and 
implications of these concepts do not travel easily from one country to the other. Their 
significance and purpose are often lost or diffused either in the translation or 
geographical transposition. The conclusion of the chapter highlights the importance of 
using these concepts under a context-specific framework delimited by time and place.
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Chapter 2 is a comparative analysis of the institutions in charge of budget 
accountability at each of the three stages of the spending cycle: prior, concurrent and 
ex-post. The comparative analysis goes beyond an historical perspective of audit 
bureaus, to encompass the current legal frameworks and resources available to 
achieve their oversight mission. The chapter explains how the presidential system 
neglected the development of autonomous audit organisations that would reduce its 
margins of financial discretion. The chapter provides arguments that support the claim 
that the new SAI and the increased congressional capability to oversee the federal 
budget undermined the financial basis of Mexican presidentialism.
Chapter 3 will explain the role of financial decentralisation in the transition to a 
constitutional presidentialism. The first part of the chapter presents the former 
institutional and non-institutional mechanisms used by the Mexican President to 
impose his authority over elected officials at state and municipal level. Discretionary 
management of budget transfers was a critical instrument in bending the autonomy of 
subnational governments to the President's will. The emergence of highly competitive 
local elections and the presence of authorities from parties other than the PRI changed 
the power relationship between the President and these subnational authorities. This 
new relationship between levels of government needed a new framework for the 
distribution of financial transfers to states and municipalities. The new rules to 
decentralise federal funds required increased accountability concerning the amounts, 
timing and conditions of such transfers. The decentralisation of expenditure forced the 
federal Executive to render "accounts" to subnational governments.
Democratisation and decentralisation led to the unprecedented political and financial 
sovereignty of states and municipal governments. For the first time, governors owed 
their political power to the polls and not to their personal relationship to the 
president. Moreover, the financial stability of state treasuries did not depend on the
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political will of the federal government. With these changes, state governors began to 
pursue their own political agendas without regard to presidential priorities.
Chapter 4 will analyse how the increased transfers of funds to states and municipalities 
fostered a decentralisation of clientelism. In the former political system, the President 
had the authority and the purse to mobilise clienteles at national level. Stronger 
mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability over the presidential role limited 
its patronage over multiple clienteles. As the constitutional presidency decentralised 
the resources that founded its patronage, governors and municipal presidents took 
political advantage of this change, creating new local versions of political clientelism.
After the end of presidentialism, the areas in the Executive's absolute control had to 
be replaced by institutional mechanisms of decision. In chapter 4, the conflicts over 
the budget negotiation during the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) showed that 
the absence of institutional replacements for the decision making process became a 
casus belli between the government and the opposition. An analysis of the state 
spending behaviour in infrastructure and bureaucracy payroll will support the claim 
that without adequate institutions for financial accountability at local level, the 
decentralisation process does not necessarily lead to efficiency gains in public 
expenditure.
A comparative analysis of Mexico's fiscal framework shows a contrast between the 
centralisation of taxation responsibilities in the federal government and the 
decentralisation of expenditure controlled by state and municipal authorities. 
Although the decentralisation process treated all Mexican states as legal equivalents, 
there were wide disparities in administrative infrastructure and institutions to ensure 
accountability. A survey of the capacities and design of subnational Supreme Audit 
Institutions, with an 85% rate of response, provided empirical evidence to show the 
unevenness of Horizontal Accountability institutions in Mexican States. An Index of
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State Budget decrees will provide further elements to show the heterogeneous nature 
of subnational financial accounts.
In chapter 5, the SAI survey and the Bll aim to provide evidence showing that the 
modernisation of accountability institutions at the federal level has not trickled down 
homogenously to subnational governments. The chapter finishes with an explanation 
of a recent trend to re-centralise the capability to homogenise budget procedures at 
subnational level, through new legislation promulgated by the federal Congress. 
Decentralisation and financial accountability gave political stability to Mexico's 
emerging multiparty political system. This new normative structure created an 
institutional replacement for the unwritten rules that gave the President centralised 
and uncontrolled powers. However, this created new challenges at subnational level. 
Some states and municipalities are working democracies, with free and fair elections, 
but with no Horizontal Accountability to check the power of governors and municipal 
presidents.
&
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CHAPTER 1 DEMOCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
By pushing to its utmost extent the accountability o f governments to the people, 
you indeed take away from them the power o f prosecuting their own interests at the expense o f the 
people by force, but you leave to them the whole range and compass o f fraud.
John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, 
Volume 1, Appendix, p. 467. 
Originally published in the London Review, 
July and October 1835.
The first chapter presents the theoretical and semantical debate regarding the definition of 
three vague concepts, which are used throughout the dissertation: accountability, good 
governance and transparency. In this chapter I will emphasise that the use of these three  
concepts should be framed into a context determ ined by geographical location and a specific 
point in tim e, as their meanings can change from country to country and from one historical 
period to another. The semantic definition of accountability becomes relevant due to the risk of 
being lost in translation, as the concept has multiple meanings in Spanish.
The chapter proceeds to the analysis of the concept of Horizontal Accountability coined by 
Guillermo O'Donnell. As the dissertation studies the evolution of the institutions for budget 
accountability in Mexico, O'Donnell's term  provides a point of reference. In further chapters, I 
argue that the concept of Horizontal Accountability has to take into account the de facto  
practices of the political system that might produce wide variations in the enforcem ent of 
accountability rules. O'Donnell acknowledges that the understanding of political dynamics of a 
new democracy requires "keen awareness of both the formal and the informal codes" (1999:3).
The second part of the chapter explores the interaction between accountability and 
decentralisation as tw o components of the boarder notion of good governance. The legitimacy 
of the decentralisation process in Mexico was grounded on the premise that it promotes
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efficiency gains in the allocation of public expenditure. The disenchantment with previous 
centralised modes of governance, like Mexico's presidentialism, drove the tendency toward  
greater decentralisation. Along the dissertation, I contend that in Mexico's case, 
decentralisation brought its own disenchantments. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005:5) argue 
that the political context has a strong influence in the outcome of decentralisation. The context 
of subnational politics in Mexico, with dysfunctional mechanisms for checks and balances, 
created a new breed of unaccountable authorities in the figure of state governors. Mexico 
provides evidence that efficiency gains on public expenditure could be hampered, by both 
excessive centralisation during presidentialism and by decentralisation with fragile institutions 
for Horizontal Accountability.
1.1 Defining Accountability
Accountability is a word with no exact translation in Spanish. In a glossary of terms from a World 
Bank (2002:17) document1 accountability is translated as accounting. At a conference in Mexico 
on corruption, one presenter defined the concept as responsabilidad (responsibility), while the 
next speaker preferred the term  rendicion de cuentas (rendering of accounts).2 The concept is 
so foreign to the language and the culture itself that two out of the three most influential 
dictionaries of political science published in Spanish do not have an entry for it.3 This is not 
unique to Spanish. Dubnick (1998:68-69) concluded that several of the Romance languages 
(French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese) lack an exact translation of the term . Japanese and 
Hebrew simply adopted the word accountability directly from the English, because a direct 
translation is lacking.
1 W o rld  Bank, C o m m ittee  On P aym ent And S ettlem en t Systems (CPSS), Glosario de Term inos U tilizados en los 
Sistem as de Pagos y Liquidaciones, (2 002 :17 ).
2 C onference: "El C om bate  a la Corrupcion En M exico : i im p e ra t iv o  Etico-Jurldico o Persecucion Politico?"  th rough  
In te rn e t: h ttp ://w w w .c d d ip u tad o s .g o b .m x /P O L E M E X /c p l/p u b licac io n es /m em _cp l.p d f, consulted August 1st 20 05 .
3 Th ere  is a re feren ce  to  th e  te rm  accountab ility  in A, Serra-Rojas, Diccionario de ciencia po litico , (M exico: U N A M -  
FCE 1998). H o w ever n e ith e r, Bobbio, N. and M atteu cc i, N ., D iccionario de po litico , (M exico: Siglo XXI, 2 0 0 0 ), nor 
B aca-O lam endi, L., Lexico de la po litico, (M exico: FLACSO-FCE, 2 0 0 0 ) have an en try  fo r  th e  te rm .
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Few political concepts are subject to such confusion (Uhr, 1998:50). In the English language, 
there is a robust and expansive academic literature that seeks to fram e a practical and 
theoretical definition of this "chameleon word. 4 The task is not easy, as Schedler (1999:13) 
shows: "(D)o we know what (accountability) means? Are we clear about its semantic boundaries 
and do we comprehend its internal structure? Not surprisingly, my answer is no: due to its 
relative novelty, accountability represents an unexplored concept whose meaning remains 
elusive, whose boundaries are fuzzy and whose internal structure is confusing."
One of the sources of the confusion is that the concept has a long list of imperfect synonyms. In 
academia and politics, accountability may be used to mean financial accountability (Bardach & 
Lesser, 1996:1), ethics (Kearns, 1996) or responsibility (Day & Klein, 1987:1). Answerability 
(Schedler, 1999:14; Starling, 1986:123) and punishment (Behn, 2001:3) are the tw o most often- 
cited characteristics of this ambiguous term . As Schedler (1999:14) explains, accountability is 
distinguished by a double meaning: answerability, or the obligation of public officials to inform  
and explain what they are doing; and enforcement, or the capacity of accountability agencies to 
impose sanctions on the holders of power who violate their public duties.
1.1.1 Accountability as Answerability
Accountability is an "agreed language or currency o f discourse about conduct, performance and 
the criteria that should be used in assessing them " (Day & Klein, 1987:2). This language can be 
classified in three categories 1) the right to address questions; 2) the obligation to give answers 
that explain and justify the conduct and/or results; and 3) the expectations of behaviour based 
on norms and habits of what constitutes an acceptable performance. Schedler (1999:15) 
distinguishes tw o kinds of currencies o f discourse (Day & Klein, 1987:2) to structure the answers 
provided by the government: 1) data or hard facts (the informational dimension) and 2) 
justifications for "the validity and reason to take a certain course of action" (the argumentative 
dimension). As an example of the informational dimension, financial accounts are presented
4 Day and Klein (1 9 8 7 :1 ) w e re  th e  first to  use this analogy w ith  th e  an im al kingdom .
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according to pre-established expectations or standards of disclosure, professional accuracy and 
classification. The argumentative dimension of accountability is constructed through narrative  
accounts that explain and aim to legitimise the course taken by decision-makers. For Schedler 
(1999:14) the "notion of answerability indicates that being accountable to somebody implies 
the obligation to respond to nasty questions and vice versa, that holding someone accountable 
implies the opportunity to ask uncomfortable questions." Responsiveness is a consequence of 
the accountability interaction between institutional structures (Ferejohn, 1999:131). 
Responsiveness, as a capacity to answer questions, is a measure of how much accountability an 
institution allows. In government, accountability is a process that asserts a form  of control over 
departments and agencies, causing them  to give an answer for their actions (Dye & Stapenhurst, 
2000:1).
Day and Klein (1987:34) distinguish between accountability and answerability, with the form er 
implying an authority-subordinate relationship and the latter assuming a vaguer and less 
hierarchic connection. To illustrate their point, they use the example of British civil servants who  
are accountable to the ministers, but are not required to answer directly to the Parliament. The 
House of Commons can directly punish ministers, but cannot do the same to civil servants. 
Accountability implies a hierarchical relationship where the subordinate might be subject to a 
certain degree of punishment.
1.1.2 Accountability as Risk o f Punishment
In an accountability relationship, the principal has the option of punishing the agent. Academic 
literature on democratic accountability has been influenced by the agency model (Ferejohn, 
1999:134). The very meaning of accountability suggests that an agent has done what he has 
been told to do, whether well or badly (Mansfield, 1982:61). Accountability means that those 
results of the agent that do not match the expectations of the principal will lead to the  
imposition of sanctions (Behn, 2001:3-4; March & Olson, 1995:165). Accountability actors do
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not simply ask questions but also punish improper behaviour. The wrong answers bring the  
possibility of sanctions (Schedler, 1999:19), yet in a democracy, punishment can vary from  
public humiliation to impeachment or electoral defeat. When the agent is politically 
accountable, the principal might hold him responsible for past performance and in consequence 
offer him the reward or punishment of the electorate. In this case, the principals are the voters 
and the agents are their elected officials.
1.1.3 Empirical Definitions o f Accountability
The academic literature reviewed above aims to construct a semantic definition of 
accountability, but other authors have searched for its meaning based on its practical 
applications in the design and performance of private and government institutions. Dubnick and 
Romzek (1998:6) established the existence of "at least" four accountability systems, depending 
on the different types of performance expectations:
1) Hierarchical Accountability emphasises the performance expectations of a higher official 
over the tasks and achievements of a subordinate. Bureaucrats are responsible for 
following the rules with regard to their office. Internal enforcement is embedded in the 
hierarchical structure and the bureaucratic procedures within the organisation. Here, the  
accountability relationship occurs without the intervention of external actors.
2) Legal Accountability is the respect of the legal frameworks that confine the actions of 
officials. The enforcement of legal accountability is imposed by institutions outside of 
the monitored agency.
3) Political Accountability consists of the expectations placed upon elected officials and 
public servants by citizens, pressure groups or market forces. In this sense, elections are 
an accountability test for the elected officials and their political parties.
4) Professional Accountability emphasises the individual responsibility of the administrator 
or manager who has some degree of discretion to perform his or her tasks. A set of 
professional norms should guide and limit the alternatives and decisions taken by 
managers.5
5 For Day and Klein (1 987 :19 ), professions are  a type o f QUA N G O  (Quasi N o n -G o vern m en ta l O rganisation) "w hich  
are collectively gran ted  th e  m ono po ly  rights o f practice in re tu rn  fo r  policing th e  co m p eten ce  o f its m em bers."
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While Dubnick and Romzek created categories to define the relationships between 
accountability holders (principals^ and accountability holdees6 (agents) in terms of performance 
expectations, Robert Behn analysed the concept according to the aims of the oversight process. 
Behn (2001:6) distinguishes three different kinds of accountability objectives:
1) Financial accountability is the most elemental form of accountability: W ho spends the 
public's money? How is it spent? W hat is the objective of the expenditure? These have 
been the questions asked in financial audits since the times of Ancient Greece.
2) Accountability fo r fairness refers to the expectation that the behaviour of public officials 
must follow ethical patterns. These assumptions of fairness are transformed into laws 
and norms that regulate the conduct of elected officials and bureaucrats. Behn's 
accountability fo r  fairness is almost identical to the legal category coined by Dubnick and 
Romzek (1998:6). According to Behn, this legal fram ework sets the standards that each 
democratic society expects from its authorities. Kearns (1996:69) adds that standards of 
legal accountability are formally codified and enforced. The enforcem ent is usually 
carried out by an outside oversight agency with the power to impose sanctions for non- 
compliance on the lower organisation. The enforcement of certain pre-established 
expectations of behaviour, codified in statutes and procedures, is a preventative 
measure against the abuse of power.
3) Accountability fo r  performance audits the results of the government's actions, asking 
how  it achieves these results and w hat the outcomes of its decisions are. This type of 
accountability also attributes those outcomes to the actions or omissions of particular 
individuals and institutions. Accountability fo r  performance combines the oversight of 
financial costs and the actions taken to achieve a given result in order to assess the  
government's outputs.
In The Audit Society, Michael Power (1997:50) characterises four possible operationalisations of 
accountability in accordance to an identical number of audit objectives:
1) Fiscal regularity in the sense of accountability for the properly legal stewardship of 
inputs.
2) Economy as accountability for obtaining the best possible terms under which resources 
are acquired.
3) Efficiency as accountability for ensuring that maximum output is obtained from  the 
resources employed or that minimum resources are used to achieve a given level of 
output/service.
6 Both term s w ere  coined by Behn (2001:2 ).
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4) Effectiveness as accountability for ensuring that outcomes conform to intentions as 
defined in programs.
1.2 The Paradigm of Horizontal Accountability
Contemporary academic literature on the concept of accountability has been strongly 
influenced by two terms coined by Guillermo O'Donnell:
1) Vertical accountability (VA) is exercised by social actors upon state actors (Kenney, 2000:3). 
Its essence is the notion that the governed have the right to choose and remove the people 
in charge of government. The notion of vertical accountability is not limited to electoral 
procedures, but extends to the controls and oversight exercised by other non-state actors 
such as the press and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).
2) Horizontal accountability (HA) is applied within the state sphere by a network of "relatively 
autonomous" state institutions that can call into question and enforce punishment upon 
other state actors. In O'Donnell's words (1999:38) HA implies the existence of institutions 
"that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that 
span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions and 
omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that might be qualified as unlawful." HA 
refers to relationships among state agents with unequal powers, but also a degree of mutual 
autonomy (Schedler, 1999:26).
The Cartesian model of vertical and Horizontal Accountability overlaps with the concept of the  
accountability environment, defined by Kearns (1996:29) as a "constellation of forces —  legal, 
political, sociocultural and economic —  that place pressure on organisations and the people 
who work in them to engage in certain activities and refrain from engaging in others."
Free and fair elections, the crucial component of VA, occur only from  tim e to tim e (O'Donnell, 
1999:30). Peters (2001:1) maintains that after elections are over, there must be other
42
CHAPTER 1 - DEMOCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
mechanisms for holding the government accountable for its actions on a regular basis. Citizen 
suffrage alone is not a guarantee for limiting the power of the government actors. Przeworski 
and Stokes (1999:41) state that retrospective voting, which is based on information of the  
incumbent's past performance, is not enough to induce governments to act responsively. In 
new and well-established democracies, the demands for government accountability share a 
basic assumption: even competitive, free and fair elections are "themselves too weak to 
guarantee a decent government."
John Ferejohn (1999:132) adds three restrictions to the accountability of democratic rule:
1) Elected officials in majoritarian institutions might not be accountable to unprivileged 
minorities.7
2) Institutions of accountability (courts, audit bureaus) operate with different tim e cycles 
from electoral politics, so officials have the opportunity to avoid the consequences of 
accountability at the polls.8
3) Elected officials enjoy a considerable information advantage over the voters, an 
asymmetric relationship between principal and agent that makes the latter 
unaccountable. In consequence, the capability of voters to punish the behaviour of the  
agent is limited.
Elections are indispensable but not sufficient to keep state powers under control (Diamond, 
Plattner, et.al., 1999:2). In several third-wave democracies (Huntington, 1994) electoral 
accountability is diminishing its own effectiveness in restricting government actors. In 
O'Donnell's terms, regimes where elections are held but enforcem ent of HA is weak are defined 
as delegative democracies.9 This kind of regime rests "on the premise that whoever wins 
election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by 
the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term  of office. The 
president is taken to be the embodim ent of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its
7 For R obert B. Reich (1 9 9 0 :7 6 ) "public servants are  accountable no t only to  th e  m ajority  o f vo ters  bu t also to  th e  
m inority , and to  those w h o  do no t vote: children (and) th e  generations y e t un bo rn ."  M arch  and Olsen do no t lim it 
accountab ility  o f go vernm en t to  th e  group o f high ranking officials w h o  lead th e  Executive branch, but also include 
public servants and bureaucrats w h o give m an ag em en t and policy advice to  th e  g o vernm en t.
8 As is de ta iled  in ch apter 3, in M exico  th e re  is no im m e d ia te  re -e lection  to  any e lected  post. The constitu tional 
proh ib ition  o f re -e lection  im pedes th e  possibility o f individual accou ntab ility  o f e lected  officials. O nly th rough  
electing a d iffe re n t political party  can th e  voters "punish" incum bents.
9 The concept shares th e  m eaning o f th e  "elective dictatorship" used by Lord Hailsham  (1 976 ).
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interests" (1999:164). Other state actors like courts and legislatures are "nuisances" and sheer 
impediments to the delegated authority of the Executive.
Zakaria (2003:19-20) expresses similar conclusions in different words: "Across the globe, 
democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through 
referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens 
of basic rights." W hat Zakaria calls illiberal democracies characterised by a weak constitutional 
liberalism resemble O'Donnell's delegative democracies defined by a lack of Horizontal 
Accountability.10
O'Donnell finds that the fragility of HA stems from weak components of the republican and 
liberal traditions in young democracies: "The newer polyarchies... have looked to transplanted 
laws and constitutions to serve as engines of political and economic modernity, sparking 
persistent and often heated debates over the gap thus created between the pays legal and the 
pays reel" (1999a:33). Successful polyarchies (Dahl, 1971:7) are a product, not of the 
importation of constitutional models, but of three historical currents: democracy, liberalism and 
republicanism. The liberal component refers to the idea that there are some rights that should 
be respected even by the state power. The republican component holds that public duty "is an 
ennobling activity that demands careful subjection to the law and the public interest" 
(O'Donnell, 1999a:31).
For O'Donnell, the effectiveness of HA requires the action of state agencies that are authorised 
and willing to control, correct and punish the unlawful actions of other state actors. The 
institutional instruments of HA ought to have legal authority and also ample political autonomy 
from the accountable authorities (O'Donnell, 1999:38). As the following chapters will show, the  
case study of this dissertation underlines the need to consider variations in subnational 
conditions in the study of HA. In Mexican states, equivalent legislations and HA institutions can
10 Zakaria (2 0 0 3 ) places m ore em phasis on th e  concept o f individual liberties and checks and balances, ra th er th an  
on accountab ility  systems.
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produce very different results due to the characteristics of each local political system. The 
informal practices of the political system determ ine the performance of the institutional 
network that constitutes the HA structure. Institutions for HA rarely operate in isolation and for 
O'Donnell, their ultimate effectiveness depends on court rulings.11 This dissertation claims that 
the results of HA institutions are constrained by both de jure  and de facto  mechanisms.
From the de jure  perspective, modern democratic constitutionalism requires elected officials, 
state institutions and even the sovereign citizenry to agree to a chain of "self-binding" 
mechanisms (Diamond, Plattner, et.al., 1999:1) that are implemented through the courts. 
Effective HA is the result of agency networks that include the active com m itm ent of courts to  
enforce accountability. In this sense the decisions of state agents must comply with the law and 
be settled under the constitutional boundaries (O'Donnell, 1999:39). The same set of norms 
that gives these agents political power may also work to punish them .
According to Day and Klein (1987:24), accountability understood as answerability to the courts 
for the lawfulness of government actors has tw o components: First, it is a means of performing 
audits to verify that officials do not surpass their legal authority and that their decision-making 
process respects the rule of law. Second, it makes political power accountable for its respect of 
individual rights. For O'Donnell, achieving a significant degree of accountability requires the  
coordination of several agencies, each of them subject to "divide and conquer" strategies. The 
network of several strong powers, which partially intrude on each other, enhances the  
autonomy of each.
In the horizontal power relationship, the judicial branch is in charge of legal and constitutional 
accountability and the legislative control process audits the means and actions of the Executive 
(Uhr, 1998:181). Modern democracies have two mechanisms for overseeing the people who 
hold government positions: One is through the criminal law system in which rulers and public
11 C hapter 2 w ill analyse h o w  th e  actions o f th e  A u d ito ria  Superior de la Federacion , M exico 's  SAI, have been revoked  
by th e  decisions o f th e  S uprem e Court.
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officials are held and can be prosecuted under explicit rules governing the powers they exercise; 
the other is through the actions of the legislative branch.
In a democratic country, the three basic functions of a legislature are 1) the representation of 
the people's will, 2) the faculty to create, amend, approve, and reject government laws and 3) 
the oversight function with the aim to guarantee that governments execute policies according 
to the consensus of the legislature (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2007:380). The budget cycle, from its 
approval to its oversight, encompasses the three basic functions of the legislature. As I will 
explain in further chapters, one of the main roles of the Mexican Congress in the transition from  
a metaconstitutional presidency was the creation of Horizontal Accountability mechanisms over 
the budget cycle. This dissertation claims that the aim to promote good governance through 
decentralised decision-making must consider the importance of institutions for Horizontal 
Accountability to oversee local governments.
1.3 Defining Good Governance
Referring to the concepts of accountability and democracy, March and Olson (1995:1) 
maintained that both terms have acquired such legitimacy, and have been used so 
indiscriminately, that their meaning has been compromised. The same could be said of the 
concept of governance. Accountability is considered to be a specific component of the boarder 
notion of governance. For Daniel Kaufmann (2003) from the World Bank Institute, external 
accountability is one of the six components of a measure of governance12. According to Schiavo- 
Campo (2007:54), "good governance rests on four pillars: accountability, transparency, 
predictability, and participation."
12 The o th er five co m p on ents  o f governance according to  Kaufm ann (2 0 0 3 ) are: (2 ) political stab ility  and lack o f 
vio lence, crim e, and te rro rism ; (3) g o vern m en t effectiveness; (4 ) lack o f reg u la to ry  burden; (5 ) rule o f law; and (6) 
control o f corrup tion .
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According to the OED, the word governance in English was recorded for the first tim e in 1380, 
almost two centuries earlier than the term  government.13 However, the word became 
uncommon for several centuries, until the last decades of the 20th century when the concept of 
governance was transformed into a global buzzword in the language of public policy. In 1989, 
the World Bank acknowledged that the promotion of development required a reform in the 
system of government: "Although sound macroeconomic policies and an efficient infrastructure 
are essential for the productive use of resources, they alone are not sufficient to transform the  
structure of African economies. At the same tim e major efforts are needed to produce a better 
trained, more healthy population and to greatly strengthen the institutional fram ework within  
which development can take place" (World Bank, 1989:XII).14 The statute of the Bank prohibited 
it to "take political elements into consideration," although the bank started to use the term  
good governance (Fierro, 2003:128) to encompass issues of public administration where it was 
possible to get involved.
The academic efforts to define the word governance emphasise the lack of a precise meaning. 
For Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992:304) it "is not a word that has been used extensively in 
the past by political scientists, but its recent appearance in popular usage has not been very 
rigorous. It has become in many ways both an all-embracing and a vague concept." For 
Doornbos (2004:3) "there has hardly been a consensus as to its core meaning and less and less a 
common idea as to how it should be applied more concretely. Rhodes (1996:652) categorises  
the  te rm  as popular but imprecise.
A limited definition of the term  should consider the contrast between governance and 
government. Governance encompasses "the activity of controlling and steering organisations of 
all kinds," government is applied to "denote the executive of a state" (Hood, 2006:3). The 
challenge of constructing a common ground definition has been complicated by the fact that
13 The OED states th a t  th e  first use o f th e  te rm  governance  as the action o r m an n er o f  governing  occurred in 13 80 . 
The use o f th e  w o rd  g o vern m en t as the  action o f  ruling  was first recorded in 1566.
14 S ub-Saharan A frica: From  Crisis to  Sustainable G row th. A Long-Term  Perspective Study, W o rld  Bank, W ash ing ton  
D.C., USA, 1989  p. xii.
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the use of the concept has been "appropriated" by different professional communities: 
politicians (Stoker, 1998:2), employees of multilateral organisations (Williams & Young, 1994; 
W orld Bank, 1992) and scholars15. Definitions of governance have filtered from  academic 
research and World Bank papers to the speeches of government leaders and professional 
politicians. W ith frequent use in the language of private corporations, Civil Society Organisations 
(CSO) and government, the concept begs for a plural meaning that transcends a single 
institutional context.
Doornbos (2004:3) emphasised the need of a contextual reference point, in the search for a 
definition of governance: "W hat exactly was it supposed to mean? Does it  represent a universal 
concept or does it vary from  context to context and from  one perspective to another? The 
challenge to define the concept of governance is determined by tim e and geography. The 
governance agenda for Mexico in the 1980s was different from its current governance agenda. 
The policies to promote "good governance" in an African country are potentially different from  
the course of action followed to achieve the same goal in a form er Soviet Republic. Therefore 
this other "chameleon word"16 is defined in good measure by a multilayer context determined  
by factors like institutional realm, historical period and country.
The imprecise idea of good governance allowed multilateral institutions to promote a broader 
agenda in the client countries. According to Doornbos (2004:4), the conceptual ambiguity of the  
term  governance might have served a specific purpose. The lack of a clear and precise definition 
helped the World Bank to have a broad list of loan conditions under the vague category of 
"good governance" goals: "an efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal 
fram ework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an 
independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and 
human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press"
15 Since January 1988, th e  p e er-re v iew ed  jo u rn a l Governance, w hich has c o n te n t on public policy and  
adm in istration , has borne th e  t it le  o f this elusive concept.
16 As m ention ed  in previous pages, th e  m e ta p h o r was b o rrow ed  fro m  Day and Klein d e fin ition  o f accountab ility  
(1 987 :1 ).
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(Leftwich, 1993:610). According to this definition, governance is a catalogue of policy objectives, 
more than a set of specific policies. Following this argument, good governance is a wish-list of 
policy outcomes.
During the economic crises of the 1980s in Latin America, multilateral institutions promoted a 
limited agenda focused on economic reform: balanced budgets, privatisation and a contraction 
of state expenditure. These measures helped to gain financial stability, but were not enough to  
promote economic growth or development. Williams and Young (2004) analysed the  
transformation of the World Bank's narrow economic agenda into a wider span of issues, 
encompassed under the umbrella of good governance. The buzzword was a key to broaden the  
scope of issues promoted by the World Bank.
The effort to translate the term  governance into Spanish is similar to the translation of the word 
accountability. The word gobernanza has existed in Spanish since medieval tim es,17 but when 
related to public policy, gobernanza appeared in the Diccionario de la Real Academia de la 
Lengua Espanola18 only in the 2001 edition. Despite its listing in the dictionary, there is still no 
agreem ent on the meaning of the word or even its correct spelling.19 The official bulletin of the 
Spanish translators in the European Union warns that the UN Commission on Global 
Governance, created in 1992, was translated with at least four different meanings.20
17 Sola A m adeu , P unto y Com a n9 6 5 /s e p tie m b re /o c tu b re  de 2 0 00 , th ro ug h  th e  In te rn e t:  
h ttp : //e c .e u ro p a .e u /tra n s la t io n /b u lle tin s /p u n to y c o m a /6 5 /in d e x .h tm , consulted February 20 th 2 0 0 8 .
18 The eq u iva len t o f th e  OED fo r  th e  Spanish language, Diccionario de la R eal A cad em ia  de la  Lengua Espanola  
defines governance  as: "A rt o r  m an n er o f  governing th a t has th e  ob jective o f  achieving econom ic, social an d  
in s titu tio n a l developm ent, an d  p ro m oting  a h e a lth y  equilibrium  b e tw ee n  th e  sta te , civil society a n d  th e  m a rk e t."  
Translation by th e  au th o r.
19 A linguistic organisation w ith  th e  aim  o f de fending  th e  correct use o f th e  Spanish language urged th e  spelling  
go bern anza  as being th e  m ost general. In striking contras t w ith  th e  English language, th e  co rrect spelling o f a w o rd  
in Spanish is th e  sam e in both shores o f th e  A tlantic  Ocean. The Real A cadem ia de la Lengua Espanola sets a 
com m on standard fo r Spanish speakers around th e  w o rld .
20 The fo u r varia tions tran s la ted  back to  English w ere : 1) Com mission on G lobal G overnance. 2 ) Com m ission on 
Global G overnab ility . 3) Com m ission on G lobal G o vern m en t. 4 ) Com mission on G lobal G ood G o vern m en t. Sola 
A m adeu (2 000).
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The emergence of the term  as a multi-lingual concept occurred in parallel with a change of 
perception over the role of corruption in the objectives of the World Bank. In the 1996 Annual 
Meetings of the International M onetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, James Wolfensohn 
placed corruption as a central obstacle to economic developm ent (Kaufmann, 2003:3). During 
Wolfensohn's tenure as World Bank President (1995-2005), corruption in government became 
one of the explanations for the failure of structural adjustment policies (Mallaby, 2004:5). In this 
change of focus within the World Bank, good governance became a by-word for anti-corruption  
policies.
Given its imprecise content and meaning, what is the use of the term  governance in academic 
language? Stoker (1998:2) provides an answer, acknowledging the value of the concept of 
governance, not as a normative theory but as "framework to understand the changing process 
of governing... (which) provides a language and a fram e of reference (that leads) to ask 
questions that might not otherwise occur." For Doornbos (2004:385), good governance, 
transparency and accountability pose as "synonymous bullet points with particular reference to 
financial management. It  seems quite possible therefore that i f  in due course broader notions of 
'good governance' will evaporate, their exit may well coincide with increased emphasis on the 
more tangible issues o f financial accountability...” Regarding this dissertation, the idea of 
governance triggers questions about the evolving process of budget accountability and 
decentralisation under the transformation of Mexico's changing political system.
1.4 Good Governance and Decentralisation in the Mexican Context
For Shah (1998:86), "a strong, responsible and accountable government at the national level is 
critical to the success of decentralisation policies." In the decade when the process of 
decentralisation gathered momentum in Mexico (1988-98), accountability was an attribute  
foreign to the political system. The argument around the country's democratisation 
concentrated on the creation of institutions that guarantee free and fair elections. If the issue of
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accountability was ignored by the democratisation debates, it is not strange that the  
decentralisation process also disregarded it.
The legitimacy of the decentralisation process in Mexico was grounded on the premise that it 
promotes good governance and efficiency gains in the allocation of public expenditure. The 
disenchantment with previous centralised modes of governance, like Mexico's presidentialism, 
drove the tendency toward greater decentralisation. A 1994 study published by the World Bank 
established that out of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 
million, 63 "were embarked on some form of transfer of political power to local units of 
government... The decentralisation now occurring is not a carefully designed sequence of 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of public service delivery; it appears to be a reluctant 
and disorderly series of concessions by central governments attem pting to maintain political 
stability" (Dillinger, 1994:1).
There are conflicting academic responses to the claim that decentralisation promotes good 
governance and serves as a deterrent to corruption. "Some observers view decentralisation as a 
good way to reduce corruption, because it... enhances efficiency in public spending, delivery of 
public services, and welfare by bringing governments closer to the people. However, sceptics 
point to the negative effects of decentralisation on growth and the high incidence of corruption 
in local governments (Bagchi, 2007:106)." For Mixin Pei, "Decentralisation may exacerbate 
corruption if it occurs in the context of weak government. When the political authority of the  
government is weak across the board, decentralisation can create independent monopolists 
who have every incentive to maximise the collection of bribery at the local level (2008:38)."
Both optimists and sceptics can find an abundance of specific country studies21 that might 
support or contradict their claims over the benefits or ills of decentralisation. Bardhan and
21 Jin, Q ian and W eingast (1 999 ) m aintain  th a t decentralisation  c o n trib u te d  to  econom ic g row th  in m odern  China. 
W ad e  (1 9 9 6 ) re lates decentralisa tion  to  th e  perfo rm an ce im p ro ve m e n t o f irrigation  services in Korea. On th e  o th e r  
hand, Tapales (2 0 0 1 ) addresses th e  risk th a t decentra lisa tion  can expand th e  op p o rtu n ities  fo r  co rrup tio n .
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M ookherjee made a comprehensive literature review of different case studies and concluded 
that "decentralisation seems to have different effects in different countries (2005:5)." They 
claim that the outcomes of decentralisation may be highly context-specific. The discussion in 
chapter 6 of this dissertation will claim that the effects of decentralisation can have uneven 
governance outcomes in different regions within a single country.
Decentralisation cannot be reduced to a list of management techniques and policies, because 
"its origins, form and outcomes are powerfully shaped by the political context in which it is put 
into practice" (Rhodes, 2001:157). In academic literature, the concept of decentralisation is 
applied to a wide range of decisions to redistribute revenue and expenditure responsibilities 
among different tiers of government. For the purposes of this dissertation, the concept of 
decentralisation is based on the case of Mexico during the last two decades of the twentieth  
century. Academic literature on Mexico's decentralisation comprises three different topics of 
research:
1) W here decentralisation is understood as a politically-induced process, in which the  
President and the federal authorities are considered to promote a financial and 
administrative redistribution of government responsibilities among the different tiers of 
government, in order to preserve the stability of the political system (Rodriguez, 1997; 
Ward & Rodriguez, 1999).
2) Diaz Cayeros (1995, 2003, 2004) has been the leading scholar in the study Mexico's fiscal 
decentralisation in the context of constitutional federalism. This path of research focuses 
on the evolving fiscal relationship between the federal and subnational governments, 
with regard to taxing and spending responsibilities. Cayeros' work has focused on the  
process whereby subnational governments delegated their taxing authority, creating an 
increasing dependence on financial transfers from the federal authorities.
Klitgaard, et. al. (2 000 ) found th a t Japanese provincial governm en ts  have 15 tim es  th e  nu m b er o f co rrup tio n  cases 
than th e  national g o vernm en t.
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3) Administrative decentralisation analyses the transfer of responsibility of delivering public 
services in areas of education and health from the federal to subnational governments 
(G. Merino, 2003; V. Llerenas, 2004).
These three branches of research on Mexico's decentralisation focused more on the formal 
relationship between federal and subnational levels of government, w ithout a further 
exploration of the accountability infrastructure or administrative capacities of local 
governments. This dissertation will explore a fourth line of research, or in Bardhan and 
Mookherjee's (2005:4) words, it belongs to a 'second generation' literature on federalism, 
which centres its attention on government accountability as a determining factor on the effects 
of decentralisation. The research will use both the political and fiscal approaches to explain the  
interrelation between decentralisation and budget accountability in the emergence of Mexico's 
new political order. National and subnational institutions in charge of Horizontal Accountability 
will be shown to have a crucial role in both the outcome of the decentralisation process and the 
financial demotion of the central figure of the form er political system: the Mexican President.
The backlash against a centralistic and monolithic government has been partly motivated by the 
perception that this concentration of power bred "high levels of rent-seeking, corruption and 
lack of accountability of government officials" (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2005:1). As stated by 
Oates (1998:97), the issue is not decentralisation vs. centralisation. If the decision to transfer 
funds and responsibilities to subnational governments is made for political reasons, the  
question is not "how much to decentralise?" but "how to do it?" (Prud'homme, 1995:24). There 
is a need for sequential reforms and institutional designs that align the expected efficiency of 
decentralisation with the political incentives of subnational authorities. If properly designed, 
decentralisation can produce welfare gains through improved efficiency and increased 
accountability in the provision of public services. If planned and applied poorly, the  
decentralisation process can produce undesirable outcomes such as the growth of bureaucratic 
spending, increased developmental gaps within a national territory, macroeconomic imbalances 
and low quality of public services (Giugale, W ebb et.al., 2000:1).
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Mexico's recent experience provides evidence that efficiency gains on public investment have 
been hampered, both by excessive centralisation of resources during the times of 
presidentialism and by decentralisation with weak mechanisms for Horizontal Accountability. 
For decades, the federal budget was used as a political tool of the President. Now, the 
decentralisation of public expenditure has become a mechanism to appease regional political 
actors.
Further research in the following chapters will contend that one of the flaws in Mexico's 
decentralisation process was the ceding of equivalent responsibilities to states and 
municipalities with asymmetric administrative infrastructures and uneven institutional 
capabilities. The federal nature of Mexico's Constitution imposed a rigid legal structure on the 
decentralisation process. Because the Constitution treats states as equal legal entities, it would 
have been almost impossible to push for a decentralisation process that varies in speed 
according to the level of development of the various states. To tem porarily withhold the  
benefits of decentralisation from some states on the grounds of their weak institutional 
structure might have been constitutionally contestable and politically unsound, despite the 
potential efficiency gains.
As will be detailed in chapter 3, Mexico's policy makers acknowledged the differences between  
the revenue collecting capacities of states and municipalities. As there are wide disparities 
among Mexico's subnational governments, the federal authority absorbed the administration 
and collection of the most important tax revenues. However, in regard to expenditure, the 
decentralisation process treated all states and municipalities as if they had equivalent capacities 
for the management and accountability of public spending. Since the decentralisation process 
was instigated more for political reasons than for efficiency gains, the federal government did 
not acknowledge Mexico's internal diversity in terms of contrasting accountability and budget 
capacities. The admission of institutional disparities among legally equivalent levels of
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government would have added some caution to the speed and intensity of the decentralisation 
process.
As with any other policy instrument, the level of success of decentralisation depends on its 
planning and execution. The incentives inherent in the institutional design of the  
decentralisation process have an impact on the achievement of its policy objectives (North, 
1990:135). The governance gains of decentralisation also depend on the relationship between  
the policy aims and the political objectives of the entire process. Referring to decentralisation 
from a general perspective, Shah has stated (1998:93):
Traditional administrative capacity matters, but it should not be considered an 
impediment to decentralisation. The administrative capacity to develop and maintain 
modern organisational practices such as budgeting, auditing and accounting systems is 
no doubt important. But its absence should not be considered a barrier to 
decentralisation, provided citizen participation and transparency in decision-making are 
ensured. Technical capacity can be borrowed from supportive central governments.
In the case of Mexico, transparency and citizen participation cannot be taken for granted as 
common virtues among the distinct political cultures of each state.22 During the earlier phases 
of Mexico's decentralisation, the federal institutions were in no condition to provide either an 
example or guidance on how to create organisations to ensure budget accountability. The legal 
framework of the budget approval and the creation of technical bureaus for auditing and 
accounting were left to the governors' initiative. Some state executives and congresses were  
willing to learn and adapt the technical capacities of the federal government, while others did 
not invest in building their budgetary and accountability institutions. Tanzi (2000:9-10) 
suggested that decentralisation increases the chances of success if there are functional 
institutions for budget management, tax policies and revenue administration.
22 C hapter 5 w ill concentrate on th e  w id e  disparities in institu tional capacities to  p e rfo rm  budgeting  and auditing  
practices at th e  state  level.
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There is a scarcity of academic research on the different institutional capacities between  
governments with equivalent constitutional status in Mexico (Cabrero, 2000:2). M y research 
contributes to filling this gap, since it analyses the institutional capacities of Mexican states 
regarding two areas of the budget accountability process: the specificity of budget decrees and 
the institutional capacities of subnational Supreme Audit Institutions.
1.5 Corruption and Good Governance
Corruption is frequently assumed to be the nemesis of good governance, accountability and 
transparency. The global NGO Transparency International has institutionalised the term  
transparency as an antonym for corruption. Shaw defines corruption as a symptom of "failed 
governance" (2007:234). Corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain 
(Shah & Schacter, 2004:41). In Robert Klitgaard's formula (1988:75), corruption is equal to the  
sum of monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.
The central focus of this dissertation is not corruption itself. This research focuses on tw o topics 
(budget accountability and decentralisation) that influence the institutional context that can 
curb or nourish corruption. Financial audits performed by Supreme Audit Institutions are a 
component of budget accountability. The following paragraphs will analyse the relationship 
between corruption and the audit process.
1.5.1 Audit and Corruption
Audit is a general and flexible term  that can be used for a massive and detailed inspection of 
financial transactions, or a simple and procedural accounting revision. An audit is a process that 
verifies that financial transactions are executed under certain normative criteria. Michael Power 
(1997:18) differentiates the scope (how many transactions need to be tested?) and depth (what 
kinds of tests must be performed on the transactions selected?) of audit procedures. Regardless 
of the scope and depth of the execution, the term  audit is used to define the examination of 
financial records. In The Audit Society, Michael Power (1997:15) pointed out that the action of
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financial auditing raises demands and expectations over its capacity to expose acts of 
corruption. There is a preconceived idea that audits, and the institutions which practice them, 
work as tools to detect fraud and reduce the impunity of corruption practices.
Power (1997:21) states that the first objective of an audit is to provide an opinion about the 
financial statements, while fraud detection is a secondary objective of the auditors. "The 
detection of management fraud is neither ruled out of the audit process, because this would 
lower expectations to the point where audit might lose its value, nor clearly ruled in, since this 
would unfairly burden the auditor and would make audits much more expensive" (Power, 
1997:25). In the same line of argument, Shah discusses "the difficulty of detecting corruption 
through financial audits" (2007:249). For Dye "the process of corruption is so invisible that it 
leaves little documentary evidence. Despite knowledge of the fact that there is widespread 
corruption in government departments, state audit has not played any effective role to forestall 
it... It is easier to prevent fraud and corruption than to detect it. (2007:304-306)."
The idea that financial audits are a powerful cure against the evils of fraud and corruption is a 
persistent perception of Mexico's media and political system. After the transition to democracy, 
the presence of multiple political parties in Congress and the creation of a new Supreme Audit 
Institution produced the expectation that independent audits would put an end to unpunished 
acts of corruption. When there is a corruption scandal in modern Mexico, the demand for "a 
special audit investigation23" is requested as a magic antidote to restore confidence and 
eliminate impunity. Despite the evidence in recent cases, the word audit still creates the 
perception that corruption can be tam ed with an able army of certified accountants.
23
R ecent exam ples are  th e  P em ex-gate  scandal o f  d iverted  funds fro m  th e  s ta te  o w ned  oil co m p any into th e  PRI 
presidentia l cam paign o f 20 00 , th e  presum ptive inexplicab le en ric h m en t o f th e  step-sons o f P resident Fox (2 0 0 5 -
OS) o r th e  p o ten tia l conflict o f in terest w h en  Juan Cam ilo M o u rin o , M in is te r o f In te rio r in th e  g o vern m en t o f  Felipe  
Calderon M o u rin o  signed a co ntrac t as legal rep rese n ta tive  o f his fam ily  firm  w ith  Pem ex, w h ile  he  was 
U nd ersecretary o f Energy.
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At the end of presidentialism, during the Zedillo administration, there was a lack of trust 
between the traditional PRI establishment and emerging political actors in the opposition 
parties. The existence of the new SAI helped to reduce the political mistrust and the asymmetry 
of budget information between the Executive and the Legislative Branch. SAIs play a major role 
in auditing government accounts and operations and promoting sound financial m anagem ent in 
their governments (INTOSAI:2003). These institutions serve to oversee the credibility of the 
financial information reported by the government (Dye & Stapenhurst, 2000:281). In order to  
create a certain level of assurance over budget accountability, the new political order created its 
own institution in charge of these "rituals of financial verification" (Power, 1997:123). It was not 
clear if the SAI would help to prosecute fraudulent practices of the ancient regime, but it 
brought a sense of trust to a plural Congress, which represented the axis of the new political 
order. Schedler (1999:15) distinguishes tw o kinds of currencies of discourse (Day & Klein, 
1987:2) to structure the answers provided by an accountable government: 1) data or hard facts 
(the informational dimension) and 2) justifications for "the validity and reason to take a certain 
course of action" (the argumentative dimension). Financial accounts are an example of the  
informational dimension. The new SAI had the mission of validating the accuracy of the financial 
data that represented the informational dimension of the Executive answerability. Each 
legislative assembly demands that the inform ational dimension ought to be presented according 
to pre-established expectations or standards of disclosure, accuracy and classification. The new  
SAI helped to create a more stable environment inside a Legislative Branch, threatened by the  
unprecedented experience of a divided Congress. However, the Auditoria Superior de la 
Federacion suffered from an expectation gap over the objective and reach of its constitutional 
task.
Michael Power (1994, 1997) argues that audits create an expectation gap over their capacity to 
prevent fraud. Dye uses similar wording and extends the argument to Supreme Audit 
Institutions (2007:311): "There is a gap between stakeholder expectations and audit mandates 
for SAIs. Traditionally, SAIs have agreed that the primary responsibility for preventing and 
detecting corruption rests with the administrative authorities, such as the police or
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anticorruption agencies. SAIs have not seen fraud and corruption busting as their main goal; the 
approach has been to prevent corruption in the field rather than detecting illegal activities. The 
public, however, believes that SAIs seek to detect fraud and corruption/'
The existence of a well functioning SAI is not a mechanism to prosecute fraud in public 
administration. The purpose of financial audits is to give assurance that the financial statements 
are not misleading and certify that economic transactions occurred in accordance with an 
accounting fram ework (Dye, 2007:312). However, an able and strong SAI promotes an 
accountability environment that can be conducive to reducing corrupt practices. Shah &  
Schacter (2004:41) identify ineffective institutions fo r  accountability as one of the main 
determinants that foster corruption. Audit institutions are one of the mechanisms of Horizontal 
Accountability (Kaufmann & Dininio, 2006:21) and help to promote budget accountability 
through the verification of the quality and credibility of a government's financial records. 
Despite the fact that SAIs are far from being a silver bullet to prosecute and prevent corruption, 
their role in the accountability infrastructure make them  a relevant topic of research from the  
perspective of Political Science and Public Administration.
1.6 Democracy, Accountability and Presidentialism in Mexico
One of the key features of Mexico's presidentialism was the unaccountable privileges of the  
presidential figure over the whole political system. However, as in other non-democratic 
systems, Mexico under presidentialism had its own peculiar mechanisms for accountability. As 
stated by Philip (1992:4): "The principle of presidential authority extends the benefits of non­
accountability to far more junior figures than the president himself. The main thing that these 
juniors have to fear is the wrath of the future president." Even elected officials at the sub­
national level, who according to law were sovereign representatives of the people of states and 
municipalities, rendered accounts to the President. Under the unwritten norms of Mexico's 
political system, the Federal Executive was the accountability holder and the rest of the  
members of the political system were the accountability holdees. Enrique Krauze (1997) titled  
his biographical analysis of Mexican presidents from 1940 to 2000 The Imperial Presidency. His
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choice of words reflects the premise of the book: During the 20th century, the lack of 
accountability of the Mexican presidency was closer to the impunity of an em peror than to the  
answerability of a democratically elected leader. Day and Klein (1987:9) defined power with  
words that could be used to explain the capacities of Mexican presidentialism: the ability to 
demand accounts, to exercise control over performance, whilst at the same tim e to remain 
unaccountable.
Mexico's judicial branch exercised the protection of individual rights through the Amparo, a 
mechanism to protect constitutional guarantees, based on the premise that citizens ought to be 
defended from the excesses of local and federal authorities, including the president himself. In 
practice, the courts were able to enact Amporos against the bureaus within the structure of the  
Executive Brach, as long as these verdicts did not contravene the president's will or affect his 
interests in a direct way. Fix Fierro (1998:2-3) states: "The President of the Republic (enjoyed 
almost absolute dominance) over the two other branches of government and the political 
system as a whole... Thus constrained, it is not surprising the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Judiciary occupied a relatively weak position in the Mexican political arena. Although they 
certainly managed to prevent and correct many violations of citizens' rights by the public 
authorities, at other times, they were unnecessarily deferential to those authorities. In any case, 
the Supreme Court was prevented from fully playing its role as a countervailing power and as 
the ultimate defender of the Constitution."
In addition to political factors, the application of the Amparo has also been constrained by 
judicial technicalities. The percentage of Amparos dismissed by federal district courts, typically 
on the grounds of hyper-technical standards of review or procedural deficiencies 
(improcedencia or sobreseimiento) increased from 54% in 1940 to 73% in 1993 (Kossick, 
2004:29). Furthermore, the Amparo suit has been excluded from protecting citizen rights in 
politically sensitive areas: election results and land distribution through agrarian reform have 
been excluded at one tim e or another (Fix Fierro, 1998:2).
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In an interview for this dissertation, Jorge Carpizo (2008), the author of El presidencialismo 
Mexicano and form er Justice of Mexico's Supreme Court, stated: "The Amparo was highly 
effective and was the only mechanism to protect citizens from the abuse of state governors. 
However, when the Mexican President was very interested in a case, not in a Juan Perez (John 
Doe) case, but in a case like some taxing regulation, then there were pressures or lobbying by 
the Secretario de Hacienda (Finance Minister) with the judges. Generally the lobbing of the  
Secretario de Hacienda achieved its purpose."
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1.6.1 The Congress during Presidentialism
As in the case of the Judicial Power, there were no functional checks and balances in Congress. 
For 70 years, the most relevant bills approved by the Congress w ere drafted in the presidential 
offices, budgets w ere approved overnight w ithout further com ment and year-end accounts 
were not subject to proper audit review. In an interview, Antonio Gershenson, deputy from the 
form er Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico (Unified Socialist Party of Mexico, PSUM) from  
1982-1985 stated: "The President did not influence the Congress, the President decided in the 
Congress. High ranking officials o f the Executive came to the Chamber o f Deputies to determine  
the course o f things" (Gershenson, 2008).
O'Donnell distinguishes tw o main directions in which Horizontal Accountability can be violated: 
the first one consists in the unlawful encroachment by one state agency upon the proper 
authority of another; the second consists of unlawful advantages that public officials obtain for 
themselves and their associates (1999:30). Using O'Donnell's definition, Mexico during the 20th 
Century is a good example of one Power, the presidency, which encroaches on the authority of 
the whole state structure.
In modern democracies, accountability is in most cases a mediated relationship. The 
government officials who implement the policies are not accountable directly to the citizens, 
but to their representatives in Congress.24 The representatives are accountable to  voters to a 
greater or lesser extent, depending on the properties of the electoral system and the state of 
the electoral competition (Laver & Shepsle, 1999:294). In Mexico during the times of the  
presidentialism, electoral competition was extremely limited. The no-reelection clause25 of the  
members of the Congress created an incentive where the professional future of the PRI
24 For M arch  and Olson, (1 9 9 5 :1 5 3 ) in a m odern  dem ocracy, th e  challenges o f accou ntab ility  ex ten d beyond th e  
control o f bureaucrats by public officials and th e  control o f officials by citizens. Organised groups th a t exercise a 
certain degree o f p o w e r (financial m arkets, unions and NGOs) are also subject to  certa in  degree o f accountab ility . 
These groups have procedures fo r accou ntab ility  outside th e  political s tru ctu re  and th e  fo rm al system  o f 
governance.
25 Please re fe r to  ch ap ter 3 fo r additiona l in fo rm atio n  on th e  n o -re -e lec tion  clause.
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legislators depended on their capacity to represent the interests of the party and the President. 
There were no political incentives to effectively mediate the accountability relationship 
between the people and the government.
In a democratic system, it is the people who serve as the principal, or holder of accountability, 
while the agents are the diverse networks of state agencies, bureaucracies and elected officials. 
In the accountability systems of authoritarian regimes, the agents are the same, but it is the  
head of government who has the right to ask accountability questions. As in the case of 
Mexico's presidentialism, the expectations of accountability in a non-democratic regime are not 
always established in the law, but may derive solely from the preferences of the ruler. Poor 
performance or obscure financial accounts can lead to punishment or pardon, depending on the 
outcome that maximises the preferences of non-democratic leaders.
One of the central differences of accountability systems in democratic and non democratic 
regimes are the expectations of transparency. This concept "denotes government according to 
fixed and published rules, on the basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the  
public, and (in some usages) within clearly demarcated fields of activity" (Hood, 2001:863). 
Hood (2006:222) also states that "transparency is closely linked to democratic principles, in that 
democracy is tied to the ability to give public justifications for policies and operations, given the  
bias that can result when decisions are taken for undisclosed reasons."
The concept of transparency is so intertwined with the idea of accountability that often they are 
taken as synonyms (Power, 1994:18). However not all accountability systems are m eant to be 
transparent. In a non-democratic regime, the justifications for budget decisions and their 
outcomes are not necessarily exposed to the scrutiny of the public eye. Mexico's presidentialism  
is an example of non-transparent accountability, where the rendering of accounts occurred 
behind closed doors.
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Rolando Cordera, deputy for the left-leaning PSUM from 1982 to  1985, affirmed in an interview: 
"The Final Draft of the Budget Bill was an exclusive task not o f the Budget Commission but of 
the President of the Commission, (the PRI, deputy) Manuel Cavazos. I have the perception that, 
just by himself, with the help of the Finance Ministry, he drafted the Budget Bill w ithout the  
help of any other member of the Chamber Deputies. Then the draft was sent to the Chamber 
floor (for the final vote), where the PRI had an assured and disciplined majority... Cavazos was 
the man of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Budget M inister from 1982-1987) in the Chamber, and 
Cavazos said what was need to be done in budget matters" (Cordera, 2008).
The attribute of transparency has been dogmatically revered (Collins, 2007; Knorre, 2008) in the  
debates about governance. Its quasi-religious significance created an uncritical acceptance over 
the term  and its practical applications (Hood, 2006:4). However, the critique of the concept 
should take into consideration the habits and traditions o f disclosure26 in each political system. 
As stated by David Heald (2006:59): "at very low levels of transparency, more transparency is 
likely to be beneficial. The trade-offs are most apparent when transparency is already high, in 
which circumstance the direction and variety, not just the amount, of the incremental 
transparency will strongly influence the relationship between benefits and costs."
Following Heald's line of argument, the instrumental benefits of transparency could be 
determined by the starting point of an incremental policy of disclosure. In a long-established 
democracy, with a strong tradition of government accountability, additional demands of 
transparency could lead to frivolous or irrational expectations over what should and w hat 
should not be observed by the public eye.27 In a political system that has recently transited from  
a non-democratic regime, with high levels opacity, the advancement in transparency is a 
positive step. The context of the political system could determ ine the point when the benefits of
26 Disclosure is an oth er English w o rd  th a t does no t have an easy tran slation  in to  Spanish. In som e dictionaries , it is 
translated  as revelacion  (reve la tion ) or a p e rtu ra  (openness). H ow ever, bo th  translations lack th e  specificity o f th e  
w o rd as used in th e  English language o f accounting and co rp orate  governance.
27 The arch itectural b lueprin t o f a high security ja il, a nuclear p lant or th e  p riva te  address o f an elected  official are  
o ften  m entioned as exam ples o f in fo rm atio n  th a t  should be considered co nfiden tia l. See Hood and H eald (2 0 0 6 ) fo r  
a detailed  analysis o f th e  doctrine and o p eratio na lisation  o f th e  idea o f transparency.
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transparency might curve into diminishing returns. During Mexico's presidentialism, the rule 
was to treat government information as confidential and transparency was the rare exception.
The documentation proving the official results of 45% of the polls in the 1988 presidential 
election was never made public (Aziz & Molinar, 1990:165). The exam results of the Mexican 
students who had participated in a global test on math and science were treated as 
confidential28. The official reserves of the Central Bank were published randomly29. In an 
Interview, Sergio Aguayo, civil advocate for government transparency, remembers the first 
struggles to promote government transparency: (In the Salinas' government) "I requested an 
organisational chart of the president's office, but the request was refused and the information  
was treated as confidential... It was impossible to get hold of a complete version of the Federal 
Budget, the opposition parties just received a concentrated version which censored most of the  
government's financial information (Aguayo, 2008)."
Regarding budget accountability during the times of presidentialism, there was an information  
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970) between the State Branches. The Executive had the discretion of 
sharing or withholding financial information with the Congress and the subnational 
governments. The first demands for increased transparency in financial matters came not from  
the citizenry or NGOs, but from deputies and governors who wanted to know the amounts 
apportioned to certain budget lines.
28 In 1995 the  in ternation al organisation Association fo r th e  Evaluation o f Educational A ch ievem en t (IEA) eva lua ted  
th e  M exican educational system am ong fo rty  o th e r  countries. M exico  was th e  w o rs t in fo u r categories and th e  next 
to  last in an o th er tw o . A fte r th e  results, th e  M exican  au tho rities  o f education asked to  th e  IEA no t to  publish th e  
results, M exico was th e  only country  appearing  as partic ip an t w ith o u t any place in th e  ranking. N evertheless th e  
new spaper R eform a  got th e  results in 20 01  and m ade th e m  public (R efo rm a , 15 -X -200 1 ). In a press in terv iew , 
M iguel Limon, M in is ter of Education during th e  Zedillo  ad m in is tra tion , argued th a t th e  results w e re  no t disclosed in 
ord er not to  discourage M exican teachers (R eform a, 16 -X -200 1 ).
29 One o f th e  requ irem ents o f th e  cred it given to  M exico  by th e  US go vern m en t a fte r  th e  "Tequila Crisis" w as to  
publish regularly th e  in ternation al reserves o f th e  Central Bank. This requ isite  w as o f especial in te res t to  th e  d o no r  
because one o f th e  causes o f th e  crisis was th a t basic m acroeconom ic in fo rm atio n  was obscure and secret. 
Especially, the  hidden in form ation  o f th e  in tern atio n a l reserves ve iled th e  real capacity o f th e  M exican  g o vern m en t 
to  support th e  pegged exchange rate . Before th e  a g re em e n t, Banxico  published th is in fo rm atio n  on ly th re e  tim es  a 
year: at th e  beginning o f th e  year, during its annual rep o rt (in April) and fo r  th e  S tate  o f U nion address. Since 19 95  
th e  Central Bank reserves have been disclosed on a w ee k ly  basis.
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Some of the institutional changes in the budgetary process were aimed at a reduction of the  
information asymmetry between the Executive and the Congress. W ith limited access to  
financial data and information by the Legislative Power, the budgeting checks and balances 
were just hollow and formal procedures. Accountability aims to increase transparency through 
demanding answers that provide information and justifications of governmental actions 
(Schedler, 1999:14).
Accountability requires institutions in charge to ask specialised questions (Norm anton, 1966), 
because the very essence of accountability requires that the initiative must be taken by the 
questioners (March and Olsen, 1995:150). The legislature is the institution with the main 
responsibility of questioning the government. W ithout the right to ask uncomfortable questions 
or minimum access to government information, the Mexican Congress was not able to enforce 
its role as an institution for Horizontal Accountability.
1.7 Conclusion
The present chapter focuses on three concepts: accountability, good governance and 
transparency. Each of the three concepts shares the lack of an unequivocal meaning that would 
end all debate about its semantic definition and theoretical content. Hood asks (2006:19): 
"W hat was it that made 'transparency' apparently so attractive as a ruling idea across so many 
domains of governance in the late twentieth century and w hat explains its diffusion to 
saturation point as an international catchword over the past tw enty years or so?" If we take the 
word 'transparency' from Hood's question and replace it with the term  'accountability/  the 
inquiry will remain as compelling. One possible answer to the transcendence of those concepts 
across policy domains and international boundaries is their adaptability  to multiple 
circumstances determined by functionality, tim e and space. This capacity to morph in various 
political, ideological and national contexts could also explain the difficulty of finding a definitive 
meaning for these trans-national concepts.
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The use of terms like accountability, good governance and transparency should come with a 
contextual warning label. The words can travel from one continent to the other; however their 
meanings change along with the country, the historical period or the political regime. In his in- 
depth study of the "audit explosion in Britain," Michael Power highlights the importance of 
framing accountability analysis in specific national contexts: "...it must be borne in mind that the  
institutional landscape of public sector auditing has a long and diverse history in different 
countries, as long as preoccupations with political accountability itself. Indeed, it is this 
admixture of administrative and political themes which makes the conception and the practice 
of public sector audit so varied and which locates the construction of an agreed language of 
performance for auditing within distinctive national contexts (1997:45)."
The meaning of accountability is not the same in a developed liberal democracy as in a young 
democratic system. W hat is perceived and punished as corruption in country A may be perfectly  
legal and morally permissible in country B (O'Donnell, 1999:43), and what counts as 
accountability in one country might mean opacity in another. In countries with strong federal 
systems or large territories, the practice and enforcem ent of accountability can change from  
one region to the next. The practices of accountability differ among contemporary political 
systems that are diverse in terms of their norms and institutional designs. The present research 
will focus on the Mexican institutions in charge of budget accountability at the national and sub­
national level to answer the question of what accountability looks like at a particular period of 
time (1997-2007).
The title of a book by Day and Klein (1987), Accountabilities, suggests that accountability 
manifests itself in multiple forms. Through a study of public services performance in Britain 
during the 1980s, the authors tried to clarify the concept by exploring its "perception and 
practice in a variety of settings." In this sense, the theoretical framing of the concept is 
supported by an "empirical context." Day and Klein aimed to translate the concept of 
accountability "in its various meanings, into effective reality... limited in its geographical setting,
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at one point in time." (1987:2). The present research has a similar intent —  namely, to define 
budget accountability in the context of a political system in times of flux.
&
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CHAPTER 2 -  FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN MEXICO
"Some officials handle large sums o f money: 
it is therefore necessary to have other officials to receive and examine the accounts.
These inspectors must administer no funds themselves. 
Different cities call them examiners, auditors, scrutinizers and public advocates."
Aristotle, quoted by Day and Klein (1987:9)
"The anti-corruption institutions in Mexico punish the fools who ignore the bureaucratic technicalities,
but not the crooks that use the positions fo r personal gain."
Ministry of Finance Official
One of the pillars of Mexico's political system, during the 20th Century was a Congress 
subservient to the Executive. The President's rule over the PRI reinforced his command over the  
will of deputies and senators. When the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, 
a new political system emerged from the ballot box. Each political order creates mechanisms to 
control the behaviour of civil servants (Hood & Peters, 2004:130). The emerging political system 
demanded new accountability mechanisms for the President and the whole structure of the  
Federal Government.
The accountability outcomes of the 1997 election undermined the arbitrary financial power of 
Mexican presidentialism. The Congress adopted its new role as an enforcer of budget 
accountability. The new accountability mechanisms reduced the President's ability to allocate 
the federal budget according to discretionary criteria. The plural Congress demanded a new  
Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) with the support of the multiple political forces. The creation of 
a modern SAI was one step of an unprecedented political experience: the rendering of accounts 
of the President and the whole Executive structure to an empowered Legislative Branch. 
However, some institutions of the previous political order manage to adapt to the new  
circumstances of a young democracy. The new SAI had to coexist with the Secretario de la
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Funcion Publica, the internal comptroller and the bureaucratic watchdog at the service of the  
President.
Chapter 2 provides an historical analysis of the institutions in charge of internal and external 
budget oversight in Mexico. These institutions evolved as a consequence of the changes in the  
political system. The chapter analyses the transformation of accountability institutions before 
and after the hegemony of presidentialism. The decline of presidentialism produced a series of 
changes in the budget cycle that lead to increase accountability of the Executive towards the  
Legislative Branch.
2.1 Accountability in times of political change
The emergence of a Congress with real capability for checking and balancing transformed 
Mexico's political system. One of the consequences of this transformation was a redesign of the  
budget cycle, from its approval to the ex post audit of funds performed by the Auditor/a 
Superior de la Federacion. Accountability systems can be seen as a set of relationships among 
state institutions. In this sense, the temporal, geographical and political contexts change the  
relationship among state institutions, and in consequence affect the whole accountability 
process.
After seven decades of single party rule, the decline of trust in political leadership demanded 
greater accountability of Mexico's Federal Executive. In the form er political system, the 
President was the accountability holder; while the subnational authorities, the federal 
bureaucracy, the Congress and other state powers were the accountability holdees. The 
following pages will explain how the Congress became an accountability holder of Presidential 
powers. The trigger to this change was the emerging force of political opposition in the 
Chamber Deputies in the afterm ath of the 1997 mid-term election. Once the Chamber of 
Deputies had a plural composition, with no single party in control of the majority, there was a 
move to strengthen the audit functions over the budget process.
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2.2 Secretaria de la Funcion Publica (SFP)
In the era of Mexican presidentialism, the President's interest marked a discretionary distinction 
between the freedom o f action and the degree o f personal privilege. The SFP is the institution 
inside the structure of the federal government in charge of drawing the line between the 
actions and privileges of public servants. However, the SFP is the result of an historical evolution 
of the internal audit of the Executive Branch.
2.2.1 History o f the Internal Audit Function
Michael Power (1994:19) accurately describes an "expectation gap" as "the difference between  
how financial auditors are perceived (responsible for the detection of fraud) and how they see 
themselves (primarily responsible for forming a professional opinion on the financial 
statements)." Most of the historical and academic literature (Lanz, 1987; Vazquez Alfaro, 1996; 
Lopez Presa, 1998) focused on Mexico's internal audit shows that the country suffers from the 
expectation gap. The historical analysis of the internal audit emphasises the view that the major 
aim of this institution is to prosecute unlawful financial transactions inside the government 
structure. However, the literature on the topic is so scarce that these studies that fall into the  
"expectation gap" are unavoidable references in the historical review of government internal 
audit in Mexico.
Parallel to the birth of Mexico as an independent nation, internal control of the Executive began 
in 1824 with the creation of the Departamento de Cuenta y Razon (Departm ent of Accounts and 
Reason) under the structure of the Finance Ministry. The Departam ento  was in charge of 
controlling the use of public funds, including the drafting of the laws of income and expenditure 
that constitute the two parts of the federal budget. In 1831, the Departam ento de Cuenta y 
Razon was replaced by the Direccion General de Rentas (General Directorate of Income). The 
responsibilities of the new office w ent beyond audit and accounting to include the collection of 
income and distribution of expenditures.
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This institutional design for the administration and oversight of government finances lasted for 
the entire nineteenth century. In the last months of its 30-year regime, Porfirio Diaz created the  
Direccion de Contabilidad y Glosa (Directorate of Accounting and Audit) in 1910. This new  
bureau focused on the audit and supervision of government finances, but was relieved of the  
functions of administering the government's revenue and expenditure.
The Ministry of Finance controlled the use and audit of public funds through the Direccion de 
Contabilidad (Accounting Directorate) and the Tesoro Federal (Federal Treasury), both of which 
were directly accountable to the Finance Minister (Vazquez Alfaro, 1996:136). In 1917, 
according to the Ley Organica de las Secretarias de Estado (Internal Law1 of the Executive 
Ministries), the administrative structure of the Mexican government was reorganised into seven 
secretariats and five departments, one of which was the Departam ento de la Contraloria 
(Departm ent of the Comptroller). These bureaus were created to "prom ote the ethical 
behaviour of public servants and to oversee the use of public funds" (Lopez Presa, 
1998:155).The Comptroller acted as internal auditor and established a working relationship with  
the Contaduria M ayor de Hacienda (CMH), the then auditing supporting agency of the Chamber 
of Deputies.
In theory, the CMH and the Departm ent of the Comptroller coordinated homogeneous audit 
and accounting systems for the government's financial records. The creation of the Departm ent 
was a response to the need for an internal audit institution with independence from  the 
Ministry of Finance. The Departamento de la Contraloria acted to balance the power of the  
Finance Minister. According to Vazquez Alfaro (1996:137), the new Departm ent helped to solve 
the shortcomings of the CMH in preventing corruption and the misuse of public money. Some 
optimistic commentators of the tim e affirmed:
1 In M exican Spanish jargon, “Ley O rgan ica ,"  has a d iffe re n t m eaning fro m  th e  litera l tran s la tio n  in English "O rganic  
Law". In M exico's public adm in istration , a ley organica  is a secondary norm  th a t regu lates th e  in ternal organisation  
o f a go vernm ent office or state body. In English an Organic Law is a C onstitu tion  o r system  o f laws, w r itte n  or 
u n w ritte n , th a t gives legal foun dation  to  a s tate  or a nation (Black's Law D ictionary , 1990, p. 1099 ).
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W ith the establishment of the (Departamento de la) Contraloria, Mexico is at the 
same level as England, Germany, France or the United States with their 
"Comptroller of the Treasury," because now there is an office in charge of the  
control of the expenditure and accounts.2
At the head of the Departm ent was the Contralor General de la Nacion (General Comptroller), 
appointed and dismissed directly by the President. In 1932, President Pascual Ortiz Rubio 
introduced an initiative that did away with the Comptroller's Departm ent and returned its 
responsibilities to the Ministry of Finance. This scheme lasted for fourteen years until 1947, 
when the Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales e Inspeccion A d m in is tra te  (Ministry of National 
Goods and Administrative Oversight) was created to take over the supervision of national 
industries and public works. The Secretaria de Hacienda (Finance Ministry) lost some of its 
functions but retained oversight of the budget process and continued to serve as the  
institutional bridge with Congress and its CMH.
From 1959 to 1976, there was a triangular system of control and financial oversight, with the  
involvement of three separate secretariats: Hacienda, Presidencia and Patrimonio Nacional 
(Finance, Presidency and National W ealth) (Lopez Presa, 1998:156; Vazquez Alfaro, 1996:136). 
The Secretaria de la Presidencia (SP) centralised the drafting of the budget and the investment 
in public projects. The SP gave the President direct control over government expenditure. La 
Secretaria de Patrimonio  was in charge of the administration and oversight of goods and 
companies owned by the state. From 1976 to 1982, under the government of Jose Lopez 
Portillo, the Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto (SPP) assumed the main responsibilities 
of the Secretaria de la Presidencia. SPP controlled the drafting and overseeing of the budget 
procedures.
2 H ijar y H aro "M an u a l de la C ontraloria ," Revista M e x ica n a  de A dm inistracion Publica  (INA P), nu m . 54 , 19 83  
quoted by Vazquez A lfaro , 19 96:1 37 .
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2.2.2 Secretaria de la Contraloria: Corruption watchdog or bureaucratic police?
In 1982, after the corruption scandals of the Lopez Portillo government, the new President 
Miguel de la Madrid based his campaign on the promise to promote a "moral renovation of 
society." The creation of the Secretaria de la Contraloria General de la Federaclon (Ministry of 
the Comptroller General of the Federation, Secogef) was a regulatory and institutional reaction 
to the corruption cases that tainted the public administration during the previous years. W ith  
the creation of the Secogef, Power's "expectation gap" acquired institutional form and a place 
in the Presidential cabinet. An institution for internal audit was perceived as a policy response 
to combat government fraud and defined as a "moral instrument to improve society" (Lanz, 
1993:548). The public perception of congenital corruption inside the government needed not 
just minor adjustments in the administrative structure, but an institutional statement: a new  
Ministry that would be recognised as a corruption watchdog.
As happened in the United States after W atergate, anticorruption initiatives were implemented  
for "political cover" after a scandal, or as an answer to the pressure of the media and society 
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996:2). Secogef was directly answerable to the President and was 
created as a centralised office to supervise the internal audit and administrative procedures of 
the Executive, functions that had previously been dispersed in other government agencies.
Despite its Ministry rank, Secogef had few er powers than its institutional predecessors. The 
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (Finance Ministry, SHCP) maintained control and 
administration over the budget, expenditure, national debt and customs. Article 32 of the Ley 
Organica de la Administracion Publica Federal (Internal Law of the Federal Public 
Administration, LOAPF), locates Secogef as a subsidiary to the SHCP, because the Finance 
Ministry can request the Comptroller to perform an audit on any government office (Lanz, 
1987:534). Secogef was given the authority to appoint the external auditors for publicly owned 
companies, as well as "give its opinion or request the dismissal" of the heads of nearly 230
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Organos de Control Interno (Internal Control Bureaus, ICB) inside ministries, government 
agencies and state-owned companies. The Internal Control Bureaus are the internal audit 
offices that oversee the financial transactions and expenditure procedures of their respective 
institutions.
The institutional design of the ICB network is similar to the French tradition in oversight, where  
every ministry and state service must have its own inspections generates (Hood, 2004:19). The 
ICB network was also influenced by the Inspectors-General structure put in place by the Carter 
administration in the USA (Peters, 2004:141). The striking difference between Mexico's ICB and 
the USA Inspectors-General was that the latter had the autonomy to report directly to Congress. 
Under the administrative structure of Mexico's presidentialism, it would have been hard to 
conceive a network of offices with direct relationship with the Legislative Branch. The USA 
Inspectors-General presented annual reports of their activities; in contrast, Mexico's ICB did not 
make reports or publish any kind of public record about their activities.
Secodam issued rules to standardize the ICB practice of public audits. However, the definition of 
audit criteria was the only area where Secogef acted as an authority over the network of ICBs. 
The law weakened the Secogef, considering that its "opinions" on the performance of the  
internal auditors could be ignored without any legal consequence. Along with the ICB, the  
Secogef performed the concurrent and ex post financial and administrative audits of the public 
administration.
According to Article 92 of the Constitution, the President has the freedom to appoint and 
discharge the heads of all his Ministries,3 including the Secogef, and Congress has no legal 
authority to intervene in the process. Like the rest of the members of the Presidential cabinet, 
the Secretario de la Contraloria is an agent who has to implement the decisions made by the 
President.
3 The ap p o in tm en t o f th e  head o f th e  Procuraduria  G en era l de la  Republica  (Justice M in istry) m ust be ra tified  by 
th e  Senate.
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To answer the question, who watches the watchdog? Article 12 of the Ley de Responsabilidades 
de los Servidores Publicos establishes the post of Interior Comptroller of Secogef, who acts as 
the internal supervisor of the Secretario de la Contraloria. The Interior Comptroller is directly 
responsible to the President and is also appointed by him.
W ith Secogef, the government gave priority to the internal administrative audit over the 
external oversight of Congress. The Presidential grip over the Contraloria limited the autonomy  
to decide how, when and where the audit reviews should be performed. The Contraloria acted 
more as a surveillance that an audit institution, in the sense used by Power (1997:128-129), in 
which "surveillance tends to take the human individual as its primary object rather than the  
organisation and its sub-systems of control." Secogef created a Panopticon (Bentham, 1791) 
surveillance infrastructure, not as prison building or a military school, but as an administrative 
structure where the whole federal bureaucracy4 was exposed to oversight from a central point: 
the President's office. The power of seeing without being seen was applied as a rule of public 
management but w ithout the emphasis in transparency and publicity. Government officials 
were monitored by the bureaucratic watchdog and the network of 230 ICBs, but there was no 
public disclosure of the audit results. Since the President had direct access to the auditors1 files, 
this Panopticon structure over government employees and professional politicians was an 
additional source of power and political extortion.5
Porfirio Munoz Ledo (2008), form er leader of both PRI and the leftist Partido de la Revolucidn 
Democratica (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), stated: "(Secogef was) a control method 
based on intimidation, as the old saying goes: 'justice and grace to the friend, plain justice to the
4 As analysed in th e  fo llow ing  paragraphs o f th e  chapter, th e  m em b ers o f Congress and th e  Judicial branch w e re  
also exposed to  th e  panopticon  oversight o f th e  President fro m  1982  to  1992 .
5 Every S eptem ber 1st, th e  P resident gave an In fo rm e de G obierno, a S tate  o f th e  Union Speech, w h e re  he rep o rted  
th e  health  o f his ad m in istration . All g o vernm en t offices un der th e  u m brella  o f th e  Executive had to  feed  data and  
in fo rm atio n  to  an annual publication known as th e  Anexos de l In fo rm e  (S ta te  o f th e  U nion Annexes), which was th e  
only source o f official g o vern m en t in fo rm atio n .
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enemy.' The control and supervision o f the budget became another instrument o f political 
control."
2.2.3 Accountability o f Public Officials under the Presidential Regime
One of the institutional consequences of Mexican presidentialism was the weakness of 
autonomous institutions formally placed outside the legal influence of the Executive. One of the  
most striking examples of subordination of autonomous powers to the authority of the  
President was Article 80 of the Ley de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Publicos (Law of 
Responsibilities of Public Servants). The clause stated that Secogef had the authority to collect 
and process the personal assets statem ent (declaracion patrim onial), not only of public servants 
and high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch, but also of members of the Congress and the  
Judicial Power. The personal asset statem ent is a questionnaire that each public servant has to 
fill with a detailed declaration of their bank accounts, financial investments, real estate property 
and other means of accumulating wealth.
The personal asset statem ent also had to include the asset information of the members of the  
immediate family of the public servants. Through the information contained in the Secogef 
archives, the President had the opportunity of pressuring and blackmailing deputies, senators 
and even judges of the Supreme Court. By way of Secogef, members of the Congress and the 
Supreme Court were directly accountable to the President. Deputies, senators and judges were  
obliged to answer and explain their personal financial situation to the accountability agent of 
the Executive. The enforcement of this arrangement held the possibility that the Minister of 
Secogef could impose sanctions for non-compliance.
A decade later, in 1992, the law was changed to create a registration office of assets statements 
in each of the State branches, so legislators and judges did not turn in their information to a 
bureau under the Executive Structure. In order to preserve the Constitutional provision of 
Division of Powers, Secogef kept the archives of asset statements  just for the Executive Branch 
staff (Lopez Presa, 1998:156).
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The creation of Secogef (1982) occurred at a tim e when the Mexican political system did not 
gave high priority to accountability and transparency. Democratic norms and values are part of 
the environmental requirements that must be m et by democratic political regimes (March & 
Olson, 1995:185). In the context of Mexico in the tw entieth  century, the environmental 
requirements were defined by an exacerbated presidentialism in a non-competitive party 
system.
In a democratic regime, it would be impossible to have an institution with the characteristics 
and legal faculties of Secogef. In practice, its main objective was to strengthen Presidential 
control over the individuals who worked in the government administration. The creation and 
design of Secogef confirms Michael Power's (1997:13) assertion that "audit is never purely 
neutral in its operations; it will operationalise accountability relations in distinctive ways, not of 
all which would be desired or intended." This operationalisation o f accountability implied that 
professional politicians and bureaucrats were the agents who gave accounts of their actions to a 
powerful principal: the President.
The financial audits of Secogef were not meant to be just a technical accounting procedure, but 
a political tool to prevent bureaucratic and internal dissent. Often, the audits and information 
collected by Secogef were used as ammunition against enemies of the President. As will be 
presented in chapter 3, during the government of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Secogef archives 
were used to blackmail several state governors, forcing them  to resign from their elected 
positions in order to benefit the political strategies of the President. If the governors refused to 
resign, a Presidential envoy threatened to send the Secogef archives to the Courts or to the  
press (Amezcua & Pardinas, 1997).6 Democratic accountability is antithetical to a power 
monopoly, as it propels a dialogue between accounting and accountable actors (Schedler, 
1999:19). In Mexico, the people dedicated to the public service were accountable to the 
monopoly of power, where the President was the only one entitled to demand accountability
6 As will be addressed in ch apter 3 ,1 7  governors ou t o f 31  states resigned during Salinas' six years in office.
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answers. In contrast, no institution had enough autonomy or political leverage to demand direct 
answers from the President.
2.2.4 Secodom: the effort to modernise the internal audit bureau
In December 1994, a change in the Law of the Public Administration (LOAPF) increased the  
powers of Secogef and renamed it the Secretaria de la Contraloria y Desarrollo Administrativo 
(Secretary of the Comptroller and Administrative Development, Secodam). As a consequence of 
this reform, the Secretary assumed the administration of the government's real estate and the  
enforcement of government acquisitions, leasing and public work contracts in addition to the  
previous duties of responsibility for internal control and evaluation.
In 1996, a new wave of legal reforms transformed the structure of the Internal Control Bureaus 
in the federal government. Before the changes in the law, the 230 directors of the Internal 
Control Bureaus were appointed and removed by the head of each agency and ministry. This 
institutional design limited the autonomy of the internal auditors and reduced their ability to  
impose corrections or sanctions as a result of their oversight. As I have mentioned above, 
according to the law, the Secretario of the Secodam had the capacity to give an "opinion about 
the appointment of the OCIs directors and could request their dismissal." However, the  
suggestions were not mandatory and could be rejected by the head of the agency.
The OCIs were so irrelevant in the internal structure of the government that they were  
mentioned in the internal statutes of only five ministries (Interior, Education, Labour, Health 
and Foreign Affairs). This lack of legal recognition transformed the OCIs into low-ranking 
bureaus, without the legal capacities to audit the finances of the minister's offices. In the case of 
the Ministries of Tourism and Environment, the respective OCI didn't even have the authority to 
impose direct sanctions against public officials who misappropriated public funds. "In a universe 
of 2 million public servants, less than 20 people had the legal capacities to impose
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administrative sanctions and just one, the minister in Secodam, could impose financial penalties 
higher than 200 monthly minimum wages7" (Lopez Presa, 1998:309).
The 1996 reform gave Secodam (the form er Secogef) the power and freedom to appoint or 
dismiss the directors of the nearly 230 OCIs of the federal government. Through this legal 
change, the OCIs became part of the structure of Secodam, although each Ministry and 
government agency had to pay the salary of the staff and total costs of its respective OCI from  
their own budget.
Despite the fact that the number of employees administratively dependent on Secodam went 
from 1,500 prior to the reform to close to 12,000 after it took place, its budget remained almost 
constant. In 1995, the Secodam budget represented 0.25% of the administrative budget of the  
Executive Branch (Lopez Presa, 1998:297), while for the year 2008 the proportion had changed 
to 0.23%.8
The new law gave the heads of the OCIs the authority to impose administrative and pecuniary 
sanctions without a limit on the amount. The OCIs also gained the capacity to resolve the 
appeals of civil servants who requested a review of their resolutions. The heads of the OCIs also 
gained the capacity to demand the intervention of the public prosecutor when they found a 
wrongdoing that might imply jail offences.9 These legal changes in the OCI network had a 
multiplier effect in the audit and enforcement capacities of Secodam. Due to the reform, the 
number of OCIs with capabilities to impose administrative sanctions rose from 20 to 230, and 
from one to 230 in the case of economic sanctions (Lopez Presa, 1998:314).
7 M exico has official m in im um  wages (O M W ) w hich are  established by th e  fed era l go vern m en t. The un it o f O M W  is 
used in several laws and norm s as a benchm ark to  establish financial penalties.
8 This figure considers th e  budget o f th e  subset Ram os A utonom os, which includes th e  18 S ecretaries de Estado, th e  
Federal Investigation Police, Land Tenu re  Courts, Special Courts fo r Taxation and A dm in istrative  Issues, Legal 
Counsellor o f th e  Executive and th e  office o f th e  President.
9 In S eptem ber 1997, th e  in ternal s tatu tes o f Secodam  w ere  changed to  specify th e  pow ers o f th e  heads o f th e  
OCIs. Art. 26 subsection III and IV.
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This reform basically gave Secodam the "teeth" to enforce its mandate; although, as a study by 
Transparency International showed, Secodam's efforts are more focused on sanctioning 
administrative misdemeanours than the unlawful appropriation of public funds. In 2001, the  
Mexican Chapter of Transparency International carried out the first independent survey of the  
performance of the 230 offices that comprise the OCI system (Transparencia Mexicana, 2001). 
Its conclusions constitute an important critique of the network of OCIs:
1) The OCI detects and sanctions a very high number of minor infractions of administrative 
rules that cannot be considered acts of corruption.
2) The OCI system is incapable of detecting and sanctioning relevant cases of corruption.
3) In the rare cases that corruption is detected and the OCI manages to impose sanctions 
on those individuals who are liable for it, the sums recovered for the public treasury are 
irrelevant (0.45% of the total economic sanctions).
4) The administrative regulations and penalties imposed by the OCI system have not helped 
reduce the problem of corruption and in fact complicate the government's performance.
Considering Transparencia Mexicana's conclusion that the OCI system is incapable of detecting  
and sanctioning relevant cases of corruption, it could be assumed that the anti-corruption CSO 
fell in the "expectation gap" defined by Michael Power. However, the general conclusions of 
Transparencia Mexicana are aligned with the basic premises of Anechiarico and Jacobs 
(1996:xii): "(T)he pursuit of corruption-free government by means of more rules, procedures 
and organisational shuffles is an im portant contributing factor (to government inefficiency). It 
should not be assumed that all corruption controls improve or even coincide with governmental 
efficiency and effectiveness, or that such measures actually reduce corruption." For Dye 
(2007:304) "audit staff often tends to take a clerical approach, demanding strict compliance 
with procedures while often missing the objective of the procedures. M inor aberrations and 
misuse of funds are highlighted, while major systemic failures resulting in large losses to the  
public treasury go unidentified."
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When I interviewed him, Francisco Barrio, a form er Comptroller General, complained about the  
rigidity of anti-corruption laws in the Mexican Government: "I have a budget to refurnish my 
office, but I cannot use that pool of money to hire a secretary to answer the phone at lunch 
time" (Barrio, 2001). If the money for furniture was used for a different purpose the Secretario 
would risk incurring an administrative penalty. The aim of preventing corruption in Mexico has 
created "exhaustive, rigorous and sometimes redundant internal control systems" (World Bank, 
2003:26).
A civil servant from the Labour Departm ent in charge of mediating contractual disputes 
between unions and management received a reprimand from Secodam because of his lack of 
performance in his job. According to Secodam, he only helped to solve two threats of union 
strikes during a given year. W hat Secodam failed to note was that during the previous 12 
months, only two unions had made strike threats. This is an extrem e example of the kind of 
oversight that Secodam performs over public servants. W ith government actions lacking 
transparency, Secodam compensated the lack of accountability with bureaucratic controls.
In a Financial Accountability Assesment (2003:26), the World Bank stated: "The main 
weaknesses (of Mexico's internal audit structure) are associated more with a persecutory and 
punitive approach than a preventive character of SFP's procedures, supported by extrem ely  
extensive and rigorous legal rules... (that) are perceived by government officials as a persecutory 
programme, inhibiting their administrative decisions and consequently hindering governmental 
management."
Peter Self (1977:277) defines the classic dilemma of public administration as "the tensions 
between the requirements of responsibility or 'accountability' and those of effective execution." 
Is there an alternative to this dilemma between accountability and efficiency? In principle, 
government performance would improve with increased flexibility in the decision making 
process. It would be beneficial to end the culture of persecution where "no one dares to sign 
any document or approve a course of action." This improved management flexibility and
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discretion should go hand in hand with stronger transparency in the decision process and its 
results. To increase government efficiency, there is a need to increase the flexibility of public 
servants in exchange for greater transparency and accountability. The challenge ahead for the  
internal audit system of the Executive is to reduce the oversight over bureaucratic paperwork 
and administrative regulations and to focus the oversight on the outcome of policy actions 
(Behn, 2001:216; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996:207).
There are several alternative institutional designs for government internal audit systems:
U.S. government agencies have their own Inspector General's Office that submits their accounts 
directly to the General Accountability Office (GAO), the audit support bureau of Congress. The 
main difference from Mexico is that the network of ICBs is not centralised under the control and 
structure of a government ministry.
In the United Kingdom, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) is the head of the National 
Audit Office (NAO), the accountability agency at the service of the Parliament. The NAO fulfils a 
double role of internal and external audit agency of the Executive and the Parliament.
In Chile, the internal audit offices of government agencies present their reports to a Supreme 
Audit Institution that is independent from both Executive and Congress. In Chile, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, accountability institutions privilege external audit from the  
control and oversight mechanisms performed within the Executive branch.
2.2.5 The creation of the Secretaria de la Funcion Publica (SFP)
In 2003, the new law of the civil service (Philip, 2003:5) was approved, giving Secodam the 
authority to regulate the civil service career of the federal bureaucracy. After the enactment of 
the civil service law, Secodam retained its previous legal and administrative responsibilities but 
changed its name to Secretaria de la Funcion Publica (Secretary of Public Function, SPF). The SFP
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has tried to rebrand itself as the institution in charge of the administrative modernisation of the 
federal government. In this process, the SFP has coordinated and homogenised the audit and 
financial oversight of the entire administrative structure of the Mexican government. In 
addition, the SFP has created innovative technology-based control mechanisms like Compranet, 
an Internet-based procurement system that provides for systematic disclosure of bidding, 
purchases, leasing and services related to government contracts. The SFP created an electronic 
data base that records whether a former government employee is legally disqualified from  
obatining a job in the public service, considering his past legal record or administrative 
problems.
Table 2.1 shows the diferent stages in the internal audit institution from the creation of the 
Secogef in 1982 to the SFP, which remains in place at the time of writing (July, 2008). The 
activities shown in the second row of Table 2.1 correspond to the description of the activities of 
the internal audit bureau according to the Internal Law of the Federal Public Administration.
Table 2-1 Evolution of Mexico's internal audit institution since 1982
P e rio d  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 2  - 
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 4
In s titu tio n  
Secretaria de la Contraloria de la 
Federacion 
(Secogef)
-C o rre c t iv e  C o n tro l
-A u d it
-S a n c tio n
A c tiv itie s
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 4 -  
A p ril 2 0 0 3
Secretaria de la Contraloria y 
Desarrollo Adm inistrativo  (Secodam)
-C o rre c t iv e  C o n tro l
-A u d it
-S a n c tio n
-A d m in is tra t iv e  d e v e lo p m e n t an d  
s im p lif ic a tio n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  
p a p e rw o rk .
A p ril, 2 0 0 3 -  to  
p re s e n t10
Secretaria de la Funcion Publica 
(SFP)
-P re v e n tiv e  c o n tro l
-A u d it
-S a n c tio n
-A n tic o rru p tio n
-A d m in is tra t io n  o f  th e  Civil
S erv ice  e m p lo y m e n t sc h e m e
Source:Constructed by the author with information from the Ley Organica de la Administracion Publica.
10 March, 2008.
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Controls over the behaviour of civil servants take different forms across political systems (Hood 
& Peters, 2004:130). Despite the institutional evolution of the SFP (See Table 2.2), the transition 
to democracy and the end of presidentialism, the type of control over civil servant behaviour 
has maintained the model of surveillance (Power, 1997:128-129) and the prosecution for minor 
administrative misdemeanours. Despite the fact that the current legal fram ework of the SFP 
emphasises preventive over corrective control, the practice of prosecuting administrative 
misdemeanours is still common.
An analysis of the SFP's annual reports shows: during 2006, from 3,113 internal audits 
performed inside the structure of the federal governm ent,11 there were 3,278 administrative 
sanctions (Secretaria de la Funcion Publica, 2006). A simple arithmetic exercise shows that, on 
average, for every audit there was at least one administrative sanction. In only 37 cases, 1.1% of 
the total, there was evidence to build a judicial case for corruption (SFP, 2006). However there  
are no public figures or data about the final outcome of these 37 cases.
As part of its legal mandate, the SFP annually collects the personal asset statem ent (declaracion 
patrimonial) of 216,468 higher public servants under the structure of the Executive Branch (SFP, 
2006). The privacy of civil servants is protected because all asset statements  are treated as 
confidential information, unless there is a specific request from the individual concerned. During 
2006, the office within the SFP that receives and processes all the asset statements  found one 
irregular file for every 1869 high ranking civil servants (SFP, 2006). However, there is no public 
information about the legal or administrative situation of the public servants with irregular 
personal asset statement.
Regardless of its institutional re-branding, the SFP still performs its activities of surveillance over 
civil servants. The transition to democracy and the end of presidentialism preserved some of the  
main features of the SFP's previous institutional reincarnations. One of the characteristics that
11 From January to November 2006.
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survived the transformation of the political system was the "expectation gap" over its role as 
corruption watchdog. W hen Francisco Barrio was appointed as minister of Secodam, at the  
beginning of the Vicente Fox administration in December 2000, the media welcomed him as the 
"Corruption Czar" of the new government. Through interviews and speeches, Barrio confirmed 
the perception that his main challenge was to catch "the big fish" of the corrupt ancient regime. 
Power (1994, 1997) and Dye (2007) claim that audits are not necessarily a tool against 
corruption and fraud. Confirming this, Barrio resigned from the ministry in March 2003, after 
two years and three months of an unsuccessful search to catch the so-called "big fish" of 
Mexico's corruption with an army of auditors.
A quarter of a century after the creation of Secogef (2008), internal audit is still used as a means 
of Presidential control over high ranking officials in the Mexican government. However, the  
period after transition to democracy needed a new audit institution which had the acquiescence 
of a plural Congress with multiple political forces. The coexistence of the SFP as internal auditor 
of the Executive and the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion, the new SAI organisation that 
reports to the Chamber of Deputies, created what is called a 'double wham m y' a "pattern in 
which new process rules and oversight are added without a substantial reduction of the old 
ones..." (Hood, 2005:16). Before the analysis of the 'double wham m y', with the audit 
institutions of the form er and the current political system, the following pages will focus in the  
history of external audit in Mexico.
2.3 The External Audit Function in Mexico
2.3.1 Early History
Throughout Mexican history, the political context has determined the institutional design and 
capabilities of the nation's Supreme Audit Institution. The earliest institutional precedent in the  
history of the external audit bureau is the Tribunal M ayor de Cuentas (High Court of Accounts) 
created in Spain in 1453, as an organisation to oversee and approve the financial administration
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of the Royal Treasury (Manjarrez, 2002:83). In 1524, the King established a Court of Accounts12 
in the New Spain to audit the fiscal income and expenditure of the colony. Nine ministers 
appointed directly by the King headed the collective body. In 160513, Philip III of Spain ordered 
the Court of Accounts to have the additional responsibility of writing an annual report with  
recommendations on how to improve the oversight of the Crown revenues. The Court of 
Accounts was formed by a large number of magistrates. Their opinions about the accuracy of 
the financial records were presented in the form of a judicial statement.
The first Spanish Constitution, promulgated in 1812 in the city of Cadiz, established the 'right of 
the deputies' assembly to oversee the Crown accounts and determine the allocation of public 
expenditure and the collection of taxes (Manjarrez, 2002:85). This cemented in law the division 
of powers and the legislature's right to oversee of the Executive finances (Lanz, 1987:526). The 
Constitution de Cadiz established the first provisions for Horizontal Accountability in the Spanish 
Colony that latter would become Mexico.
After the proclamation of Independence, Mexico enacted its first Constitution in 1824. Article 
50 instituted the exclusive power of the general Congress to "establish expenditures and the  
necessary income to cover them , arrange tax collection and supervise the government 
accounts" (Manjarrez, 2002:83; Lanz, 1987:526). Congress also passed a bill to regulate the 
administration of the public treasury. In Articles 42 to 51, the document established the closure 
of the Court of Accounts and the establishment of the Contaduria M ayor de Hacienda (High 
Comptroller of the Treasury, CMH), the first SAI of independent Mexico.
Embracing the model of the Contaduria and rejecting the Court o f Accounts, the new  
constitution adopted an institutional design that was similar to the Treasury Comptroller of the
12 The Court o f Accounts gained historical relevance w h en  it revoked th e  right o f th e  Spanish co nq ueror H ernan  
Cortes to  dem and 6 0 ,0 0 0  ducados as th e  cost o f th e  wars o f conquest. The au d it p e rfo rm ed  by th e  Courts led to  an 
accusation against th e  C onqueror fo r th e ft  and hiding o f th e  Crown's taxes (Faya, 1980 :6 2 ; Lanz, 19 87 :5 26 ).
13 In th e  same year, th e  first Courts o f Accounts in South Am erica w e re  established in Lima, Peru, and Bogota, 
Colom bia.
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recently independent United States and dismissed the model designed by its form er European 
masters.14 The 1824 bill decreed that the Mexican Contaduria would have the responsibility of 
examining and commenting on the accounts presented by the Ministry of the Treasury. Despite 
the bicameral design of the first Congress, the Constitution located the CMH under the exclusive 
supervision of the Chamber of Deputies. For 180 years, that arrangement has prevailed, with  
the Senate excluded from the control of the SAI.
The political instability of Mexico during the 19th century15 was reflected in a lack of 
institutional permanence for the SAI. In 1836, the Constitution was abrogated although the  
fields of responsibility and responsibilities of the CMH survived for a brief interval. In 1838, the  
powers of the CMH were affected by the creation of a Tribunal de Revision de Cuentas (Court of 
Account Supervision). The Tribunal had the power to impose penalties on public servants and 
appoint auditors to oversee the allocation of a particular transaction (Manjarrez, 2002:86; CMH, 
1984:36; Lanz, 1987:527). The new institutional arrangement reintroduced the European model 
of the Court of Accounts.
The lack of institutional permanence is well exemplified by the fate of the Court of Accounts. 
President Santa Anna abolished the Court of Accounts in 1843, although it was reinstalled ten  
years later. The succession of liberal and conservative governments, with opposing views 
concerning the Tribunal, marked the existence of the institution. Conservative forces tended to  
favour the Tribunal of Accounts as the system applied in the European Monarchies, while the  
Liberals opted for the American model of Comptroller General. Over a period of 18 years (1838- 
1855), the Court of Accounts was created, suppressed, re-enacted and abolished again. In 1865, 
the Austrian-born Emperor Maximilian re-established the Court of Accounts, but two years later 
his government was overthrown along with the last version of the audit tribunals.
14 It is w o rth  noting th a t th e  Treasury C om ptro ller in th e  U nited  States was part o f th e  Treasury D e p a rtm e n t un der  
th e  structure o f th e  Executive. The US Congress assum ed th e  task o f auditing th e  federa l treasu ry  until 1921.
15 In a period o f 60  years (1 8 2 3 -1 8 7 6 ), M exico  had 38  Presidents. In this period, A nton io  Lopez de S antanna was  
President 11 tim es. The average span o f a Presidential te rm  was 16 m onths.
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The new Constitution (1857) established in Article 72 the power of Congress to freely appoint 
and remove the head and the staff of the CMH, which was considered an "independent bureau" 
of the Legislative Branch. The institutional mission of the CMH was to audit and com ment on 
government accounts. In 1862, President Juarez (1853-1863 and 1867-1872) published a decree 
that established strong powers for the head of CMH. The Contador M ayor de Hacienda had the  
authority to demand any kind of document or information from government sources 
(Manjarrez, 2002:89). Porfirio Diaz's government (1876-1911) brought institutional stability to 
the CMH. He also introduced a legal reform in 1896. For the first tim e, a specific piece of 
legislation was enacted to specify the capacities and obligations of the CMH. This legislation set 
the basis for Mexico's contemporary Audit Institutions.
2.3.2 Mexico SAIs in the 20 th Century
There is no single approach to the institutional design of a SAI. The institutional relationship 
between the SAI and the legislature, or other state powers, varies among countries and political 
systems. The SAI may be subordinate to the legislature or the Supreme Court, or be an entirely 
independent organisation. However, there are four basic audit structures:
1) The Napoleonic model was created in 1807 with the establishment of the Statute des 
Cours des Comptes in France. The model was exported to Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Brazil (Manjarrez, 2001:37). It is a system oriented to 
enforcement, which makes legal judgements on the compliance of government actions 
to laws and regulations. The European Court of Auditors, located in Luxemburg, is one 
example. Based on the French model, it is responsible for auditing the budgetary 
expenses of the European Union and is composed of one judge for each member 
country of the EU.
2) The Westminster system is designed to have an Auditor General (AG) who makes 
periodic reports to the parliament, usually once a year (in the case of the UK and 
Canada, reports can be more frequent). The Westminster model has the singularity of 
combining the internal and external audit bureaus in a single institution. The 
Comptroller & Auditor General model (C&AG) is prevalent in countries influenced by 
British political institutions like the Republic of Ireland, or form er British colonies like 
India. (Dye and Stapenhurst, 2000:282).
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3) The Board system shares similarities with the Westminster model with one major 
difference: the responsibility of the AG is shared within a Board of Auditors. This model 
is found in Japan and South Korea.
4) Most Latin American countries share the institutional design of the Government 
Accountability Office16 (GAO), the oversight support agency of the US Congress. This 
system is different from  the Westminster model in that the posts of the Auditor and the  
Comptroller General are held by two different individuals heading their respective 
institutions and working for different branches of government. The institutional 
characteristics of the eight national SAIs are compared in Appendix 2.1 at the end of this 
chapter.
During the 20th Century, Mexico was influenced by the institutional model of the oversight 
supporting agency of the US Congress. Articles 73 and 74 of the 1917 Constitution established 
the basic guidelines of the relationship between the Congress and the Supreme Audit 
Institution. Article 73 specified the right of Congress to draft the internal law (Ley Organica) of 
the CMH. For the next tw o decades, Congress did not enact the internal law of the CMH. Finally 
in 1937, President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) published the Ley Organica of the CMH that 
regulated the internal life of the institution. This period was marked by political turmoil; from  
1917-1934 the average span of a presidency was 2)4 years. The lack of stability helps explain the 
delay in publishing the Ley Organica, although it also shows a certain disdain for the role of the 
CMH in the institutional structure of the Congress.
Article 74 of the Constitution reaffirmed the exclusion of the Senate from the management of 
the CMH. Through the Comite de Vigilancia (Investigative Committee), the Chamber of Deputies 
had the political control over the CMH, which was expressed in the authority to appoint the  
head of the SAI and the approval of its annual budget.
The metaconstitutional powers of the President and the one-party system that emerged from  
the revolution brought unprecedented political stability to Mexico. In the case of the CMH, this
16 A fte r 83 years, in July 2004, th e  US G eneral Accounting O ffice changed its nam e to  th e  G o vern m en t A ccountab ility  
Office.
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stability was reflected in longer periods of time without any statutory changes. In 1963, a 
reform in the Ley Organica established that the ministries and bureaus under the structure of 
the Executive branch had the legal obligation to submit an annual report of its accounts directly 
to the CMH.
In 1976, the CMH gained the capability of doing more than paying "visits" to the offices of the  
Executive structure and to conduct on-site audits. The reform included the requirement that the  
CMH was to produce its annual report on the government's accounts, within a year from the  
dates when the complete documentation was submitted. The CMH also gained legal authority  
to demand the audit of contracts established between state-owned companies and private 
entities. In 1978, a change in its Ley Organica (Internal Law, LO) defined the CMH as a "technical 
bureau of the Chamber of Deputies in charge of the revision of the financial accounts of the  
Federal Government and the Federal District17 (Mexico City)" (Manjarrez, 2002:97).
One of the main changes of the law was the tenure of the Contador M ayor (the head of the  
CMH), who would remain in his post for eight years. Previously the law had established a three- 
year tenure, parallel to the electoral cycle of the Chamber of Deputies. Before 1978, the  
ministries and agencies in the federal government did not have a specific period of tim e to  
clarify any errors or misdeeds found by the CMH. The new law gave the offices under the  
Executive structure a 45-day period to answer, with no extension. This period to respond to the  
CMH has remained as a standard for future reforms, but an additional extension period of 45 
days was added in 1999 in case the Executive bureaus did not m eet the original deadline.
The initiative to reform the law, presented by a group of deputies from the state of Tabasco, 
considered the change in the name of the institution from Contaduria to Contraloria. In Spanish, 
the term Contaduria implies the idea of the managerial accounts of a business, the input and 
outflow of a company's money. The term Contraloria is not limited to the strict management of
17 Since 1994, th e  Legislative Assem bly o f th e  Federal D istrict has gained th e  au to n o m y to  oversee th e  accounts o f  
M exico City's go vernm en t th ro ug h  its local SAI.
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accounts but also certain degree of control over the actions of civil servants. Finally the  
Chamber rejected the new name because it would have required a Constitutional change18 and 
the term Contaduria stayed.
2.3.3 Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF)
In the first six months of a Presidential term , the Executive has the constitutional mandate to 
draft and publish the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Plan). This planning 
document should outline the central government's projects for the six years of the Presidential 
term . The Plan Nacional de Desarrollo for the administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 
stated that:
It is imperative to strengthen the independence, technical capacities and credibility of the  
institutions in charge of the oversight and evaluation of government actions and public 
spending. This will imply a structural reform of the current institutions and mechanisms of 
the government's internal and external controls, as well as the statutory fram ework of 
accountability (Zedillo, 1995).
Mexico joined the OECD in May 1994. The majority of OECD m em ber countries already had an 
independent SAI with operational autonomy and strong audit capacities. In this context, 
President Zedillo introduced an initiative in November 1995 to create the Auditoria Superior de 
la Federacion (ASF), a supportive audit agency that would replace the CMH and enhance the  
accountability capacities of the Chamber of Deputies. The initiative to increase the technical and 
operational autonomy of the new SAI implied a reform of four articles in the Constitution.
The initiative was not a Presidential priority. From December 1994 to July 1997, Zedillo was the 
last President with a majority in both Chambers of Congress, which would have supported the
18 This argu m ent m ight sound rath er odd fo r M exico 's  constitu tional history: fro m  19 17  to  2 0 05  th e  C onstitution  
was revised m ore th an  40 0  tim es.
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initiati ve at the President's request. However, it was not until December 1998, three years after 
the Billl was presented to Congress, that the Chamber of Deputies approved the reform, by 338 
votes in favour and 121 against. The PRI joined forces with the PAN to achieve the majority, 
while the  PRD opposed the bill, arguing that the deputies ought to approve a reform to fight 
corruption and eliminate impunity. In their eyes, the initiative was a "mediocre" solution 
(Gomez, 1998). In an address to the Congress floor, the Deputy from the PRD, Pablo Gomez, 
explained that his party aimed for a more ambitious reform and they were not going to support 
a diluted version of their proposal.
The PRD initiative proposed that the SAI should be a totally independent institution from the 
Congress and other State Powers. International experience shows that in most presidential 
systems SAIs are located within the structure of the legislative branch, with different degrees of 
independence.19 The PRD proposal was similar to Chile's SAI, which has the atypical institutional 
design of being independent from all three branches of government. However, the PRI deputies 
and senators rejected the possibility of an independent SAI and the PRD initiative was 
disregarded. The Chamber of Deputies approved the bill and sent it to the Senate for its 
ratification. In a debate on the Senate floor, the then main opposition parties, PAN and PRD, 
disagreed on the virtues of the Bill approved by the deputies but expressed a consensus on the 
need to  reform the SAI.
Despite the fact that his party opposed the reform, the legislative leader of the PRD, Pablo 
Gomez, acknowledged the political need to transform the congressional supporting agency; 
during an address in the Senate house he stated: "The Contaduria M ayor de Hacienda has been 
historically like a laundering process, because the President always appointed the Contador 
M ayor (head of the SAI) and because all its actions were in conformity with the interests of the  
Executive" (Gomez, 1998). During his turn on the Senate podium, the PAN senator Garcia Villa
19 In som e rare cases, like th e  S tate o f California in USA, Bolivia, China and th e  Philippines, th e  S uprem e A udit 
Bureaus are located w ith in  th e  Executive Branch, m eaning th a t th e y  are in tern a l au d it bureaus.
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stated: "For more than 175 years, Mexico has audited government in a very poor and limited 
way, today (with this reform) we have the opportunity to take a major step" (Garcia Villa, 1998).
In April 27th, 1999, the Senate held the debate and approval of the reform with 89 votes in 
favour (PRI-PAN) and 13 against (PRD)20. During the debate in the Upper Chamber, the PAN 
Senator Juan Antonio Garcia Villa provided three reasons to justify the support of his party:
1) The head of the new SAI was to be appointed by a two thirds majority vote in the  
Chamber of Deputies. Previously, the head of the form er CMH had been elected by a 
simple majority vote. The simple majority helped the PRI, and the President, to appoint 
the head of the SAI w ithout the need for any kind of political bargaining. This new  
provision was consistent with the policy to bolster the trust and institutional legitimacy 
of the SAI, through political autonomy from the Presidential sphere of influence. As no 
party can control more than 60% of the seats in the Chamber of deputies21, in the future, 
the head of the SAI was to be approved by at least two political parties. For Pope 
(2000:75): "The Office of the Auditor-General (Comptroller or Supreme Audit Institution) 
stands at the pinnacle of the financial accountability pyramid. It is therefore crucial that 
the appointment of the office-holder not be in the gift of the ruling party. If it is, it is a 
little like asking the burglar to select the watchdog. Indeed, political appointments of 
Auditor-Generals have been the root cause of many of the problems with integrity 
systems in various parts of the world."
20 Any Constitutional re fo rm  has to  be first approved by th e  Federal Congress and th e n  ratified  by a sim ple m ajority  
(16 ou t o f 31) o f th e  State Congresses. The Legislative Assem bly o f th e  Federal D istrict is no t considered as a state  
Congress.
21 As stated in constitu tional articles 51 , 52, 53  and 56 , th e  M exican Congress w orks according to  a m ixed electoral 
system th a t prevents any p a rty  from  contro lling m ore th an  60%  o f th e  to ta l seats. The Low er C ham b er is fo rm ed  by 
500  m em bers w h o  serve a th re e -y e a r tim e  period; 3 0 0  o f th em  are vo ted  by sim ple m ajo rity  in s ing le -m em ber  
districts, 200 are chosen by p rop ortio nal representa tio n  th rough th e  system  o f party  lists in five m u lti-m e m b er  
districts o f 40  seats each. A rtic le  54  establishes th e  legal constra in t th a t fo rb ids any party fro m  having m ore th an  
30 0  deputies. The Senate has 128 m em bers; each o f th e  32 fe d era l en tities  selects 2 Senators by sim ple m ajority  
and one seat is given to  th e  p arty  th a t ob ta ined  th e  second largest a m o u n t o f votes. The o th e r 32  Senators are  
selected by proportional rep rese n ta tio n  according to  vo te r rolls in one single na tio nal m u lti-m e m b e r district. 
N eith er Deputies nor Senators can be ree lected  fo r th e  next im m e d ia te  period .
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2) The new wording of Article 79 of the Constitution emphasised the technical and 
managerial autonomy of the SAI from Congress. The SAI was defined as an organisation 
under the control of the Chamber of Deputies, which could still request a special audit of 
a government office. However, due to its Constitutional autonomy, the Deputies could 
not veto an internal decision of the SAI to perform a certain audit or verification process.
3) The third major change is the possibility that the SAI, in special circumstances, could 
make concurrent audits before the end of the fiscal year, during the spending stage of 
the budget cycle. Before the reform, the SAI had to wait between 22 and 32 months to 
start a detailed audit of an irregular transaction. This measure was the first step in 
balancing the relationship between internal and external audit in Mexico. However, the 
motion set the stage for the 'double whammy' scenario, where tw o audit institutions, 
one internal the other external, might oversee the same government transaction.
According to the wording of the new regulation, the CMH was replaced by the Entidad de 
Fiscalizacion Superior (EFS), which was put in place in January 2000, to begin oversight functions 
with the financial accounts of FY 2001. W ith the approval of the secondary law that regulates 
the constitutional provisions [Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion, LFSF), the Entidad 
de Fiscalizacion Superior became the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF), which began 
operations on January 1st, 2001.22 The ASF became the financial audit arm of the Chamber of 
Deputies, which performed the external audit process of the public finances of the three  
branches of government, the agencies of the federal government and autonomous state 
organisations.
22 C urrently  th e re  is a legal an om aly  regard ing th e  nam e o f M exico 's  SAI. W h ile  A rtic le  74  o f th e  C onstitution  
m entions th e  E ntidad de Fiscalizacion Superior, th e  secondary law  speaks o f th e  A u d ito ria  S uperior de la 
Federacion. The problem  was th a t th e  Congress first approved th e  co nstitu tion al re fo rm , th en  changed th e  nam e of 
th e  SAI in th e  secondary law, but did no t acknow ledge th e  new  nam e w ith  a n e w  am e n d m e n t o f th e  constitu tional 
text.
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Table 2-2 Differences between the form er and current Mexican SAI
Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda 
(CMH)
Until 2000
The head of the SAI was appointed via simple 
majority of the Chamber of Deputies.
The Chamber of Deputies could decide or veto the 
audits performed by the SAI.
The CMH had limited scope of audit in terms of 
time and subjects under vigilance; the autonomy 
was limited and dependent on the cooperation and 
goodwill of the Chamber of Deputies.
CMH reports of its audits were treated as 
confidential information.
If the CMH wanted to prosecute a civil servant, 
who had presumably committed a wrongdoing, it 
did not have the independence to present the 
evidence before a tribunal. The CMH had to 
present the evidence to Secodam with the 
expectation that the Ministry would present the 
case before a judge. This design gave the President 
a de facto veto power over the capabilities of the 
CMH to present evidence against public servants.
The CMH was a bureau focused only on financial 
audit.
Auditoria Superior de la Federacion 
(ASF)
From 2001 
The head of the SAI is appointed by two 
thirds vote in the Chamber of Deputies, so no 
single political party can control the 
appointment of the head of the SAI.
The ASF has the technical and managerial 
autonomy to decide upon the depth, timing 
and subjects to be audited.
The ASF has internal and technical autonomy 
to perform audits. The ASF does not require 
the permission of the Chamber of Deputies to 
perform an audit.
The report over the Cuenta Publica is made 
public once it is given to the Chamber of 
Deputies, and is accessible through the 
Internet.
The ASF has the legal capability to press 
charges against public servants who have 
presumably committed unlawful acts.
The main activities of the ASF are financial 
audits, but it can also perform evaluations on 
the outcomes of government programmes.
The CMH limited its sphere of audits to the then-17 The ASF can audit the three branches of 
Ministries and 11 public entities dependent on the government, autonomous state organisations 
Executive branch. and even federal transfers of funds to
subnational governments.
Source: Constructed by th e  a u th o r using in fo rm atio n  from  Ley de Fiscalizacion S uperior de  la  Federacion  and Ley de  
la  C ontaduria  M a y o r  de H acienda.
With the Constitutional reform (Art. 73, XXIV) and the new secondary law, the ASF widened the  
scope of its audit authority. The CMH was limited to audit the accounts of the Executive Branch 
and the Chamber of Deputies. In contrast, the ASF has the legal capability to oversee the
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financial transactions of the Executive Branch, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the  
Judiciary. The legal reform gave the ASF the authority to audit these branches of government as 
well as autonomous entities such as the Elections Commission (IFE), the National University and 
the Human Rights Commission (LFSF, Article 4th). Private entities and NGOs that receive public 
money are also subjects to oversight by the ASF.23
2.3.4 Comision de Vigilancia (Congressional Oversight Committee)
The relationship between the Chamber of Deputies and the ASF is mediated by the Comision de 
Vigilancia (Oversight Committee, CV) which is in fact the institutional authority and supervisor 
of the ASF. Thirty deputies from  different political parties form  the CV, with its internal 
composition reflecting the distribution of political parties inside the Chamber. Until 1999, the  
CV was the only congressional com mittee that was specifically mentioned in the Constitution 
(Article 74 section II). With the enactment of the Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion, 
the CV was erased from the Constitution, but the secondary law confirmed its role as the bridge 
between the Chamber of Deputies and the ASF. The CV also remained as the legislative body 
with the responsibility for evaluating the performance of the SAI.
Despite its constitutional ranking, for several decades the CV was not regarded as a high-level 
committee within the Chamber. Antonio Gershenson, deputy of the form er Partido Socialista 
Unificado de Mexico, remembers his role on the CV in the Legislature from 1982-1985: "By law 
we had to meet every month, but nobody cared that much about the Committee. There were  
times when the only people in the meeting room were the President (of the CV) and myself 
(Gershenson, 2008)." The Committee had no professional staff and w ithout the re-election of 
deputies or personnel with some knowledge of the Committee responsibilities, the CV did not 
have any sort of institutional continuity. Ugalde (2000:74) narrates how, in 1994, tw o new  
members of the CV staff found that the only things left in the com m ittee offices were "chairs
23 The Catholic NGO, Provida, was banned from  receiving g o vern m en t subsidies a fte r  th e  ASF fo u n d  th e  
m isappropriation o f a donation o f 30  m illion pesos (£ 1 .7  M illio n ) in 20 03 .
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and tables." Juan Antonio Garcia Villa narrates in an interview that he found "absolutely 
nothing" in the archives of the CV when he became chairman in 1994. "In the third and last year 
of each Congress, all the legislators disappear, so then there was no continuity in the legislative 
commissions (Garcia Villa, 2008).
Despite these institutional shortcomings, the CV has the legal capabilities to:
•  Present to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies the names of three candidates to head 
the ASF (LFSF, Art. 69).
•  Present the request to remove the head of the ASF (LFSF, Art. 69).
•  See the draft of the budget request of the ASF and the expenditure report (LFSF, Art. 67).
•  Present the name of the head of the Unidad de Evaluation y Control (UEC), which is the  
bureau within the structure of the Chamber of Deputies with the sole mission of 
overseeing and auditing the performance and internal finances of the ASF. In other 
words, the UEC is the external auditor of Mexico's external auditor (LFSF, Art. 96).
•  Receive the Cuenta Publica from the Chamber of Deputies and turn it over to the ASF 
(LSFS, Art. 15). As stated above, the Cuenta Publica is a legal term  for the comprehensive 
report of government transactions during the whole fiscal year.
•  Request the presence of the head of the ASF to explain the report of the Cuenta Publica.
Reflecting the pre-eminence of the President's party, from 1970 to 1994 the chairman of the CV 
was a deputy from the then-governing PRI (See Table 2-3). In 1994, Juan Antonio Garcia Villa, 
from the opposition PAN, was elected chairman of the CV, although the PRI kept control of the 
Committee with a majority of 18 PRI members out of 30 seats. The appointm ent of Garcia Villa 
raised the visibility of the CV and in consequence of the CMH. In an interview, Garcia Villa 
stated: "(Since my appointment) it was established as an unwritten rule that the one in charge 
of such a commission (CV) should be a m em ber of the opposing party... the logic is that an 
adversary should be in charge of this kind of work on oversight matters (Garcia Villa,
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2008)."W ith the election of Garcia Villa as chairman of the CV, the SAI guaranteed that all its 
reports would be given to a m em ber of the opposition in the Legislative Branch.
The survival of an institution like the SAI requires a reasonable match among its structure, 
purposes and the changing political environment (March & Olson, 1995:184). In Mexico at the 
end of the 1990s, political institutions had to evolve at the pace set by democratic change. In 
1997, the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In the previous 70 years, the 
hegemonic control of the PRI over the Congress had been reflected in a subordinate relationship 
with the President. The President's control over the PRI strengthened his command over the 
collective decisions of deputies and senators. Until the PRI's electoral defeat of 1997, Congress 
had functioned as a mere rubber stamp.
One of the four conditions put forth by Weldon (1997:227) for the survival of presidentialism is 
a unified government where the ruling party controls the presidency and both houses of 
Congress. If this condition ceases to exist, "then the equilibrium of presidentialism will begin to 
break down." When the opposition parties became a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
balance of power changed in an irreversible way. The outcome of the 1997 elections showed 
the emergence of a new political system. Figure 2.1 shows the number of deputies per political 
party from 1985 to 2009. The Figure shows how in 1997, the PRI had less the 251 deputies, the 
minimum to control the simple majority, in the lower Chamber with 500 seats. The Figure also 
shows the electoral success of the PAN and the PRD and the downfall of the PRI in its share of 
Congress.
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F igure 2-1 N u m b e r o f  D e p u tie s  p e r P o litica l P a rty  (1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 9 )
3 5 0
3 0 0
2 5 0
PAN
200
1 5 0 PRD’
100
PRI
Others5 0
nV
Source: Federal Congress; w w w .c id a c .o rg  *T h e  PRD w as fo u n d e d  in 19 89
The end  o f  PRI's h e g e m o n y  s ig n if ie d  a p o w e r s h if t  in th e  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  E xecu tive  and  
L e g is la tive  p o w e rs . D esp ite  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  d iv is io n  o f  p o w e rs  w as an in te g ra l p a r t o f  th e  
M e x ica n  c o n s titu t io n a l tra d it io n , th e  fe d e ra l e le c tio n  o f  1997  c re a te d  th e  p o lit ic a l c o n d it io n s  fo r  
a de fa c to  se p a ra tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  E xecu tive  and  th e  Leg is la tive  B ranch . The C ong ress iona l ro le  
o f  f in a n c ia l o v e rs ig h t had to  a d a p t i ts e lf  to  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  th e  s tru c tu re  th a t  g u a ra n te e d  
s ta b il ity  in  th e  fo rm e r  re g im e . The c re a tio n  o f  th e  A u d ito r ia  S u p e rio r de  la  F ede rac ion  w as p a rt 
o f  a p rocess o f  s tre n g th e n in g  th e  H o riz o n ta l A c c o u n ta b ility  ro le  o f  C ongress. The ASF w as a f ir s t  
s tep  o f  an u n p re c e d e n te d  p o lit ic a l e x p e rie n c e : th e  re n d e r in g  o f  a cco u n ts  o f  th e  p re s id e n cy  and  
th e  E xecu tive  b ranch .
Baeza (20 0 3 :6 ) d e fin e s  a p o lit ic a lly  in c o n g ru e n t c o n s t itu t io n a l re g im e  as " th e  p e rm a n e n t 
d ic h o to m y  b e tw e e n  w h a t is m a n d a te d  by th e  C o n s titu t io n  and th e  a c tu a l c o m m o n  p ra c tice s  o f  
th e  p o lit ic a l ac to rs . These a c to rs  in te ra c t in th e  sp h e re s  o f  p o w e r by c re a tin g  th e ir  o w n  codes o f  
b e h a v io u r and using  le g a lity  o n ly  as a fo rm a l re q u ire m e n t."  The 1997  e le c tio n s  in M e x ic o
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reso lved th e  p e rm a n en t d ic h o to m y  be tw e e n  th e  pays ree l and th e  pays le g a l (O 'D onne ll, 
1997:49), be tw een  th e  d iv is ion  o f po w e r as a c o n s titu tio n a l a sp ira tio n  and th e  ine fficacy  o f th e  
Congress in its ro le  as in s titu tio n a l balance to  th e  Executive. The em ergence  o f  a tru e  d iv is ion  o f 
pow ers  rep resen ted  a s tru c tu ra l in n o va tio n  th a t p ro v id e d  in s titu tio n a lis e d  spheres fo r  
a cco u n ta b ility  (M arch  &  O lson, 1995:166).
As can be seen in Table 2.3, PAN and PRD to g e th e r o u tn u m b e re d  th e  PRI in th e  C ham ber in 
1997. T he re fo re , th e  PRI los t its co n tro l o ve r th e  in te g ra tio n  o f th e  CV. Tab le  2.3 show s th e  
dec line  o f the  PRI's hegem on ic  co n tro l, in bo th  th e  C ham ber o f D epu ties  and th e  O vers igh t 
C o m m itte e . For 27 years, th e  PRI had he ld  b o th  th e  m a jo r ity  and th e  cha irm ansh ip  o f th e  
c o m m itte e . It is w o rth  n o tin g  th a t since 1994, th e  co m p o s itio n  o f  th e  O ve rs igh t C o m m itte e  has 
m irro re d  th e  pa rty  d is tr ib u tio n  in th e  w h o le  C ham ber. Since th e  ye a r 2000, w h e n  th e  PAN w on 
th e  presidency, th e  cha irm ansh ip  o f the  O ve rs igh t C o m m itte e  has been in th e  hands o f th e  PRI 
(2000-2006) and th e  PRD (2006-2009).
Table 2-3 C om pos ition  o f C ham ber o f D eputies and C om ision de V ig ilanc ia  (1970-2009)
f'h jsm h p r n f Party Composition Difference in % Chairman o f the  ComisionV-.I I d l  11 U C I  U l
Deputies Congress % CV%
points between 
compositions
de Vigilancia 
(Party a ffilia tion)
1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 3 PRI 8 3 1 0 0 + 17 Hum berto H iriart
PAN 9 0 -9 (PRI)
Other 7 0 -7
1 9 7 3 -1 9 7 6 PRI 8 2 1 0 0 + 1 8 Julio Camelo Martinez
PAN 1 0 0 -1 0 (PRI)
Other 7 0 -7
1 9 7 6 -1 9 7 9 PRI 8 1 6 2 -1 9 Luis Pliego Irtiz
PAN 9 12 3 (PRI)
Other 7 2 4 1 7
1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 2 PRI 8 3 7 1 -1 2 Gonzalo Castellot
PAN 9 0 -9 (PRI)
Other 7 2 8 2 1
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 5 PRI 7 4 6 4 -1 0 Rogelio Carballo
PAN 11 7 -4 (PRI)
Other 13 2 8 15
1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 8 PRI 7 3 6 6 -7 Fernando Ortiz Arana
PAN 12 9 -3 (PRI)
Other 13 2 2 9
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Chamber o f 
Deputies
Party Composition 
Congress %
Difference in % 
points between 
compositions
Chairman o f the Comision 
de Vigilancia 
(Party affilia tion)
1988-1991 PRI
PAN
Other
52
20
28
64
17
17
12
-3
-11
Jose Trinidad Lanz 
(PRI)
1991-1994 PRI 63 76 13 Laura Alicia Garza
PAN 17 7 -10 (PRI)
PRD 7 5 -2
Other 12 9 -3
1994-1997 PRI 60 60 0 Juan A. Garcia Villa
PAN 23 23 0 (PAN)
PRD 14 13 -1
Other 2 2 0
1997-2000 PRI 47 46 -1 Fauzi Hamdam Amad
PAN 24 23 -1 (PAN)
PRD 25 23 -2
Other 6 5 -1
2000-2003 PRI 42 43 1 Manuel Galan Jimenez
PAN 41 40 -1 (PRI)
PRD 10 10 0
Other 6 7 1
2003-2006 PRI 45 43 -2 Salvador Sanchez
PAN 30 30 0 (PRD
PRD 19 16 -3
Other 6 10 4
2006 2009 PRI 21 24 -3 Antonio Ortega M artinez
PAN 42 41 1 (PRD)
PRD 26 24 2
Other 11 11 0
Sources: Constructed by the  au tho r using in form ation  from  M an jarrez , 20 02 :1 19 -120 ; C am ara de Diputados  
(w w w .d ipu tad os .gob .m x); and Centro de Investigation  para  el Desarrollo  (w w w .c idac.org).
The O vers igh t C om m ittee  was in charge o f th e  a p p o in tm e n t and rem ova l o f  th e  head o f th e  
th e n  CM H, th e  C on tado r M a y o r de H acienda. D uring th e  tim e s  o f p re s id e n tia lism , th e  C on ta d o r 
M a y o r  was th e  head o f a su p p o rtin g  agency o f a w eak Legis la tive Branch. Luis Carlos U galde 
(2000 :37-40) has o ffe re d  som e re le va n t o b se rva tions  on th e  pos ition  o f th e  C on tado r M a y o r:
1. From  1970-2000, th e  CMH did n o t have any c iv il service p ractice  o r te n u re  jobs  and none  o f 
th e  G eneral C om p tro lle rs  had w o rke d  b e fo re  in th e  CMH p rio r to  th e ir  a p p o in tm e n t.
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2. Most contadores mayores had had political careers linked to the PRI and the Federal 
Government. Francisco Rodriguez, Contador M ayor from 1978-1979, was elected to the  
Congress representing the PRI on three occasions, one of them  just after his term  at the  
CMH. Javier Castillo Ayala, CM from 1990-98, was m em ber of the PRI and was 
Undersecretary of Budget when Carlos Salinas was secretary. When he finished his tenure as 
CM, President Zedillo appointed him as Under-Secretary of Labour.
3. From 1970-1998, there were 9 contadores mayors who had remained in the position an 
average of 3.1 years.
Countries like Argentina, Brazil and Spain have a Court of Accounts with high authority. 
However, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies opted that the ASF should be headed not by a 
council but by an individual. The PAN Senator, Juan Antonio Garcia Villa (1998), argued that if 
the ASF were to be headed by a collective high authority, it was very feasible that the  
appointment of its members would reflect the weight and interests of the political parties 
represented in the Chamber of Deputies. After the 1999 reform, the head of the SAI was named 
Auditor Superior de la Federacion, who is elected for eight years by a two-thirds majority of the  
attending quorum in the Chamber of Deputies. As stated above, with the two thirds majority it 
is impossible that a single political party by itself could have enough votes to appoint the head 
of the SAI. This legal requirement was designed in the context of a 7 decade tradition of a single 
political party, the PRI, with an almost absolute control over the Chamber of Deputies 
(Manjarrez, 2002:148).
In December 1998, Gregorio Guerrero Pozas was chosen Contador M ayor by 340 votes out of a 
total quorum of 459 deputies and the support of four out of five parties represented in the  
Chamber (Gaceta Parlamentaria, December 2nd 1998). Before his new position, Guerrero had 
been treasurer of the Chamber of Deputies and did not have any public affiliation to a political 
party. In an interview for this dissertation, Guerrero Pozas stated: "This was the first tim e that 
the deputies agreed and pushed forward the entire selection process for the Contador M ayor
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without the intervention from the Executive power. I believe it occurred for the first tim e, when 
I was elected Contador M ayor" (Guerrero Pozas, 2008).
Originally, Guerrero Pozas was appointed for an eight-year period, but the Constitutional reform  
of 1999 and the new LFSF established that his term  would end in December of 2001 to give way 
to the new auditor of the new SAI. The Chamber of Deputies had the option of bestowing on 
him the new title of Auditor Superior de la Federacion or choosing a different person for the  
position. The Chamber did not ratify Guerrero Pozas in his post and opened a new selection 
process. Due to the distribution of political forces inside the Chamber of Deputies, only the joint 
support of the PAN and the PRI could produce the two-thirds majority needed to appoint the  
new head of the ASF. After an open contest to fill the position, Arturo Gonzalez de Aragon was 
appointed Auditor Superior for the period 2002-2009.
Gregorio Guerrero Pozas, the form er Contador Mayor, challenged in court his dismissal from the  
post with the argument that the Chamber of Deputies did not offer a valid justification for his 
removal. According to his appeal, the Chamber of Deputies had violated his constitutional 
rights. The case reached the Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal by a vote of 8 to 1 in 
October of 2003. The judge who voted against the decision argued that the post of the Contador 
M ayor was analogous to the judges of the Supreme Court, and thus a sitting official should not 
be removed in the absence of a major offence. However, the rem ainder of the judges rejected 
this opinion. Finally, the Court argued that the Chamber of Deputies had the "discretionary 
faculty" to discharge Guerrero and appoint Gonzalez de Aragon. The verdict of the Court also 
stated that the Contador M ayor was an "employee" with no right to "tenure" so he could be 
dismissed by the deputies (Suprema Corte de Justicia, 2003).24 After the court ruling, Gonzalez 
Aragon was confirmed in his position until 2009. The legal interpretation of the Court reduced 
the autonomy of the ASF, because the head of a supposedly independent agency became a 
direct subordinate of Congress.
24Suprem a Corte de Justicia, (S uprem e Court), O ctob er 28 th  20 03 .
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In an interview for this dissertation, the form er Contador Mayor, Gregorio Guerrero Pozas 
stated: "I think that the decision made by the Court was pretty bad, but not because it affected 
me personally. One of the concerns that the legislators had back at the 1999 constitutional 
am endm ent was to give enough autonomy to the SAI. Despite this, the Court's decision was to  
define the head of the SAI as an employee from the House of Representatives to serve as 
Comptroller General, allowing the House of Representatives to have full control, and to be able 
to remove the person at any time. This obviously weakened the institution's original design." 
(Guerrero Pozas, 2008).
W ith the selection of Gonzalez de Aragon, it became clear that the Federal Executive had lost its 
capacity to appoint the head of the SAI. This fact gave the new SAI its basic premise of 
legitimacy in the new political system: independence from the presidential figure. The 
Declaration of Lima25, the Magna Charta of Supreme Audit Institutions enacted in an 
international conference of SAIs in Peru's capital, emphasises the importance of independence 
from the audited bureaus: "SAIs can accomplish their tasks objectively and effectively only if 
they are independent of the audited entity and are protected against outside influence. 
Although state institutions cannot be absolutely independent because they are part of the state 
as a whole, Supreme Audit Institutions shall have the functional and organisational 
independence required to accomplish their tasks (INTOSAI:1977)." The autonomy to make 
decisions as to where and when to carry out audits, as well as an institution's ability to impose 
sanctions and penalties on other state agents is crucial for the performance of a SAI. A good 
measure of a SAI's organisational autonomy is the way in which the organisation decides on the  
subject, scope and timing of an audit.
The professional independence of the AG or the members of a court of audit "must be set out in 
legislation and acknowledged in tradition" (Dye & Stepenhurst, 2000). Legal independence is 
relevant to the quality of financial and performance audits, due to the possible political conflicts 
that are inherent in the auditors' role. An OECD survey (2003) shows that in 43.5% of the
25 The Declaration o f Lima w as approved a t an in tern atio n a l conference o f SAIs in Peru's capita l in 1977.
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countries, the SAI's independence from the Executive is established in law; in 56.4% of the cases 
it is stated in the constitution. The leader of the SAI should report directly to the legislature 
without any interference from  the executive branch. Of the 40 countries participating in the  
OECD/World Bank survey on Budget Practices and Procedures, 7.9% of the SAIs reported to the 
Executive Branch, 74.3% to the Legislative Branch and 2.4% to the Judiciary (OECD/World Bank, 
2003).
The SAIs are one of the main accountability instruments under the control of the legislature 
(Uhr, 1998:209). Through the SAI, the Congress supervises, audits, and verifies that all entities 
using public resources are allocating them in accordance with the guidelines approved in the  
budget. The role of Mexico's Congress in the political system was transformed through an 
election that took away the political control of the President over the Chamber of Deputies in 
1997. This political change triggered institutional reforms to adapt the Congress to its new  
central role as real mechanism for Horizontal Accountability.
2.4 The timetable of accountability: from budget draft to the Cuenta Publica
2.4.1 The three stages o f budget accountability
The control and oversight of public funds occurs in three stages. Heald argues that control is 
exerted ex ante and accountability is exerted ex post (1983:156). Ex ante  controls are exercised 
when the Chamber of Deputies determines the allocation of fiscal resources through the 
modification and/or approval of the federal budget at the beginning of the fiscal year (FY).26 The 
budget approval process is in itself an action of oversight regarding how the government money 
is allocated according to the priorities negotiated between the Executive and the Legislature.
26 Breaking w ith  th e  in ternation al linguistic norm s o f g o vern m en t budgeting, in M ex ico  e l presupuesto  (th e  budget) 
is understood to  re fer to  th e  ap p ro p ria tio n  o f ex p en d itu re  resources. The go vern m en t's  incom e is tre a te d  in a 
differen t docum ent called Ley de Ingresos  (Revenue Law).
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The second stage or concurrent oversight of government expenditure is performed by the 
Secretaria de la Funcion Publica, the Executive internal comptroller, and the network of more 
than 230 internal comptroller offices that are embedded within every ministry, bureau or state 
company that makes up the structure of the federal government. This simultaneous or 
concurrent control occurs while the government is spending the budget. The third stage occurs 
at the end of the fiscal year when the public resources have been spent. The Chamber of 
Deputies is responsible for the ex post oversight of budget accounts with the assistance of the 
Auditorla Superior de la Federacion (ASF).27
2.4.2 Ex ante accountability: the approval o f the Federal Budget
The original text of the 1917 Constitution did not determ ine any precise deadline for the 
submission of the budget draft to the Chamber of Deputies. In 1977, an am endm ent to Article 
74 established that the Executive would submit the budget initiative no later than November 30 
of each year. In 1982, another constitutional reform moved the date to November 15th. In this 
budget calendar, which operated for 22 years, the Executive had ten-and-a-half months to 
prepare the budget proposal, while Congress had six weeks to debate and approve it, before the 
beginning of the next fiscal year. The Constitution did not establish a deadline for the budget 
approval by the Chamber of Deputies. To permit informed debate and approval, the budget 
should be presented to the legislature in a timely manner — that is, two to four months before 
the start of the fiscal year (Schiavo-Campo, 2007:272).
In order to give more tim e for the budget debate in Congress, a constitutional am endm ent was 
approved in July 2004 to change the calendar of the first stage of budget accountability. The 
amendment of Article 74 of the Constitution establishes that the President has the obligation to 
present the draft of the budget to the Chamber of Deputies by September 8th, with the deputies 
voting on it before the 15th of November, a month and a half before the beginning of the new
27 According to  a study by G utierrez et. al. (2 0 0 1 ), am ong th e  countries w ith  th e  longer periods fo r  budget debate  
and approval in th e  Legislative Assem blies are  th e  U nited  States (2 35  days), S w eden (1 5 0  days) and D en m ark  (120  
days).
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fisca l yea r. The Executive p resen ted  th e  bu d g e t b ill in S e p tem be r fo r  th e  f irs t  tim e  fo r  th e  
d eba te  o f  th e  2005 FY budget. Every six years, w ith  th e  P res iden t's  in a u g u ra tio n  on D ecem ber 
1st, th e  b u d g e t b ill m ust be p resen ted  to  Congress by D ecem ber 15th.
D iagram  2-1 Budget P repara tio n  a nd D iscussion
Year 1 ......................................................................................Year 2
Budget Preparation and Discussion
April 1st June 30th September 8th November 15th FISCAL
YEAR
The economic A list o f the The Federal Executive Last day fo r the  Chamber
forecasts o f the main (SHCP) submits the of Deputies to  approve
budget should programmes to Expenditures Bill (PEF) both parts o f the Budget.
be published. be included in 
the fo llow ing 
year's budget 
should be
and the Bill o f Income 
(LIF) to  the Legislature.
published. In case o f the In case o f new presidential
inauguration o f a new term  every 6 years: Jan 1st
governm ent (every 6 December 31st to  Dec
years): December 15th 31th
Source: Ley de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad H ocendaria  (2006).
If th e  leg is la to rs  have n o t app roved  th e  budge t by th e  beg inn ing  o f th e  new  fisca l year, A rtic le  
75 o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  m andates th a t th e  sa laries o f pub lic  servan ts  sha ll be pa id  acco rd ing  to  
th e  am o u n ts  app roved  in th e  b u d g e t fo r  th e  p rev ious  year. This p ro v is io n  gua ran tees  th e  
m in im u m  ongo ing  o p e ra tio n  o f th e  g o ve rn m e n t, even if  the  d e p u tie s  have n o t reached an 
ag re e m en t o ve r budge t a p p ro p ria tio n s . H ow ever, any o th e r  g o v e rn m e n t e x p e n d itu re  needs the  
a u th o r isa tio n  o f th e  deputies .
The C o n s titu tio n  excludes th e  Senate fro m  th e  app rova l o f th e  a p p ro p r ia tio n s  b ill, g iv ing  th e  
C ham ber o f D eputies th e  exclusive r ig h t to  discuss and vo te  on th e  budge t. C ritic is ing  th e  
d is tr ib u tio n  o f respons ib ilities  b e tw e e n  th e  cham bers in th e  b u d g e t ap p ro va l, Rabasa (1976: 
236-237) s ta ted : "This exdus iv ism  o f th e  C ham ber (o f D eputies)... ca n n o t be fo u n d  in any o f th e  
c o n s titu tio n s  o f th e  m os t im p o rta n t n a tions  o f th e  co n tin e n t... W e igno re  th e  source o f 
in sp ira tio n  o f such a schem e th a t is an incons is tency  th a t b o rd e rs  on a c o n s titu tio n a l
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contradiction." On the same issue Tena Ramirez (1996:328) wrote: "This lack of congruence can 
only be explained as a leftover of the unicameral system of the 1857 Constitution."
In a study by Santiso (2004:57) of 10 countries in Latin America with a presidential system and a 
bicameral Congress, Mexico was the only one where the budget was approved by a single 
Chamber. As Tena and Rabasa state, it is not possible to know the reasons for this peculiar 
arrangement. However, from the perspective of the Executive, a single Chamber simplifies the  
whole budget approval process, because there are no possibilities of a disagreement within the  
Congress that would delay the final approval of government spending. Von Hagen (2005:16) 
elaborates on the same argument in a European context: "Where both houses have equal 
budgetary authority, as in Italy or Belgium, finding a compromise is a necessary part of the  
budgeting process. The effect tends to weaken the position of the Executive because it now  
faces two opponent bodies. The Executive may be strengthened by limiting the budgetary 
authority of the upper house, as in France and Germany, where the lower house prevails if an 
agreement between the two chambers cannot be reached. In the United Kingdom, the upper 
nouse has no budgetary authority at all, leaving the Executive with only one chamber to deal 
with."
Before the allocation of public expenditures, both chambers of Congress must determine the  
sources of tax and non-tax income. The senators, in conjunction with the deputies, have the  
power to reform the Ley de Ingresos, the revenue law approved each year to establish 
government income, drafted by the Executive. The Treasury Ministry sends the draft of the law 
to the deputies who discuss and may modify the original document. After that, they forward the  
bill to the Senate, which can also modify it. The Ley de Ingresos is approved when both 
Chambers give a favourable vote and the President enacts it into law.28 All taxes must be 
included annually in the Ley de Ingresos, whether or not they are considered to have an 
indeterminate duration. Taxes not included in the revenue bill are void for that fiscal year
28 As it will be deta iled  in chapter 4, th e  Senate can m odify  th e  Incom e Bill and send it d irec tly  to  th e  Executive, 
w ith o u t th e  need o f th e  Deputies to  endorse th o se  changes.
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(Weldon, 1997:238; Tena Ramirez, 1985:323-27). If the Executive decides to veto the Ley de 
Ingresos, Congress can overturn the veto with the support of two-thirds of the legislators in 
both Chambers. There is a legal vacuum in the Constitution regarding circumstances in which 
the President neither vetoes nor publishes the law.
Under presidentialism, the budget approval process highlighted the subordinate role of the 
Congress. Despite its legal authority, the Congress was politically and technically overwhelmed  
by the Executive. To exemplify the lack of infrastructure of the Chamber Deputies during 
presidentialism, Rolando Cordera remembers: "(From 1982 to 1985) we did not even have 
offices fo r  each deputy, we only had one meeting room fo r  the whole party (PSUM), with a small 
office fo r  the typist. In such circumstances, it was impossible to have a professional Congress" 
(Cordera, 2008).
"When the budget is submitted, the finance ministry knows a great deal about public finance, 
and the legislature knows very little other than what the government wants from it. This 
informational asymmetry places the legislature at an enormous disadvantage. Even with  
standing committees and modest staff resources of its own, the legislature is no match for the  
government (Schick, 2002:22)." Because of the prohibition on consecutive terms, deputies 
rarely have a deep understanding of the vast complexities of the preparation and execution of 
the government's budget.
The Chamber of Deputies does not have the technical support of an institution similar to the  
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of the U.S. Congress. The CBO has more than 200  
professional staff members selected according to non-partisan criteria, and its studies provide 
valuable input to the congressional budget debate. In Mexico, the Centro para el Estudio de las 
Finanzas Publicas (Center for Public Finance Studies, CEFP) created in 1998 does not have
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sufficient resources or human capabilities to balance the asymmetry in technical knowledge 
between the Executive and the Congress.29
2.4.3 Ex post accountability: the oversight o f the Cuenta Publica
The Chamber of Deputies relies on the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion to conduct the audit 
and the report of the document named Cuenta Publica. The Cuenta Publica is the consolidated 
report that the three branches of government and autonomous state organisations present to 
the Chamber of Deputies in order to render accounts of their financial transactions during the 
most recent fiscal year. The document presents information on the use of all the income and 
expenditures of the federal government. According to the internal law of the ASF,30 the Cuenta 
Publica oversight consists of verifying the origin and appropriation of government resources, 
overseeing its financial transactions and certifying that these transactions are in compliance 
with the authorized amounts established in the Revenue Law and the Appropriations Budget.
To provide a sense of the administrative challenge of the oversight of the Cuenta Publica, Lanz 
(1987:530) notes that the document in 1978 consisted of more than 140,000 volumes 
containing 60 million government transactions. A reform of the accounting form at gradually 
reduced the size of the document to 23 volumes in 1988 and just one since 1995 (Rocha & 
Samperio, 2003:17).31 As Diagram 2.2 shows, the Cuenta Publica should be presented by the 
Executive in the first ten days of the following June, after the closure of the fiscal year. Ten 
months later, the ASF is required to present the audit report to the Chamber before March 31st 
of the following year.32
29 In a request fo r in fo rm atio n  fo r this chapter, th e  C enter fo r Public Finance Studies o f th e  M exican  Congress 
responded th a t th e  data concerning its budget and hum an resources was co nfiden tia l.
30 Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la  Federacion, A rtic le  7th .
31On th e  physical size o f th e  do cu m en tation  th a t conta ined th e  M exican  Federal Budget, The Econom ist (D ecem ber  
5th 20 0 2 ) co m m en ted : "The M exican  go vernm en t's  budget proposals fo r 20 03  are  n o w  going th rough Congress. 
N oth ing  very unusual ab ou t th a t: except th a t, by com parison w ith  previous budgets, th is one has shrunk —  by 
ab ou t one fo o t and ten  inches, or 56  cm. M exico 's legislators no w  have a handy, 4 5 0 -p ag e  single-vo lum e sum m ary  
o f th e  budget to  consult, conta in ing a crisp synopsis o f each d e p artm en t's  aim s, m ain spending plans and  
p erfo rm an ce targets."
32 Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la  Federacion, Articles 8 th and 3 0 th.
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As it can be inferred from Diagrams 2.2 and 2.3, the whole budget cycle, from its draft and 
approval to the final steps of oversight, lasts almost four years. Due to the prohibition of re- 
election in Congress and the term  of office of the deputies for a single three year period, the 
legislators do not have the opportunity to participate in the whole budget cycle. They approve 
the budget in their first year, and then the budget is spent during their second year. By the time  
the ASF gives to the CV a first report about the Cuenta Publica, the deputies are out of office. 
This lack of synchronicity between the budget cycle and the permanence of the deputies in their 
elected positions is a remaining vulnerability in the Horizontal Accountability role of the 
Mexican Congress. In this case, the no-re-election rule represents a bidimensional weakness of 
accountability affecting both the horizontal institutions and the vertical mechanisms to render 
accounts.
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Diagram 2-2 Budget Cicle
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
N o v e m b e r
1 5 th
Jan 1 st to  
D e c 3 1 th
J u n e  1 0 th N o v e m b e r M a rc h  3 1 st A p r il 1 5 th M a y  1 5 th O c to b e r  1 5 th
Budget Bill 
approved 
by the 
Chamber 
of
Deputies
FISCAL
YEAR
SHCP 
submits 
the CP 
to  the 
Chamber 
o f
Deputies
ASF present 
its
prelim inary 
report o f 
the CP
ASF presents its 
final report of 
the CP to  the 
Comision de 
Vigilancia (CV) 
w ith  tw o  
possible 
outcomes:
If observations 
are found, the 
ASF w ill request 
the  respective 
public servant or 
governm ent 
office to provide 
fu rthe r 
explanation
If the  ASF finds 
th a t public funds 
have been 
m isappropriated, 
it produces a 
d iffe ren t kind of 
observation in 
o rder to  recover 
the funds.
The ASF 
gives to  the 
CV a firs t 
report about 
the state o f 
observations
The audited 
agency can 
answer 
observations 
till th is date. 
In case o f no 
answer 
w ith in  the 
next 15 days, 
the  ASF has 
the  au thority  
to  impose 
financial 
sanctions.
The audited 
agency has 
till this date 
to  restore the 
funds to  the 
Public 
Treasury or 
the  ASF w ill 
begin the 
legal
procedures 
to  recover 
them .
The ASF 
gives a 
second 
report to  
the
Chamber of 
Deputies 
about the 
state of 
observations 
and given 
answers.
Source: Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion.
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2.4.4 The oversight o f the Cuenta Publica 
The audit of the Cuenta Publica has the objectives of:
1. Verification that: a) the government's costs and payments are aligned with market 
prices; b) the quality of public works is acceptable c) government offices abide by the  
statutory regulations over public expenditure and the provisions established in the  
budget.
2. Oversight of the subsidies and investment projects provided by the federal government 
to the states, municipalities,33 state owned companies and private entities. The process 
of oversight has the aim of certifying that the resources were used as programmed in 
their respective budgets.
3. Certification that public expenditure was invested according to the government's 
programmes and objectives (Manjarrez, 2002:142).
If the ASF detects any anomalies in the supervision of the Cuenta Publica, it must take  
preventive and corrective measures. Fifteen months after the end of the fiscal year, the ASF 
presents a report of its "observations" of the Cuenta Publica. The term  observaciones, as used 
by the ASF, is a political euphemism to highlight potential wrongdoings or incomplete 
information in the financial transactions of the public administration. If observations are found, 
the ASF will request the respective public servant or government office to provide additional 
explanations and clarifications of any possible confusion in the information presented in the  
Cuenta Publica.
The audited agency has 45 days to answer the observations. If the period of 45 days passes and 
the audited agency does not present its clarifications, or an explanation for the delay, the ASF 
has the authority to impose financial sanctions and may request the dismissal of the public 
servant in charge. These penalties do not cancel the obligation to respond to the original
33 State governm ents are in charge o f overseeing th e  subsidies to  m unicipa lities.
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request of observations. The Treasury Ministry is required to submit a report twice a year to the 
ASF on the procedures it has undertaken to recover the sums that were defrauded (LFSF, 
Arts.56). From 2002 to 2005, the oversight of the Cuenta Publica produced 12,133 observations, 
of which the audited government bodies have clarified 93.5% (ASF, 2007:224).
When the ASF finds that public funds have been misappropriated, it produces a different kind of 
observations that are intended to recover the funds as well as clarifying the information. The 
audited agencies have a 45 day period, w ithout extension, to restore the funds to the Public 
Treasury, or the ASF will begin legal procedures to recover them . If this proceeds, financial 
sanctions and criminal charges follow. Public servants have three kinds of legal responsibilities 
derived from the observaciones of the ASF:
•  Direct responsibility falls upon the public servants, private individuals or companies that 
have perpetrated the wrongdoings.
•  Subsidiary responsibility is borne by the immediate superior of the public servant who 
had direct responsibility.
•  Shared responsibility corresponds to the public servant, private individual or company 
that participated in the wrongdoing.
The ASF has the authority to verify the performance of the Sistema de Administracion Tributaria 
(Inland Revenue Service, SAT). If the ASF detects a possible fiscal evasion, it can request the SAT 
to perform a direct tax audit to determine the amount in question. The ASF can request a 
government agency to impose direct sanctions upon public servants or other individuals who 
have broken the law or an administrative norm. In addition, the ASF can present evidence and 
judicial accusations to the Procuradurla General de la Republica (Public Prosecutor Office, PGR) 
(Manjarrez, 2002:144). The ASF can solicit the Tesorena de la Federacion (Federal Treasury, 
TESOFE) for the sequestering of goods or capital of the accused person or organisation. Every six 
months, the Finance Ministry has the obligation to submit a report to the ASF and the Chamber 
of Deputies, presenting the amounts recovered as a consequence of the observations.
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2.4 .5  The ASF observations and the rescue o f the Mexican banking system
As a result of the oversight of the Cuenta Publica of FY 2000, in the revision of the financial 
bailout of the Mexican banking system, the ASF reported observations for 47,139 million pesos 
(£3,287 million)34. The observations did not necessarily indicate unlawful actions. In the  
following months, the Treasury Ministry, bank regulators and the institution in charge of the  
administration of the bank rescue (IPAB) gave proof and explanation for about 38,674 million 
(£2,670 million), which represented 82% of the total rescue package for that year. W ith respect 
to 8,465 million pesos (£617 million), the authorities did not provide enough information to  
justify the allocation of public money to the banks. According to the ASF, this amount came 
from bad loans and interest that should have been absorbed by the banks and not the public 
treasury.
In the oversight of the Cuenta Publica 2001, the ASF reported additional observations for 45,409  
million pesos (£3,396 million) that presumably were misallocated to the financial system. From 
this sum, the respective authorities justified 18,362.4 million pesos (£1,373 million). An 
additional 25,896 million pesos (£l,936.9m illion) were not classified as legitimate transactions, 
so the public treasury should not have been responsible for this share of the bailout. According 
to the ASF, the total for both years amounted to 34,360 million (£2,570 million) and were  
required to be repaid according to the following procedures, depending on the type of bank: For 
banks that survived the crisis, the value of the misappropriated funds (25,860.8 million pesos) 
was deducted from future payments of the financial rescue package. For the banks that were
34 M e th o d o lo g y  fo r  currency conversion: The M exican peso was co nverted  in to  UK pounds (and vice versa) using 
data fro m  INEGI. The exchange ra te  is a yearly  average fo r  th e  m ean o f th e  sale and purchase price, th a t is, th e  
price o ffe red  to  th e  public and th e  price a t w hich banks buy th e  fore ign currency. For th e  sake o f consistency, every  
a m o u n t in pesos w as converted  to  an a m o u n t in pounds fo r th e  sam e year. For exam p le , 1 ,0 0 0  pesos o f 20 03  
correspond to  £ 5 6 .4 1  o f 20 03 .
Exchange r a te s (1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 7 )
1995 1996 1997 1 9 98 1999 20 0 0 20 0 1 2002 20 03 2 0 0 4 20 05 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7
l£ = X  Pesos X 10 .27 11 .96 13 .04 1 5 .34 15 .53 14 .34 13 .37 14 .78 17 .73 2 0 .8 2 1 9 .71 2 0 .2 6 21 .9 2
1 P eso=Y  £ Y 0 .0 9 7 0 .0 8 4 0 .0 7 7 0 .0 65 0 .0 6 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 75 0 .0 6 8 0 .0 5 6 0 .0 4 8 0 .0 5 1 0 .0 4 9 0 .0 4 6
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rescued and then sold to new owners, the ASF requested the Secretaria de la Funcion Publica 
(form er Secodam) to  do an inquiry and establish sanctions or press for criminal charges.
The federal government took the ASF to the Supreme Court to challenge the demand to reduce 
future payments to the banks as a way to recover the misallocation of public funds. W ith this 
legal action, the government defended the banks' interests with the argument that the ASF did 
not have the authority "to order" the reduction of imminent transfers of public money to 
bolster the financial system. The Supreme Court ruled that the ASF, as a support agency of the  
Congress, has the authority to suggest but not to give orders to the Executive Branch. A majority 
vote in the Congress can force the Executive to take a certain course of action, but that 
constitutional capacity is reserved for the deputies and senators and not a congressional 
supporting agency. As a consequence of the judicial verdict, the ASF limited its actions to 
"recommending" that the Secretaria de la Funcion Publica should follow up the inquiries and 
the recovery of the public funds that are presumed to have been misallocated in the bank 
rescue. The Supreme Court rulings, first regarding the ASF and then on the bank rescue, 
diminished the powers and autonomy of the SAI, but have also been part of its 
institutionalisation process. The decisions of the Court have clarified the capabilities and 
limitations of the ASF that were not expressly included in the law.
2.4 .6  Budget resources and the audit capabilities o f the ASF
Dye and Stapenhurst described the minimum requirements that ought to be fulfilled by the 
institutional design of a SAI. The new legal fram ework for the ASF fulfilled the principles 
outlined by Dye and Stapenhurst (See Table 2.4), although an adequate institutional design does 
not guarantee the functionality of an agent of Horizontal Accountability. The legal fram ework  
should entitle the SAI to apply directly for the necessary financial means to the public body that 
decides the allocation of the national budget (INTOSAI, 1977). Lack of financial or human 
resources for a SAI would mean that the legal aspiration for accountability could be transformed
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in to  an u n fu n d e d  m a n d a te  35 B udget lim ita t io n s  have re s tra in e d  th e  ASF's a u d it capab ilitie s . In 
M e x ico 's  F inancia l A cco u n ta b ility  Assessm ent, th e  W o rld  Bank (2003 :30) s ta ted : " th e  ASF is an 
in s t itu t io n  s till in fo rm a tio n , it  is n o t possib le  to  show  resu lts  o r s ig n ifica n t s tre n g th s  and 
w eaknesses in its m anagem en t. H ow ever... (its) s till in c ip ie n t o p e ra tio n a l capac ity  w ill n o t be 
su b s ta n tia lly  im p ro ve d  unless it is g ra n te d  an a dequa te  b u d g e t."
Table 2-4 Dye &  S tapenhu rs t P rincip les and M exican  SAIs
P rin c ip les C M H * A S F * *
1. C rite r ia  fo r  th e  s e le c tio n  o f  th e  a u d ito r  g e n e ra l o r  e q u iv a le n t p o s itio n YES YES
2. T e rm  o f  serv ice YES YES
3. P ro v is ions  fo r  r e t ir e m e n t  o r  dism issal N O YES
4. Im m u n ity  fro m  lia b ility  fo r  th e  a u d ito r  g e n e ra l YES YES
5. R e q u ire m e n t to  re p o rt  re g u la r ly  r a th e r  th a n  a n n u a lly N O YES
6. R igh t to  h ire  an d  f ire  SAI e m p lo y e e s NO YES
7. R igh t to  c o n tra c t o u t p ro fe s s io n a l services YES YES
*C ontaduria  M a y o r de H acienda  
* *A u d ito ria  Superior de la Nacion.
Source: Ley de fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion; Ley de la C ontaduria M a y o r de Hacienda
For FY 2004, th e  ASF requested  th a t th e  C ham ber o f D epu ties  d o u b ie  its budge t fro m  588 
m illio n  pesos (£29 .4  m illio n ) to  1,286 m illio n  pesos (£64 .3  m illio n ) .36 A cco rd ing  to  ASF 
p ro je c tio n s , 234 m illio n  pesos o f th is  sum  w e re  to  be d is tr ib u te d  b e tw e e n  th e  s ta tes ' SAIs th a t 
show  th e  w ill to  co -o p e ra te  w ith  th e  Federal Congress in th e  a u d it o f dece n tra lise d  funds . The 
D eputies igno red  th e  reques t and d e te rm in e d  th e  ASF bu d g e t fo r  FY 2004 a t 613.8  m illio n  pesos 
(£30.7 m illio n ) .37 As seen in Table 2.5, in th e  n ine  bu d g e t p roposa ls  fro m  2000 to  2008, in fo u r  
years (2000, 2001, 2005 and 2008) th e  ASF o b ta in e d  th e  fu n d s  to  co ve r its fu ll budge t reques t; 
also in five  years (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007) it o b ta in e d  an average o f 18.65%  less th a n  
th e  requested  budge t. H ow ever, th e  average does n o t re f le c t th e  w ide  va ria tio n s  fro m  one  yea r
35 According to  th e  US Congressional Glossary an unfunded m an d ate  is a req u irem en t im posed by Congress on state  
or local governm ents w ith  no funding to  pay for it. Through In ternet: w w w .c -
span.org/congress/g lossary/unfunded.htm , consulted April 25 th 2005.
36 Proyecto de Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion  fo r 2004.
37Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion 2004. Through In ternet:
h ttp ://w w w .s h cp .ss e .g o b .m x /c o n ten id o s /p resu p u es to _e g reso s /te m as /p e f/20 04 /p o r_ ram o s /tem a s /to m o s /0 1 /r01  
_ep.p df, consulted M a y  31st 2004
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to  th e  n e x t, e sp e c ia lly  2002  and 2004 . W ith  an a c c u m u la te d  in f la t io n  o f  4 1 .6 5  %38 in th e  p e rio d  
2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 8 , th e  b u d g e t o f  th e  SAI g re w  36 .6%  in rea l te rm s .
T ab le  2-5  R eques ted  and o ff ic ia l b u d g e t fo r  th e  SAI (M illio n s  o f  c u r re n t M e x ica n  pesos)
Requested O ffic ia l Budget D ifference
D ifference
(%)
2000 415.93 415.93 0.00 0.00
2001 493.71 493.71 0.00 0.00
2002 704.99 549.49 -155.50 -22.05
2003 620.38 588.00 -32.38 -5.20
2004 1,286.48 613.88 -672.60 -52.30
2005 680.98 680.98 0.00 0.00
2006 725.96 721.88 -4.09 -0.56
2007 971.33 843.67 -127.66 -13.10
2008 929.39 929.39 0.00 0.00
Sources: B udget pro jects and official budget repo rts  2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 8 . Through In te rn e t:
h t tp : //w w w .d ip u ta d o s .g o b .m x /L e y e s B ib lio /re f/p e f_ 2 0 0 8 .h tm , h ttp : //d g p p .s e p .g o b .m x /P P T O /p rin c ip a l2 .h tm , 
consulted M arch  2 0 th, 20 08 .
F igure  2-2 Real g ro w th  o f  th e  b u d g e t g ive n  to  SAI c o m p a re d  to  th e  p re v io u s  ye a r 
1 4 %
12%
10%
8%
6 %
4 %
2%
0%
- 2 %
Source: C onstructed  by th e  a u th o r fro m  Federal B udget Decrees.
38 Last da ta fo r in fla tion : M a y  20 0 8
2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7
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The fin a n c ia l lim ita t io n s  o f M exico 's  SAI d e m o n s tra te d  a c o n flic t o f in te re s ts  b e tw e e n  the  ASF 
and th e  C ham ber o f D eputies, since th e  budge t o f th e  a cco u n ta b ility  s u p p o rtin g  agency is taken  
d ire c tly  fro m  th e  resources a lloca ted  to  th e  depu ties . B e tw een th e  years 2000  and 2008, th e  
b u d g e t o f th e  M exican  Congress has been an a lm o s t-co n s ta n t 0 .34%  share o f  th e  to ta l na tiona l 
b u d g e t (see Tab le  2.6). In th is  same pe riod , th e  bu d g e t o f th e  ASF re m a in e d  a lm o s t co n s ta n t 
w ith  an average o f 10.8%  o f th e  com b ined  congressiona l b u d g e t o f  b o th  th e  Senate and th e  
C ham ber o f D eputies.
Table  2-6 Percentage o f  th e  to ta l na tiona l b udge t a lloca ted  to  th e  Congress and percen tage  o f
th e  Congress b udge t a llo ca ted  to  th e  SAI
C o n g re s s /T o ta l 
N a tio n a l B u d g et
S A I/C o n g ress
~ ~ 2 0 0 4 0 .3 3 % ~” l l  3 0 %
2 0 0 5 0 .3 5 % 1 0 .7 0 %
2 0 0 6 0 .3 5 % 1 0 .4 0 %
2 0 0 7 0 .3 3 % 1 1 .2 0 %
2 0 0 8 0 .3 5 % 1 0 .4 0 %
A v e ra g e 0 .3 4 % 1 0 .8 0 %
Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la  Federacion  (2 004-08 )
If th e  bu d g e t o f th e  Congress rem a ins cons tan t, th e  C ham ber o f D epu ties  w o u ld  have to  take  
resources fro m  its ow n  poo l in o rd e r to  increase th e  fu n d s  o f th e  ASF. The D eputies  lack 
incen tives  to  increase th is  fu n d in g  above its "m in im u m  ind ispensab le ".
Table 2-7 P ercentage o f th e  to ta l na tiona l bu d g e t a lloca ted  to  th e  Congress, 2004
A rgen tina Chile M ex ico
(2000-08)
USA
0.59% 0.40% 0.34% 0.17%
Source: Constructed by th e  au tho r w ith  in form ation from  N ational budget docum ents. Through In ternet.
W ith  its  c u rre n t budge t, th e  ASF is capable o f a u d iting  a sam ple  th a t re p resen ts  1.9% o f th e  
to ta l fe d e ra l b u d g e t (Fuentes, 2008). The a ud ited  bu d g e t sam ple  in OECD co u n tr ie s  ranges fro m  
5% to  9%. A t c u rre n t bu d g e t levels, th e  ASF w o u ld  have to  l im it  its  a c tiv itie s  to  th e  325 aud its
121
CHAPTER 2 - FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN MEXICO
performed in 2003. Table 2.7 present the share of the Congressional Budget with regard to the 
total national budget to provide context for Table 2.8, which shows that in 2004 the Mexican 
Congress allocated a smaller share of its budget to its SAI than other legislatures.
Table 2-8 Financial resources of the ASF as percentage of the legislative budget
compared to other SAI, % (2004)
Chile* United States** Canada Mexico U K ***
34.7 17.6 17.6 10.5 12.1
Sources: Constructed by th e  au th o r w ith  in form ation  fro m  national budget 
docum ents th rough In te rn e t.
*T h e  C om ptro lle r G eneral o f Chile is in d ep en d en t fro m  th e  Executive and th e  
Legislative Branch.
* *T h e  data o f th e  US Congress excludes th e  budgets fo r  th e  Library o f th e  
Congress and th e  O ffice o f th e  A rchitect o f th e  Congress.
* * *  This percentage is th e  result o f th e  addition  o f th e  n e t op era tin g  costs o f 
both Houses o f P arliam ent plus th e  NAO budget fo r 2 0 0 0 -0 1 .
W ith the evidence presented above, it is possible to argue that the ASF lacks proper funding to 
increase the size of the audited budget. Table 2.9 shows that the ASF has one half of the budget 
of the SFP, but its responsibilities are more extensive. If the comparison includes the 230 
internal audit offices inside the Executive branch, the ASF budget represents 1 /10  of the entire 
structure controlled by the internal audit of the Executive.
Table 2-9 Human and Financial Resources ASF vs. SFP
Resources ASF SFP
Number of Employees (2008) 1,571 222,441
Budget 2003 (Millions of pesos) 929 111,520
Audited bodies
Executive, Congress, Judicial branch, 
independent organisms and co­
ordination for the oversight of 
decentralised funds to the states
Executive
Sources: Federal Budget 2003; Transparencia M ex ican a , "D iagnostico Institucional del Sistem a  
Federal de Control (DSFC)"; A u d ito ria  Superior de la Federacion, 2 0 0 3 .R eform a, O ctob er 2 7 th, 
2003
The ASF argues that an increase in its budget would reflect an efficient investment of public 
money because, through its audit report, it would reduce government waste and
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misappropriation of funds. According to ASF data, for every dollar invested in its budget, it 
recovered $1.78 between 2000 and 2003, while the Secodam recovered only 72 cents out of 
every dollar invested in its budget.39 These figures should be taken with scepticism, since the 
ASF publish them  as an argument to increase its budget, under the premise of the efficiency 
returns as a result of its performance.
2.4.7 Institutional relationship between the ASF and the SFP
The ASF and the SFP have the mandate to audit the finances of the federal government and 
oversee its compliance with the resources allocated in the appropriations bill. Both 
organisations have to resolve the operationalisation of the 'double wham m y' between the 
internal and external audit institutions. The internal audit institution of the times of 
presidentialism had to coexist with the external audit institution that emerged from the 
transition to democracy and a Congress with plural political forces.
The internal and external audit bureaus have some supplementary functions that can give rise 
to confusion. In order to reduce the risks of redundant oversight and to promote a 
complementary approach, in May 2001, the ASF signed an agreement with the then-Secoc/om to 
co-ordinate actions, prevent duplication, and strengthen the oversight capabilities over the  
Executive branch. This was the first tim e that the internal and external audit institutions 
formalised their willingness to assist each other with their responsibilities. The agreement is in 
line with the constitutional precept of division of power and the laws that regulate the Auditoria 
Superior de la Federacion.
In a reflection over the relationship of the two institutions, the World Bank Accountability 
Assessment (2003:29) stated that the agreement "does not seem to be the correct way to 
formalize these types of institutional commitments...the delimitation and compatibility of
39 The ASF tu rn ed  dow n tw o  fo rm al requests fro m  m e fo r th e  m eth odo log y on ho w  th ey  produced these figures.
123
| CHAPTER 2 - FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN MEXICO
functions between the ASF and the SFP must be carefully analysed and defined to avoid 
overlapping and redundant audits."
In the agreement the Secodam commits to: A) Share information about the basic audit 
programmes applied to the ministries and agencies of the Executive Branch. B) Inform the ASF 
about the audit results. C) Through the internal control bureaus, Secodam can request the 
report received in answer to the observations made by the ASF. The agreement also establishes 
that the ASF will present the results of its audits to the Secodam. All the information is to be 
open between the two institutions, with the exception of documents that had been classified as 
confidential. The most politically relevant aspect of the agreement was that Secodam 
acknowledged that the ASF was an institutional partner in the accountability process of the 
budget cycle. A ministry under the structure of the Executive regarded a Congressional 
supporting agency as a collaborative partner. This equal treatm ent between the two institutions 
would have been unthinkable in the times of presidentialism.
A World Bank report (2003:30) stated that the analogous functions of the SFP and the ASF, in 
addition to "the major difference in operational capacity between both entities, have created 
confusion with respect to how viable the coexistence of both institutions may be... Opinions 
have been expressed to strengthen the ASF and restrict the scope of the SFP to the function of 
Administrative Development."
The overlapping responsibilities of the ASF and the SFP could be corroborated by examining the 
legal basis of both institutions. Table 2.10 presents a comparison of the tasks granted to the 
SFP, as stated in Article 37 of the Ley Organica de la Administracion Publica Federal (Internal 
Law of the Public Administration, LOAPF) that have common characteristics with the 
institutional responsibilities of the ASF.
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Table 2-10 O verlapp ing  re sp o n s ib ilit ie s  o f  th e  SFP and ASF
Legal R e sp o n s ib ilitie s  o f  th e  SFP
D o e s  th e  ASF p e rfo rm  
a s im ila r  task?
In s p e c t th e  e x p e n d itu re  a llo c a tio n s  an d  o v e rs e e  th e ir  a lig n m e n t w ith  th e  
c r ite r ia  e s ta b lis h e d  in th e  fe d e ra l b u d g e t.
Yes
O v e rs e e  th e  legal an d  fin a n c ia l a c c o u n ta b ility  o f  g o v e rn m e n t b u re a u s  an d  
p u b lic  s e rv a n ts .
Yes
S u b s titu te  o r  s u p p o rt th e  c o n tro l b u re a u s  in th e  a u d it  p ro c e d u re s  o f  th e Yes
p u b lic  a d m in is tra t io n .
Legal R e sp o n s ib ilitie s  o f  th e  SFP D o e s th e  ASF p e rfo rm  
a s im ila r  task?
In v e s tig a te  th e  c o n d u c t o f  pu b lic  s e rv a n ts  th a t  m ig h t c o n s t itu te  
a d m in is t ra t iv e  m is d e m e a n o u rs , a p p ly  th e  re s p e c tiv e  sa n c tio n s , an d  if 
a p p lic a b le  press fo r  c r im in a l ch arges .
Yes
O v e rs e e  a n d  a u d it  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  p u b lic  w o rk s  an d  th e  fin a n c ia l 
a g re e m e n ts  b e tw e e n  g o v e rn m e n t o ffice s  a n d  c o n tra c to rs  fro m  th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r.
Yes
P e r fo rm  th e  a u d its  a n d  e v a lu a tio n s  d e c id e d  on  its o w n  o r  re q u e s te d  by th e Yes, b u t a u d its  a re
SHCP. re q u e s te d  by th e  
C h a m b e r  o f  D e p u tie s
O rg a n is e  a n d  c o o rd in a te  th e  in te rn a l c o n tro l sy s tem  an d g o v e rn m e n t  
e v a lu a tio n .
N o , ju s t  e x te rn a l a u d it
A p p o in t e x te rn a l a u d ito rs  fo r  s ta te  o w n e d  c o m p a n ie s  a n d  s u p erv is e  th e ir  
p e rfo rm a n c e .
N o
A p p ro v e  th e  o rg a n is a tio n a l a n d  e m p lo y m e n t s tru c tu re  o f  th e  M in is tr ie s  
a n d  e n tit ie s  th a t  c o n s t itu te  th e  F e d e ra l G o v e rn m e n t.
N o
C o n d u c t an in v e n to ry  o f  th e  rea l e s ta te  o w n e d  by th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t. N o
O rg a n is e  an d  o p e r a te  th e  civil se rv ice  o f  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t. N o
P ub lish  th e  n o rm s  an d  in te rn a l re g u la tio n s  o f th e  in te rn a l sy s tem  o f  c o n tro l 
o f  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t.
N o
Source: Ley Organica de la Adm inistracion Publica Federal; Ley de la E ntidad de Fiscalizacion Superior de la 
Federacion.
The legal re fo rm  and co n flic ts  in th e  S uprem e C ourt have ra ised th e  p ro file  and th e  pub lic  
aw areness o f th e  ASF as a key in s titu tio n  o f bu d g e t a c c o u n ta b ility  in M ex ico . In its p rev ious 
in s titu tio n a l fo rm , th e  C ontaduri'a  M a y o r the  H acienda  was a w eak s u p p o rtive  agency o f  a 
Congress th a t had a m in o r ro le  in th e  p o lit ica l system . The p o lit ica l h e ig h t o f th e  Executive 
ove rshadow ed  any m edia in te re s t in Congress. Secodam  was acknow ledged  by th e  press as th e  
m ain  in s titu tio n  in charge o f g o v e rn m e n t a cco u n ta b ility . F igure 2-3 show s a com parison  o f th e  
n u m b e r o f tim e s  th a t th e  m ain M exican  new spapers (El F inanciero, M ile n io , R eform a  and El
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U n ive rsa l)  have  m e n t io n e d  th e  ASF and th e  S ecodam  in th e  pas t fo u r  yea rs . These n u m b e rs  
have  th e  s h o rtc o m in g  o f  o n ly  c a p tu r in g  th e  n u m b e r o f  t im e s  th e  in s t i tu t io n  w as m e n tio n e d  and 
n o t th e  p ro m in e n c e  o f  th e  m e n tio n  (e.g. f r o n t  page o r  in n e r pages). H o w e v e r, F igure  2-3 show s 
in c re a se d  co ve ra g e  o f  th e  ASF by th e  p o lit ic a l press. In 2001 , th e  ASF w as m e n tio n e d  201 tim e s , 
w h ile  by 2007  th is  n u m b e r had ju m p e d  a b o ve  500 . G ra d u a lly , th e  M e x ic a n  press has been  g iv in g  
m o re  a tte n t io n  to  th e  SAL
F igure  2-3  N u m b e r o f  t im e s  th e  ASF and S e c re ta r ia  de la  F unc ion  P u b lica -S ecodam  have been  
q u o te d  in m a jo r  M e x ica n  n e w sp a p e rs  (2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 7 )
2000 
1800 
1600 
1400 
1200
1000
800
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400
200
ASF
SEC O DA M  or 
SFP
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sources: w eb pages  o f new spapers El Financiero, M ilen io , R efo rm a, and El U niversal. H its fo r: ASF OR "A ud ito ria  
S up erior de la F e d e ra c io n "/ S e co d am / SFP OR "Secretaria  de  la Funcion Publica" b e tw e e n  2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6 .
2.5 Conclusion
D u rin g  th e  70  ye a rs  o f M e x ica n  p re s id e n tia lis m , th e  fo r m e r  C o n ta d u r ia  M a y o r  de  H a c ie n d a  w as 
an agency  sh aped  by its  p o lit ic a l ro le  and its  in s t itu t io n a l des ign . A  p re s id e n c y  n o t a c c o u n ta b le  
to  o th e r  p o w e rs  m ade  p o lit ic a lly  im p o ss ib le  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  a u to n o m o u s  in s t itu t io n s  o u ts id e
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the realm of his influence. Metaconstitutional presidentialism  was able to flourish because state 
institutions, isolated from Executive pressures, did not exist. The evolution from the Contaduria 
M ayor de Hacienda (CMH) into the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF) was part of the 
process of institutional change that built the basis for a new political system in Mexico. The 
CMH had a trust deficit and institutional inadequacies that did not fit the needs of an 
empowered Congress. The new ASF became an institution "willing and able" to perform its role 
as the external auditor of government financial transactions. Through the ASF, the Chamber of 
Deputies reduced the asymmetry in the analysis and audit of budget information.
As Table 2-11 shows, the ASF has widened the scope and number of audits over the Cuenta 
Publica. The CMH, the form er SAI, performed mostly regularity audits, which had the aim of 
verifying that the audited entities used their resources in conformity with the criteria approved 
by the Chamber of Deputies. Since the review of the Cuenta Publica for FY 1999, the ASF also 
performs special audits, which oversee transfers and subsidies which are categorised as 
"atypical financial operations" of the federal government. In 2003, the ASF started to do 
tracking audits, which are an oversight-follow up of the recommendations originated in the  
audits of the previous years. The ASF performs exceptional audits, when the Oversight 
Commission demands a financial investigation over a particular government bureau, because of 
a suspicion of corruption.
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Table 2-11 A u d its execu ted by th e  Public A ccoun t by typ e , CMH-ASF (1993-2006)
A u d it
ty p e /F Y
P e r fo rm a n c e R e g u la r ity
S pecial
a u d its
Process
tra c k in g
E x c e p tio n a l
s itu a tio n s
T o ta l
1 9 9 3 5 5 1 5 5 1
1 9 9 4 552 5 5 2
C M H
1 9 9 5 6 4 9 6 4 9
1 9 9 6 6 7 0 6 7 0
1 9 9 7 7 2 6 726
1 9 9 8 6 0 5 1 6 * 5 7 6
1 9 9 9 * * 23 4 5 0 3 6 5 0 9
2 0 0 0 * * 2 4 2 5 7 3 1 3 1 2
2 0 0 1 2 4 2 4 8 35 3 0 7
ASF
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 4
2 4
226
2 1 9
4 2
4 6 9
—  —  —  —  —
2 9 2
2 9 8
2 0 0 4 4 4 2 7 3 4 2 13 3 3 7 5
2 0 0 5 51 4 8 1 3 2 9 1 5 7 4
2 0 0 6 72 5 7 8 4 6 8 2 7 0 6
*For 1998 a unique audit on Ram o 33  was included as regularity audit.
**P u b lic  Accounts o f 1999 and 2000 w ere  revised by th e  ASF as stipu lated in tran sito ry  articles o f the Ley de 
Fiscalizacion (Audit Law), even though it begins its fo rm al activities for Public Account 2001 .
Sources: In form e de Resulcados de la Revision y Fiscalizacion Superior de la Cuenca Publico 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005 and 2006  (ASF 20 01-2 008 ); In form e sobre la Revision de la Cuenta Publica Federal 1998 (C M H  2000).
H ow ever, i f  S ecoge f was an in s titu tio n a l p ro d u c t o f th e  pres idenc ia lism o , th e  ASF has som etim es 
been labe lled  as an in s tru m e n t o f po lit ica l pa rties  ins ide  th e  C ham ber o f D eputies. As Apreza 
Reyes show s (2004 :22), depu ties  have been know n  to  o rd e r a u d its  aga inst th e ir  po lit ica l 
enem ies, m ean ing  th a t th e  ASF can be used as a paw n by p o lit ica l pa rties , as in th e  fo rm e r 
reg im e th e  P res iden t used Secogef.
The ASF rep re se n te d  an in s titu tio n a l im p ro v e m e n t in te rm s  o f inde pe n d e n ce  and techn ica l 
capacity . H ow ever, its fu ll in s titu tio n a lis a tio n  is s till in process and severa l S uprem e C ourt 
ru lings are s till d e fin in g  th e  uncha rted  co rne rs  o f its  legal fra m e w o rk . H ow ever, th e  process o f 
app rova l o f  its  in s titu tio n a l design and th e  new  SAI its e lf m arked  th e  sign o f th e  tim es : th e  
congressiona l in it ia t iv e  and the  Judic ia l ve rd ic ts  d ra w  th e  b lu e p rin ts  and ca p a b ilitie s  o f th e  ASF. 
For th e  f irs t t im e  in 175 years, th e  Executive has had a su p p o rtin g  ro le  in th e  process o f d ra ftin g  
th e  in s titu tio n a l design o f th e  SAI.
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The creation of the ASF strengthened the rendering of Horizontal Accountability of the 
Executive towards the Congress. The unprecedented political plurality inside the Legislative 
Branch and in state governorships forced the President to a new kind of Horizontal 
Accountability towards subnational governments. Through the decentralisation process, the 
President and the Federal Government were forced to end the discretionary mechanisms of 
financial transfers to states and municipalities. During the times of the metaconstitutional 
presidentialism, the President had a strong control over budget expenditure at federal and 
subnational level. After an intense process of decentralisation, the presidency lost its grip over a 
large share of government spending. Chapter 3 explains how the transition to democracy led 
the President to release a substantial portion of the federal budget to subnational authorities.
&
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CHAPTER 3 DECENTRALISATION AND PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Being fo r or against decentralisation is not enough. The following should also be clear: why, when and 
how decentralisation is to be encouraged (or discouraged); what trade-offs are involved; a t what speed it 
should proceed; in what sectors and fo r what functions decentralisation would be introduced first; what 
specific forms it should take; toward which levels of government it can most easily be implemented and
what precautions or correcting measures should be introduced with i t
Prud’homme [1995:2)
The previous chapter explained how the Congress created a new SAI to strengthen the President's 
accountability. Chapter 3 argues that through decentralisation, the federal Executive was forced to  
render accounts to subnational authorities. Here, I will contend that the transparent allocation of 
transfers to states and municipalities reduced the President's capacity to use the federal budget 
for political manipulation. The chapter will analyse how the discretionary criteria for allocating 
transfers to subnational authorities were replaced by clear and predictable formulas approved by 
the new plural Congress.
During most part of the 20th Century, the federal nature of the Constitution was overridden by the 
centralising synergies of the PRI monopoly and presidentialism. In a quasi-single party system, the  
Mexican President controlled the appointment of PRI candidates to elected positions at federal, 
state, and even municipal level. Electoral competition at local level brought new life into the formal 
arrangements of Mexico's federalism. For the first tim e, subnational political forces called for more 
financial accountability from the federal government. For Riker (1964) the most important variable 
defining the nature of the federal regime is the level of competition within the party system. This 
chapter addresses how the evolution of Mexico's democracy, and its party system, defined the  
outcome of decentralisation under the structure of a federal Constitution.
In 1980, the states signed a fiscal revenue sharing agreement with the federal government in order 
to surrender their main taxation powers in exchange for sharing increased federal transfers. The
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centralisation of taxation was based in the arguments of the regional asymmetries of the tax bases 
and the unevenness of revenue administrations in states and municipalities. As a consequence of 
the federal fram ework, the decentralisation of spending treated all Mexican states as equals, 
despite the differences in their accountability infrastructures.
The decentralisation process started as a Presidential initiative, where states and municipalities 
had to absorb their new tasks, w ithout regard for their capacities to administer public expenditure. 
Mexico's decentralisation was in its origins a deconcentration of earmarked resources and 
administrative burdens from the central government, rather than a vertical dispersion of policy 
making and political power. During the twilight of presidentialism, the process of decentralisation 
strengthened the political autonomy of Mexico's subnational authorities. This chapter contends 
that expenditure decentralisation combined with the declining of presidentialism gave the  
governors unprecedented political autonomy and turned them  into central figures of national 
politics.
3.1 Centralising taxes, decentralising expenditures
The centralisation of taxation responsibilities by the federal government, established in the  
system of fiscal coordination, acknowledged the economic asymmetries of the tax bases in 
Mexican states. As Mikesell (2007:22) affirms: "Tax bases are not evenly dispersed because there  
is an unequal geographic distribution of natural resources; hubs of commerce; and people within 
countries. A pattern of fiscal imbalance will emerge with almost any local tax source..." Graphs
3.1 and 3.2 show how Mexico City concentrates the largest share of the tw o main sources of tax 
revenue: the Income Tax (60%) and the Value Added Tax (49%). The uneven geographical 
distribution of the tax bases was a strong argument in favour of the concentration of tax 
collection by the federal government. Antonio Alvarado, form er official in the Treasury Ministry 
affirmed in an interview: "It was a lot easier to modify the national fiscal coordination law rather 
than making each of the 2,500 municipalities and 32 states establish their own fiscal legislations 
and taxation systems."
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F igure  3-1 In co m e  Tax c o lle c te d  by S ta tes and  M e x ic o  C ity , 2006 .
Other states 
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Source: R eporte  de In fo rm acio n  O p o rtu n a  IQ  20 0 7 , INEGI, 20 0 7 .
F igure  3-2 V a lue  A d d e d  Tax c o lle c te d  by S ta tes and M e x ico  C ity , 2006 .
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To p re v e n t th is  p a tte rn  o f  im b a la n ce s , M e x ic o 's  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t k e p t c o n tro l o f  th e  m a in  
ta x a t io n  re s p o n s ib ilit ie s . In c o n tra s t, th e  d e c is io n  to  p ro m o te  th e  d e c e n tra lis a tio n  o f  e x p e n d itu re
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to states and municipalities disregarded the asymmetric capabilities of subnational governments. 
The decentralisation of spending gave equal treatm ent to states with differing administrative and 
accountability infrastructures.
3.2 The Municipio: the forgotten "cell"
According to its Constitution, Mexico is a federal Republic with three tiers of government: federal, 
state and municipal. The country's entire territory is divided into 31 states and a Federal District1. 
Governors are the state executives and are elected by popular vote for a six-year term , and re- 
election is forbidden.2 The states' legislative branches are represented by a unicameral Congress 
elected every third year, and immediate re-election of state deputies is also forbidden by the law. 
Each state is subdivided into municipalities,3 which are considered the foundation of Mexico's 
administrative and political organisation. In the law and political discourse, the municipio is 
enthroned as the "cell of government," because it is the closest authority to the citizens.
The ayuntamiento  is the collective government authority in each municipio, and is form ed by a 
municipal president (or mayor) in charge of the Executive Branch; and the cabildo, an assembly 
that is the "rough equivalent of the legislative branch" (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:60). The cobildo is 
in charge of the oversight of the municipal president, approving the budget of the municipio and 
voting all the local regulations of the municipality. However, the municipal assembly does not have 
the legal authority to approve laws; the state or the federal congresses approve all the laws that 
regulate the operation of the municipalities. As Diagram 3.1 shows, the cabildo is form ed by the  
sindicos (trustees) and several regidores (councillors or aldermen) with equal hierarchical status 
(Cabrero, 1999:10). The sindicos are in charge of municipal finances and also perform the  
equivalent function of an attorney general or legal representative of the municipality.
1 Each State has its ow n C onstitution. M exico  City, th e  Federal District, does no t have its ow n C onstitu tion  and its 
general go vernm en t s tructure is de fined  in A rtic le  12 2  o f th e  National C onstitution.
2 Each State Constitution has d iffe re n t crite ria  governing th e  re-election o f governors w h o  had gained th e  post th rough  
m eans o th e r th an  an election, such as a p p o in tm en t by Congress.
3 A t th e  end o f 2 0 0 7 , th e re  w e re  2 ,4 2 6  m unicipa lities in M exico . S tate congresses have th e  a u th o rity  to  subdivide th e  
te rr ito ry  o f a m unicip io  to  create a new  one.
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D iagram  3-1 S tru c tu re  o f th e  A y u n ta m ie n to
Executive
Branch
M u n ic ip a l P res ident
H L o c a l m in isters
Avimtamiento
Sindicos
Cabildo
Regidores
Every s ta te  has its ow n  secondary law  th a t es tab lishes th e  size o f th e  ca b ild o , w h ich  o rd in a r ily  is 
fo rm e d  by a range o f 5 to  20 m em bers, depend ing  on th e  d e m ograph ic  scale o f each m u n ic ip io . As 
an exam p le , Table  3.1 p rov ides th e  size o f th e  cab ildos  fo r  th e  10 m u n ic ip ios  w ith  th e  la rgest 
p o p u la t io n  in M ex ico  (2005). As th e  Table shows, th e  2 m un ic ip ios  fro m  th e  S tate  o f M exico  
(Ecatepec de M o re io s  and N ezahua lcoyo tl) have th e  sam e n u m ber o f s ind icos  and reg iaores, also 
th e  tw o  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o f Baja C a lifo rn ia  (M exica li and T ijuana) share th e  sam e s tru c tu re  in th e ir  
respec tive  a yu n ta m ie n to s .
Table 3-1 Size o f C abildo  in th e  10 m un ic ip ios  w ith  la rgest p o p u la tio n  in M exico .
M u n ic ip io S ta te
P o p u la t io n
(2 0 0 5 )
S ind icos R eg id o res
1 E c a te p e c  d e  M o re lo s S ta te  o f  M e x ic o 1 ,6 8 8 ,2 5 8 3 19
2 G u a d a la ja ra Jalisco 1 ,6 0 0 ,9 4 0 1 1 9
3 P u eb la P ueb la 1 ,4 8 5 ,9 4 1 1 23
4 T iju a n a Baja C a lifo rn ia 1 ,4 1 0 ,6 8 7 1 15
5 Ju arez C h ih u a h u a 1 ,3 1 3 ,3 3 8 1 18
6 Leon G u a n a ju a to 1 ,2 7 8 ,0 8 7 2 12
7 Z a p o p a n Jalisco 1 ,1 5 5 ,7 9 0 1 1 9
8 N e z a h u a lc o y o tl M e x ic o 1 ,1 4 0 ,5 2 8 3 19
9 M o n te r r e y N u e v o  Leon 1 ,1 3 3 ,8 1 4 2 27
10 M e x ic a li B aja C a lifo rn ia 8 5 5 ,9 6 2 1 15
Sources: Constructed by th e  au tho r using data from  Conteo 20 05  by INEGI, m unicipal w eb pages and 
h ttp ://w w w .e -lo ca l.g o b .m x
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The members of the cabildo are elected through a list included in the ballot of the candidates for 
municipal president. Because citizens vote for a list rather than for individual, it is not possible to  
split the votes between the different positions of the ayuntamiento  (Rodriguez, 1997:32). In most 
municipalities, the cabildo seats are allocated to different political parties in accordance with a 
semi-proportional distribution of the percentage of votes. In 30 out of 31 states, the municipal 
authorities are elected every three years. In Coahuila, the period was extended to four years in 
2002. In line with the Mexican Constitution, state laws forbid re-election for municipal 
representatives. As will be explained in the next section, the prohibition on re-election and the 
relatively brief period of the government term  have hampered the autonomy and performance of 
municipal governments.
3.2.1 The first step fo r  decentralisation: the municipal reform o f 1983
Just five days after his presidential inauguration, in December 1982, Miguel de la Madrid (1982- 
1988) sent a bill to Congress to reform Article 115 of the Constitution, which regulates the life of 
the municipios. W ith this reform, opposition parties were allowed to be part of the cabildo through 
a clause of relative proportional representation. In addition, the ayuntamientos became 
responsible for their internal administration and the management of their finances. The fiscal 
component of the reform transferred the collection of the property tax and w ater services from  
the states to the municipalities. Both taxation capabilities already belonged to the ayuntamiento, 
but in practice they were absorbed by state governments. However, few municipalities had the 
administrative infrastructure to collect tax revenues, and so to profit from fiscal decentralisation 
(Rodriguez, 1997:2). The law gave municipalities the ability to levy taxes, though this capacity was 
constrained by the challenge to transform the tax law into actual revenues. The hypothetical extra 
revenue was to be used to cover the cost of a wide range of public services like local police, 
drinking water, sewerage, public lighting and cleaning. Article 115 of the Constitution specified that 
the municipalities were responsible for providing these services.
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The 1982 Constitutional amendment determined that State Congresses would be in charge of the 
approval of the municipal revenues and the ayuntamiento  would have the freedom to determine  
the appropriations in their budget. This new freedom  of the ayuntamientos had the political 
constraint of an overreaching presidential power, with the capacity to veto the decisions of elected 
officials at all three levels of government. As will be explained later in the dissertation, this political 
constraint ended with the fall of presidentialism. The only expenditure constraint on the municipal 
authorities was the auditing capacities of the state legislatures, which gained the constitutional 
mandate to review and approve the financial accounts of the ayuntamientos. The process of 
approving municipal budget expenditures has three general stages common to most municipalities 
in Mexico. The Treasury of the ayuntamiento  receives the first budget drafts containing the  
financial needs of the different offices of the municipal public administration. Then the Treasury 
prepares a final draft that is presented for the approval of the ayuntamiento. Once the budget is 
approved by the municipal collective government, it is sent to the state legislature for its 
registration and publication.
For Martinez (2003:266) the 1983 reform did not enhance the autonomy of the municipalities, but 
rather gave constitutional stature to the political control that the state legislatures exercised over 
the ayuntamientos. Through the reform, the state's legislative hegemony over the municipalities 
became more formal and less arbitrary. The reform also clarified that in special circumstances, the  
state legislatures have the capacity to revoke the mandate of the entire municipal government or 
of one of its officials. The state legislatures also have control over the debt-financing capabilities of 
municipal governments. In the income part of the budget, the municipal government must request 
permission from Congress in order to contract debt. Ramirez Verdugo (2001:2-3) found that 
municipal presidents who share party affiliation with the state congressional majority tend to  
acquire more debt than the ayuntamientos with a different party affiliation from the congressional 
majority. A municipality governed by a party that has the absolute majority in Congress has a 20% 
greater possibility of having a higher debt than a municipio governed by a party with a simple 
majority, a 45% higher chance than one with a relative minority and an 89% greater chance than a
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municipal government with the same party affiliation as the minority in Congress (Ramirez 
Verdugo, 2001:133).
Although the Ley de Coordination Fiscal (Law of Fiscal Coordination, LFC) states that municipal debt 
can only be used for investment infrastructure, there are well-founded suspicions (Merino, 
2001:167) that loans are often used to cover current expenditures. The PAN federal deputy Moises 
Alcalde Virgen asks himself during an interview: "The Fortamun is a federal transfer for the  
strengthening of municipal treasuries, well, why are the municipalities in so much debt? If this 
federal transfer is to pay debt, right? Either it is not being used correctly, something in the design is 
not right or the Mayors have too many incentives to be very irresponsible" (Alcalde Virgen, 2008). 
The state legislatures have to give special authorisation when the repayment of the debt exceeds 
the 3-year term  of the municipal government. While intended as a political and financial overhaul 
of the structure of the ayuntamiento, the reform left untouched the clause for no consecutive re- 
election.
The prohibition of re-election in consecutive terms obstructs the abilities of municipal presidents 
to build a solid political base within their constituencies. The ban on re-election is the single most 
relevant legal provision that affects the autonomy of the municipalities. The right of citizens to re­
elect an incumbent municipal President would reduce the political control of governors and 
political party bureaucracies over local officials. Originally, the Constitution of 1917 forbade 
presidential re-election, but allowed the re-election of municipal authorities and members of 
Congress at the state and federal levels. A constitutional reform in 1933 forbade re-election in all 
elected positions. This measure increased the political control of the President and the PRI4 and 
weakened the autonomy and strength of regional political machines. Through the prohibition of 
re-election, the President was able to control the professional future of all Mexican politicians. In 
the words of Alonso Lujambio (1995:175):
4 Then called th e  P artido  de la Revolucion M ex ican a  (PRM ). The nam e PRI was fo rm a lly  in stitu ted  in 1946.
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In a rural, ungovernable country, dominated by regional strongmen (caciques), the rule of 
no-re-election might have positive effects: it created the basis of the governability in the  
Executive-Legislative relationship and solved the problem of the circulation of elites, which 
is one of the main challenges of an authoritarian regime.
Schlesinger (1994:39-40) identifies three types of incentives for professional politicians: 1) static, 
when the politician aims to gain re-election, if re-election is available, 2) progressive, when the 
politician desires to climb to higher positions and 3) discrete, when a politician sees his current 
position as a goal in itself and without particular concerns about his next job. W ith the cancellation 
of re-election, the President controlled the other tw o incentives identified by Schlesinger.
The lack of continuity of the municipal authorities hinders long-term municipal planning. Issues like 
urban development are hard to plan and implement in the span of a three-year government term. 
Once the municipal officials have gained basic knowledge and experience, they have to leave their 
positions to the newly elected administration. In cases where a different party wins the next 
election, it is common for the newly elected municipal President to replace most of the officials 
who worked with the form er government.
Table 3-2 shows the term  for municipal governments in 19 Latin American countries. Mexico and El 
Salvador have the shortest terms with 3 years and only Colombia, Mexico and Paraguay prohibit 
immediate re-election. The average term  in the 19 Latin American countries is 4.2 years. Costa Rica 
allows re-election for municipal Presidents but prohibits to it to  the federal congress. In the 19 
Latin American countries, Mexico is the only one that limits re-election of all elected positions.
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Table 3-2 M u n ic ip a l a u th o r it ie s  in Latin A m erica
C oun try Term
(years)
Im m e d ia te  re- 
e le c tio n  
in local g o v e rn m e n t
A rgen tina 4 Yes
Bolivia 5 Yes
Brazil 4 Yes
Chile 4 Yes
C olom bia 4 No
Costa Rica 4 Yes
Ecuador 4 Yes
El Sa lvador 3 Yes
G uatem ala 5 Yes
Haiti 4 Yes
H onduras 4 Yes
M exico 3 * No
N icaragua 6 Yes
Panama 5 Yes
Paraguay 5 No
Peru 4 Yes
D om in ican  Republic 4 Yes
U ruguay 5 Yes
Venezuela 4 Yes
* ln  th e  State o f Coahuila th e  period was ex tended to  4 years in 2002  
Source: Constitutions and M unicipal Laws of each Country, through In tern et.
3.2.2 The 1999 Reform
S eventeen years a fte r  th e  1982 c o n s titu tio n a l a m e n d m en t, a new  re fo rm  was im p le m e n te d  by th e  
Z ed illo  a d m in is tra t io n  in 1999. This new  m un ic ipa l re fo rm  c la rif ie d  th e  capac ities  o f th e  s ta te  
congress as th e  e n tity  th a t regu la tes th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  a yu n ta m ie n to s  and th e  o th e r  
tw o  tie rs  o f  g o ve rn m en t. The legal re fo rm s  con so lid a te d  th e  n o tio n  th a t  s ta te  leg is la tu res  are in 
charge o f  d ra ftin g  and a p p rov ing  the  legal fra m e w o rks  o f  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s . The 1999 re fo rm  also 
in tro d u c e d  a change o f w o rd in g  w ith  im p o rta n t p o lit ica l im p lica tio n s . Since 1917, th e  C o n s titu tio n  
had s ta te d  th a t each m u n ic ip a lity  w o u ld  be "a d m in is te re d "  by an a y u n ta m ie n to . The 1999
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constitutional am endm ent changed the word to "governed." Consistent with the previous 
municipal reform of 1982, the 1999 change failed to address the issue of immediate re-election of 
the ayuntamiento.
Considering the financial and political leverage of the state legislatures over the ayuntam iento , 
future reforms of the municipality will depend on political negotiations inside the local congresses. 
The increased plurality of state political forces might have a wider impact on municipal life than 
the reforms that are promoted through constitutional changes in the Federal Congress (Martinez, 
2003:268).
3.3 The fiscal structure of Mexican Federalism
3.3.1 The Constitution and subnational fiscal and expenditure procedures
Article 124 of the Constitution establishes that the states have the capability to execute all residual 
functions not expressly reserved for the federal government. For Courchene and Diaz Cayeros 
(2000:204), the Constitution reflects a serious distrust of the states, as it limits their authority by 
excluding their specific taxation and tariff rights, but expressly mentioning the federal and 
municipal taxation capabilities. Since the first draft of the 1917 Constitution, states and 
municipalities have been forbidden to contract debt from foreign governments or in foreign 
currency, and the debt that is acquired can only be used for investment in infrastructure.5 
Following the pattern stated in the federal Constitution, every year state executives are required to 
submit the budget bill to their respective congresses. However, each state defines the legal 
procedures, timing and contents of the budget bill.
In three different articles, the Constitution expressly defines the distribution of taxation authority  
among the three levels of government:
5 For an analysis o f op era tio na l costs and capita l in vestm ent a t th e  subnational level, see ch ap ter 4.
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1) Article 73 gives the federal Congress the exclusive power to establish taxes on gasoline, 
electricity, alcohol and tobacco.
2) Article 177 forbids state authorities from imposing any kind of levy on the transit of people and 
goods. As will be explained below, a secondary law establishes the formulas that distribute the tax 
funds between the federal government and each state. The legal capacities of the states are 
established in their respective constitutions and secondary laws. States do not have legal 
capabilities to approve any law that controverts the federal judicial framework, including taxes on 
people or merchandise that goes through their territories.
3) Article 115 regulates the competence of municipal governments, which are responsible for the 
provision of several public services. The same article establishes that the ayuntamientos can obtain 
income through tariffs on the provision of public services, property tax, and financial transfers 
from state and federal governments. Despite the fact that the Constitution defines the municipal 
governments as "free," their autonomy is limited because they do not have the capacity to write  
and approve laws. However, all the state constitutions allow the municipalities to present bill 
reforms before state congresses. In tax issues, each state Congress is required to discuss, reject or 
approve any levy proposed by the municipalities (Cabrero & Carrera, 2000:9-10).
In several cases reported by Martinez (2003:227), state congresses have vetoed the revenue bills 
of the municipalities. In her study, four municipalities6 presented new tax bases to  increase 
revenues, but the bills were rejected by the state congresses. All the municipalities took these 
controversies before the Supreme Court, but the verdict favoured the state congresses in all cases.
During 2005, the 300 municipalities with the largest populations accounted for 71.5% of the total 
revenue generated at the municipal level; the remaining 2,000 ayuntamientos have weak tax
6 The m unicipalities w e re  Rio Bravo and Ciudad V ictoria in th e  state o f Tam aulipas, City o f Puebla in Puebla and 
Cuernavaca in M o re los.
142
CHAPTER 3 -  DECENTRALISATION AND PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
a d m in is tra tio n s  a n d /o r  lim ite d  tax  bases (INEGI, 2007:86). As a consequence  o f th e  lack o f fu n d in g , 
severa l m u n ic ip a lit ie s  e ith e r p ro v id e  pub lic  services w ith  th e  s u p p o rt o f  s ta te  go ve rn m en ts , o r 
s im p ly  fa il in th e  q u a lity  o r coverage o f th e  services.
3.3.2 Low Tax revenues as a share o f GDP
As is show n in Table 3.3, M ex ico 's  ta x  revenues are low  as a share o f GDP. Exclud ing o il revenues 
and social se cu rity  paym ents , th e  g o v e rn m e n t revenues a m o u n te d  to  11% o f  GDP (on average 
fro m  2000 th ro u g h  2004). M o re  h igh ly  deve loped  econom ies  w o u ld  be expected  to  have a h igher 
p ro p o r tio n  o f ta x  revenues. H ow ever, M ex ico 's  tax  revenues are p ro p o r tio n a lly  lo w e r th a n  those  o f 
co u n tr ie s  w ith  s im ila r o r lo w e r GDP pe r cap ita  in Latin A m erica . O ne o f th e  reasons o f lo w  fiscal 
revenues is th e  ce n tra lisa tio n  o f ta x a tio n  re sp o n s ib ilit ie s  in th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t, as it  w ill be 
exp la ined  in th e  fo llo w in g  section .
Table  3-3 GDP p e r ca p ita  and ta x  revenues in Latin A m erica , 2005
C oun try Tax revenues as 
% o f GDP
GDP p e r cap ita  
($ USA)
Brazil 33.4 4,788
Chile 20.0 7,351
Bolivia 19.4 1,004
A rg en tina  a 19.3 3,975
U ruguay 18.7 5,219
C olom bia 18.2 2,669
N icaragua 16.8 841
Venezuela 15.6 5,427
M e x ico * 14.6 7,447
Costa Rica 14.2 4,609
Peru 13.8 2,920
Paraguay 12.6 1,289
G uatem ala 11.2 2,158
Ecuador 11.1 2,761
M e x ic o ** 9.7 7,447
Panama 7.1 4,799
"■Includes oil tax revenue * *  Excludes oil tax revenue,3 Data for Argentina: 2004
Sources: G overnm ent Finance Statistics Yearbook 2006, IM F; All th e  GDP data w ere  taken from  W orld  Economic 
O utlook Database, O ctober 2007; Data fo r M exico is from  th e  Treasury M in istry, SHCP; Data fo r Brazil is from  th e  
report Carga Tributaria no Brasil 2005, Coordenagdo-Geral de Politico Tributaria; Data from  Ecuador is from  Tax 
Collecting Agency, SRI (h ttp ://w w w .s ri.g o v .e e /s ri/p o rta l/se a rch F o rm s /s ta ts .d o ).
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3.3.3 The National System o f Fiscal Coordination
Mexico's original system of revenue distribution was created in 1953, with the first Ley de 
Coordinacion Fiscal (Law of Fiscal Co-ordination, LCF), although it wasn't until 1974 that all the  
states signed agreements to join the tax sharing system. Originally, the pool of federal distributable 
resources was collected only through a limited tax base excluding the main sources of fiscal 
revenue.
David Ibarra, form er Treasury Minister (1976-1981), stated in an interview: "Mexico had a 
concurring fiscal system that allowed each federal entity to make their own fiscal laws in their 
territories. The same happened on a smaller scale in each of the municipalities. This generated a 
series of distortions when it came to assigning investments and the exemption of taxes in each of 
the states. W e had a very weak fiscal system, which is why we created a single fiscal pool" (Ibarra, 
2008).
In 1980, the states signed a new revenue sharing agreement with the federal government to create 
the Sistema Nacional de Coordinacion Fiscal (National System of Fiscal Co-ordination, SNCF). The 
contract established that the states would surrender their main taxation powers in exchange for 
sharing federal transfers derived from the key sources of fiscal revenues. The criteria for 
distributing these tax revenues to local governments was established in the Law of Fiscal Co­
ordination, approved in 1978, but not enacted until 1980. The new fiscal scheme was the  
culmination of a process of centralisation of tax revenues that began with the first National Fiscal 
Convention of 1925 (Gutierrez, 2003:55).
The SNCF encouraged participation by state governments with the promise that the new scheme 
would give them more revenues than they could expect to raise themselves. The enactment of the  
SNCF was possible due to the cancellation of 383 state and 206 municipal taxes (Indetec, 1997:3).
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In an interview, Guillermo Prieto, undersecretary of Revenue in the Treasury Ministry (1978-1986), 
rem em bered the negotiation process with the states: "It was brutal, we had endless meetings and, 
sure, the basic topic was stated to the Secretary of Treasury; he went over it, gave his feedback, 
made some changes and then he'd present the generalities to the President, who had the final 
word. The President would approve or reject it, command a few  changes, but the actual building- 
process was always done by the people at the bottom . It took years, not months but years of 
negotiations (with the states) for the fiscal coordination. The states didn't complain too much 
because this reform implied a budget increase, and indeed, their resources did increase 
substantially" (Prieto, 2008).
There was no legal force that compelled the states to abandon their taxation capabilities, although 
the political dominance of the President and the extra revenues from  the oil boom made the 
agreem ent a palatable option. The truth is that the governors did not enjoy sufficient political 
autonomy to reject the offer; moreover, the financial agreement was highly beneficial in that the 
LCF created more predictable financial scenarios for state and municipal governments.
In an interview, David Ibarra, form er Treasury Minister (1976-1981) provides his interpretation of 
the issue: "States and municipalities were not very good at collecting taxes, because all the friends, 
close friends who finance political campaigns are always near by, ready to receive a tax exemption" 
(Ibarra, 2008). Jesus Silva Herzog, form er Treasury Minister (1981-1986) stated in an interview: 
"The basic judgem ent of the Treasury Ministry was that states were incompetent as tax collectors. 
There was a perception of lack of capacity and lack of honesty, and we sincerely thought that the  
federal government could do it better than the states (Silva Herzog, 2008)." Both form er Treasury 
Ministers were in charge of implementing the 1980 revenue sharing reform. Ibarra and Silva 
Herzog share their concern not only about the efficiency state revenue administrations, but also 
about the corruption practices in subnational governments. Later in the 1990s, those concerns 
were ignored when expenditure decentralisation moved in rapid steps.
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The 1980 a g reem en ts  to  ab ide  by th e  SNCF had a specia l append ix  fo r  o il-p ro d u c in g  sta tes, w h ich  
s ta te d  th a t  th e y  w o u ld  receive a d d itio n a l revenues in p ro p o r tio n  to  th e ir  hyd ro ca rbo n  p ro d u c tio n . 
P rio r to  th e  a g re e m en t, th e  local a u th o r it ie s  did n o t o b ta in  d ire c t b e n e fits  fro m  o il exp o rts , since 
th e  e x tra  revenues w e re  u n de r th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  fed e ra l g o ve rn m e n t. In a d d itio n , th e  
P re s id e n t and th e  fed e ra l bu reaucracy co n tro lle d  th e  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts  financed  by th e  oil 
w e a lth  (C ourchene  &  Diaz Cayeros, 2000 :127), m ean ing  th a t th e  f lo w  o f in ve s tm e n t to  s ta tes and 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  was sub jec t to  th e  d isc re tio n  o f th e  fe d e ra l Executive.
The p re m ise  o f th e  revenue-sharing  ag re e m en t was th a t th e  fe d e ra l g o ve rn m e n t w as a m ore  
e ff ic ie n t ta x  c o lle c to r th a n  th e  states. The lite ra tu re  on fisca l fe d e ra lism  argues th a t su b n a tio n a l tax  
a d m in is tra tio n s  are n o t o p tim a lly  e ff ic ie n t in th e  co lle c tio n  o f revenue  fro m  bases w ith  high 
g eog raph ica l m o b ility . The a rg u m e n t s ta tes th a t m o b ile  tax  bases, like  incom e o r la b o u r, w o u ld  
have in ce n tives  fo r  re lo ca tio n  to  o th e r  subna tiona l e n tit ie s  w ith  lo w e r taxes. In consequence , tax  
bases w ith  high m o b ility  o r w ith  revenue  sources "u n e v e n ly  d is tr ib u te d  am ong ju r is d ic tio n s "  
shou ld  be a d m in is te re d  a t n a tiona l level (N o rregaard , 1997 :55). The sam e a rg u m e n t d ic ta te s  th a t 
su b n a tio n a l g o ve rn m en ts  shou ld  a d m in is te r less m o b ile  ta x  bases like  p ro p e rty  (O ates, 1972:136). 
H ow ever, w h e n  th e  th e o ry  o f d e ce n tra lisa tio n  is a p p lied  to  a spec ific  co u n try , its geograph ica l, 
h is to rica l and c o n s titu tio n a l co n te x t d e te rm in es  th e  p o licy  o u tco m e . T h e re fo re , "(T )he  o p tim a l 
degree o f fisca l d e ce n tra lisa tio n  w ill va ry  su b s ta n tia lly  am ong  d if fe re n t soc ie ties" (O ates, 1972:31). 
Table 3 .4  show s th a t M exico  has th e  low es t share o f ta x  co lle c tio n  a t th e  sub n a tio n a l leve l o f all 
fe d e ra l co u n tr ie s  o f th e  OECD fo r  2005.
Tab le  3-4 Percentage o f to ta l tax  revenue  by Level o f G ov e rn m e n t in OECD Federal Countr ie s  
Country Federal State M unicipal Social Security
or Local Funds
1 9 8 5 2 0 0 5 1 9 8 5 2 0 0 5 1 9 8 5 2 0 0 5 1 9 8 5 2 0 0 5
A u s tra lia 1 8 1 .4 6 9 .2 1 4 .9 2 7 .9 3 .7 3 .0
B e lg iu m 6 2 .6 3 2 .2 - 2 4 .0 4 .8 5 .0 3 1 .0 3 7 .7
C an ad a 4 1 .2 4 4 .8 3 6 .0 3 8 .4 9 .3 8 .4 1 3 .5 8 .4
G e rm a n y 3 1 .6 3 0 .2 2 2 .0 2 1 .4 8 .9 7 .8 3 6 .5 3 9 .9
M e x ic o 8 7 .7 811 0 .4 2 .1 0 .6 1 .1 1 1 .3 1 5 .7
U n ite d  S ta tes 4 2 .1 4 1 .1 2 0 .2 2 0 .1 1 2 .6 1 4 .1 2 5 .2 2 4 .7
'j c i c i j ! ' 3 5^ ' ' 1^ ' ' '|| i")'^2 ' ' ^ 2211 '3 cl all receipts are appropria^ States and
territories. Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2006.
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M e x ico 's  po licy  m akers fo llo w e d  th e  a rg u m e n t estab lished  by th e  d e c e n tra lisa tio n  lite ra tu re , as 
th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t abso rbed  m ore  m ob ile  and lu c ra tive  revenue  sources (Incom e and V a lue 
A dded Tax), w h ile  su b n a tio n a l a u th o r it ie s  to o k  ove r th e  a d m in is tra t io n  o f p ro p e r ty  taxes. As it  w ill 
be analysed la te r in th e  ch a p te r, th e  p ro p o rtio n  o f p ro p e r ty  ta x  revenue  is e x tre m e ly  lo w  in 
co m p a riso n  w ith  o th e r c o u n tr ie s  in th e  OECD and Latin A m erica .
From  th e  pe rspective  o f M ex ican  taxpayers, th e  SNCF e lim in a te d  d o u b le  o r  even tr ip le  ta x a tio n  by 
th e  d iffe re n t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t. But, as a consequence o f th is  new  a rra n g e m e n t, sub n a tio n a l 
finances becam e heav ily  d e p e n d e n t on fe d e ra l trans fe rs . From  1979 to  1980, d u rin g  th e  f irs t  yea r 
o f th e  a g reem en t, s ta te -g e n e ra te d  tax  revenues w e re  reduced  by 54%, w h ile  th e  share o f fe d e ra l 
revenues increased in real te rm s  by 121% (G utie rrez, 2003 :55).
Locally ge n e ra te d  revenues have fa llen  as a p ro p o rtio n  o f to ta l s ta te  incom e fro m  17.6%  in 1994 to  
9.1% in 2008 (Incom e Laws fo r  all s ta tes and M exico  C ity, 2008). Table 3.5 show s th a t, in Latin 
A m erica , M ex ico  has ve ry  lo w  levels o f  subna tiona l ta x  revenue  in co n tra s t w ith  A rg e n tin a , Brazil o r 
Chile. H ow ever, M ex ico 's  ta x  revenue  in sta tes and m u n ic ip a lit ie s  is s im ila r to  o th e r  La tin -A m erican  
c o u n tr ie s  w ith  a high deg ree  o f ta xa tio n  ce n tra lisa tio n .
Tab le  3-5 Tax revenue  by level o f gov e rn m e n t as % o f GDP, 2 0 0 0 *_______
Country National Subnational governm ents Total
Governments
A rg e n tin a 1 2 .9 8 .3 2 1 .2
B ra z il* 2 0 .3 1 3 .9 3 4 .3
C hile 1 7 .8 1 .5 1 9 .3
C o lo m b ia 1 5 .8 0 .0 1 5 .8
M e x ic o 1 4 .9 0 .5 1 5 .4
P eru 1 4 .9 0 .3 1 5 .2
V e n e z u e la 1 2 .8 0 .0 1 2 .8
* Data fo r subnational governm ents includes transfers o f federa l taxes.
+ Includes contributions to  social security.
Source: w ith  data from  Banco de Mexico, 2003, w w w .banxico .org .m x; In fo rm e de los avances de trab ajo  de la 
Prim era Convencion H acendaria , h ttp ://c n h .g o b .m x /; Servicio de Im puestos Internos, Chile, Carga tr ib u taria  y 
tasas im positivas, w w w .s ii.c l.
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For C a b re ro  e t. al. (2 0 0 0 :1 1 ), " fe d e ra lis m  in M e x ic o  has m e a n t f in a n c ia l s u b o rd in a tio n  fo r  
s u b n a tio n a l leve ls  o f  g o v e rn m e n t. The c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t7 has ta k e n  th e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  fisca l 
re so u rce s , and  th e re fo re  it possesses th e  m o s t e la s tic  and a d e q u a te  re v e n u e  so u rce s ."  W ith  th e  
e n a c tm e n t o f  th e  SNCF, th e  s ta tes  lo s t th e ir  fisca l a u to n o m y , b u t th e  loca l a u th o r it ie s  g a in e d  th e  
p o lit ic a l a d va n ta g e  o f  n o t b e ing  d ire c t ly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  m a in  sou rces  o f  p u b lic  re v e n u e . The 
g o v e rn o rs  e n jo y e d  th e  p o lit ic a l re w a rd s  o f  b e ing  a t th e  e x p e n d itu re  end  o f  th e  b u d g e t cyc le . The 
c o n v e rg e n c e  o f  th e  re v e n u e -s h a rin g  a g re e m e n t and  th e  p rocess  o f  fin a n c ia l d e c e n tra lis a t io n  have 
c re a te d  a s itu a tio n  in w h ic h  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t is th e  m a in  p a r ty  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  p u b lic  
re v e n u e  c o lle c t io n , and  loca l a u th o r it ie s  a re  in ch a rg e  o f  th e  m a in  sha re  o f  e x p e n d itu re . W h e n  
re fe r r in g  to  th e  e x te n t and speed  o f  M e x ic o 's  d e c e n tra lis a tio n  o f  e x p e n d itu re , G iuga le  and  W e b b  
o b s e rv e d : "T he  b o ld  e x p e n d itu re -c u m -tra n s fe r  re v o lu t io n  in fisca l fe d e ra lis m  is im p re ss ive  
(2 0 0 0 :1 9 )."  As F igure  3-3 show s, in 1990  th e  Federa l G o v e rn m e n t sp e n t c lose  to  66%  o f  to ta l 
e x p e n d itu re  and s ta te s  and  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th e  o th e r  36% . For 2006 , s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  
s p e n t c lose  to  57%  o f  a ll to ta l e x p e n d itu re .8
F igure  3-3 T o ta l e x p e n d itu re  by  leve l o f  G o v e rn m e n t
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*  This percentage  excludes th e  budg et a llocation  fo r  deb t, pensions and au to n o m o u s s ta te  en tities  like th e  Congress, 
th e  Judicial Branch and IFE. Source: SHCP, 20 03 .
7 In th is  d isserta tion , is assum ed th a t "fed era l g o vern m en t"  is an e q u iv a len t to  "n atio n a l g o v e rn m e n t."  O th e r  au tho rs , 
like C abrero , use "cen tra l g o vern m en t"  as a synonym  fo r  "n atio n a l g o vern m en t."  Th e use o f th e  te rm  ce n tra l 
g o vern m en t can cause som e confusion in th e  case o f countries w ith  a fe d e ra l system .
8 This percentage does n o t include fe d era l d e b t service, g o v e rn m e n t em p lo yee s ' pension provisions o r subsidies to  
s ta te -o w n e d  com panies.
%
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3.3.4 Financial transfers and the Federal Budget
Intergovernmental transfers aim to balance the expenditure needs and the limited revenue 
capabilities of subnational authorities through sharing the tax and non-tax revenues of the federal 
government. These financial transfers also give a social and political dimension to fiscal federalism, 
because they integrate socio-economic criteria into the conditions and formulas of the transfers 
(Giugale & Webb 2000:19).
Participaciones and aportaciones are the tw o main mechanisms for federal transfers to subnational 
governments in Mexico. Participaciones are formed by tax revenues that correspond to local 
authorities, but are collected by the federal government under the guidelines of the SNCF. 
Aportaciones are earmarked federal transfers that cover the costs of key public services, like health 
and education, which were previously provided by the federal government but were decentralised 
to states. M ore regulations and conditions on the allocation of funds between levels of 
government mean greater centralisation; few er conditions imply greater decentralisation (Giugale 
& W ebb, 2000:19). Mexico combines strictly regulated and conditional transfers (aportaciones) 
with unconditional ones (participaciones).
Every year, the Chamber of Deputies approves the transfers to subnational governments as a 
component of the federal budget. Both participaciones and aportaciones are allocated in specific 
sections of the budget, which are called Ramos according to Mexican budgetary jargon. The 
classification of the budget by sections or Ramos aims to answer the question: Which entity is in 
charge of the administration and expenditure of these resources? The federal budget is composed 
of 39 sections or Ramos, each corresponding to a ministry, an autonomous entity or a government 
programme financed through budget allocations. The financial transfers to subnational 
governments are concentrated in Ramo 28 (participaciones), Ramo 33  (aportaciones) and Ramo 39 
(federal subsidies to strengthen state finances). Ramo 20  allocates the funds for human 
development and the anti-poverty programmes controlled by the Ministry of Social Development
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in th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t. The resou rces  o f  R am o  20  a re  s p e n t in s ta te s  and m u n ic ip a lit ie s , b u t 
th e  p o lic y  des ign , im p le m e n ta tio n  and in te rn a l a u d it  is p e rfo rm e d  by th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t.
T he  re so u rce s  tra n s fe rre d  th ro u g h  p a rt ic ip a c io n e s  a re  n o n -e a rm a rk e d  fu n d s  th a t  a re  s p e n t 
a c c o rd in g  to  th e  p r io r it ie s  and  p o lit ic a l in te re s ts  o f  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  (G iuga le  &  W e b b , 
2 0 0 0 :1 9 ). T he  p o o l o f  m o n e y  o f  th e  p a rt ic ip a c io n e s  (R am o  28) is fo rm e d  by th e  s ta te 's  sha re  o f 
n a tio n a l o il re ve n u e s , a lo n g  w ith  p ro ce e d in g s  fro m  th e  In co m e  Tax, VAT, excises and th e  ta x  on  
o w n e rs h ip  o f  n e w  and  used veh ic les . A cco rd in g  to  th e  Law  o f  Fiscal C o o rd in a tio n , th e  fe d e ra l 
g o v e rn m e n t is s im p ly  re tu rn in g  th e  re ve n u e s  th a t  le g it im a te ly  b e lo n g  to  th e  s u b n a tio n a l 
a u th o r it ie s . As th e  a llo c a tio n s  o f  R am o  28 a re  c lass ified  as "s ta te  re so u rce s ,"  th e  s ta te  C ongress is 
in ch a rg e  o f  th e  su p e rv is io n  and a u d it in g  o f th e  fu n d s .
S ince 1998 , R am o 3 3  o f  a p o rta c io n e s  c o n ta in s  th e  tra n s fe r  o f  fu n d s  fo r  e d u c a tio n , h e a lth  and  socia l 
in fra s tru c tu re . The  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  to  co v e r th e  d e c e n tra lis a tio n  o f te a c h e rs ' p a y ro lls  re p re s e n t 
tn e  la rg e s t ite m  in R am o 33 . The e a rm a rk in g  o f  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  l im its  th e  c a p a c ity  o f  s ta te  
g o v e rn m e n ts  fo r  d is c re tio n a ry  sp e n d in g  and "has  b ro u g h t n o t m u ch  a u to n o m y  b u t m o re  
a c c o u n tin g  fo r  fu n d s "  (C a b re ro  &  C arre ra  200 0 :1 6 8 ).
F igure  3 -4  D is tr ib u t io n  o f  R am o 33  tra n s fe rs
1 .7 %
to s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6  ave rage
■ Education Fund
■ Public Health Fund
■ Infrastructure Fund
■ Multiple Fund
■ Municipal Fund
■ Security Fund
Technical and adult 
education Fund
Source: A u th o r research fro m  SHCP Data.
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R am o  39  o f  th e  F edera l B udge t w as c re a te d  in 2 0 03 . The g u id e lin e s  fo r  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th e s e  
re so u rce s  w e re  n e g o tia te d  b e tw e e n  th e  c e n tra l and  s ta te  g o v e rn m e n ts . The a im  o f  R am o  39  is to  
in c re a se  th e  f in a n c ia l s ta b il ity  o f  loca l a d m in is tra t io n  th ro u g h  d e b t re fin a n c in g , p e n s ion  p ro v is io n s  
and  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  th e  a d m in is tra t io n  o f  loca l re v e n u e . As th e  re so u rce s  o f  R am o  39 a re  le g a lly  
re g is te re d  as fe d e ra l fu n d s , th e  fe d e ra l C ongress, th ro u g h  th e  A u d ito r ia  S u p e rio r de  la  F e d e ra c ion , 
has th e  legal c a p a c ity  to  a u d it th e ir  use and  a d m in is tra t io n . F igu re  3-5 show s th e  in c re a se  and 
c o m p o s it io n  o f  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts .
F igu re  3-5 T o ta l T ra n s fe rs  to  S tates and  M u n ic ip a lit ie s , 1 9 7 9 -2 0 0 7  (B illio n s  o f 2006  M e xican Pesos)
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■  Fund fo r Financial S treng then in g  o f S tates &  M u n ic ip a litie s  (FAFEF)
Sources: D iagnostico in te g ra l de la s itu a tio n  ac tu a l de las haciendas es ta ta les  y m u n ic ip a ls , 2 0 0 7 , SHCP.
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F igure  3 -6  sh o w s  th e  2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 6  ave rage  o f  to ta l s ta te  re ve n u e s  in c lu d in g  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  and  th e  
s ta te 's  o w n  so u rce s  o f  re ve n u e . M e x ico  C ity  is a ra re  case because  43%  o f  its  to ta l re v e n u e s  co m e  
fro m  its  o w n  sou rces , w h ile  th e  n a tio n a l ave rage  is ju s t 9%.
F ig u re  3 -6  S ta te  re ve n u e s  by Federa l T ra n s fe rs  and S ta te  O w n  re ve n u e s , 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 6  a ve rage
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Source: O w n  research w ith  d a ta  fro m  INEGI. Due to  a lack o f in fo rm a tio n , average fo r S ta te  o f M e x ico  is 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 5 .
3.3.5 State Tax Dependence and Accountability
Besides th e  a p o rta c io n e s  and p a r t ic ip a c io n e s , th e  o th e r  tw o  sou rces  o f  re ve n u e  fo r  s ta te s  and 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a re  th e ir  loca l ta x  bases and d ire c t in v e s tm e n ts  o f  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t. The  a n t i­
p o v e rty  p ro g ra m m e s , g o ve rn e d  by th e  R am o 2 0  in th e  b u d g e t, a re  in v e s te d  in th e  s ta te s  and 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  b u t a re  a d m in is te re d  and c o n tro lle d  by th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t.
A fte r  th e  e n a c tm e n t o f  th e  SNCF, th e  s ta te s  re ta in e d  th e  lega l c a p a c ity  to  im p o se  ta xe s  on  b ee r, 
to b a c c o , s p ir its , p a y ro ll, h o te l o ccu p a n cy , ca r te n a n c y  an d  rea l e s ta te  sales, a lth o u g h  loca l 
a d m in is tra t io n s  have  n o t ta k e n  fu l l  a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e ir  fisca l ca p a c ities . M o s t o f  th e  s ta te s  and 
m u n ic ip a l re ve n u e  a d m in is tra t io n s  n e g le c t th e ir  o w n  c a p a b ilit ie s  fo r  ta x a t io n  and  re ly  o n  th e  f lo w
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o f  fe d e ra l m o n e y . T he  m assive  re lia n ce  on  c e n tra l tra n s fe rs  has w o rk e d  as a s tro n g  d is in c e n tiv e  
a g a in s t ta x  e f fo r ts  in s ta te s  and m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (C a b re ro  &  C arre ra , 2 0 0 0 :1 3 ). In 1990, c lose  to  76%  
o f  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n t in co m e  cam e fro m  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs , (SHCP, 2 0 0 3 : 44 ) w h ile  in 2 0 0 5  i t  w as 
86 .1 %  (SHCP, 2 0 0 7 :1 2 4 ) . As F igure 3 -7  show s, fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  have  g ro w n  a lm o s t te n  t im e s  fa s te r  
th a n  th e  in c re a se  o f  lo c a lly  g e n e ra te d  revenues .
F igure  3 -7  G ro w th  o f  Local R evenues vs. Federa l T ra n s fe rs  to  S ta tes, 1 9 8 9 -2 0 0 6
(M il lio n  Pesos o f  2006 )
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Source: C onstructed  by th e  a u th o r w ith  data fro m  INEGI, 20 07 .
T he fo rm e r  u n d e rs e c re ta ry  o f  th e  T reasu ry , G u ille rm o  P rie to , s ta te s  in an in te rv ie w : "T he  
re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  s ta te s  and th e  fe d e ra tio n  has a lw a ys  been  v e ry  c o n flic t iv e , in m y  o p in io n , 
w h e n  it com es  to  fisca l m a tte rs . The s ta te s  have  a lw a ys  w a n te d  resou rces , b u t in m y  o p in io n  
th e y 'v e  tr ie d  to  a vo id  th e  re s p o n s ib il ity  o f  ta x  c o lle c t io n . T h e y  d o n 't  w a n t to  go  th ro u g h  th e  t ro u b le  
o f  s ta in in g  th e ir  p o lit ic a l p o p u la r ity  i f  th e y  can a vo id  it, and  so th e y  g ra d u a lly  a cce p te d  la rg e r 
b u d g e ts  th a t  w e re  o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  fe d e ra l taxes . A  m e ch a n ism  w as d e s ig ne d  to  
d is tr ib u te  fe d e ra l resou rces  a m o n g s t fe d e ra tiv e  e n tit ie s  based on a fo rm u la  th a t  in c lu d e d  th e
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p ro d u c t fro m  w ith in  th e  c ity , th e  to ta l p o p u la tio n , etc... This fo rm u la  has su ffe red  m illio n s  o f 
changes, and th e  idea l ve rs ion  w ill never be reached because e ve ryb o d y  w a n ts  to  ge t m o re  and th e  
fe d e ra tio n  w a n ts  to  give less" (P rie to , 2008).
By 2001, a fe w  sta tes like Veracruz and Zacatecas had a pp roved  fisca l re fo rm s  in o rd e r to  deve lop  
th e ir  ow n  sources o f ta x  co lle c tio n . Both sta tes app roved  a payro ll ta x  th a t in th e  case o f Veracruz 
he lped  to  increase its tax  revenues fro m  70.6  m illio n  pesos in 2000 to  521.3 m illio n  pesos fo r  2001 
(SHCP, 2003 :30 ). In th e  1994-2005 pe riod , Zacatecas m ade a su b s ta n tia l c o n tr ib u t io n  to  th e  g ro w th  
o f ta x  co lle c tio n  fro m  th e  sta tes, w ith  a share o f 66.5%  o f th e  to ta l increase. From  2001 to  2005, 22 
s ta te s9 enacted  fisca l re fo rm s  to  crea te  new  taxes. The core  o f these  re fo rm s  was pa y ro ll tax, 
w h ich  o ffe re d  an easy basis fo r  increasing  revenue  (SHCP, 2007 :127 ). This pa y ro ll ta x  consists o f 
b e tw e e n  1 and 2% o f th e  la b o u r costs o f businesses loca ted  w ith in  th e  s ta te 's  te r r ito ry . Table 3.6 
show s th e  g ro w th  o f ta x  co lle c tio n  and those  sta tes th a t app lied  fisca l re fo rm s . The high g ro w th  o f 
tax  revenue , like  Q u e re ta ro 's  734.6% , can be exp la ined  due to  a ve ry  lo w  s ta rtin g  p o in t o f  local tax  
co lle c tio n . W ith in  a fe w  years, these  percentages o f g ro w th  shou ld  s tab ilize .
Table 3-6 G ro w th  in ta x  revenue  o f s ta tes w h ich  app lied  fisca l re fo rm s  re ce n tly  (percentages)
State 2005/2004 Tax and year o f im plem entation
Colima Payroll tax and public events in 2005
Guanajuato 659.9 Payroll tax and Cedular tax* 2005
Queretaro 734.6 Payroll tax in 2005
Chihuahua 9.4 Cedular tax 2005
*C edu lar tax is a license fee  applied to  professional activities, goods and building rents, and business 
activities. Source: Diagndstico In teg ra l de las Haciendas Publicas Estatales y M unicipales, SHCP 2007.
David C o lm enares, th e  fo rm e r tre a s u re r o f th e  s ta te  o f Oaxaca, s ta ted  in an in te rv ie w  fo r  m y 
d isse rta tio n  (2008): "G ove rno rs  o n ly  go to  th e  C ham ber o f D epu ties  try in g  to  ge t th e  fed e ra l 
g o ve rn m e n t to  g ive th e m  m ore  m oney; how ever, th e y  are ra re ly  conce rned  a b o u t th e ir  ow n 
incom e o r ta x  po lic ies, ve ry  ra re ly ."  M u n ic ip a lit ie s  also depend  heav ily  on fin a n c ia l tra n s fe rs  and do 
n o t take  advan tage  o f th e ir  ow n ta xa tio n  capab ilities . Less th a n  0.2%  o f GNP is co lle c te d  th ro u g h
9 During 2001, Hidalgo, Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, Veracruz and Tam aulipas established new  taxes; in 2002  
Tlaxcala, M ichoacan, Oaxaca, Sinaloa and Chiapas did so as well; in 2003 Q u ere taro , M ore los, Hidalgo and Michoacan; 
in 2004 Cam peche, Hidalgo, Colima and Yucatan; and for 2005 Colima, G uanajuato, Q u ere taro  and Chihuahua.
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the property tax, according to the Treasury Ministry (SHCP, 2007; 183), though municipalities could 
collect as much as 0.5% of GNP from this source (Cabrero, 2004:4). In addition, municipalities also 
have the responsibility of charging fees for the provision of w ater services, but according to the  
National W ater Commission, more than 60% of the w ater services are free.10
Jose Luis Romero Hicks, Treasury Minister of Guanajuato during the administration of the then  
governor Vicente Fox (1995-1999), stated in an interview: "Some states, like Tabasco, don't even 
charge for water. W hat I mean is that w ater is a public service that the people defray with their 
taxes, not with the payment of bills" (Romero Hicks, 2008).
3.3 .6  State Systems o f Fiscal Coordination
The current Law of Fiscal Coordination has been characterised by its lack of legislative stability. In 
the 25-year period following its enactment in 1980, the law was modified 26 tim es.11 These 
changes reflect the unstable nature of the agreement on how to distribute the national pool of 
fiscal revenues.
In contrast to the states, which receive direct transfer from the federal government, municipalities 
receive funds indirectly, depending on the formulas established by the local legislation or the 
allocation decisions of state congresses. Just as the federal government coordinates transfers to 
the states, they coordinate with the municipalities. The transfer of funds to municipalities takes 
place in two stages: first the federal government transfers the resources to state governments, and 
then these funds are allocated to the municipal authorities. The participaciones to municipalities 
are distributed with two different criteria for each stage of the transfer process: The first is 
determined at the federal level and governs the distribution of the pool among the states, and the  
second is determined by each state legislature based on its own criteria for distributing funds 
among the municipalities.
10 Comision N aciona l d e lA g u a  (2 001 ), Tarifas recaudacion y ag ua no contab ilizada. Through In ternet: 
h ttp ://w w w .c n a .g o b .m x /p o rta l/p u b licac io n e s /su b s ec to r2 001 /cap 2 .P D F  consulted M a y  2nd 20 04 .
11 The m ost recent re fo rm  w as published in th e  D O F 1 0 /0 2 /2 0 0 5 .
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The constitutional autonomy of the states limits the capacity of the federal government to transfer 
resources directly to the municipalities. Article 6 of the Ley de Coordination Fiscal states that the 
"Federation will deliver the participaciones to the municipios through the states." This 
constitutional scheme gave the states some precedence over the freedom and financial autonomy 
of municipalities. W ith the two-stage transfer, the state governments had some discretion in the 
distribution and timing of the allocation of funds.
The LCF was modified to establish a maximum period of five days in which the states had to pass 
on the transfers of participaciones to the municipal authorities. If state governments retained the 
participaciones for more than five days, they had to pay the interest rate established by the 
Federal Congress for this purpose. However, the enforcement of this clause of the law has been 
very weak in certain states. David Colmenares Paramo was treasurer of the state of Oaxaca from  
1986 to 1992, then from 2000 to 2006 he became the chief federal liaison officer between the  
Ministry of the Treasury and the financial ministries in the 31 states and Mexico City. In an 
interview for this dissertation, Colmenares Paramo (2008) said this about the discretionary 
management of the state governors in the financial transfers to municipalities:
"When Diodoro Carrasco was state governor of Oaxaca (then member of the PRI, governor from  
1992-1998) the state's capital12 transfer coefficient was 30% of the total. However, the  
municipality houses just the 8% percent of the population. When Diodoro was governor, the city of 
Oaxaca had its first Municipal President from the PAN. After the municipal election, a law was 
approved promptly in order to reduce the transfers to the city to 13% of the total. But the real 
payment was that of four or five percent, because the municipal presidents had no idea of what 
was the true percentage for their municipality's contributions." This discretional treatm ent over 
the financial transfers to another level of government resembled the informal capacities of 
presidentialism.
12 Oaxaca is both th e  nam e o f th e  state  capita l city and th e  w h o le  state.
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3.3.7 The Municipalities and the Law o f Fiscal Coordination
In th e  o rig in a l 1980 ve rs ion  o f th e  LCF, A rtic le  6 s ta ted  in a single paragraph  o f 45 w o rd s  th a t th e  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w o u ld  rece ive no less th a n  20% o f th e  p a rtic ip a c io n e s  a llo ca ted  to  th e  states. A 
q u a rte r  o f  a ce n tu ry  and e ig h t legal re fo rm s  la te r, A rtic le  6 takes fo u r  paragraphs and 330 w o rd s  to  
im p ro ve  th e  c e rta in ty  th a t th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ill receive th e ir  respective  fu n d s  in fu ll and in a 
t im e ly  m anner.
Table 3-7 R eform s to  A rtic le  6 o f th e  LCF in 1981 and 1983
B efo re  R eform s
T here  w e re  no  c lea r and d e fin it iv e  c r ite r ia  to  
d e fin e  h o w  th e  p a rtic ip a c io n e s  w o u ld  be 
d is tr ib u te d  am ong m u n ic ip a lit ie s .
There  w as no t im e  fra m e w o rk  to  tra n s fe r th e  
f unds fro m  th e  s ta te  to  th e  m u n ic ip a lity 's  
treasu ries . There  w e re  no pena lties  fo r  
delays o r  unexp la ined  re te n tio n  o f th e  funds .
A fte r  R eform s 
(Year o f R eform )
State  leg is la tu res estab lish  th e  c r ite r ia  fo r  
d is tr ib u tio n  o f th e  p a rtic ip a c io n e s  w ith  a genera l 
s tandard  fo r  all th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in each sta te . 
(1981)
The pa rtic ipac iones  m ust be handed o ve r to  th e  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  five  days a fte r  th e  s ta te  receives 
ih e m . Any de lay w ili ge n e ra te  th e  p a ym e n t o f 
in te re s t, and th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t w ill tra n s fe r 
th e  funds  d ire c tly  to  th e  m u n ic ip a lity  a t th e  
expense o f th e  re te n tio n  o f fu tu re  pa rtic ip a c io n e s  
th a t co rrespond  to  th e  s ta te  tre a su ry .(1 9 8 3 )
Source: Digital Library o f th e  Cham ber o f Deputies through In ternet: h ttp ://w w w .d ip u ta d o s .g o b .m x /b ib lio t/ 
docleg /refleyes.h tm , consulted M arch 14th 2006.
These changes to  A rtic le  6 fo rm a lly  reduced  th e  m arg ins o f d isc re tio n  th a t th e  s ta te  go ve rn m en ts  
o rig in a lly  had o ve r th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f fu n d s  a lloca ted  to  m u n ic ip a lit ie s . H ow ever, te s tim o n y  
co llec ted  th ro u g h  in te rv ie w s  fo r  th is  ch a p te r show  th a t, desp ite  th e  a m e n d m en ts  in th e  LCF, som e 
gove rno rs  re ta ined  d isc re tio n a ry  c o n tro l o ve r fin a n c ia l tra n s fe rs  to  m un ic ipa l a u th o r it ie s . Rosendo 
V illa rea l, th e  f irs t M u n ic ip a l P res ident fro m  th e  PAN in th e  c ity  o f  S a ltillo  (1991-1993), s ta te  o f 
C oahuila, re m em bers  in an in te rv ie w  fo r  th is  d isse rta tio n :
" I f  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  g o ve rn o r and th e  m un ic ipa l p re s id e n t w a s n 't good , th e y  w o u ld  
s im p ly  cu t you o f f  fro m  th e  budge t. Federal c o n tr ib u tio n s  cam e th ro u g h  th e  s ta te  g o ve rn o r and
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since there was no transparency at all, nobody could see how the money was being managed. I 
was the first municipal president from an opposing party in the city. W e received far less money 
than we ought to have got. Somebody here in Mexico City offered to tell me how much we should 
be receiving in exchange for some payment. I came to the Federal Ministry of the Treasury and 
explained the situation to them , so they told me that I was receiving a lot less than we were  
supposed to get... I can't remem ber the exact numbers now, but I think that (the state government 
was) keeping al least a forty percent of w hat we had to get. There was no transparency either. W e  
had no idea how much we could get and the local Congress was completely dependent on the  
governor. There was no chance to ask the Congress for help. In fact, the Congress was against us."
Francisco Barrio, governor of the state of Chihuahua (1992-1998) and Mayor of Ciudad Juarez 
(1983-1986) shared his experience for this dissertation (2008): "The state handled all the  
investment expenses, what happened to me and the other mayors from PAN in big cities of 
Chihuahua was that the governor set off a programme, so all that money was distributed in the  
small municipalities, who were governed by the PRI. (However) I had a good relation with the  
governor of the PRI obviously (Oscar Ornelas 1980-1985) and I managed to get his support in a few  
things, to convince him to give us money, but it was fully capricious behaviour."
Despite the fact that both testimonies could be considered as anecdotal evidence, Villareal and 
Barrio's experiences suggest that Horizontal Accountability provisions in the law were bypassed by 
the informal power of the governors. The financial opacity of state governors towards municipal 
presidents reproduced the informational asymmetries between the Federal Executive and 
subnational governments. Even though Barrio and Villareal give testimonies from  the 1980s and 
early 1990s, the dissertation will provide evidence that their individual experiences as municipal 
presidents reflect a weak accountability of state governors, which is still customary in some 
Mexican states. As Table 3.7 shows, Article 6 of the LCF had further amendments in the year 2000. 
The new round of reforms provided further mechanisms to  reduce the discretionary power of state 
governors in the management of the transfers to municipal governments.
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Table 3-8 Reforms to Article 6 of the LCF in 2000
Before Reforms
In some cases, when there was a bad 
relationship between the governor and the  
municipal authorities, the participaciones 
w ere "transformed" into infrastructure ! 
investment projects decided upon by the  
governor.
Data and information about the  
participaciones w ere not public and in ; 
some cases this information was not even 
shared w ith municipal authorities.
After Reforms 
(Year of Reform)
State governments are required to hand over 
the participaciones to the municipalities in 
cash with no conditions, and funds cannot be 
exchanged for investment in public works. 
(2000)
State authorities must publish annually in the 
government newspaper the calendar of the 
transfer handover, the percentages for each 
municipality and the formulas for distribution. 
In addition, every three months, the state is 
required report publicly on the funds 
transferred to municipalities. (2000)
Source: Digital Library o f th e  C ham ber o f D eputies th rough In te rn e t:  
h ttp ://w w w .d ip u ta d o s .g o b .m x /b ib lio t/d o c le g /re fle y e s .h tm , consulted M arch  14th 2006.
Some observers interviewed for this dissertation considered that the strengthening accountability 
of state governors is due more to the presence of strong opposition parties in the state congresses 
than to the amendments of the LCF. It is impossible to construct a common narrative for the 31 
states and Mexico City, as each region has its own singular characteristics. However, congressional 
plurality can be one relevant explanation of stronger Horizontal Accountability in some states.
In an interview, Jesus Silva Herzog compares the "accountability" of governors in the times of 
presidentialism, to the conditions at the beginning of the 21st Century: "W e have to understand 
that several political variables have changed. Back then, governors could not exercise a lot of 
political power because they had to look well behaved in the eyes of the President. Today they  
simply do not care about it because presidentialism does not have this central force that formerly  
was applied through the Treasury Minister... Today governors behave in an unaccountable way 
that was unthinkable back then (in the times of presidentialism) —  'You don't want to explain to  
me how you spent the 28 million I sent, well I wont send you a penny the next tim e.' Today that is
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not possible, because the governor is going to put political pressure upon the Treasury Minister, so 
he will have to surrender. Today that is feasible and frequent" (Silva Herzog, 2008).
David Ibarra, Treasury Minister during the Government of Jose Lopez Portillo, remembers: "Back 
then in the seventies, the petitions (of resources) from the states were taken care in the Federal 
Executive and they didn't follow a normative procedure. There was a serious authoritarian 
favouritism for one state or the other, depending on w hat was politically convenient... If there was 
waste or corruption the transfers were reduced, and the government investment was completely 
centralized... The Ministry of Finance acted as an accountability institution" (Ibarra, 2008).
3.3.8 State governments and the evolution o f the LCF
The LCF defined the size of the transfers to subnational governments through the creation of the  
Fondo General de Participaciones (General Fund of Participations, FGP). In the original version of 
the law, Article 2 established that the FGP would receive 13% of the total tax revenue collected by 
the federal government. In 1987, the allocation for the FGP changed to 17.3% of total government 
revenues. Two years later, in 1989, the share was increased to 18.1% and finally in 1995 it was 
settled at 20%, the share that has remained until the present (June 2008). The FGP was distributed 
among states according to the following criteria:
- 45.17%  in direct proportion to the number of inhabitants in each state for that fiscal year.
- 45.17%  based on the tax revenues generated by the tax bases of each state.
- The remaining 9.66% in inverse proportion to the participaciones per capita in each state.
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In 2007, a major reform  of the LFC changed the distribution of the FGP. Beginning in 2008, the new  
distribution of this fund is:
- 60% based on local GDP growth of the previous year.
- 30% according to an average of the last three years' growth of the state's own source of 
revenues from local taxes and w ater duties.
10% depending on the state's sources of revenue from  local taxes and w ater duties of 
previous year.
The FGP represents 85% of the total resources transferred as participaciones.13 As shown in Figure 
3-8, the remaining 15% is allocated through the revenues collected from  taxes on car ownership 
and new vehicles (7.6%), the Fund for Municipal Strengthening (3.7%) and the pool of resources 
from  tobacco, beer and alcohol taxes (1.5%).
Figure 3-8 Composition of total resources transferred as participaciones, Ramo 28  
Others
ISAN-IS1
4%
I EPS
2%
FOMUN 7% FGP: General fund o f 
Participaciones 
FOMUN: Fund fo r  M un ic ipa l 
S trengthening
ISAN-IST: Taxes on Car Tenancy 
and New Vehicles 
IEPS: Tobacco, Beer and 
A lcohol Taxes
Source: A u th o r ca lculation m ad e  using d a ta  fro m  th e  SHCP re p o rt a t th e  end o f th e  b u d g et cycle fo r  2 0 0 7
13 This ca lculation w as m ade using d a ta  fro m  th e  re p o rt a t th e  end o f th e  b u dg et cycle fo r  20 07 .
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The Law of Fiscal Coordination also establishes that the states are mandated to transfer at least 
20% of their respective share of participaciones to the municipalities (Art. 3A), although each state 
is free to design and execute the criteria to distribute the resources within their respective 
municipalities. In light of the high financial dependence of the municipalities on federal transfers, 
the municipalities are politically and financially subject to the local Congress. The power of the  
state legislature to define the criteria by which resources are distributed can determ ine the fate of 
the municipalities. Most of the subnational laws of fiscal coordination define the formula of 
distribution based on population, municipal tax revenue and/or levels of poverty. However, in 
cases where the governor's party also controls the majority of the legislature, the state Executive 
can administer the resources to undermine or bolster the finances of the municipalities.
De Remes (1998:4-5) identifies four possible electoral outcomes that would determ ine the political 
relations among local congresses, state government and municipal authorities. These political 
outcomes could determ ine the transfer of resources to the ayuntamientos as well as the strength 
of the financial oversight:
- Unified government: The governor, the state Congress m ajority and the municipal president 
share the same party affiliation.
- Overlapping government: The municipal authority is from a different political party from  
the state Congress majority and the governor.
- Divided government: The municipal president shares party affiliation with the governor, but 
the majority of the Congress is in the hands of the opposition.
- Divided executives: The municipal president shares party affiliation with the majority of the  
Congress but the governor belongs to a different party.
The main beneficiaries of the 1983 municipal reform were the governors because they still had 
legal control over the flow of federal transfers to the municipalities (Rodriguez, 1997:150). Tello 
(2002:4) found that local politics might play a role in the allocation from  states to municipalities, as 
there are wide variations of transfers to different municipalities with no apparent pattern. There is
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no clear relationship between the size of the transfers from the states and the efficiency of 
municipal tax collection (Martinez, 2003:226-28). As stated above, each state establishes its own 
distribution methods, criteria and allocation priorities to transfer funds to the municipalities.
In 1990, just five states had local laws of fiscal coordination to organise revenue sharing between 
state and municipal authorities. In the other states, the distribution of resources was established in 
an annual decree by the state Congress or was included as an appendix to the state budget 
(Mijangos, 1996:628). W ithout state laws of fiscal coordination, the state Congress had the power 
to change the criteria guiding the allocation of resources from one year to the next. This regulatory 
vacuum left open the opportunity for wide political discretion in the transfer of participaciones to  
municipios.
By 2008, 29 states had approved statutory regulations governing the allocation of resources to the  
municipalities.14 These laws determ ine the allocation formulas for redistributing the transfers to 
different municipalities within the states. As with the distribution of federal revenues, the limited 
tax bases make the sharing of subnational resources a zero-sum game between the municipalities 
of each state.
3.4 The fiscal outcome of decentralisation
According to Oates (1998:97), the optimum efficiency of decentralised public services occurs when 
local governments raise most of their revenue from the taxes, fees and levies on their own 
constituencies, with intergovernmental transfers serving solely as an income supplement. The 
larger the federal transfers to subnational governments, the lower is the incentive to collect taxes. 
In contrast to Oates' theoretical scheme, the fiscal outcome of Mexico's decentralisation has been 
an immense transfer of expenditure to subnational governments combined with a high degree of 
tax dependence (Diaz Cayeros, 2004:209).
14 A rticle 73  (XXIX, G) o f th e  C onstitution establishes th a t th e  state Congresses w ill fix  th e  percentage o f th e  electric ity  
consum ption tax  a llocated to  th e  m unicipalities.
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Musgrave et. al.{ 1973:6) state that a condition of economic efficiency in the provision of public 
goods is that the provider should be the level of government closest to the users of the service and 
its costs should be absorbed by the residents of the community. In theory, the internalisation of 
the benefits of these public goods ought to be compensated by an equivalent payment to the local 
tax administration. One of the premises of fiscal federalism is that the authority required to  
provide a service should be responsible for collecting the taxes to pay for it. The issue is not just a 
fiscal problem, as it also affects the performance accountability of local authorities.
As shown by Shah (1998:94), a significant delinking of taxation and spending responsibilities leads 
to accountability problems in the local public sectors. If the citizenship complains about the low 
quality of public services, local governments can shift the blame to a lack of financing by the  
federal government. The current Mexican system of centralised taxation and decentralised 
spending has created politically unaccountable governments that are not fully responsible for 
policy outcomes. The tax co-ordination system was the result of an agreement between federal 
and state governments, under which local authorities delegated taxation power to the federal 
government in exchange for increased transfers.
On the revenue side of the fiscal equation, Mexico's policy makers acknowledged the differences 
between the administrative and revenue collecting capacities of states and municipalities. As there  
are wide disparities among Mexico's subnational governments, the federal authority absorbed the  
administration and collection of the most important tax revenues. However, on the expenditure 
side of the equation, the decentralisation process treated all states and municipalities as if they  
had equivalent capacities for the management and accountability of public spending. Mexico's 
expenditure decentralisation was treated not as a process where subnational entities build 
administrative capacities in parallel to the absorption of new responsibilities, but as consummated 
decision where states and municipalities had to absorb their new tasks, no m atter whether they  
were ready or not.
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3.4.1 The politics o f decentralisation
In political speech and academic research, decentralisation is often put forth as a goal in itself. This 
dissertation assumes that decentralisation is a policy tool, the goal of which is to increase the  
efficiency of public finances and improve the provision of public services. As with any other policy 
instrument, decentralisation can succeed or fail depending on its planning and execution. The 
incentives inherent in the institutional design of the decentralisation process have an impact on 
the achievement of its policy objectives (North, 1990:135). The governance gains of 
decentralisation also depend on the interaction between the policy aims and the political 
objectives of the entire process.
Riker (1964) argues that the most important variable shaping the nature of the federal regime is 
the level of competition within the party system. Based on this premise, this analysis also 
addresses how the evolution of Mexico's democracy and party systems interacted with the 
federalist nature of the Constitution. Haggard (1999) points out that decentralisation is not simply 
a technical or administrative problem, but also a political and institutional issue. Alongside with the 
transformation of the political party system, Llerenas (2004:15) analysed the role of health and 
teaching unions in the move toward decentralisation in Mexico: "Decentralisation was a way to 
manage the crisis of the welfare state by trying to bypass corporate actors; improve the delivery of 
the services; increase local financing and divert conflict." Prud'homme explains (1995:3) that the 
concept of decentralisation implies the double notion of an ongoing process and an outcome that 
results from this process. The next section will explain the process, its outcomes and its 
consequences for the Horizontal Accountability of the President towards the subnational 
governments. Decentralisation in Mexico will be explained as a process that evolved in tw o stages, 
corresponding to the presidential terms of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994- 
2000). The sexenio of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) represents the outcome of the decentralisation 
process, started by the two previous governments.
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3.4.2 From Ramo 26 to Pronasol: the budget in the president's service
During the presidential term  of Miguel De la Madrid (1982-1988) the funding of several investment 
programmes for states and municipalities was concentrated in one regular budget line called 
Regional Development or Ramo 26, which was created in 1982 (Haggard, 1999:42; Gutierrez, 
2003:56). The rules for the allocation of federal transfers were neither clear nor permanent; each 
year the criteria for allocation were included in the text of the federal budget as part of a 
negotiated agreement between the federal and state governments. As there was no institutional 
mechanism for budget transfers, the investment priorities and expenditure preferences of the  
President could be inferred from the geographical allocation of Ramo 26. W ith political control 
over the Chamber of Deputies, the President had ample room to impose his expenditure 
preferences in the budget decree.
Francisco Barrio, form er Governor of Chihuahua, remembers the relationship of the state 
executives and the federal government during the times of the presidentialism: "There were times 
where we governors had to spend much of our tim e in Mexico City looking after undersecretaries, 
secretaries and the President (lobbying for money). Now it is extremely unusual that a governor 
would visit the ministers, because there are smaller pools of discretionary resources. But... still in 
the times of President Salinas there were thousands of millions every year. It was a big fund where  
the President could really make the difference. When a project was proposed to the President or 
some funds requested, he really had the possibility to respond and act. This gave way to a lot of 
asking for favours and requesting: '...Excuse me, M r. President, sorry to bother you...' W e were  
promised copious amounts of money, but it was not transparent, it was like... 'Come over here to  
the back, and you will be given the money and bang... you got it'" (Barrio, 2008).
Otto Granados, press secretary of President Salinas (1988-1992) and form er PRI governor of 
Aguascalientes (1992-1998) remembers his negotiations with federal authorities: "During my 
administration I worked with two presidents, Salinas and Zedillo. I have to say that, as for me, and 
as for the government of Aguascalientes, we frankly had good access and good negotiation
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capacities with both presidents. I'll give a few  examples: I had worked very closely with Salinas in 
the past so surely he'd help me with my requests —  Pedro Aspe (the then Treasury Minister) was a 
gatekeeper you had to get past if you wanted something from the Ministry of the Treasury —  so I 
would say to the President: "we need this much money for im portant works of infrastructure/' so 
he (President Salinas) would refer me to Pedro Aspe. Then, I'd go to the Treasury and they would 
reduce my budget request by 15 or 10%. But the point of it is that at the end of the day I always 
got something... I never had a problem negotiating anything: roads, federal highways, 
infrastructure, nothing (Granados: 2008)."
Jose Antonio Alvarado, a high ranking official in the Undersecretariat of Budgeting in the  
administration of Salinas and Zedillo, commented on the financial dependence of states from  the  
perspective of the federal government: "In a very discretionary way, the federal government had a 
huge amount of power through the management of the resources and its ability to determ ine the  
when, where and how they were going to be used. There was a federal programme made through 
coordination agreements (between the states and the federal government) and (federal) decisions 
could easily change the agreements. For example, a certain amount of money would be allocated 
to the state of Guanajuato for the w ater and sewage programme and a minute later the figure 
would be reduced. The federal government controlled all this and was allowed to either slow down 
the process of authorisation for the resources or to demand a series of bureaucratic measures 
from the states in order to postpone the transfer indefinitely" (Alvarado, 2008).
During the Salinas administration (1988-1994) the funds of Ramo 26 were exploited as electoral 
assets for the PRI (Molinar & Weldon, 1994:133). Pronasol, a demand-based anti-poverty  
programme assigned under Ramo 26, became the hallmark of the president's political strategy. 
Nora Lustig (1994:94-96) emphasises the political use of Pronasol when she argues that the  
strategy for resource allocation was not related to the level of poverty in the communities. During 
Salinas's six-year government, Pronasol quadrupled its fraction of the federal budget, from  US$500 
million in 1989 to US$ 2.2 billion in 1993 (Rodriguez, 1997:81). During the first tw o years of 
Pronasol (1989-91), the process of expenditure and programme decentralisation shifted
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responsibilities from the federal government directly to societal institutions, bypassing subnational 
governments. Decentralisation resulted in an exclusion of state authorities from the policies 
established by the federal government (Merino, 1996:387-88).15
Pronasol Committees within urban and rural communities requested funding for specific projects 
directly from  the federal government or its branch offices in each state. The Pronasol network 
constituted a parallel organisation to the subnational structures of the PRI, which remained under 
the control of the governors. Despite being criticized for its political exploitation of the anti­
poverty problem, Pronasol was the catalyst for an unprecedented degree of citizen participation in 
the debate over public expenditure allocation. Pronasol created a national network of assemblies 
and committees that were in charge of deciding on the allocation and utilizing of decentralised 
funds. Francisco Barrio shared his insights on Pronasol: "The Federal Government still decided on 
the money used in municipalities through the delegates of Pronasol. W hen all investment projects 
w ere decided, they created a solidarity com mittee in each municipality. A high percentage of them  
incorporated people with records of PRI militancy, who were popular leaders or peasant leaders. 
Then, they were manipulated (2008)."
The anti-poverty programme's list of beneficiaries was made up of willing participants in PRI 
campaign rallies and were easily mobilised on election days. The Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) 
governor of Baja California, Ernesto Ruffo, complained that their states were marginalised from  
their fair share of Pronasol funds for political reasons (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:106), and research 
by M olinar and Weldon (1994:133-134) shows that the allocation of Pronasol funds was larger in 
the states that favoured the PRI in the polls. The political relevance of the programme became 
evident through the size of its financial allocation. The federal funds disbursed as part of the 
government's antipoverty strategy became a key part of the PRI's political machinery (Pardinas, 
2004:67; Cornelious, Craig and Fox, 1994:3).
15 M e rin o  (1 9 9 6 ) shows th a t m unicipal au tho rities  w ere  also excluded fro m  th e  political benefits  o f  Pronasol, w h ile  in 
contrast W ard  and Rodriguez argue th a t th e  single au th o rity  excluded from  th e  process w e re  th e  state  governors.
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This "decentralisation to society" at the expense of subnational authorities implied an extreme 
centralisation of political power in the hands of the President and the federal bureaucracy. 
Governors resented their position as mere spectators of a politically successful expenditure policy. 
The programme also showed that Salinas had insufficient trust in the will of state governors to 
im plem ent his anti-poverty programme and administer the funds for it (Ward & Rodriguez, 
1999:56, 67). As the presidential election of 1994 approached, there was a policy U-turn and the  
governors became more involved in the Pronasol programme. The change of strategy also had 
political consequences. Luis Donaldo Colosio, the man in charge of Pronasol since 1992, became 
the PRI's presidential candidate handpicked by Salinas. It would have been extremely difficult to  
run a successful presidential campaign with the antipathy of the PRI's subnational leaders. As head 
of the Pronasol programme, Colosio had created a network of political allies in the state 
governments through the disbursements of the anti-poverty funds. However, Colosio was 
assassinated during a campaign rally in March 1994, and Ernesto Zedillo became the newly 
appointed heir to the Salinas presidency.
3.4.3 Education decentralisation: the search fo r political stability
During 1989, the first year of his administration, Carlos Salinas confronted a national strike by the  
powerful national teachers union (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion, SNTE) of 
more than one million members. The strike left 10 million elem entary and high school students 
without classes. Two weeks of school closings in Mexico City and several states created major 
political turmoil for the government. The largest union in the country had shown its capacity for 
pressuring the federal government, with the union's leader and the political machinery of the  
President seemingly incapable of disciplining the ranks of one of its strongest corporate arms. After 
an initial rejection of a 10% wage increase demand, finally the government agreed to a 25% rise, 
which was accepted by the union under new leadership (Presidencia de la Republica, 1994:211). 
This increase led to a near-doubling of pay increases of all other public workers.
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After the 1989 strike, it became clear that without major changes in the administrative structure of 
the education system, the annual contract negotiations with the teachers' union would pose a 
perm anent risk to political stability. Decentralisation policies are often "predetermined" by political 
parameters (Prud'homme, 1995:24), and educational decentralisation became a way of preventing 
further challenges to the authority of the federal government. For Llerenas (2004:16) "In 
education, the reformers wanted to improve quality, reduce social unrest and reduce the power of 
the (union) SNTE."
In 1992, Salinas launched the decentralisation of education with the aim of fragmenting the  
national contract negotiation into 31 separate agreements between the state governments and 
the teacher's union. W ith incentives similar to those in the 1980 System of Fiscal Coordination, the  
federal government lured the states into joining the agreem ent through the promise that the  
amounts of transfers for education would be at least on the scale prior to the decentralisation 
agreement. Finally the government decided not to break the teacher's union, because that would 
pulverize one of the PRI's most efficient political machines (Raphael, 2007:100). However, state 
governments became responsible of paying the teachers’ salaries with the resources transferred 
through the federal government.
Educational decentralisation changed the provision of a service, where the federal government 
was in charge of the day to day operation of schools, to a transfer of resources to pay for the  
states' provision of educational services (Merino, 2003:352). Beginning in 1993, more than 13.5 
million students from kindergarten through high school were absorbed into the states' school 
systems. From one year to the next, state authorities assumed the administration of 100,000  
schools and saw their teachers' payroll multiply by a factor of tw o (Moctezuma, 1993:123-124). 
Subnational authorities were given an enormous administrative responsibility and in some cases, 
insufficient funds to handle it. Some state governments had to add from their own resources to 
face the demand for the teachers' wage increase. As all the funds were earmarked for the  
educational payroll, in this particular case the extra resources obtained through federal transfers 
did not improve the autonomy of state finances. Before decentralisation, in most of the regions,
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federally hired teachers enjoyed higher salaries than teachers hired by the states to perform the  
same tasks (Llerenas, 2004:115-117).
The decentralisation of education was a "centralised" decision of the federal government, with the  
state authorities acting mostly as passive recipients of the initiative. State governors did not have 
enough political power to negotiate the whole process on their own terms. The decision to  
decentralise also ignored regional and institutional diversity within Mexico. Decentralisation was 
ordered from  the centre by a presidency in full use of its metaconstitutional capabilities: 
homogeneous responsibilities and administrative challenges were imposed on state governments 
with heterogeneous capabilities (Merino, 1996:377). In Mexico, as in other countries of Latin 
America, the national authorities triggered the decentralisation processes with a lack of 
consideration for the administrative development and managerial conditions of the subnational 
governments (Cabrero & Carrera, 2000:30).
!n considering the motivations of key actors involved in the process (Haggard, 1999:34), it is clear 
that the President and the federal bureaucracy obtained the largest advantages from educational 
decentralisation. In contrast, the teacher's union lost bargaining power, as the initiative diminished 
its capability to apply homogenous political pressure at the national level. The teachers union had 
to organise separate negotiations with each state governor. Decentralisation gave more flexibility 
to the administration of the school system, although it did not promote significant educational 
reform. The federal Ministry of Education retained the authority to evaluate and coordinate school 
programmes, but unloaded most of the conflict resolution responsibilities and administrative 
burdens onto subnational authorities (Merino, 1996:386). For example, states required permission 
from the Ministry of Education to change the topics of study or the school calendar, but were free  
to set their own educational expenditures. The main aim of decentralisation was not to improve 
the efficiency of the system, but to reduce the political exposure of the federal government. In his 
memoirs, Salinas de Gortari (2002:620-632) concedes that decentralisation in education was a 
policy to change the relationship with the teacher's union and solve the labour conflict.
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In order to convince the SNTE to participate, the government made important concessions to the  
union's leadership. The SNTE kept its legal authority to represent teachers' interests in salary and 
labour matters at the federal and state level. State governments signed agreements with the SNTE 
to establish that the union's central com mittee would have the capacity to remove regional 
representatives and assume the labour representation of teachers in the region. Moreover, federal 
and local authorities conceded that educational authorities would collect the union's fees directly 
from the teachers' payroll and pass them on to the union's national com mittee. The state branches 
of the union did not have the legal capacity to collect fees directly from their own members. Any 
transfer of funds to the union's regional offices had to come from Mexico City, directly from the 
national union committee (Raphael, 2007:107). The federal government approved additional 
funding to reduce the disparity between the salaries of state and federal teachers.
To make decentralisation even more palatable to the union, the government agreed that in a first 
stage of the process, labour negotiations would remain centralised.16 Finally in December 1997, 
Congress approved a motion to pass on to the state governments the full responsibility for salary 
negotiations with the teacher's union (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:156). From 1992 to 1997, the  
federal government negotiated a national minimum pay rise and then state governments had to  
deliver the additional funds required to match the demands of local teachers. In most cases, 
federal transfers for education were not enough to cover the teachers' payroll, causing a huge 
impact on local finances. Article 16 of the 1998 federal budget established a cap on federal 
transfers that would be used to cover the states' teacher payrolls, potential salary increases, 
pensions, and the creation of new teaching positions (PEF, 1998:Article 16).
A process of decentralisation implies the existence of independent subnational authorities. 
However, the meaning of "independent subnational governments" can differ (Prud'homme, 
1995:3), depending on the institutional design and the political context. At one end of the  
spectrum, there are locally elected subnational authorities with real independence to implement 
policies or hold opinions that do not correspond to the views and decisions of the central
16 Ornelas (1 997) presents a useful analysis o f th e  process o f annual labour negotiations.
172
| CHAPTER 3 -  DECENTRALISATION AND PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
government. However at the other end there are subnational governments that behave as 
subordinates of the national authorities, with the task of implementing policies that were designed 
and decided upon at the centre.
In the first stages of Mexican decentralisation, during the administrations of De la Madrid and 
Salinas, the process involved subnational governments that were politically and financially 
dependent on the president's will. In Mexico's case, decentralisation was initially a 
deconcentration of earmarked resources and administrative responsibilities from  the central 
government, rather than a vertical dispersion of political power and decision-making capabilities. 
In the second stage, electoral competition gave new meaning to Mexican federalism and granted 
unprecedented freedom to subnational authorities. W ithout the shadow of the presidentialism, 
the process of decentralisation strengthened the political autonomy of Mexico's subnational 
authorities.
3.4.4 Federalism with quotation marks
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Mexican thinker Ricardo Flores Magon affirmed that the  
Mexican Constitution of 1857 was a dead letter when it was w ritten .17 By this he m eant that the  
formal prescriptions stated in the law were merely a facade that disguised the true dynamics of 
Mexican politics. In 1916, Venustiano Carranza presented a legal draft to amend the 1857 
Constitution. In the bill, Carranza claimed that Mexican federalism was a vain "promise," because 
state autonomy was only a written formality with no empirical backing in the relationship between  
the states and the central government.
The congressional assembly of 1916 used almost the identical wording to the previous Constitution 
to reinstate federalism as a basis for Mexico's political and administrative organisation. As did its 
predecessor of 1857, the 1917 Constitution established in Article 40 that states were free and 
sovereign. However, during the tw entieth century, the powers of the presidency added another
17 In th e  original q u ote  from  Spanish, Flores M agon  stated: "La constitucion es letra  m u erta ."
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layer of meaning to the federal status of the law. The metaconstitutional capabilities of the 
presidency (Carpizo, 1977:190) blurred the notion of free and sovereign local authorities. In the  
words of Acosta Romero (1982:401-02): "Mexican federalism is an aspiration punctuated by the 
reality of an undeniable centralism which is characterised by an increasingly pervasive presidency."
The federal nature of the Constitution was overridden by the centralising synergies of the PRI 
monopoly and presidentialism. In a quasi-single party system, the Mexican President controlled the  
appointm ent of PRI candidates to elective positions at federal, state and even municipal level. The 
President had the power to determine the political future of state governors through his consent 
over nominations, support for campaign finance and non-elective appointments, which served as 
professional safety nets once an individual's term  in power was over. Governors and local 
politicians understood that discipline towards the President did pay off. For Weldon (1997:255): 
"the metaconstitutional powers of the President are also in part due to a consensus over the elite 
members of the party that delegation to a central authority is (was) in their best interest." 
However, as it will be explained in the next section, during the Salinas government the "delegation 
to a central authority" brought negative consequences for the regional elites of the PRI and its 
most visible leaders: the state governors.
3.4.5 Institutional and non-institutional mechanisms to oust governors
The political autonomy of a governor within his state was maintained only if his decisions did not 
interfere with the wishes of the President. This was the premise that had defined the relationship 
between the President and the governors since the administration of Lazaro Cardenas (1934- 
1940). W ithin the boundaries of the states, the governors reproduced a smaller-scale version of 
the president's written and unwritten powers.18 In most states, the local Congress and the judicial 
branch failed to exercise the elem entary tasks of Horizontal Accountability. Despite the end of
18 As th e  presidentia l institution concentrated  political p o w er, it also centralised th e  a tte n tio n  o f po litical scientists. 
Th ere  is a vacuum  o f studies o f th e  m etacon stitu tio na l pow ers o f governors at th e  state level. O ne exception  is th e  
research o f Ram irez G u tierrez (2 003 ) on th e  relationship  b e tw ee n  th e  Executive and th e  Congress in th e  state  o f 
Tam aulipas.
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presidentialism, in several regions a scaled-down version of “gobernadourism” is still prevalent in 
the Mexico of today. In some states, local media and press lack the basic freedom to question the  
actions of the government,19 and the political independence of national newspapers, TV channels 
and radio stations has yet to trickle down to regional news media. However, the 
m etaconstitutional power of governors is limited through institutional and noninstitutional 
mechanisms.
Article 76 of the Constitution gives the Senate the power to remove state governors through the 
dissolution of powers. By a two-thirds majority, the members of the upper chamber can depose 
the elected governor and appoint his substitute based on a three-nam e list (terna) presented by 
the President. The new governor then finishes the rest of the term  or holds the post until new  
elections are called. According to Gonzalez Oropeza (1987:252), the removal of state powers has 
been applied 49 times since the enactment of the Constitution in 1917, with 41 of these cases 
occurring before the birth of the PRI in 1940 (Weldon, 1997:253). The last tim e the Senate applied 
this constitutional provision was in 1975. However, the President retained the means of removing 
dissident or incompetent governors by coercing their resignation through non-institutional means, 
without the need for the Senate's collaboration. The dissolution of state powers is a "club at the 
door that the President rarely needs to use" (Weldon, 1997:254).
The ousting of governors was not an unprecedented practice in the 20th century. Since the three- 
decade dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876-80, 1884-1911), a golden rule had governed the 
relationship between the President and the state executives: the authority of a governor was 
respected as long as his political decisions did not interfere with the priorities of the Federal 
Executive. After the enactment of the Constitution of 1917, the relationship between the President 
and the state governors maintained the patterns established during the Diaz regime. "The Mexican 
president has the ability, when he wishes, to clamp down on petty tyrannies and local abuses of
19 During th e  gu bern ato ria l elections o f Cam peche in 1997, a G erm an v is itor observed th a t local TV  new s rem in d ed  him  
o f th e  bias o f TV broadcasts in th e  fo rm er East G erm any. In th e  sam e election , th e  PRI go vern m en t o f Jorge Salom on  
A zar bought 3 m onths o f p rin ted  publicity in th e  m ajor s ta te  new sp aper in exchange fo r th e  ed ito rs  o f th e  jo urnal 
cheering th e  PRI cand idate  and neglecting th e  reports o f th e  m ain opposition  co ntend er.
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authority" (Philip, 1992:170). Lazaro Cardenas had the highest number of unseated governors; 19 
state executives were ousted before the completion of their constitutional terms (See Annex 3.2). 
Most of these changes were a consequence of the political rupture between Cardenas and the  
maximum boss of the revolution, Plutarco Elias Calles. For Weldon (1997:227): "The legal authority 
granted to the President was insufficient in creating stability and efficiency through centralisation," 
so there was a political need to increase the concentration of power through his stature as the  
PRI's central authority.
In the six years of the Salinas' administration, on average, a governor was ousted every 4Vi months. 
Fourteen out of 31 states had provisional governors and 17 holders of state executive offices were  
not elected by popular suffrage. More than 50 million people, then 62% of the total population, 
were governed by subnational authorities that had not won their post through an election. 
President Salinas treated the governors as his subordinates even without any legal basis for doing 
so.
During his government, Salinas broke several unwritten rules of Mexican political behaviour. One 
of the most important of these rules implied perfect symbiosis between the political interests of 
the President and its party. However, Salinas' decisions frequently clashed with the interests of the 
PRI's regional apparatus, and state governors were the most visible victims of this collision. Salinas 
ousted 17 state executives, more than any other civilian President (Lazaro Cardenas was a form er 
army general). Every confrontation with the PRI state political machines left open wounds between  
the PRI and the Presidency. These tensions between PRI governors and President Salinas set the  
stage for future pressures towards greater decentralisation and higher margins of freedom to  
allocate budget apportions in subnational governments.
If a governor showed resistance, the President had several tools to exercise pressure. The 
discretionary management of federal funds transferred to the states and municipalities constituted 
political leverage that could determine the fate of the local public treasuries. A tense relationship 
between a state governor and the President could bring to a halt federal investment programmes
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in the region. In such circumstances "governors behaved more like appointed federal bureaucrats 
than elected local officials" (Diaz Cayeros, 2004:223). Even the internal audit office of the  
Executive, (Secodam-Secogef) could use some of its files to "twist the arm" of a governor who 
w anted to remain in place despite the president's wishes.
W hen Zedillo assumed the Executive office, he inherited the animosity against the overreaching 
powers of the presidency. Roberto Madrazo, governor of Tabasco (1994-2000), was the first 
governor to resist pressure from the central government to push for his resignation during the first 
months of Zedillo's term . The resignation of Madrazo was negotiated in Mexico City to appease a 
state revolt over accusations of massive overspending during his electoral campaign in 1994. In 
violent street demonstrations, Madrazo loyalists revolted against the decision and halted his 
resignation. "While subnational actors operate in a larger system that they do not control, they are 
able to exert some influence over national actors (Beer, 2004:181)." Roberto Madrazo in Tabasco 
was the last tim e that a governor was coerced to resign through political pressure. When the  
governor survived pressure from the President, it was a sign that the overreaching powers of 
presidentialism were not what they used to be.
3.5 The emergence of a plural party system
W ith analytical foresight, Robert Dahl predicted in 1971 the future of Mexico's political system: 
"The eventual shift from an hegemony to a polyarchy may well come about slowly and not too  
painfully, as the opposition wins an increasing number of victories at the local level and takes on 
the always sobering responsibility of governing (1971:227)."
In a slow but incremental process, local political forces became a serious challenge to the PRI's 
electoral monopoly. In the first half of the 1980s, municipal elections became true contests with 
unpredictable outcomes. The toll of the economic crisis was reflected in an increase of the anti-PRI 
vote. In the northern part of the country, the PAN emerged as a serious contestant for state and 
municipal positions in urban centres. After the contested 1986 state elections in Chihuahua, the
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PRI could not take its unrivalled electoral success for granted. For Gabriel Zaid:20 "To finish with  
presidentialism w ithout finishing the country (Mexico), there is the need to demand effective 
suffrage w here it is possible to obtain it: in the least relevant elections for the Great Elector (The 
President), but most relevant for local voters." In 1989, for the first tim e in six decades, the  
governing party lost a state governorship. The PAN's trium ph in Baja California became a crucial 
step in Mexico's political evolution towards a democratic system, and soon citizens in many states 
and municipalities became accustomed to party alternation in governm ent and divided congresses 
in local legislatures (Lujambio, 2000:43).
Figure 3-9 Num ber of Governors per Political Party (1985-1997)
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The triumphs of the PAN during the Salinas adm inistration were seen as a path to improve the  
democratic credentials of the President at the expense of the state branches of the PRI. The PRI's
Quoted in Lujambio 1995.
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local political machines became the most vociferous opponents of the emergence of a plural party 
system and the anachronistic state electoral laws became the last stronghold in defence of the  
ancien regime. The presence of the first panista governors created new paradigms of governance 
and fresh patterns of political behaviour. These entrepreneurial^ driven governors gave impetus 
to administrative modernisation and in some cases confronted local congresses with PRI majorities 
in other to promote policy reforms (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:71-72).
In his first press conference as governor of Baja California, Ernesto Ruffo announced that he had 
inherited a bankrupt government and challenged President Salinas to keep his promise that the  
federal government would give equal treatm ent to state governments led by a party other than 
the PRI. In budget terms, this meant that the flow of federal transfers would not change despite 
the party affiliation of the state governor. Panista governors from  Baja California and Chihuahua 
(Francisco Barrio) made claims on President Salinas to increase the distributable share of revenues 
from 18.5 to 30%. The federal government finally settled on 20% through the Law of Fiscal 
Coordination.
During the Zedillo administration, increased electoral competition altered the subordinate 
relationship between the state Executives and the President. The governors from the PAN or the  
Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) were outside of the presidential sphere of political 
influence. PRI governors assumed that their positions were the consequence of voter support and 
not presidential intervention (Diaz Cayeros, 2004:217). W ith the increase of electoral competition  
and the dusk of presidentialism, governors gained unprecedented political autonomy and became 
central figures of national politics.21
21 During th e  2000  Presidential e lection, th e  th re e  m ain contestants w e re  governors and th e  w in n er, V icen te  Fox, was  
th e  first pres iden t w h o  had previous experience as a go verno r since 1964 . For th e  2 0 0 6  pres identia l elections, tw o  o u t 
o f th re e  m ain contenders had experience as local executives.
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3.5.1 A 90-year-old-untested constitutional order
Mexico's slow transition to democracy involved an ongoing debate over how to achieve valid and 
convincing electoral results under conditions of real competition. In striking contrast with other 
transitions in Latin America or Eastern Europe, Mexico did not break with its political institutions, 
but merely adapted them  to the new circumstances. There was no sudden collapse of the previous 
regime, nor was there a demand for a new constitutional framework (Lujambio, 1995:11). The legal 
basis of presidentialism was never challenged with any serious propositions for alternative  
constitutional models, such as parliamentarism. The main criticisms of the previous regimes 
centred on the unwritten powers of the President and the lack of transparency of the electoral 
system. The equation was simple: a President bound by law and institutions, plus fair and free 
suffrage, equalled democracy. The constitutional scaffolding of the ancien regime provided the  
guiding light for the new era.
Despite being promulgated in 1917, the Mexican Constitution remains young and untested as a 
legal means for imposing limits upon political actors (Silva Herzog M, 2004). The overpowering of 
constitutional rule by presidentialism, in so many instances, meant that Executive determination  
was the main mechanism for resolving political disputes and the leading source of jurisprudence. 
W ith the end of presidentialism, the Constitution and its judicial interpretation emerged as a new 
referent to solve political disputes. Many decades after its enactment, Mexico's constitutional 
order became what it was meant to be, although the Supreme Court had to fill in the blank spaces 
where the constitutional text left room for interpretation, as the overreaching presidential 
authority was not there to solve uncertainties.
The President was not a "six-year-term absolute monarch," but the axis of a coalition of corporate 
and regional interest groups that were willing to rethink their association with him if he acted 
against their interests (Lujambio, 1995:53). Once the institution of the Presidency opposed the 
interests of this coalition of local interest groups, the federal nature of the Mexican Constitution
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became a shield for their political agenda and a point of reference to solve political controversies 
between the federal government and the state authorities.
3.5.2 Decentralisation under a new political system
During the Salinas administration, the decentralisation of funds and public services was in 
accordance with the political interests of the President. W ith the emergence of autonomous 
political actors at the subnational level, the process of decentralisation acquired a new set of 
priorities. The decentralisation process began within the context of a quasi-single party political 
system and a strong President, but continued under a national collage of party representation and 
an Executive with receding powers. The transformation of the political landscape had unforeseen 
consequences in the dynamics of expenditure decentralisation. In the words of W ard and 
Rodriguez (1999:53): "If De la Madrid and Salinas were in a position to centralise by decentralising, 
Zedillo's reality is to survive by decentralising."
A new wave of decentralisation was one of the most relevant consequences of the 
democratisation process in Mexico (See Appendix 3.1 for a timeline of democratisation and 
decentralisation). The emergence of political pluralism was the catalyst for a process of 
expenditure decentralisation with clear rules for all the participants involved. The longstanding 
pattern of financial transfers to local governments based on the President's discretion had only 
been possible as a result of the political submission of regional authorities. Electoral legitimacy 
gave the governors an unprecedented margin of political autonomy to make direct budget claims 
from the federal authorities. To reduce the political dispute over budget transfers, it was necessary 
to create a new set of non-discretionary norms to institutionalise and clarify financial transactions 
among the three levels of government. A legitimised system of Horizontal Accountability over 
financial transfers became a necessity for the construction of a new political stability.
Governors and political parties demanded greater control and freedom to administer the resources 
they received. For the first tim e, local political forces called for more financial accountability from
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the federal government. The basic premise of the new rules was that states ought to have clear, 
com plete and trustworthy information on the amount of resources that would be transferred  
every fiscal year. The re-allocation of resources and responsibilities among the three levels of 
governm ent helped to ease rising political pressures, and alleviated "some of the administrative 
problems that have contributed to the erosion of the government's legitimacy and control" 
(Rodriguez, 1997:1). Political competition redistributed the power of decision-making across the  
three tiers of government and increased demands for accountability at all governm ent levels 
(Giugale & W ebb, 2000:XV). Decentralisation with accountability became the best available policy 
to appease the plurality of regional political forces.
3.5.3 Decentralisation without discretionary funding
The rise of regional political pluralism had a spillover effect on national politics. The processes of 
decentralisation and democratisation accelerated during the government of Ernesto Zedillo. As 
was detailed in chapter 2, the PRI lost the congressional election of 1997. The change in the 
balance of power within the Chamber of Deputies promoted a reform to end the discretionary 
criteria and political manipulation that governed federal transfers. As an outcome of the electoral 
defeat, the PRI lost its control over congressional committees and its ability to speed or obstruct 
the passage of bills in the legislature. In an interview for this dissertation, Porfirio Munoz Ledo, 
(2008) leader of the PRD in the Chamber of Deputies after the 1997 election, said: "During this 
Congressional period, the total control over the Congress was lost. The party that had the power 
lost its absolute power during this legislation. I explained it to Dr. Zedillo. The country had already 
changed... they had to understand that they w eren't the majority any longer, and that they 
wouldn't be able to pass laws without us. They couldn't even pass the budget."
In the new Congress, transparency in the allocation of resources for states and municipalities 
became the centre of budgetary debates. The political grievances caused by over-centralisation 
converged with the pressures of the new pluralism to produce an authentic redistribution of 
government finances and political control. In November 1997, an unprecedented event took place
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in the  Mexican Congress: the PAN and the PRD, which together controlled more than 50% of the 
Chamber of Deputies, presented their own budget bill in parallel with the one drafted by the 
Executive. To end the dispute between these two alternative pieces of legislation, the PRI and PAN 
approved the government's bill against the opposition of the PRD. However, the Executive 
conceded to several of the demands embodied in the opposition budget. In exchange for its 
support, the PAN demanded a compromise from the federal government to increase transfers to 
subnational governments. Close to 1% of the GNP was reallocated under the supervision of the  
state and municipal treasury offices (Estevez & Magaloni, 1998:8).
3.5.4 Progreso: an anti-poverty programme not designed fo r political manipulation
Progresa was the first antipoverty scheme that was explicitly designed to shield itself from political 
influence. Traditionally, peasant organisations close to the PRI would negotiate their electoral 
support in exchange for government benefits. On election days, the peasant groups would be 
encouraged or even coerced into voting for PRI candidates. Under Progresa, financial transfers go 
directly to individuals rather than to middlemen or corporate leaders, reducing the influence of 
interm ediate organisations that might require electoral support for their favoured candidates in 
exchange for social benefits.
It is difficult to  claim with any certainty that Progresa, w ith an annual budget of US$1800 million 
and 5.2 million beneficiary families in thirty-one states, is immune from electoral pressure, 
although the ongoing oversight of media and Congress certainly provide some protection. In 
addition, the 2000 presidential elections serve as a prime piece of evidence that Progresa had 
succeeded in protecting itself from political manipulation. On Election Day in July 2000, the turnout 
of the PRI's rural constituencies was lower than expected. W ithout the full support of its 
strongholds and with massive opposition in urban centres, the PRI had to concede defeat and the  
opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, was elected to the presidency.
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According to an exit poll by the Los Angeles Times and the Mexican daily Reforma, 44% of the  
beneficiaries of Progresa voted for a party other than the PRI.22 Although the PRI still had its 
strongholds in non-urban areas, in 2000 its share of the rural vote fell below 50% for the first time  
ever. In the presidential election of 1994, the PRI received 5.5 million votes in regions with high 
levels of poverty; for the 2000 election, PRI turnout in the same areas fell to 4.4 million votes. The 
share of the PAN vote in poor and rural areas grew from 14.7% in 1994 to 28.9% in 2000 (Tuiran, 
2000). In the sexenio during which Progresa was implemented, the PRI lost its capability to 
mobilize 1.1 million of the core voters that had given the party its triumph of 1994.
In the Presidential election of 2006, Progresa, under its new name Oportunidades, confirmed the  
claim that the largest anti-poverty scheme of the Mexican government was not a successful tool 
for political manipulation. Research by Fernando Pliego Carrasco (2006:39) shows that in 
municipalities with a higher percentage of the population benefiting from Oportunidades, the  
PAN's government candidate Felipe Calderon received few er votes. Figure 3-10 shows that in 
municipalities where 81% or more of the population were Oportunidades recipients, Calderon 
received just 9.1% of the total votes.
22 Reforma, July 3rd 2000.
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Figure 3-10 Distribution of the vote in the 2006 Presidential Election among municipalities with 
different percentages of Oportunidades beneficiaries
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Source: Pliego Carrasco (2006), "Las poh'ticas de com bate a la pobreza en M exico y sus efectos en la eleccion 
presidencial de 2006: dCoaccion del voto o justicia social?" in Revista M exicana de Ciencias Sociales, Num . 198 IIIQ. 
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3.5.5 Decentralisation under Zedillo: the transformation o f Ramo 23 and the creation 
of Ram o 33
Until 1998, Ramo 23 of the federal budget contained a Programme of Fiscal Coordination with 
state governments.23 This Ramo was used as a mechanism for transferring federal resources to 
state governments in exchange for certain promises to improve their fiscal balance. Through this 
programme, the states reduced their public debts in the aftermath of the "Tequila Crisis" of 1995; 
in that year, local governments allocated an average 7.8% of total expenditure to debt service, 
while for 1998 this percentage was reduced to 2% (Levy, 2000:13). The distribution of funds within
Empirical academ ic research on state budget institutions in federal countries has developed m ostly in th e  United  
States. See Alesina & Bayoumi (1996) and Poterba & Hagen (1999).
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states depended on direct negotiation with the Treasury Ministry. However, the final allocation of 
resources was subject to the president's will. In addition, the resources of the programme created  
a "moral hazard" because state governments that had a close political relationship with the  
President had strong incentives to contract new debt above reasonable levels, because they could 
expect to be bailed out with federal transfers.24 "In 1998 and 1999, discretionary transfers under 
Ramo 23 declined to less than one tenth of their pre-1995 value. In the 2000 budget, the transfers 
at the discretion of the Executive ended completely" (Giugale & W ebb 2000:20).
For decades, most of the resources in the federal budget allocated to state governments were  
transferred through the Ministry of the Treasury and the regional offices of the federal ministries. 
From 1998 on, after the defeat of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies, the funds for poverty 
reduction and social development (Ramo 26) were consolidated in Ramo 33, which distributed 
earmarked resources to local authorities via a formula system. W ith the creation of Ramo 33, the  
rules of allocation became clear and stable, as they were set in the Law of Fiscal Coordination 
(LCF). The creation of Ramo 33  constituted a revolution in the financial relationship between the 
states and the federal government; before its creation close to 80% of the federal budget was 
"open to more discretionary-federal-influence; and 'successful' governors are those who manage 
to leverage a greater share of funding from the Treasury" (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:678). Ramo 33  
became a mechanism of Horizontal Accountability from the President and the Federal Government 
towards the subnational government.
The LCF sets the allocation formulas of the seven federal funds that compose Ramo 33 .25 These 
make up the transfers earmarked for financing health, education, infrastructure and public 
security. The resources that were managed with discretionary criteria under the Pronasol scheme
24 Ter-M inassian  and Craig (1 9 9 7 :1 6 0 -6 1 ) show th rough case studies o f tw e lv e  develop ing  countries fro m  Latin 
A m erica, Asia and Africa th a t th e  central go vernm en t exercises, w ith  d iffe re n t degrees o f success, certa in  
ad m in istrative  restrain ts over th e  indebtedness capacity o f subnational g o vernm en ts . In th e  cases o f fifte e n  tran sitio n  
econom ies, local au tho rities  are  fo rb idd en fro m  contracting any d ebt in local o r fo re ign  currency.
25 The R am o 33  is no t expressly m ention ed  in th e  Ley de C oord ination  Fiscal.
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during Salinas' administration became part of the earmarked funds for state and municipal 
infrastructure, which constitute a component of Ramo 33.
As a consequence of a reform in the LCF, states were able to incorporate the transfers of Ramo 33 
as part of their own budgets. However, the LCF establishes that states and municipalities cannot 
use the funds transferred through Ramo 33  as guarantee of future income to  negotiate with  
potential creditors. In contrast, the law allows the subnational authorities to obtain credit through 
the use of the non-earmarked funds (participaciones) of Ramo 28.
After the creation of Ramo 33  in 1998, subnational authorities spent more resources than the 
federal government for the first time, although these additional transfers did not always increase 
the discretionary spending of state governments (Merino, 2001:150). The discretionary spending 
to states was funnelled through Ramo 28, which distributed the non-earmarked funds. Ramo 33  
and Ramo 28  became the budget mechanisms of expenditure decentralisation and a new structure 
for Horizontal Accountability from the federal government to state and municipal authorities.
According to the Constitution, the Senate does not participate in the debate and approval of the 
expenditure portion of the federal budget, so the Chamber of Deputies became the central arena 
of the decentralisation reforms. Since 1997, no party has had majority control of the Chamber of 
Deputies, so the reforms of the LCF and the new design of the federal budget were approved with 
the joint votes of PRI and PAN legislators. Both parties had an interest in bolstering the finances of 
state governments. The PAN conditioned its crucial vote on the federal budget to the creation of 
Ramo 33. For Haggard (et. al. 1999:18), the shape of decentralisation is determined by the  
structure of political parties and its balance of power. "Subnational electoral competition is a 
crucial variable for understanding decentralisation (Beer, 2004:181)." The emerging political forces 
had a definitive influence in the shape of decentralisation during the Zedillo government.
In Mexico, the opposition and the ruling party exerted pressure to change the statutory fram ework  
of the expenditure decentralisation process. After the decentralisation due to the Pronasol 
programme, governors from the PRI wanted to recover some influence in the allocation process of
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the federal budget. The PRI's subnational structures were affected by presidential control over the  
allocation of the budget. The creation of Ramo 33  was not just a direct result of the process of 
democratisation, but also an answer to PRI regional political forces that were mistreated during 
the Salinas administration.
One key difference between the tw o funding mechanisms is that Ramo 33  distributes federal 
funds, while Ramo 28  are considered to be a federal transfer of state funds. This difference implies 
that the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF) (see chapter 2) has the mandate to oversee the 
allocation of Ramo 33  at state and municipal level. The legal capacity is not the same as the  
enforcem ent of this capacity, as the existence of a Horizontal Accountability fram ework does not 
necessarily compel its enactment. However, this prerogative of the federal SAI creates contrasting 
conditions in the state's management and administration of the resources. As will be explained in 
chapter 5, local SAIs are fully responsible for the audit of Ramo 28.
As summarised by Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni (2003:34):
"Mexico transited in a very brief period of tim e from a highly discretionary and politically 
manipulated allocation of funds for local public works characterizing Pronasol during the 1989- 
1994 period, to a formula-driven system of resource allocation, where municipalities and states 
not only know the amount of funds they will receive, but also their calendars for disbursement 
and clear rules for the application of those resources, under federal monitoring."
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Table 3-9 M a in  Changes in th e  D ece n tra lisa tio n  o f Federal Funds
B efo re  1998 
The tra n s fe r o f funds  m ig h t exc lude  som e 
sta tes.
T rans fe rs  w e re  m ade acco rd ing  to  th e  
P res iden t's  d isc re tio n a ry  c rite r ia .
The size o f th e  tra n s fe rs  was u n p re d ic ta b le  fo r  
s ta tes  and m u n ic ip a lit ie s .
The tra n s fe rs  to  im p ro ve  th e  fin a n c ia l p o s itio n  
o f th e  s ta tes w e re  estab lished  in th e  fe d e ra l 
b u d g e t a fte r an ag re e m en t b e tw e e n  th e  
M in is try  o f th e  T reasu ry  (SHCP) and th e  s ta te  
go ve rn m en ts .
U neven d is tr ib u tio n  o f resources
B efo re  2000
The SAI o f  th e  fe d e ra l Congress d id  n o t have a 
legal m anda te  to  oversee th e  tra n s fe rs  o f 
Ram o 33.
A fte r  1998
A ll s ta tes  are inc luded  in th e  tra n s fe r 
schem e.
T ransfers are based on ru les  and fo rm u la s  
s ta ted  in law .
The size o f tra n s fe rs  becam e m ore  s tab le  
and p re d ic ta b le .
The tra n s fe rs  to  im p ro ve  th e  fin a n c ia l 
po s itio n  o f th e  s ta tes are s ta ted  in th e  
fe d e ra l budge t, th e  a m o u n t is based on 
budge ted  fe d e ra l revenues.
M o re  p ro p o rtio n a l d is tr ib u tio n  b e tw e e n  
reg ions
A fte r  2000
The ASF has a legal m a nda te  to  oversee  th e  
tra n s fe rs  o f Ramo 33.
Source: By th e  author, based on th e  diagram  presented in SSE, 20 00 :1 18  and Levy (2000:5).
D espite  th e  fa c t th a t th e  c rea tion  o f Ram o 33  occu rred  d u rin g  th e  te n u re  o f P res iden t E rnesto 
Zed illo , th e  c ritica l mass fo r  d e ce n tra lisa tio n  re fo rm  cam e fro m  th e  n e w ly  p lu ra l Congress and th e  
dem ands o f s ta te  gove rno rs . Z ed illo 's  a d m in is tra tio n  p ro v id e d  th e  te ch n ica l in p u t to  im pose 
c o n s tra in ts  on th e  d isc re tio n a ry  a llo ca tions  fo r  e x p e n d itu re , tra n s fe rs  and b o rro w in g  (G iugale &  
W ebb  2000:30). Since 1997, th e  la rgest e xp e n d itu re  p ro g ra m m e s o f th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t, like 
th e  a n ti-p o v e rty  schem e Progresa , o p e ra te d  u n d e r s tr ic t no rm s to  g u a ran tee  a basic leve l o f 
a cco u n ta b ility . The new  balance o f fo rces  inside th e  Congress tr ig g e re d  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f 
m echanism s fo r  H o rizon ta l A c co u n ta b ility  th a t w o u ld  have been im poss ib le  in th e  p rev ious  p o lit ica l 
system . The P resident was fo rce d  to  exp la in  how , w here  and w hen  th e  fe d e ra l fu n d s  w e re  to  be
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distributed among Mexican states. The explanations of the President were discussed openly, 
through the debate and approval of the federal budget. This Executive's obligation to provide 
answers and explanations to Congress meant that the President was being accountable.
3.5.6  The secret budget item: a prerogative o f presidentialism
Article 74 of the Mexican Constitution mandates that: "There will be no other partidas secretas 
(secret pools of resources or secret budget items), with the exception of the ones that would be 
considered as necessary in the Budget." The pool will be used by the ministers through a written  
agreem ent with the President. As its name implies, the resources of the secret budget pool were  
not subject to the oversight of any internal or external auditor. This statem ent gave the President a 
constitutional license to use public funds without any kind of budget accountability.
The "secret fund" provision originated as an am endm ent approved in 1977, during the government 
of Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982), and does not appear in the original text of the Constitution. As 
of March 2008, the secret fund provision remained in the Constitutional text, although it has not 
received any funding since 2000 (See Figure 3-11). However, its permanence in the Constitution 
gives state governors the legitimacy to have unaccountable portions of resources in the state 
budgets. The peak of the secret fund occurred in 1993, when President Salinas de Gortari allocated 
2,009.8 million pesos (£436.13 million) to it. During the government of Ernesto Zedillo, the use of 
the secret fund was reduced from 1,949 million pesos in 1994 (£374.2 million) to one million in 
1999 (£64,000) (Levy, 2000:3).
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F igure  3 -1 1  B u d g e t o f  th e  P re s id e n tia l se c re t fu n d  1 9 8 9 -2 0 0 8  (M il l io n  pesos 2000)
2,010
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000-08
Sources: C onstructed  by th e  a u th o r using da ta  fro m  Levy, 2 0 0 0  and Federal B udget D ecree  2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 8 .
The s ta n d a rd s  o f  d isc lo su re  o f  fin a n c ia l a cco u n ts  have  e vo lve d  as a c o n s e q u e n ce  o f  changes in th e  
a c c o u n ta b ility  e x p e c ta t io n s  o v e r g o v e rn m e n t fin a n ce s . The p rocess  o f p o lit ic a l change  has fo rc e d  a 
c o n s ta n t n e g o tia t io n  o f  th e  n o rm s  and tra d it io n s  o f  b u d g e t d isc lo su re .
As O 'D o n n e ll, (1 9 9 9 :4 3 ) a ff irm e d , th e  p e rc e p tio n  o f  c o r ru p t acts  d o  change  fro m  o n e  c o u n try  to  
a n o th e r . The p e rc e p t io n  o f  c o rru p tio n  and  w ro n g d o in g  can a lso  e v o lv e  in th e  sam e c o u n try  in 
d if fe re n t  h is to r ic a l p e rio d s . W h a t used to  be an a c c e p te d  b u d g e t p ra c tic e  o f  th e  fo rm e r  
p re s id e n tia lis t sys te m  has b e co m e  p o lit ic a lly  u n v ia b le  tw o  decades  la te r . T o d a y  th e  re -e n a c tm e n t 
o f  th e  "s e c re t fu n d "  w o u ld  be a cause fo r  p o lit ic a l c o n fro n ta t io n  w ith  th e  C ongress and  th e  m e d ia . 
W ith  s tro n g e r m e ch a n ism s  o f  H o r iz o n ta l A c c o u n ta b ility  and  m o re  d y n a m ic  v e r t ic a l a c c o u n ta b ility , 
it  seem s u n lik e ly  th a t  th e  "s e c re t fu n d "  c o u ld  be re p le n is h e d  in th e  fu tu re . S erg io  A g u a yo  ana lyses 
Z e d illo 's  a t t itu d e  to w a rd  tra n s p a re n c y  in a p o s itiv e  lig h t: "Z e d illo 's  a t t itu d e  w as v e ry  d if fe re n t  f ro m  
S a linas ' w h e n  it ca m e  to  p o lit ic a l p e rsp e c tive s  and  s ty les . Z e d illo  to o k  m e a su re s  to  re d u ce  secrecy, 
and  th e  p a r t id o  se c re ta  w as re d u ce d  to  n o th in g  —  it w as s til l backed  up b y  th e  C o n s titu tio n , b u t a t 
leas t he beca m e  th e  f ir s t  p re s id e n t to  p u b lish  th e  in fo rm a tio n  on  his s a la ry "  (A guayo , 2008).
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3.6 Budget accountability and the 1995 Tequila Crisis
Before the "Tequila crisis" of 1995, Mexico's federal and subnational governments had no legal 
obligation or com m itm ent to systematically disclose key financial information. There was no 
requirem ent to disclose basic financial data of national or subnational governments. At federal 
level, the  recently autonomous Central Bank did not regularly disclose the level of international 
reserves. At the subnational level, there was no public information about revenue from  local 
taxation, the size of the public debt or the calendar of payments. Federal and state government 
financial institutions did not provide key data, according to regular timetables, in order to be 
accountable to financial markets. However, the 1995 financial crisis highlighted the need for true  
and relevant information on government finances. As a consequence of the crisis, the timely  
disclosure of government financial information became a common practice for the Mexican 
government. In the afterm ath of the crisis, the routine disclosure of public debt payments in state 
budgets became an innovation for Mexico's subnational authorities.
In 1996, the Mexican government signed the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), a 
mechanism created by the International M onetary Fund (IMF) to evaluate the transparency and 
quality of the financial data of its member countries. In an indirect way, the IMF acknowledges on 
its web site that the Mexican financial crisis of the mid-1990s was the catalyst for promoting new 
standards for accountability of government financial and budgeting accounts:
In the wake of several international financial crises that began in 1994,26 there was 
heightened awareness that the ready availability of comprehensive, reliable, and timely  
data would facilitate the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and investment 
decisions, thereby reducing the frequency and moderating the severity of future crises.27
26 The M exican  financial m eltd o w n  known as th e  Tequila Crisis exploded in D ecem b er o f 1994 .
27 Through In te rn e t: h ttp ://d s b b .im f.o rg /A p p lic a tio n s /w e b /g d d s /g d d s fa q /, consulted M a rch  16th 2 0 0 5 .
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In an address "How to Avoid International Financial Crises/' Stanley Fisher, Deputy Director of the  
IMF stated:
One of the many lessons drawn from Mexico was that the extent of the crisis was worsened 
by the poor quality of information supplied to both the official sector (including the IMF) 
and the markets.28
As a consequence of the Mexican crisis, the IMF created a compliance information system for 
financial data (Savage, 2005:67). In October 1995, a com m ittee of the IMF recommended the 
establishment of a tw o-tier standard for financial transparency: the SDDS, and the General Data 
Dissemination System (GDDS).29 The GDDS is a less demanding standard of disclosure and a first 
step before joining the stricter benchmark of the SDDS. Both standards link the accountability of 
national financial information to the success of macroeconomic policies. The aim of the GDDS30 is 
to modernize the statistical systems with an emphasis on the dissemination practices for 
economic, financial, and socio-demographic statistics. The objective of both disclosure standards is 
to help m em ber countries strengthen their financial statistical disclosure in order to seek access to  
international capital markets. The list of 83 countries that adhere to the GDDS is comprised of less 
developed economies from Africa, Asia and the Middle East.31 The 60 countries that m eet SDSS 
specifications include highly developed economies and new emerging markets.32
In order to improve the confidence of bondholders and potential lenders, the Mexican government 
had to adhere to the IMF criteria of information disclosure. Mexico subscribed to the SDDS in
26 Through In te rn e t h ttp : //w w w .im f.o rg /e x te rn a l/n p /s p e e c h e s /1 9 9 7 /1 0 1 4 9 7 .h tm , consulted June 27 th 2 0 05 .
29 The fo rm al decisions to  establish th e  SDDS and GDDS w e re  taken  in M a rch  19 9 6  and D ecem b er 1 9 97  respectively .
30 The decision o f a country to  incorpora te  both accounting and disclosure gu idelines is vo lun tary . Each national
g o vernm en t had th e  flexib ility  to  d e te rm in e  th e  speed and m echanism s fo r im p le m e n ta tio n  o f both system s. H ow ever,
th e  guidelines o f th e  GDDS are  considered as a first step on th e  road to  th e  SDDS's m ore  challenging standards. The  
SDDS shares th e  sam e goals as th e  GDDS, bu t th e  partic ip an t countries, in genera l, a lread y  m e e t high d a ta  quality  
standards.
31 O f th e  83 countries th a t have partic ipated  in th e  GDD, fo u r no w  subscribe to  th e  SDDS: Kazakhstan, A rm en ia , 
Bulgaria and Kyrgyz Republic, through In te rn e t: h ttp ://d s b b .im f.o rg /A p p lic a tio n s /w e b /g d d s /g d d s h is to ry d a te s /, 
consulted M arch  16 th  20 05 .
32 Through In te rn e t: h ttp ://d s b b .im f.o rg /A p p lica tio n s /w eb /s d d s su b scrip tio n d a tes /, consulted M arch  17 th  2 0 0 5 .
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August 1996, but did not meet its specifications until June 2000. W ith the subscription to the 
Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB), the Mexican government abided by a compromise 
to disclose tim ely financial information related to balance of payments, international reserves and 
foreign currency liquidity.
As a consequence of the 1995 financial crisis, Mexico's subnational treasuries fell into a payment 
crisis. During the negotiation of the financial bailout of the states, the federal government pressed 
for the periodic disclosure of the financial information of subnational authorities (Ramirez 
Verdugo, 2001:47).33 The disclosure methodology established by the SDDS formed the basis for 
new benchmarks to improve the financial transparency of Mexico's state and municipal 
governments.
Jorge Chavez Presa, form er director of the Public Debt Managem ent in the Ministry of the Treasury 
(1994-1996) remembers: "The 1995 crises helped to discipline the states. The crises m eant that 
there was a big financial problem for the majority of the state governments. The debt became 
ridiculous and impossible to pay since there were interest rates of 100%. The financial rescue of 
the states that happened during (19)95, was meant to  reduce their debt and to order their 
accounting. They were very precise agreements in terms of federal transfers for subnational debt 
reductions. W e forced state governments to inform us of their debts and of their public finances. It 
was a mess because states would come to ask for money and I would say, 'on w hat grounds? Do 
you have information on your public finances?' -No! 'Do you have a public account?' In this case 
we helped the PAN governors, then there was no one from the PRD, but (PAN Governors) from  
Baja California and Chihuahua. W e helped, and then asked them  to do the same for the municipal 
governments. That helped a lot. It was the catalyst for the change in the debt grades, I mean, it 
was a radical reform, actually the modifications transformed the financing to the states and 
municipalities —  that was the result of the 1995 crisis (Chavez Presa, 2008).
33 In D ecem b er 1995 , th e  to ta l d e b t o f states and m unicipalities w as eq u iva len t to  1.8%  o f th e  GNP (A m ieva -H u e rta , 
1997:592)
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W ith the aim of reducing the risk factor of subnational public borrowing, the federal government 
prom oted a reform in the Fiscal Coordination Law34 that forced states and municipalities to 
publicise the ir financial records. After Zedillo's reforms, subnational governments were required to 
publish current financial information in order to be eligible for a loan from a public or private 
financial institution (Cabrero, et. al., 2000:14). In the afterm ath of the financial crisis of 1995, the 
federal authorities did not have enough resources to bail out states with financial problems. The 
Tequila crisis raised alarm over the lack of budget and financial transparency, not only of national 
governments, but also of subnational authorities in federal countries. In order to prevent the need 
for further bailouts from the federal government, the new law required that state and municipal 
borrowers adopt the risk valuations of the rating agencies. According to Merino (2001:167) there  
has been a reduction in the discretionary use of federal funds to provide financial help to state 
governments. Since March 2000, there are new audit regulations, which establish that state debt 
ought to be graded by at least two independent rating agencies (Ramirez Verdugo, 2002:48).
Subnational governments use the participaciones as collateral to guarantee the borrowed sums 
(Giugale & W ebb 2000:23). The new legal fram ework for subnational debt marked an important 
im provem ent in the disclosure standards of subnational budgets. However, this wave of 
transparency only affected data that is mainly relevant to the financial markets: the calendar of 
debt payments, debt/state revenue ratios, etc. As will be discussed in chapter 5, in fields that are 
not directly linked with financial performance, state budget transparency in Mexico still leaves 
ample room for improvement.
3.7 Decentralisation and the dusk of Presidentialism as we know it
Mexico's accelerated decentralisation eroded the financial dimension of the metaconstitutional 
powers of the President. The political system, with its commanding central figure who ruled the  
country with no counterbalance to his authority, receded to be replaced by a polyarchy (Dahl,
34 DOF, January 28th 2000.
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1971:7) w ith dispersed political and financial powers. In his 1996 State of the Union address, 
Ernesto Zedillo acknowledged the existence of presidentialism and phrased the epitaph for an era:
"It is my conviction that the President of the Republic should not have to exercise any 
powers other than those explicitly conferred on him by the Constitution and the law. The 
Executive Power can only be legitimately strong if it abides by the law. I will always be on 
the side of the Mexicans that demand the consolidation of a new stage, where the exercise 
of Executive powers would not be authoritarian nor benefit from powers foreign to  the rule 
of law. If the Executive invades the rights of other powers or other levels of government, it 
does not resolve conflicts, nor does it improve democracy or strengthen the Republic 
(Zedillo, 1996:23)."
Zedillo was not joking. In 1994 he promoted a reform to increase the independence and judicial 
review abilities of the Supreme Court. He also decentralised the nomination of the party's 
candidates for state governorships to the local PRI machines. In 1994, the PRI changed its statutes 
to permit local conventions to choose local candidates without the interference of the centre. In 
1996, he promoted an overhaul of the electoral system, diminishing the influence of the Executive 
over the electoral institution. Finally, during the last year of his sexenio, Zedillo relinquished the  
president's unwritten power to appoint his successor. Ernesto Zedillo was the first president in 
modern times who faced a Congress effectively controlled by the opposition. In this political 
context, he was left only with his constitutional powers.
3.8 Conclusion
For the last seven decades of the 20th Century, the constitutional federal system was made 
ineffective by the centralising synergies of the presidentialism and the PRI monopoly. In a quasi­
single party system, the Mexican President controlled the appointm ent of PRI candidates to 
elective positions at federal, state and even municipal level. The same figure that controlled the 
professional career of politicians had domination over the tax bases and the geographical
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distribution of government spending. The President had control over the input and output of 
public finances, as the federal government concentrated the tax revenues and the expenditure 
allocation. Democratisation of the political system and the decentralisation of expenditure eroded 
the hegemony of presidentialism. The laws and distribution formulas that were the basis of 
decentralisation forced the President to render accounts to subnational political actors. The 
Executive was transformed from accountability holder to accountability holdee of state governors.
The most relevant characteristic of Mexico's decentralisation is that the President and the federal 
bureaucracy agreed to cede control over a massive pool of resources that were used as a device of 
political manipulation. The act of self-mutilation of a financial tool of political control was a means 
to hold on to power, not for the President as an individual, but for the institutions that gave the PRI 
its command over the political system (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999:52). An anecdote illustrates the 
outcome of the new political and financial order. According to press reports,35 a street vendor 
approached President Ernesto Zedillo and tried to sell him a small figure of the Virgin of 
Guadalupe. The president's reply provides an apt metaphor for the conclusion to this chapter: 
"Excuse me, but I do not have cash." The institutional figure who was the supreme patron of 
political clientelism did not have any money on him. But after decades of client-patron  
relationships, clientelistic practices would not vanish just because of a change in the president's 
political behaviour. Zedillo announced the epitaph of Mexican presidentialism, but state governors 
became the modern heirs of the declining institution.
These changes are fundamental in understanding the endurance and evolution of clientelism 
(Roninger & Gunes-Ayata, 1994:15). In Mexico, single-party presidentialism was the hegemonic 
system of political organisation, but was challenged by the emergence of a competitive party 
system. To understand current clientelistic practices at the subnational level, it is crucial to follow  
the decline of the President as a central figure of the political structure and the main financial 
source for subnational governments.
35 La Jornada, October 31st 1998.
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With increased accountability mechanisms in financial transfers to states and municipalities, the  
President faced a reduced ability to apply clientelistic strategies and use federal cash transfers as a 
tool of political control. From 1998 on, the President's powers over a clientelism-based budget 
diminished. This was not the end of political clientelism in Mexican politics, but the beginning of its 
decentralisation.
The unintended result of decentralisation was to make additional financial resources available to  
state and municipal office holders, who did not have effective institutional mechanisms to enforce 
budget accountability. The concentration of tax collecting tasks in the federal government was a 
sign of the asymmetrical economic development and institutional imbalances of Mexico's regions. 
However, the decentralisation of spending treated all Mexican states as legal equivalents, despite 
their deep disparities in administrative and accountability infrastructures.
1st
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Decentralisation efforts o f the last twenty years have produced change;
it has been in the emergence of a new brand o f federalism, 
with large powers concentrated at state level.
Victoria E. Rodriguez (1997:87)
The government of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-1997) marked the beginning of a new order in 
Mexico's political system. This transformation implied that the Executive became an 
accountability holdee of the Congress and subnational governments. The Legislative branch and 
the state authorities evolved from a submissive role, to  become the accountability holders of 
the presidential institution. Through these changes, the President lost his role as the supreme 
patron of political clients in Mexico.
Chapter 4 claims that clientelist practices survived presidentialism. The traditional patron-client 
relationship adapted itself to the transition from a single party system, to a new context of 
intense electoral competition under a multiparty structure. Clientelism continued under a 
competitive democratic regime, because it works as a mechanism of reward for party loyalty. 
The most relevant difference between the earlier version of clientelism under the PRI hegemony 
and the new plural party system is that the budget used for clientelistic practices is not 
monopolised by either the President or a single political group.
In chapter 4, I contend that state governors and municipal presidents became the new patrons 
of clientelistic politics in Mexico. W ith a resemblance of the habits of presidentialism, the 
unwritten powers of state governors undermine the formal checks and balances that are stated 
in the law. However, state and municipal governments are not alone in the use of public 
resources to mobilise loyal constituencies.
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Chapter 4 analyses how the allocation of public resources through the Federal Congress became 
influenced by the political preferences of the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Clientelism in the Mexican democracy has a singular characteristic. As the law forbids 
congressional re-election, the deputies do not have the classic pork barrel incentives because 
they do not obtain individual political gains from increasing spending in their own electoral 
districts. Their incentives lie in allocating expenditure to states governed by their own parties 
and expecting that the governors and party bureaucracies will take notice of their services in the  
budget negotiations. In the afterm ath of decentralisation, the Congress and the subnational 
authorities became the new managers of particularistic spending.
4.1 Mexico after decentralisation
Since the creation of Ramo 33  in 1998, the most visible changes in the decentralisation process 
have been the increasing demands for funds made by subnational governments. During the  
government of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the effective tax bases of state governments were the 
deputies at the federal Congress. The governors applied political pressure on the deputies that 
represented their own states in order to increase the share of financial rewards. This trend  
increased subnational fiscal dependence and created further disincentives for state and 
municipal tax collection (Diaz Cayeros, 2004:207).
In countries where there is a full decentralisation of taxing capacities to local authorities, 
subnational tax bases might increase the revenues of the entire public sector. In Mexico, fiscal 
federalism has become a dispute over a fixed pool of resources: the federal tax base. W ith  
limited political will for taxing local fiscal bases, the distribution of federal resources is based on 
a zero-sum game. The additional resources obtained by one state are lost by the others or by a 
corresponding reduction in federal government spending (Rojas, 1999:21). Such a distribution of 
fiscal responsibilities and the limitation of subnational tax bases created incentives for rent 
seeking behaviour by states and municipalities. Fiscal federalism became an endless dispute 
over a purse of finite resources (Diaz Cayeros, 2004:200). Haggard (1999:33) finds that in a 
decentralisation process there are cases where expenditure responsibilities are transferred
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ahead of revenue-raising powers, as has happened with Mexican states. In the opposite case, 
funds are transferred without any additional responsibilities.
W hen the main motive for decentralisation is to appease regional political forces, the  
reallocation of responsibilities and funds is not based on the premise of increased efficiency and 
im provem ent in the quality of public services. As will be shown later in this chapter, the increase 
of funds for municipal governments has triggered bureaucratic expenditures and extravagant 
pay-rises for municipal officials.
4.1.1 Accountability: the neglected issue o f Mexico's decentralisation
Mexico's prospects of economic development have been burdened both by an extreme 
concentration of power in federal hands during presidentialism and a "high-speed" 
decentralisation process. In the form er political system, the budget was used as a political tool 
of the Executive. Under the new political system, the decentralisation of spending redistributed 
the means of guaranteeing political power in states and municipalities. In theory, a 
decentralisation process has the potential of promoting developm ent through greater efficiency 
and accountability. However, if it is ill designed and executed, the process can have unwanted 
effects (Prud'homme, 1995:2; Giugale, Webb, et.al., 2000:1).
Mexico's decentralisation transferred symmetric responsibilities to states and municipalities 
with asymmetric infrastructures and institutional capabilities. The federal character of Mexico's 
Constitution determined the outcome of the decentralisation process. As the Constitution treats 
all states as legal entities with equal rights, it would have been politically complicated and 
legally contested to promote different degrees of decentralisation, in accordance with the  
respective level of budget management administration. The decentralisation of Mexico's 
expenditure was treated as a consummated decision where states and municipalities had to 
absorb their new tasks, no m atter whether they were ready or not. Instead, it should have been 
a process where subnational entities built administrative capacities in parallel with the
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absorption of new responsibilities. It is easier to write and approve a new law than to create the  
institutional infrastructure and human capital to enforce it.
From a constitutional point of view, states are legally equivalent to each other, and the same is 
true about the municipalities. However, these entities with equivalent constitutional rank had 
enormous disparities in their levels of economic developm ent and contrasting governance 
capacities to absorb the responsibilities of expenditure decentralisation. To illustrate the  
different socioeconomic circumstances of the country's regions, Mexico's Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2007:26-27) considers that the inhabitants of the Federal District (Mexico City) 
have a level of human development equivalent to the Czech Republic. The states of Oaxaca and 
Chiapas rank below the human development of the Palestine Occupied Territories. The 
contrasting levels of Human Development are also reflected in the different institutional 
capacities of state and municipal governments. For example, in 2000, only "25 to 40% of the  
municipalities had a budget planning unit and computerised accounts" (Giugale & W ebb  
2000:9).
The acknowledgement of institutional differences among legally equivalent levels of 
government would have added some prudence to the pace of the decentralisation process. On 
the other hand, the transition from a metaconstitutional to  a constitutional presidentialism  
would have been much more difficult under a gradual approach to decentralisation. To withhold  
the transfer of funds and responsibilities to some states on the grounds of their fragile 
institutional structure could have been constitutionally contestable and politically unviable.
For Shah (1998:86), "a strong... accountable government at the national level is critical to the 
success of decentralisation policies." At the tim e when decentralisation moved forward (1988- 
98), transparency and accountability were neither attributes of the Mexican political system, 
nor topics of research for political scientists. The whole debate around the democratisation of 
the country focused particularly on the construction of institutions to guarantee free and fair 
elections. If the issue of accountability was ignored by the democratisation debates, it is 
understandable that it was also overlooked by the whole process of decentralisation. In
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Mexico's case, the assumption that decentralisation is a mechanism for good governance was 
tested in the context of a federal country in a period of political flux. Through Mexico's case 
study, it would be feasible to suggest that a certain degree of political stability at national level 
is a desirable precondition for the success of decentralisation. Mexico had a stable transition to 
democracy, although it was evident that the sexenio of Ernesto Zedillo marked the beginning of 
a new order in the political system.
By 1998, when the institutional setting of decentralisation was already in place, the Congress 
and the federal government were taking the first steps to build technical capacities for modern 
audit and budgeting systems.1 As described in chapter 2, Mexico's Supreme Audit Institution did 
not become fully operational until 2000. During the most intensive stage of decentralisation, the 
federal institutions did not have the technical skill, nor the legitimacy, to provide leadership on 
how to design institutions for budget accountability. The initiative to take advantage of 
decentralisation as a tool for good governance was left to the resourcefulness and will of state 
governments. Tanzi (2000:9-10) maintains that the outcome of decentralisation depends on 
functioning institutions for budget management, tax policies, revenue administration and 
financial accountability. Strong budgeting and accountability institutions increase the likelihood 
that local authorities will use the financial transfers to improve efficiency and public services. As 
a basic step, decentralised decision-making must incorporate institutions for Horizontal 
Accountability in order to fulfil its theoretical expectations of improved governance.
Weak administrative systems and the inadequacy of budget and financial institutions at 
subnational level are some of the problems that were highlighted by Mexico's decentralisation 
(Cabrero, 2000:30). Decentralisation refers both to a condition and to a process, and its merits 
and flaws are often discussed simultaneously for both concepts (Prud'homme, 1995:3). The 
gains obtained from decentralisation depend on the institutional fram ework, the regional 
political culture and the speed of its implementation. Mexico's decentralisation process started
1 See ch apter 2 regarding th e  in stitu tio nal changes th a t led to  th e  creation  o f th e  S uprem e A u d it In stitu tio n  and th e  
reform  in o f th e  fed era l budgeting cycle.
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from  a point of institutional asymmetry between federal and local bureaucracies. The 
professional capacities of public servants and the institutional infrastructure in each state or 
municipality have a determ inant influence on the process. There were contrasting differences 
between the administrative capacities of state bureaucracies.
4.1.2 Differences between federal and local bureaucracies
In the early 1980s, state administrations had neither the capacity nor the resources to face the 
challenge of decentralisation. During the De la Madrid government, federal ministries began to 
open branch offices in the state capitals in order to build a basic administrative infrastructure at 
the local level. The federal government needed to decentralise its own structure before 
initiating a genuine process of delegating responsibility at a subnational level (Merino, 
1996:375). In education and health, the federal government created a network of regional 
offices (delegaciones federales) that would be the institutional bedrock of subnational public 
administrations. The next step of decentralisation was to transfer this network of regional 
offices to the administrative control and authority of state governments. The decentralisation 
process thus began, in the early eighties, with a geographical dispersion of administrative units 
but no real process for distributing authority and political power among different levels of 
government (Diaz Cayeros, et. a i,  2000:127).
Decentralisation transfers power and resources both to local governments and local 
bureaucracies. Despite some advances in building administrative infrastructure, there are still 
big gaps between the federal, state and municipal authorities. The federal bureaucracies 
operate with better resources and technical skills than some of their local counterparts. Federal 
bureaucrats also tend to receive higher salaries and better opportunities for promotion than 
their local peers (Prud'homme, 1995:9). After the recent implementation of the civil service law 
of the federal administration, the level of political intervention in bureaucratic activity will be 
higher in states and municipalities than at the federal level. Since 2003, 4 states governments 
(Aguascalientes, Veracruz, Quintana Roo, and Zacatecas) and Mexico City have approved civil
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service laws. However, further research is needed to investigate the impact of the new  
legislation on the professionalisation of a new generation of civil servants at state level.
The asymmetry of administrative developm ent between federal and state governments 
reproduces itself at the next level of government. The ayuntamientos often depend on the  
structure and capacities of state administrations in the same way that states rely on federal 
capacities. W ith an identical premise that the federal government has better capabilities for tax 
collection than the states, some state revenue bureaus perform the collection of the property 
tax for the municipalities. "Thus by agreement, by custom or by inertia, state governments 
often act 'on behalf of municipalities. To what degree they take on these functions varies from  
state to state and municipality to municipality. (Cabrero, 2000:11)" W ith the aim of breaking the  
chain of fiscal subordination, municipalities in large cities have built their own revenue 
administrations to collect property taxes and charge for the use of public services.
Chapter 1 of the dissertation offered a discussion on corruption and decentralisation. For the  
present chapter, it is relevant to incorporate Prud'homme's critique of decentralisation 
(1995:9), as he presents several intuitive arguments to sustain the case that there are greater 
opportunities for bureaucratic corruption at the local than at the federal level. He does not 
present empirical evidence, but his intuitions are useful to explain Mexico's case:
•  Local politicians and bureaucrats are probably more subject to pressing demands from  
local interest groups (whose money and votes count).
•  The major theoretical advantage of decentralisation is the flexibility of local politicians 
and bureaucrats to make decisions; however, this attribute might lead to discretionary 
use of the budget to favour their own political clienteles.
•  Subnational bureaucrats have a smaller margin of autonomy relative to subnational 
politicians than national bureaucrats do relative to national politicians.
•  Corruption frequently requires the collaboration of politicians and bureaucrats and the  
distinction between them is generally less rigorous at the local level.
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Mexico could add a fifth argument to Prud'homme's thesis: In states, the media is rarely 
independent. Most local newspapers and electronic media have a strong financial dependence  
on state governments. In O'Donnell terms, the vertical accountability of local bureaucracies 
through free media is a rare exception in Mexican states. The following section of the chapter 
presents some recent cases to show that the margins of autonomy among local politicians and 
bureaucrats have created a new breed of clientelism and pork barrel politics2 in Mexico.
4.2 Clientelism and Democratisation in Mexico
Shah (2007:232) includes patronage and clientelism as tw o of the forms of corruption, where  
officials abuse their positions to provide assistance to their clients to guarantee that they  
receive preferential treatm ent in their dealings with the public sector, including public sector 
employment. Clientelism implies a dyadic relationship in the sense that it is a direct association 
involving some kind of exchange between two individuals (Lande, 1977:xiii). This dyadic 
relationship presupposes that the client will welcome his patron's political leadership and in 
exchange be "provided with goods, services and social advancement" (Roninger & Gunes-Ayata, 
1994:4). The practice of clientelism requires a certain kind of incumbent who is willing to use 
the powers of his office to generate direct benefits for core supporters. Politicians will give 
preference to policies that benefit voter clusters, which bring higher expectations of electoral 
gain. According to Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni (2003:16), politicians can provide four different 
kinds of rewards:
•  Targeted goods or services that are delivered to particular individuals or groups and the  
consumption of which can exclude the rest of the society.
•  Goods that are usually granted to political followers but can also be used by other 
groups in society, including swinging voters.
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•  Universal public goods where it is impossible to target the benefits to specific groups: 
these might include clean air, universal immunisation or national defence.
•  Public goods that have limited or targeted beneficiaries because their provision is 
circumscribed to certain geopolitical jurisdictions. These goods are those most widely 
used for "pork barrelling," or particularistic spending.
The voter will determine his or her voting behaviour according to his or her preferences in the  
delivery of public goods and the credibility of a candidate's promises. Clients award their votes 
on the expectation of some benefits. Medina and Stokes (2002:16) distinguish clientelism from  
general electoral politics because it involves a convincing possibility that clients who do not 
show their support at the polls may be excluded from the benefits. In this sense, clientelism  
implies the use of goods that can be targeted to loyal supporters.
The allocation of budget spending and the provision of public goods aligned with political 
interest was a basic element of the Mexican political system under the PRI regime (Mitchell, 
2001:1). Weldon and Molinar (1994:139) found evidence that PRI governments directed goods 
and expenditures to their core supporters. Roninger & Gunes-Ayata (1994:19) state the  
expectation that "modern" forms of political participation would replace patron-client relations. 
However, clientelistic practices are not fated to vanish with the emergence of democratic 
regimes. If economic development has slowed behind political modernisation, clientelistic 
practices can be more adaptable to new political structures (Lermarchand, 1981).
For Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni, (2003:29) as modernisation and urbanisation move forward, 
clientelism becomes circumscribed to rural or backward areas; in their view, clientelism does 
not fade, but it is concentrated in specific regions of a country. However, in 2001, the mayor of 
Mexico City created a pension scheme for low-income, elderly citizens that bred a new version 
of urban clientelism. Close to 330,000 people, 70 years or older, receive monthly pensions of
2 According to  th e  OED, "pork barrel" refers to  "The state's financial resources regarded as a source o f d is tribu tion  
to  m e e t regional expen d itu re; th e  provision o f funds (in U.S., Federal funds) for a particu lar area achieved th ro ug h
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700 Mexican pesos (£35). With the pension provided for the elders, it was possible to mobilize 
other members of the family for political purposes. The beneficiaries of the program were 
frequently called up for electoral rallies. The city government sent the message that the only 
way to guarantee the continuity of the pension scheme was to re-elect the incumbent political 
party.
The main critique of this pension scheme was its long term  financial viability, even though the  
programme was replicated by different political parties in other states of the country. In light of 
this example, it is unreasonable to infer that clientelistic relations are limited to rural areas. It 
can even be said that the practice of clientelism depends on the degree of economic 
developm ent more than on the level of political modernisation. For Roninger & Gunes-Ayata 
(1994:22), the key determinant in the prevalence of clientelistic relationships is whether 
individuals or communities perceive their expectations, hopes and sense of security as 
dependent on the political fortunes of their patron.
According to official data,3 in 2006, 42.6% of the Mexican population lived below the threshold 
of poverty. Despite the radical changes in the political system, this vast sector of low-income 
citizens still leaves ample room for budget-based political manipulation. As prosperity remains 
an unattainable goal, there is a propensity to exchange political support for goods and services. 
Scott (1972:125) argued that clientelistic practices are preserved by a state of inequality in 
which the patron supplies goods that the "client and his family need for their survival and 
wellbeing." In a comparative analysis Piattoni (2001:23) found that in some European societies 
like Spain, clientelism can coexist with the civic society and that the patron-client relationship 
might persist even after an intense process of economic modernisation.
political representa tio n  or in fluence." The te rm  was used fo r th e  first t im e  w ith  th is m ean ing  in 1909.
3 CONEVAL, th ro ug h  In tern et: h ttp ://w w w .c o n e v a l.g o b .m x /c o n e v a l/P ro g ra m a s .h tm l, consulted January 7, 2008. 
The th resho ld  o f poverty  refers to  people w h o earn less th an  w h a t is necessary to  cover basic consum ption in food  
and clothes; Coneval defines it as Pobreza p a trim o n ia l (Assets poverty ).
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Clientelistic bonds might be affected by political modernisation, but new versions of exchange 
can emerge within the new environment. Carl Lande (1983) argued that modern political 
systems and clientelism were not only compatible but also complementary. Clientelism can 
evolve and interact with modern types of political participation (Roninger & Gunes-Ayata, 
1994:20). Clientelism can survive the transition from an authoritarian single party system to a 
plural and democratic regime, because it works as a mechanism to reward political activists and 
party loyalty. However, control over the constituency of clients is not assured and might be 
subject to the competition of alternative patrons and power brokers, such as other political 
parties or social organisations (Roninger & Gunes-Ayata, 1994:14). The most striking contrast 
between previous forms of clientelism under the PRI hegemony and the new plural party 
system is that the resources used for clientelistic practices are not monopolised by either the  
President or by a single political group.
W ith the expansion of political pluralism in Mexico, there was an open question about how  
traditional clientelistic practices would mutate after the end of the PRI monopoly in power. 
During the tw entieth century, Mexican presidents used social policies to support their 
legitimacy. As a consequence of political change, the Presidency required more democratic 
means of legitimisation (Mitchell, 2001:2). The divided Congress and the reforms that promoted 
budget accountability and decentralisation reduced the space for clientelistic policies emanating  
from the Presidency and the federal government.
The PRI is no longer a national hegemonic presence, but it is still the strongest force in the  
political spectrum. In several states, the PRI prevails as a chief political actor. In 2008, it 
governed 18 states and was the main political force in 17 local congresses. The PRI's corporatist 
arms have reduced their political strength, but they are still effective means of political 
participation and channels to articulate special interests (Mitchell, 2001:7). Patronage and 
clientelism are mechanisms that serve to bridge the formal and informal rules of the game 
(Roninger & Gunes-Ayata, 1994:10). If the rules change, as happened in Mexico, clientelistic 
practices will adapt their informal practices to the new political order. Governors and municipal
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authorities still use the provision of goods and services as a source of political capital that 
enables them  to obtain the support of community and corporatist leaders.
David Colmenares, form er M inister of finance of Oaxaca, states in an interview: "Every governor 
has an incredible clientelistic sense of public works investment. Even PAN governors. They will 
talk about public works as their own: Tm  building a hospital, I'm building a freew ay / they'll say. 
And their best technique is spending. I was financial secretary for five years. Talk to my boss, the  
state governor, all he did was to spend money, and it still works that way" (Colmenares, 2008).
Opposition parties do not have enough access to state resources to mobilize large clienteles, but 
they can make use of patronage once they are in power as it remains the most common way to  
manipulate public funds for political gain. Roninger and Gunes-Ayata (1994:22) state that in a 
democracy, political parties have two basic purposes: 1) they are the bargaining agents over 
resource allocation in the case of both clientelistic practices and universalistic principles; 2) they 
create in the individual "a new kind of identity, a sense of belonging to an imagined community" 
that serves as a bridge of access to political power. Often, belonging to these politically 
organised communities can bring direct benefits to their members. In a democratic system, 
clientelistic networks can be a source of both electoral influence and a political input to define 
the formulation, execution or blockage of public policies.
Normally, clientelism does not break the law, but it pushes the boundaries of "proper moral and 
ethical conduct in government." The tolerance or acceptance of this behaviour depends on the  
regional or national political culture (Simpson, 1988:387). The logic of clientelism is not a m atter 
of legality, but the administration and allocation of public resources. Clients and patrons are 
looking for ways to maximise their advantages through the non-illegal diversion or political use 
of government funds. Client networks can create mechanisms of allocation that act parallel to 
the formal standards or they can become an intrinsic elem ent of the legal procedures for 
assigning resources.
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4.2.1 Clientelistic practices under Mexican democracy
Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni (2003:21) argue that petitions for employment in the bureaucracy 
are an "excludable and reversible good" that link the medium- and long-term interest of the  
voter to the fate of his patron-politician. Thus, an employment position is an ideal "good" for 
the voter because there is no assurance that politicians will keep their com m itm ent to deliver 
other kinds of policies or services. For Robinson and Verdier (2002:2) politicians have the  
motivation to expand the public sector even at the expense of higher taxes. As will be shown in 
the following section, in Mexico new bureaucracies are funded through higher federal transfers 
and in some cases cuts in capital investment. Patrons also prefer to create constituencies in the  
bureaucracy because they can expect long-term support from government workers. Just four 
states and Mexico City have a civil service regulation, and there is no form al tenure for 
government workers in subnational public administrations. The lack of tenure makes public 
servants more vulnerable to the pressures from their political patrons.
Figure 4-1 shows the average real growth in total expenditures and in the cost of bureaucratic 
payroll in states and municipalities from 2001 to 2006. After discounting inflation,4 during this 
period bureaucratic payroll grew 34% in states and 69% in municipalities. Average total 
expenditure had a real growth of 43% in states and 53% in municipalities.
4 According to  Banxico, aggregated in flation in M exico fro m  20 0 0  to  2006  w as 39 .53% .
Year 20 00 2001 20 02 20 0 3 2 0 0 4 20 05 2 0 06
Annual in flation  at D ecem b er o f each year 8 .96 4 .4 0 5 .7 0 3 .9 8 5 19 3 .33 4 .0 5
D eflacto r 2 0 0 6 1 .2 98 1 .2 430 1 .1 760 1 .1 309 1 .0 7 5 1 1 .0 405 1 .0 000
Source: BANXICO, Indice Nacional de Precios y Cotizaciones 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6 , th ro ug h  In te rn e t:  
h ttp ://w w w .b an x ico .g o b .m x /p o lm o n e in flac io n /s erv ic io s /c a lcD e ln fla c io n /ca lcD e ln flac .h tm l, M a y  8 th 2 0 08 .
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F igure  4 -1  Real c u m u la tiv e  g ro w th  in s ta te s  and m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 6 )
Q  
O
2001 2002 200 200 2005 2006
•  S tate Expenditure A S tate Payroll ♦M u n ic ip a l E xpenditure ■ M unicipal Payroll
Source: C alculated by th e  a u th o r, using d a ta  fro m  INEGI, 20 07 .
F igure  4 -2  show s th a t  th e  p e rce n ta g e  o f  b u re a u c ra t ic  p a y ro ll has g ro w n  as a sha re  o f  to ta l 
m u n ic ip a lity  e x p e n d itu re  fro m  27 .6%  in 1990  to  32 .4%  in 2006 . It is p la u s ib le  to  su p p o se  fro m  
th e  F igures 4 -1  and  4 -2  th a t  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  have m o re  b u d g e t m a rg in  to  a p p ly  c lie n te lis t ic  
p ra c tice s  th a n  s ta te s  do . In s ta tes , th e  sha re  o f  b u re a u c ra t ic  p a y ro ll has re m a in e d  a lm o s t 
c o n s ta n t a t 28%  o f to ta l s ta te  e x p e n d itu re .
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F igure 4 -2  D is tr ib u t io n  o f  to ta l m u n ic ip a l e x p e n d itu re s
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■ Public works ■ Bureaucratic payroll O ther apportionm ents
Source: C onstructed by th e  a u th o r, using d a ta  fro m  INEGI 20 0 7
T he d a ta  fo r  F igures 4 -1  and 4 -2  w as c o lle c te d  fro m  th e  In fo rm e  de F inanzas P ub licas  E s ta ta le s  y  
M u n ic ip a ls  (R e p o rt o f  P ub lic  F inances o f  S ta tes an d  M u n ic ip a lit ie s ) , w h ic h  is th e  la rg e s t 
c o m p e n d iu m  o f  fin a n c ia l da ta  o f s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  and is p u b lis h e d  b y  th e  INEGI, th e  
N a tio n a l O ffice  o f  S ta tis tics . INEGI g a th e rs  th e  d a ta  d ire c t ly  f r o m  th e  c u e n ta  p u b lic a , th e  e n d  o f  
fisca l y e a r fin a n c ia l re p o r t, o f  th e  31 s ta tes , th e  F edera l D is tr ic t and  th e  2 ,4 3 8  m u n ic ip a lit ie s . 
The  c a te g o ry  o f  B u re a u c ra tic  P ayro ll, se rv ic ios  pe rso n a te s  in  its  S pan ish  o r ig in a l, in c lu d e s  a ll th e  
costs  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e  la b o u r re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  s ta te  g o v e rn m e n ts  and its  
e m p lo y e e s : sa la ry , socia l s e cu rity , p e ns ions  and w o rk e r  b e n e fits .
F igure  4-3  p re s e n ts  d isa g g re g a te d  in fo rm a tio n  by  s ta te  o f  th e  rea l g ro w th  in B u re a u c ra tic  
P ayro ll fo r  2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6 . The T ab le  show s w id e  d is p a r it ie s  in  th e  changes in e x p e n d itu re  on  th e  
b u re a u c ra cy , w ith  534%  increase  in th e  s ta te  o f  Tabasco , and  3 s ta te s  (C hiapas, G u a n a ju a to  and  
N u e vo  Leon) w ith  n e g a tive  g ro w th  a t th e  b o tto m  o f  th e  F igure . The n a tio n a l ave rage  g ro w th  
w as 61%  and  th e  m o d e  w as 44% . T h ir te e n  s ta te s  had  an inc rease  o f  50%  o r  m o re  in p a y ro ll 
expenses d u r in g  th e  six y e a r p e rio d .
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F igu re  4 -3  Real G ro w th  in B u re a u c ra tic  P ayro ll E x p e n d itu re  (2 0 0 0  -  2006 )
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Source: C onstructed  by th e  a u th o r, using da ta  fro m  INEGI, 20 0 7 .
4.2.2 The challenge o f measuring government employment in states and 
municipalities
W ith  th e  a va ila b le  d a ta , i t  is im p o ss ib le  to  d isce rn  i f  th e  inc rease  in p a y ro ll cos ts  is th e  re s u lt o f  
h ig h e r w ages, in c re a se d  n u m b e r o f  w o rk e rs  o r  a c o m b in a tio n  o f  b o th  fa c to rs . U n til 2005 , th e re  
w as no  s y s te m a tic  and  p e r io d ic a l in fo rm a tio n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t e m p lo y m e n t in s ta te s  and  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s . INEGI a p p lie d  a fo u r -y e a r ly  p o ll, th e  E ncuesta  N a c io n a l de  E m p leo  (N a tio n a l
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Employment Survey, ENE) from April 2000 to the end of 2004. The main objective of this poll 
was to provide periodical data of Mexico's labour market. This poll distinguished between  
people who worked in government and the private sector. However, there was no additional 
inform ation to differentiate between federal, state and municipal workers. In 2005, the ENE was 
replaced by the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (National Poll of Occupation and 
Empolyment, ENOE). The new poll shared the same objective as its predecessor, but it had a 
new methodology and a new questionnaire. In its 2005 exercise, the ENOE incorporated a 
question that allows us, for the first tim e, to have data about changes in government 
em ploym ent in states and municipalities. From the perspective of the dissertation, the problem  
is that there are only consistent figures from the same source for the years 2005 and 2006. At 
the tim e of writing, July 2008, there is no scheduled date for the release of the data for 2007.
Another possible source of information about governm ent employment are the INEGI 
monographs with economic and demographical information for each state. This source presents 
inconsistent and contradictory information due to lack of homogeneity in the classification of 
information: some states include the teachers as government workers, others exclude them  
from the category. The state of Michoacan reported 296,000 workers in the year 2000, but for 
the year 2002 it only stated 33,000 w ithout any explanation for the 89% reduction in 
government em ploym ent. For this dissertation, I tried to find the data through the states' 
Freedom of Information Act. However, state governments merely referred back to the  
documents published by INEGI.
There was a national survey of municipal presidents in 2002, including data about government 
workers employed in municipalities. In 2002, one of every three employees was dedicated to 
administrative services and one of every five to policing and public security (Sedesol, 2002:59). 
The problem was that the survey of municipal presidents was an isolated exercise that was not 
replicated in later years. Using the data of the 2002 survey5 of municipal presidents and the
5 Los m unicipios en M exico : In form acion  p a ra  e l Desarrollo, C ed em u n-lneg i 1997; Encuesta N ac io n a l a  Presidentes 
M unic ipales sobre D esarro llo  Social, Sedesol, INEGI, Conapo, 20 02 .
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2006 National Poll of Occupation and Employment, the total number of employees in the 2,427 
municipios grew from 548,000 in 2002 to 758,178 in 2006; this represents a 38% increase in the  
num ber of people working in municipal governments. In the same period (2002-2006), the real 
growth of bureaucratic payroll in municipal governments was 40%. There are obvious 
methodological shortcomings of comparing data from two different measures of municipal 
em ploym ent and there is no data available for the years 2003 to 2004. Patience is required in 
order to obtain data for future years and be able to have a proper correlation analysis of the 
INEGI's National Poll of Occupation and Empolyment and the Report of Public Finances of States 
and Municipalities.
Table 4.1 presents the first known data on employment in the 31 state and DF governments in 
Mexico. The table was constructed with information derived from  the National Poll of 
Occupation and Employment, which contains data on the employed population by sector of the 
economy and state. Since the poll is applied every three months in 120,260 homes, these 
figures guarantee that the sample is representative at national and state level. The aggregated 
data of the ENOE poll is available through INEGI's Internet webpage,6 but the information on 
government employment does not distinguish between workers in the three levels of 
government. However, since 2005, the data base of the poll allows the use of information from  
question 4d of the questionnaire, which differentiates the population employed in the Federal, 
state and municipal government.
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of state government workers as a share of the total population 
above 14 years of age, which is considered by INEGI as the threshold for the working age. In 
three states, (Baja California Sur, Tabasco and Zacatecas) the state government provides more 
than 10% of the employment opportunities available in the state. The INEGI account of the total 
working populations includes workers from both the formal and informal sectors.7 If the
th rough  Internet: http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/enoe/ind_trim/ 
default.asp?c=11415 Consulted June 11th 2008.
7 Rural workers are considered by INEGI as part of the informal sector.
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p e rce n ta g e  inc ludes o n ly  th e  fo rm a l secto r, th e  w e ig h t o f g o v e rn m e n t e m p lo y m e n t increases up 
to  20 .7%  in th e  case o f  th e  s ta te  o f Tabasco.
Tab le  4-1 N u m b e r o f S tate G o ve rn m e n t W o rke rs  and P ercentage 
o f To ta l P opu la tion  In W o rk in g  Age (2006)
State Government 
Workers (SGW)
SGW as % o f Total SGW as % o f Total W orking
State W orking Age 
Population
Age Population In the  form al 
economy
Aguascalientes 36,572 9.0 12.1
Baja California 73,858 6.0 7.5
Baja California Sur 23,198 10.3 11.9
Campeche 31,498 9.5 13.2
Coahuila 70,904 7.1 9.0
Colima 21,852 8.3 12.7
Chiapas 103,726 6.8 12.5
Chihuahua 95,324 7.0 8.8
D istrito  Federal 270,108 6.9 7.4
Durango 51,298 9.3 14.2
Guanajuato 95,623 5.1 8.4
Guerrero 107,248 9.0 16.1
Hidalgo 84,620 9.0 16.8
Jalisco 168,976 5.9 8.9
State o f Mexico 338,287 6.0 12.3
Michoacan 122,654 7.7 14.3
M orelos 52,460 7.8 13.5
Nayarit 37,339 9.2 14.2
Nuevo Leon 115,749 6.2 7.4
Oaxaca 113,149 8.2 14.0
Puebla 117,127 5.2 10.4
Queretaro 45,167 7.2 9.2
Quintana Roo 45,794 8.4 10.5
San Luis Potosi 65,055 7.0 11.6
Sinaloa 84,269 7.4 11.7
Sonora 64,424 6.5 9.0
Tabasco 74,557 10.3 20.7
Tamaulipas 87,367 6.8 9.4
Tlaxcala 32,819 7.7 15.6
Veracruz 181,164 6.7 12.4
Yucatan 59,683 7.4 11.7
Zacatecas 52,547 10.3 17.9
*lncludes teachers, and w orkers in th e  state health system.
Source: Constructed by th e  author, using data from  ENOE, INEGI 2007a.
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W ith no tenure, the absence civil service systems in most of the state administrations, and non­
transparent processes for bureaucratic career advancement, governors have an important 
influence upon the opportunities in the labour market. As PRD Senator from Tabasco Arturo 
Nunez phrased it during an interview: "In my state, either you work for Pemex (the national oil 
company), for the municipalities or for the governor. The other job option is to become a 
government contractor" (Nunez, 2008).
The premise that decentralisation will produce efficiency gains in budget expenditure assumed 
that governors would not use the new pool of resources for different objectives than 
maximising the welfare gains of society. "The Mexican public sector is clientelistic. The president 
chooses his cabinet and selects a number of people to fill a number of public offices; senior 
figures in the government will also expect to be able to appoint their juniors so the process 
continues downward." W hat Philip (1992:7) states here about the federal bureaucracy can also 
be applied to governors and municipal administrations.
Moises Alcalde Virgen, form er PAN deputy in the Congress of the State of Mexico and 
contender to the municipality of Naucalpan in the same state, said in an interview: "A municipal 
president from any political party begins his political aspirations first with the heart and mind's 
desire, right? 'I want to become a city-mayor'... for this reason, he will have to go with its party 
activists and constituencies... at the end of the day commitments are generated, and those 
commitments generate the obligation that when one becomes Mayor, one has to pay with jobs 
as a reward for participating in the political project...and another reason is that it's im portant to 
maintain political bases, right?, and that happens in any political party" (Alcalde Virgen, 2008). 
Fakin & Crombrugghe (1997:8) noted that the decentralisation of expenditure may imply the  
expansion of the state's bureaucracy, as in many cases greater resources have produced "an 
unnecessary increase in the staff members." The figures presented in the previous section 
support Fakin & Crombrugghe's claim.
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4.2 .3  Bureaucracy as clientelism: the bounty o f municipal autonomy
As a consequence of financial decentralisation, municipalities have received considerable 
unallocated funding (Giugale, et. al. 2000:21), and the transfer of funds w ithout additional 
responsibilities has created incentives for overblown payrolls and inefficient expenditures. In 
Decem ber 2002, the daily Reforma published the following story on its front page: "The mayor 
of Tultitlan, Jose Antonio Rios, earns US$46,000 more than the British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair... According to the secret payroll of the municipal government, Rios Granados receives at 
least US$213,000 (a year), while the British head of government received US$167,000 in the 
same period (Reforma, 2002-XII-19)." Tultitlan is one of the 125 municipalities in the State of 
Mexico and according to the 2000 census it had a population of 432,000 people. There are 
2,429 municipalities in the country.
Article 115 of the Constitution grants municipalities the autonomy to decide upon their own 
"internal administration." In some cases, this constitutional provision has translated into the 
autonomy and freedom for municipalities to provide government officials with salaries that are 
equivalent to the heads of government of G-8 countries. Neither federal nor state governments 
have legal mechanisms to prevent municipal officials from allocating a disproportionate share of 
municipal budgets into their own salaries. The federal constitutional system shielded states and 
municipalities from pressures to improve the transparency and accountability of public 
expenditure. Subnational authorities exercised the freedom and sovereignty to decide upon 
internal administrative matters. Until the constitutional reform of 2008s, neither the federal nor 
the state governments had any authority over the draft, content and accounting typologies of 
municipal authorities. Each state and municipality has had its own semantic categories to  
classify its expenditure appropriations in the budget decree. Also, every local authority has the 
liberty to establish its own disclosure criteria. The form er mayor of Tultitlan hid his 16,000 USD
8 The Congress has until M a y  2 0 09  to  ap prove th e  secondary legislation th a t w ill en force th e  hom ogenisation  o f 
b udget in fo rm atio n  in states and m unicipalities. For an analysis o f th e  C onstitutional R eform , please re fe r to  
ch apter 5.
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per month salary behind obscure budget categories like "contingent appropriations" or "special 
expenditures for non-predicted budget items."
The lack of clear and homogenous budgeting criteria opened the door for opacity, waste and 
corruption at subnational level. Before the recent constitutional reform, there was no mandate  
to have a coherent glossary of budget terminology. The information about the oversized salary 
of public officials in the municipality of Tultitlan was just the tip of an iceberg.9 Local authorities  
have had numerous ways of creative accounting to hide the real wages of high-ranking 
municipal officials. The gross income of municipal officials can be broken into different budget 
lines like "performance bonus," "incentives," or "costs related to the municipal president's 
office." The budget line of remuneraciones adicionales y especiales (additional and special 
payments), which consists of supplementary income for elected and administrative municipal 
officials, grew 45.25%  in real terms between 1999 and 2006. For 2006 the am ount allocated for 
additional and special payments represented an additional 17% of the total recognised 
expenditure as bureaucratic payroll of municipal administrations (INEGI, 2008:78). One of the  
problems with budget documents in several states and municipalities is that it is impossible to  
get a complete picture of labour costs just by observing the budget line item of servicios 
personates (bureaucratic payroll). That lack of transparent budget data was one of the  
arguments for promoting a national legislation to homogenise the design and content of budget 
documents in states and municipalities.
The disproportionately high salary of a city mayor may not have grave financial implications 
within a given municipal budget; however, the problem is that the pay of the highest ranking 
officials sets an income standard for the top officials of the municipality. As the  salary of the  
mayor is granted by the vote of the cabildo, the municipal version of a legislative branch (see 
chapter 3), the members of this municipal assembly usually receive generous incomes to assure
9 According to  th e  w ee k ly  new spaper Cam bio  (2 0 0 2 -l-2 7 th ), a t least th re e  m unicipal pres idents in th e  S tate  o f  
M exico ea rn ed  h igher salaries th an  President V icen te  Fox.
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their collaboration. In 2002, the monthly payroll of 18 officials10 of Tultitlan's Municipal 
governm ent was close to US$1.5 million (Reforma, 2001-VIII-02).
At the federal and state level, there have been several initiatives to impose a ceiling on the  
salaries of municipal presidents. The State of Mexico changed the law to force municipal 
governments to publish full information about its payroll (Diario de Mexico, 2004-VII-23), but 
there w ere no provisions to enforce the bill. In Tlaxcala there was a decree to cap municipal 
salaries, but municipal authorities did not abide by the new rule (El Sol de Tlaxcala, 2005-111-29). 
The then leader of the PAN in the Chamber of Deputies, and current President of Mexico, Felipe 
Calderon drafted a bill to limit municipal salaries, but it was never presented on the floor of the  
Congress because of the possibility that it might be rejected by the Supreme Court, due to the  
constitutional concept of free sovereignty of municipalities. The political parties tried to  curb 
the increases of the salaries through written commitments of their candidates for municipal 
elected positions, but these were informal compromises that are not enforced by any law. Any 
serious attem pt to cap the payroll expenditure of municipal authorities would need to  change 
the Constitution, in order to reduce the margins of administrative autonomy given to state and 
municipal authorities.
In the heyday of presidentialism, there was no transparency of public official salaries and the  
President had the political leverage to control or revoke the decisions of subnational authorities, 
even in the furthest corner of Mexico. The administrative opacity of the presidentialist era has 
been replaced by a considerable degree of transparency but w ithout any institutional 
mechanisms to prevent a lawful but abusive appropriation of public funds by top officials in 
subnational governments. The disproportionate size of public official salaries has been 
interpreted as a "legalisation of corruption," because those wages are paid w ithout the  
infraction of any law.
10 O ne m ayo r and 15 regidores  (a lderm en) m ake up th e  cabildo, along w ith  tw o  high ranking officials o f th e  local 
adm in istration .
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The problem is not limited to the salaries but also to government waste. In an Interview, Jesus 
Silva Herzog, M inister of Finance from 1982-1986, stated with a joke: "The distribution of 
resources in states and municipalities has contributed to a suburbanisation of government 
expenditure. This means that when a Municipal President gets some transfers, the first thing he 
does, is he goes to buy a suburban vehicle" (Silva Herzog, 2008). The form er governor of 
Chihuahua, Francisco Barrio, shares a similar perspective: "I saw many Municipal Presidents in 
the state and other states, where you could see the city hall buying SUV and useless stuff. For 
example, in my state, I saw municipalities that were locked away in the mountains, where there  
wasn't a newspaper in two hundred kilometres around and had no radio station in tw o hundred 
and fifty kilometres, but they had a budget for a press secretary and a media relations 
department... that kind of expenditures in cell phones and vehicles, was and is still brutal" 
(Barrio, 2008).
Expenditure in bureaucratic payroll and government contracts give subnational authorities 
enormous influence over their respective states and municipalities. In the absence of a 
consistent tim e series of employment in municipal and state governments, it is impossible to 
make a statistical examination of how this influence translates into favourable outcomes in local 
elections. However, there are some recent cases that contribute to the claim that governors 
have wide margins to mobilise resources and clienteles in order to guarantee favourable 
electoral results.
4.3 Governors1 role in electoral outcomes
The present section will make a descriptive analysis of three different cases where it is plausible 
to assume that governors can have a relevant influence in the outcome of local elections. The 
first case is the 2002 PRI internal election to determ ine the leadership of the party. The 
following sections are the only two cases in Mexican history where the Federal Electoral 
Tribunal has reversed the results of a governorship election under the premise that the
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governor of the incumbent party made an unlawful intervention in the election process. The 
first annulled election was in the state of Tabasco in 2000 and the second in Colima in 2003.
4.3.1 The 2002 PR I internal election
The case of the 2002 internal election of the PRI helps to show that Mexico's governors retain 
non-institutional and non-legal means of influencing elections. A fter the triumph of the PAN's 
candidate Vicente Fox in 2000, the PRI was shut out of presidential authority. For the first tim e  
in its seven decades of existence, the party had to find an institutional mechanism to choose its 
new leader without presidential intervention. In February 2002, the PRI held an internal election 
to choose the chairman of the party. The participation in the internal election was open to all 
Mexican citizens with voter identification. The electoral system was based on a simple majority, 
meaning that the candidate with the most votes at the polls would be the next leader of the  
major opposition party.
The campaign teams of the two candidates, Roberto Madrazo and Beatriz Paredes, made 
mutual accusations that their respective opponent was receiving unlawful support from some of 
the 18 PRI governors. According to the rules of the internal election, the governors w ere not 
able to show or give any kind of support to the candidates; however, several press reports11 
stated that most of the PRI governors were using the weight of their offices to mobilise the  
voters in favour of their preferred candidate. In at least eight states, there were press reports o f 
the use of public resources to support the political campaigns.
In a very strongly contested election where almost 3 million PRI supporters went to the polls, 
Roberto Madrazo won by merely 51,846 votes, just 1.7% of the total participation. The close 
result did not reflect the wide margins of difference in the results state by state. The average 
margin of difference between the candidate with more votes and the other contender was
11 R eform a  February 2 7 th 2002; La Jornada  February 13th  20 02 ; M ile n io  February 14 th  2 0 02 .
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33.3% and the median was 37% in the 18 states with PRI governors. Roberto Madrazo obtained 
91.5% of the valid votes in his state Tabasco and 84.5% in Oaxaca. These two states, which 
represent only 5% of the national voter's list, gave Madrazo 20% of his total votes. On the other 
hand, Paredes received more than 66% of the votes in five states. As Table 4.2 shows, the 
candidate that received the support of the governor won the state's election with a wide 
advantage. The first column of the table gives the name of the governor and his preferred 
choice for the chairmanship of the PRI, according to press reports prior to the election. The 
second column shows the winner in the respective state and his margin over his contender.
Table 4-2 State governors and the outcome of the 2002 PRI internal election
S ta te
(G o v e rn o r  a n d  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  c a n d id a te )
M a rg in  o f  v o tin g  d if fe re n c e  
b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  c a n d id a te s  
(W in n e r )
T a b as co 8 6 .1 4 %
(M a n u e l A n d ra d e  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  M a d r a z o ) * (M a d r a z o )
O ax aca 7 3 .0 2  %
(Jose M u r a t  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  M a d r a z o ) * + (M a d r a z o )
T laxca la 6 0 .8 2  %
(a lle g e d ly  s u p p o r te d  P ared e s) (P a re d e s )
Q u in ta n a  Roo 5 1 .7 1  %
(Jo aq u in  H e n d ric k s  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  M a d r a z o ) * (M a d r a z o )
S ta te  o f  M e x ic o 4 2 .9 7  %
(A r tu ro  M o n t ie l  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  P a re d e s )*+ + (P a re d e s )
C a m p e c h e 4 1 .4 4 %
(A n to n io  G o n za le z  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  M a d r a z o ) * (M a d r a z o )
H id a lg o 4 0 .7 8  %
(M ig u e l A n g e l N u n e z  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  P a re d e s )* (P a re d e s )
G u e rre ro 3 8 .8 3  %
(R en e  J u a re z  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  M a d r a z o ) * (M a d r a z o )
C o lim a 3 8 .7 3  %
(F e rn a n d o  M o r e n o  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  P a re d e s )*+ + (P a re d e s )
T a m a u lip a s 3 7 .1 8 %
(T o m a s  Y a rr in g to n  a lle g e d ly  s u p p o rte d  P a re d e s )*+ + (P a re d e s )
* M ilenio  Sem anal (10-11-02); +Accusation by Paredes Supporters (N otim ex, 8-11-2002); 
++ Directly accused by M adrazo  (Reform a, 10-11-02)
The single explanation for such wide disparities in the states' voting pattern is the political 
support of the governor. It is important to note that the internal elections of the PRI were not 
monitored by an external electoral bureau that could verify the process, so any disputes over
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th e  v a lid ity  o f  th e  resu lts  had to  be reso lved by th e  p a rty 's  o w n  a u th o r it ie s . Th is fa c t is n o t a 
conc lus ive  in d ica tio n  o f th e  pers is tence  o f c lie n te lis tic  p ractices in th e  M ex ican  d e m o c ra tic  
sys tem , b u t i t  he lps to  s u p p o rt th e  c la im  th a t s ta te  g o ve rno rs  have am p le  ro o m  to  use th e  
p o w e r and in flu e nce  o f th e ir  o ffices  d u rin g  v o tin g  p rocedures.
F rom  1997 to  2007, d u rin g  th e  f irs t  decade a fte r th e  PRI lost th e  m a jo r ity  in th e  C ham ber o f 
D epu ties , th e re  w e re  64 g o ve rn o rsh ip  e lec tions  in M e x ico ,12 and in 44 cases (69%) th e  
in c u m b e n t pa rty  w o n  th e  e le c tio n . In th e  pe riod  2000  to  2007, since th e  PRI w as ous ted  fro m  
th e  p residency, th e re  have been 41 gove rn o rsh ip  e lec tions , w ith  30 cases (73%) in w h ich  th e  
in c u m b e n t pa rty  rem a ined  in p o w e r (See Table 4 .3 ). From  th e  h is to rica l pe rspec tive , th e  
M ex ican  dem ocracy  is s til l young  and a t th is  p o in t in tim e  it is hard  to  d ra w  th e  long te rm  
fe a tu re s  o f th e  em erg in g  p o lit ica l system . H ow ever, g iven th e  te n  yea r e le c to ra l da ta , it  is 
poss ib le  to  c la im  th a t  a p o lit ica l p a rty  th a t co n tro ls  th e  g o ve rn o rsh ip  has m o re  th a n  a tw o - th ird s  
p ro b a b ility  o f re m a in in g  in pow e r.
Table 4-3 O u tcom e  o f S tate G ove rno r's  e le c tio ns  in M ex ico  (1997-2007) ________
Year o f election State Governor's Party before Governor's Party a fte r
_____________________________________     e lection _  e lection
1997    Campeche PRI PRI
1997 Colima PRI PRI
1997 DF PRI PRD
1997 Nuevo Leon PRI PAN
1997 Queretaro PR! PAN
1997  ...............  -------     -    prT
1997 Sonora PRI PRI
1998 _  Chihuahua PAN PRI
1998 Zacatecas PRI PRD
1998 ’ Durango    PRI   _ PRI...
1998 Veracruz PRI PRI
1998 Aguascalientes PRI PAN
1998 Oaxaca PRI PRI
1998 Tamaulipas PRI PRI
1998 Puebla PRI PRI
1998 Sinaloa PRI PRI
1998 Tlaxcala PRI PRD+Others
12 Including th ree  elections o f th e  Chief o f G overnm ent o f M exico City in 1997, 20 0 0  and 2006.
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Year o f e lection State Governor's Party before Governor's Party a fte r
election election^
1 9 9 9  Baja California Sur PRI PRD
19 9 9  Hidalgo PRI PRI
19 9 9  Quintana Roo PRI PRI
19 9 9  Guerrero PRI _ _ _______ _____  PRI
19 9 9  Nayarit PRI P R D +O thers
1 999  State o f Mexico PRI PRI
1 999  ...........................Coahuila PRI......................................................PRI......
 2000...................................DF................................................ PRD.....................................................PRD.....
2000 Guanajuato PAN PAN
2000 Morelos PRI PAN
2000 Chiapas PRI P R D +P A N +O thers
2000 Jalisco PAN PAN
20 0 1  Yucatan PRI P A N +P R D +O thers
2 0 0 1  Baja California PAN PAN
2 0 0 1  Michoacan PR! P R D +O thers
2 0 0 1  * Tabasco PRI PRI
2 0 0 3  Campeche PRI PRI
2 0 0 3 *  Colima PRI PRI
2 0 0 3  Queretaro PAN PAN
2 003  Nuevo Leon PAN PRI
2 003  San Luis Potosi PRI PAN
2003 Sonora PRI PRI + PVEM
2004 Chihuahua PRI PRI
2004 Durango PRI _  PRI
2004 Zacatecas PRD RRD_
2004 Aguascalientes PAN PAN
2004 Oaxaca PRI PRI+Others
2004 Veracruz PRI PRI+Others
2004 Puebla PRI PRI
2004 Sinaloa PRI PRI
2004 Tamaulipas PRI PRI
2004 Tlaxcala P R D +O thers P A N + O th e rs
2005 Baja California Sur PRI PRD
2005 Guerrero PRI PRD
2005 Quintana Roo PRI PRI + PVEM
2005 Hidalgo PRI PRI + PVEM
2005 State o f Mexico PRI PRI + PVEM
2005 Nayarit P A N +P R D +O thers  PRI
2005 Coahuila PRI PRI
2006 Chiapas PRD+PAN PRD
2006 DF PRD PRD
2006 Guanajuato PAN PAN
2006 Jalisco PAN PAN
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Date o f e lection State Governor's Party before Governor's Party a fte r
election election
2006 Morelos PAN " pa n
2006 Tabasco PRI PRI
2007 Michoacan PRD PRD+Others
2007 Yucatan PAN PRI
2007 Baja California PAN PAN+Others
*E xtraord in ary  election a fte r TRIFE's decision to  revoke previous results
Source: Constructed by th e  au tho r w ith  data from  w w w .cidac.org and State Electoral Institutes.
4.3.2 The invalidation o f Tabasco's 2000 gubernatorial election
In an unp re ce d e n te d  decis ion , in 2000, th e  Federal E lectora l T ribuna l ann u lle d  th e  e le c tio n  o f 
th e  g o ve rn o r o f th e  s ta te  o f Tabasco. The C ourt v e rd ic t to o k  th e  v ic to ry  aw ay fro m  th e  PRI 
can d ida te  and decreed  th a t new  e lec tions  m us t be he ld  d u rin g  th e  f irs t six m o n th s  o f 2001. 
A cco rd ing  to  s ta te  e le c to ra l law , if m o re  th a n  20% o f  th e  s ta te  po lls  expe rience  any kind  o f 
ir re g u la r ity  it is possib le  to  call fo r  a new  e le c tio n . W ith  a d iv ided  m a jo r ity  o f  fo u r  vo tes  against 
tw o , th e  c o u rt s ta ted  th a t th e re  w e re  reasons to  in va lid a te  th e  re su lt because o f in te rv e n tio n s  
o f th e  PRI g o ve rn o r R oberto  M adrazo  to  su p p o rt his p a rty 's  cand ida te , M a n u e l A nd rade . The 
c o u rt also alleged ir re g u la rit ie s  in a n u m b e r o f s ta te  po lls , and o th e r "gene ra lized  and d is tu rb in g  
fa c to rs "  (TRIFE, 2000 :X II-29 )13.
The C ourt's  ve rd ic t a ff irm e d  th a t a t som e v o tin g  po lls , cash and fo o d  supp lies w e re  exchanged 
fo r  v o te r  suppo rt. F u rth e rm o re , local a u th o r it ie s  m ade th e  d e live ry  o f pub lic  w o rks  and services 
c o n d itio n a l on th e  tr iu m p h  o f th e  in cu m b e n t's  p a rty . The T ribuna l also fo u n d  th a t th e  local 
M in is try  o f T ranspo rt m ade  an illegal d o n a tio n  o f 2.5 m illio n  pesos (£174,350) to  th e  PRI. This 
was th e  f irs t tim e  th e  E lectora l C ourt accep ted  ev idence  o f  c lie n te lis tic  p rac tices  and illegal 
d ive rs ion  o f pub lic  resources as ev idence  to  o ve rru le  th e  o u tco m e  o f an e le c tio n .
Tabasco has a w ide  bu d g e t m arg in  fo r  c lie n te lis tic  p ractices in M exico  due to  its  h ig h e r share o f 
fed e ra l trans fe rs , because o f special taxes re la ted  to  o il e x tra c tio n . Tabasco a lso rece ives th e
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highest per capita revenues when there is an oil surplus. As will be discussed further, the oil 
surplus is not overseen by the local Congress and in some cases is not even included at the end 
of year spending accounts. This lack of control leaves wide room for misallocation of the non­
budgeted oil revenues.
4.3.3 The invalidation o f Colima's 2003 Governor Election
In October 2003, for the second tim e in history, the Federal Electoral Courts annulled an 
election for state governor, revoking the triumph of the PRI candidate Gustavo Alberto Vazquez 
in Colima. In a split decision of four votes against three, the Federal Electoral Court annulled the  
verdict of the state tribunal, which had ratified the PRI victory. The court sentence found that 
the incumbent governor, Fernando Moreno, intervened in the election result by making public 
statements in favour of the PRI candidate, participating in his political rallies, and authorizing an 
advertising campaign promoting the achievements of his government.
The draft of the final verdict stated that the "number, magnitude, importance, frequency, 
intensity and generalisation of interventions" (TRIFE, 29-X-2003) made by Governor Moreno in 
favour of the PRI, despite the legal restrictions on doing so, were reason enough to invalidate 
the election. According to the tribunal, the governor made public statements that bolstered the  
PRI campaign before, during and after the election. Another offence quoted in the verdict was 
that 40 PAN supporters were detained without justification by the state police on Election Day.
The court decision was controversial, because in the midterm elections of that year, President 
Vicente Fox followed a similar strategy to that of Colima's governor, indirectly promoting the  
vote for his own party. In most democracies, the incumbent in the Executive has the legal right 
to engage in the political promotion of his own party. As a backlash to the extrem e powers of
13 Source: C onstitutional revision process. File: S U P-JR C -487/2000. Tribunal Federal Electoral, D ecem b er 29, 2 0 0 3 .
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presidentialism, there is an informal expectation that the Mexican President and the governors 
will refrain from participation in political campaigns.
In the case of Colima, the political right of the Governor to promote his own party is forbidden 
by Article 59 of the state Constitution. Following the invalidation of the election, the state 
Congress appointed an interim governor for two months, the period given to organize a second 
election in less than six months. In December 2003, in the re-run of the elections, the PRI 
candidate Vazquez Montes won again with 51.5% of the vote.
There are interesting differences between the cases of Tabasco. In Colima, the Tribunal 
punished the governor for promoting his own party in an electoral campaign. This would be an 
odd fault for a professional politician in most democracies around the world. In Tabasco, the  
Federal Electoral Court documented clientelistic practices and the use of public funds for 
political purposes. The election in Tabasco in 2000 offered judicial evidence of subnational 
clientelistic practices in modern Mexico. Moises Alcalde Virgen, from  the PAN, states that the 
problem affects the whole political spectrum and not just PRI governors: "There is a permanent 
citizens' complaint, and a political complaint from all political parties of all colours, of the  
governors' use of budget resources for electoral matters. How many times have we heard that 
Veracruz's Governor (PRI) used all the available resources for local Congress and municipal 
electoral campaigns? But we hear the same from Guanajuato's (PAN); and we hear the same 
from Zacatecas' or Mexico City (PRD)" (Alcalde Virgen:2008).
The flow of resources from state coffers to the ayuntamientos is another source of power for 
governors who want to guarantee the electoral loyalty of municipal presidents. By 1997, just 
three states had secondary legislation to regulate fiscal relationships with the municipalities, 
budget accounting and public debt. By 2008, 29 states have laws to coordinate the financial 
transfers from states to municipalities. In the case of Mexico City, Michoacan and Sonora, the  
fiscal coordination between levels of government is organised through specific decrees that are 
voted by the two state congresses and the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City. Despite the
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existence of formal mechanisms to transfer resources from states to municipalities, Grindle 
(2007:96-99) found testimonies in six Mexican states, where the flow of resources from  the  
state treasury to the municipalities was used to cultivate personal relationships between the  
Municipal President and the Governor or other state officials. The importance of personal and 
political relationship to ensure the flow of resources brings back memories of the times of 
presidentialism, when the main task of a Governor was to befriend the President or the Finance 
Minister in order to  guarantee the financial health of his state.
State and municipal governments are not alone in the use of public resources to create or 
mobilize politically loyal constituencies. As will be shown in the next section, the budget process 
and the allocation of public resources through the Federal Congress is highly influenced by the  
political criteria and clientelistic preferences of the parties represented in the Chamber of 
Deputies.
4.4 The Chamber of Deputies and democratic incentives for clientelism
In 2005 and 2006, during the second half of Vicente Fox's sexenio, the President and the  
Congress began an em bittered confrontation over the approval of the federal budget. Since 
1997 no party has had the simple majority of 251 deputies, necessary to approve on its own the  
annual expenditures of the federal government. However, during the first years of a divided 
Congress, the main opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies agreed to endorse the  
Executive priorities included in the budget. From 1997 to 2004, the Chamber of Deputies 
displayed a tense but cooperative attitude towards the budget bills presented by the Executive. 
There were harder debates on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies and backroom  
negotiations, but the budget was always approved under the spending premises set by the  
Executive. However, the relationship between Vicente Fox's government and the majority 
opposition moved from scepticism and lack of trust to an open political and judicial conflict. The 
budget became the metric for measuring the power of the Congress versus the Executive 
(Schick, 2001:6).
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From  2000  to  2008, th e  C ham ber o f D eputies has pressured  to  increase th e  o rig in a l spend ing  
a m o u n t p roposed  by th e  Executive in th e  budge t b ill. As show n in Table 4 .4, th e  de p u tie s  
a p p ro ve d  m o re  o p tim is tic  fo recasts  fo r  pub lic  e x p e n d itu re  th a n  th e  sobe r e s tim a tio n s  o f th e  
Finance M in is try . In 2005, th e  o p p o s itio n  depu ties  a p p ro ve d  a raise o f 4 .24%  o f th e  o rig ina l 
bu d g e t, in o rd e r  to  p rov ide  h igher a lloca tions  to  th e  s ta tes  gove rned  by th e  PRD and PRI.
Tab le  4-4 D iffe rence  be tw een  a p p ro p ria tio n s  b ill and th e  bu d g e t decree  
(M illio n s  o f c u rre n t Pesos)
Year Total spending proposed Total spending approved by the Difference between the 
by the  Executive in the Chamber o f Deputies in the  apportions bill and the
federal apportions bill 
(A)
federal budget 
(B)
budget decree 
B-A (% increase)
~ 2 0 0 0 ~ 1 ,1 87 ,8 1 9 1 ,1 95 ,3 1 3 7 ,4 9 4  (0 .63 )
2 0 0 1 1 ,3 39 ,6 0 1 1 ,3 6 1 ,8 6 6 2 2 ,2 6 4  (1 .6 6 )
2 0 0 2 1 ,4 1 0 ,6 5 4 1 ,4 6 3 ,3 3 4 5 2 ,6 7 9  (3 .7 3 )
2003 1 ,5 00 ,1 8 0 1 ,5 24 ,8 4 5
__________
2 0 0 4 1 ,6 37 ,0 5 5 1 ,6 50 ,5 0 5 1 3 ,44 9  (0 .82 )
2005 1 ,7 44 ,3 7 0 1 ,8 18 ,4 4 1 7 4 ,0 7 1  (4 .2 4 )
2 0 0 6 1 ,8 81 ,2 0 0 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 7 2 1 1 8 ,8 7 2  (6 .3 2 )
2 0 0 7 2 ,2 34 ,3 7 5 2 ,2 6 0 ,4 1 3 2 6 ,0 3 8  (1 .1 7 )
2 0 0 8 2 ,4 1 6 ,9 1 7 2 ,5 6 9 ,4 5 0 1 5 2 ,5 3 3  (6 .3 1 )
Source: Extracted by the au tho r from  federa l budgets 2000-08.
A ccord ing  to  th e  2003 O EC D /W orld  Bank Budget P ractices and P rocedures Survey o f 41 
co u n tr ie s , o n ly  th e  Indonesian  leg is la tive  assem bly m o d ifie d  th e  b u d g e t by m o re  th a n  3% o f 
to ta l spend ing  (See Table  4.5). A t th e  tim e  o f th e  survey, M exican  d e p u tie s  w e re  n o t used to  th e  
in c o rp o ra tio n  o f  m a jo r changes in th e  budge t. H ow ever, in 2005, 2006  and 2008, th e  M exican 
C ham ber o f D epu ties  m ade rea lloca tions  th a t ranged fro m  4 .24  to  6.31%  o f to ta l g o v e rn m e n t 
spend ing .
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Tab le  4-5 In p rac tice , does th e  leg is la tu re  g e n e ra lly  a p p ro ve  th e  b udge t 
as p resen te d  by th e  Executive?
A n s w e rs T o ta l P e rc e n ta g e  o f  
all c o u n tr ie s
It g e n e ra lly  a p p ro v e s  th e  b u d g e t w ith  no ch ang es 1 4 3 4 .1  %
It g e n e ra lly  a p p ro v e s  th e  b u d g e t w ith  m in o r  ch an g es  o n ly  
(a ffe c t in g  less th a n  3%  o f to ta l  sp en d in g )
2 6 6 3 .4  %
It g e n e ra lly  a p p ro v e s  th e  b u d g e t w ith  m a jo r  ch ang es  
(a ffe c t in g  m o re  th a n  3%  b u t less th a n  20 %  o f to ta l s p e n d in g )
1
In d o n e s ia
2 .4  %
It g e n e ra lly  a p p ro v e s  a b u d g e t s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe r e n t  f ro m  th e  
e x e c u tiv e  (a ffe c tin g  m o re  th a n  20 %  o f to ta l sp e n d in g ).
0 0
Source: Through Internet: http://www.oecd.0 rg/document/6 l / 0 ,2340,en_2649_34119_2494461_l_l_l_l,00.html 
consulted June 3rd 2007.
Tab le  4 .6  is based in th e  OECD B udget Practices and P rocedure  Survey o f 2006, w h ich  com pares 
th e  size o f th e  e x p e n d itu re  re a llo ca tio n  as a share o f th e  to ta l bu d g e t fo r  FY 2005 and 2006. 
W ith  th e  exce p tio n  o f V enezuela w h e re  th e  Congress has increased th e  to ta l b u d g e t by o ve r 
20%, in th e  La tin  A m erican  c o n te x t th e  M exican Congress execu tes som e o f th e  m o s t extens ive  
m o d ific a tio n s  to  th e  Executive Budget D ra ft.
Table 4-6 P ercentage o f to ta l spend ing  a ffe c te d  by 
changes m ade by th e  le g is la tu re  to  th e  budge t
R an ge  
(%  o f  to ta l  
b u d g e t)
C o u n tr ie s  
FY 2 0 0 6
C o u n tr ie s  
FY 2 0 0 5
0 C hile C hile
0 1 I—
4
U ru g u a y -
1 . 1 - 2 B o liv ia , G u a te m a la B o liv ia , C osta  R ica, E cu a d o r
2 . 1 - 3 A rg e n tin a , C osta Rica, P eru A rg e n tin a , Brazil
3 . 1 - 4 E cu ad o r P eru
4 . 1 - 5 - M e x ic o *
5 . 1 - 7 B razil, M e x ic o * -
2 0 .1 - 2 5 V e n e z u e la V e n e z u e la
*Data from Mexico: Author calculations based on budget bills and federal budgets.
Source: Budget practices and procedure survey 2006, phase I, through Internet:
http://www.oecd.0 rg/document/6 l / 0,3343,en_2649_33735_2494461_l_l_l_l,00.html, consulted June 5th 2008.
For th e  fiscal ye a r 2005, th e  o p p o s itio n  pa rties  dec ided  to  m ake su b s ta n tia l changes to  th e  
budge t d ra ft p resen ted  by th e  Executive, n o t on ly  in th e  to ta l a m o u n t sp e n t b u t also in th e
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deficit projections and in the geographical allocation of spending. On the issue of government 
indebtedness, the Chamber of Deputies has usually adopted the budget deficit suggested by the 
Executive appropriations bill, but in 2005 that tradition was broken and the Chamber of 
Deputies changed the deficit margin from 0.63% of the total budget to 0.95%.
Through the increase in the deficit, the deputies increased the am ount of money available to 
assign to different uses. According to Hernandez (2005:10), up to 93% of the federal budget is 
made up of committed expenditures that are not subject to any possible reassignment.14 Thus 
the margin of flexible expenditure is close to 7% of the total federal budget. Each country has its 
own standards for defining an irreducible budget, but a common agreem ent is that these 
appropriations are legally restrained obligations to cover certain expenditures or commitments 
for future unavoidable payments like salaries, debt services or pension coverage. The only way 
to "soften" this "hard" budget is to change the law, or to modify labour contracts and social 
entitlements.
Accepting Hernandez's figures for 2005, the opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies 
reallocated funds equivalent to 30% of the Executive "flexible" budget. The deputies from the 
PRI and the PRD, who together controlled 321 out of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
rearranged the appropriations to increase the expenditure in the states governed by their own 
parties. At the end of 2004, out of the 32 federal entities, 18 were governed by the PRI, 8 by the 
PAN and 6 by the PRD. Table 4.7 shows how the opposition deputies distributed the 
appropriation reforms among states governed by the different political parties.
14 H ernandez used th re e  d iffe re n t sets o f variables to  calculate th e  "hard share" o f th e  budget. His calculations  
produced th e  fo llow ing  results, depending  on th e  m ethodo logy: 87% , 91%  or 93%  o f th e  fe d era l budget can no t be 
reassigned to  o th e r  uses.
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T a b le  4 - 7  A l lo c a t io n  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e  in c re a s e s  in t h e  2 0 0 5  f e d e r a l  b u d g e t
S ta te s  g o v e rn e d  b y  th e
PRI PRD PAN
%  o f t h e  to ta l  M e x ic a n  p o p u la t io n  liv ing
in s ta te s  g o v e rn e d  by 5 7 .4 %  1 7 .7 %  2 4 .8 %
D is tr ib u tio n  o f  re s o u rces  in d i f fe r e n t  p ro g ra m m e s
E d u c a tio n  a n d  H e a lth 4 6 %  4 0 %  14 %
H ig h w a y  In fra s tru c tu re 7 5 %  11 %  14 %
D rin k a b le  W a te r  an d  S ew ag e 5 9 %  2 2 %  19 %
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Presidencia de la Republica (2005) and Annex 19, 19-A and 
19-B of the 2005 Federal Budget.
In th e  case o f  e xp e n d itu re s  fo r  h ighw ay in fra s tru c tu re , th e  in fo rm a tio n  ava ilab le  show s th a t th e  
d e p u tie s  increased th e  o rig in a l a llo ca tio n  o f th e  b udge t d ra ft  by 231% in s ta tes g ove rned  by the  
PRI, 162% in PRD sta tes and 82% in PAN sta tes (Federal B udget A nnex 19, 2005).
The C ham ber o f D epu ties  app lies  a s ingu la r b rand o f in d ire c t c lie n te lis tic  p o litics . As M exico  
does n o t a llo w  fo r  congress iona l re -e le c tio n , th e  de p u tie s  lack th e  classic p o rk  b a rre l incen tives 
because th e y  do  n o t o b ta in  in d iv id u a l p o lit ica l gains fro m  increasing  spend ing  in th e ir  ow n 
e le c to ra l d is tr ic ts . T h e ir in ce n tives  lie in a llo ca ting  e xp e n d itu re  to  sta tes gove rn e d  by th e ir  ow n 
pa rtie s  and expec ting  th a t  th e  g o ve rno rs  and p a rty  bureaucrac ies w ill take  n o tice  o f th e ir  
services in b u d g e t n e g o tia tio n s .
A fte r  th e  2005 budge t, th e  S uprem e C ourt lim ite d  th e  capac ity  o f th e  C ham ber o f  D epu ties  to  
m ake ex tens ive  b udge t re a llo ca tio n s . For th e  f irs t t im e  in M ex ico 's  h is to ry , th e  P res iden t ve toed  
th e  share o f th e  budge t th a t  w as m o d ifie d  by th e  depu ties . The S uprem e C ou rt had to  solve th e  
C o n s titu tio n a l d isp u te  o v e r th e  v e to  capacities o f th e  Executive. The C o n s titu tio n  c lea rly  sta tes 
th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  a p re s id e n tia l ve to , w h e n  th e re  is a ru lin g  by th e  b icam era l Congress. The 
C o n s titu tio n  lim its  th e  S ena te 's  ro le  in th e  bu d g e t process exc lus ive ly  to  th e  app rova l o f 
g o ve rn m e n t revenues (Ley de Ingresos) and excludes th e  U pper House fro m  th e  n e g o tia tio n  o f 
th e  a p p ro p ria tio n s  b ill. The C ham ber o f D eputies has th e  exclusive r ig h t to  discuss and v o te  th e  
a llo ca tio n  o f p u b lic  e xp e n d itu re s . The S uprem e C ourt had to  d e te rm in e  th e  Executive 's  capac ity  
to  ve to  a b ill passed by a s ing le  house and n o t th e  Congress as a w h o le . In June 2005, w ith  a sp lit
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vote of 6 to 5, the Supreme Court ruled that the President had the power to impose a full or 
partial veto over the apportions bill.
For 70 years, the Congress had not dared to modify a line of the budget w ithout Executive 
consent. Under a plural and competitive political system, with presidential power restricted by 
the law, there was no clear certainty about the possible outcomes of a budget dispute between  
the Congress and the Executive. The Supreme Court ruling strengthened the command of the  
President on budget matters and filled one of the institutional blanks in Mexico's democratic 
transition. The Chamber of Deputies kept the power to overrule the veto with a two-thirds  
majority, though the opposition deputies from the PRI and PRD decided not to overrule the  
presidential veto over a share of the budget. Still, the deputies found ample opportunities for 
increasing the transfers to subnational governments, through the windfall of resources from oil 
wealth.
4.5 The dispute over oil revenues
During 2002, the states' finance ministers created a joint group with their federal equivalent to  
supervise the sources of oil and non-oil revenues. Since then, the federal government shares all 
its revenue information with the state governments. For the first tim e, the profit reports of 
Pemex have been disclosed outside the sphere of the federal bureaucracy. The aim of this 
oversight com mittee was to reduce suspicions by some state authorities that the federal 
government was not transparent concerning the amount of resources available to be 
distributed among the federal entities. This informal agreement between the Ministry of 
Finance and the state treasurers was another example of how the political power of state 
governors became a force demanding more Executive accountability.
Until March 2006, Mexico did not have a specific law to manage the surplus of resources from  
oil revenues. Before the enactment of the new Ley de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad
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Hacendaria ( la w  of Budget and Fiscal Responsibility^, the Ministry of Finance presented its own 
projections of the average price per barrel on the revenue side of the budget bill. However, the 
Congress had the last word in fixing the forecast over the average price per barrel. The 
predicted price has a significant impact on the amount of resources available for distribution to 
states and municipalities. Oil revenues from Pemex and the duties on its income represent on 
average 30% 15 of total government revenues and close to 5.3% of GDP. They also account for 
close to 48% 16 of the pool of transfers to subnational authorities. According to the Law of Fiscal 
Coordination, most of the oil revenues are appropriated by the federal government, although a 
share is transferred directly to the states. The Law of Fiscal Coordination states that subnational 
governments receive 20% of the ordinary oil extraction rights through the Ramo 28  of 
participaciones.
During the oil shock of 1998, the price projection in the budget was US$15.5 per barrel of 
exported Mexican oil, but the average market price at the end of the year was US$10.1 per 
barrel (See Table 4.8). The drop in oil prices during 1998 caused political tensions and budget 
cuts across the three levels of government. After that year, the Executive and the Congress 
opted to err on the side of caution in their price estimations. As Table 4.8 shows, from 1999 to 
2007 the year's end market prices have been on average 48% higher than the budget 
projections.
Apart from  the price fall of 1998, there are sound reasons to keep expectations low over future  
oil prices. The previous price falls (1982 and 1986) have provoked parallel expenditure cuts. 
Sharp appropriation cuts are financially inefficient and politically unpopular. Sudden decreases 
in resources for capital investments might abort or delay the construction of vital infrastructure. 
With a drastic fall in public income, the government faces the dilemma of cutting expenditure 
and affecting the productivity of public investment or tolerating a mounting fiscal deficit.
15 Leyes de Ingresos, 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 5 .
16 Calculated fo r 2004: oil reven ue levies//?om os 28  +33.
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T a b le  4 - 8  G o v e r n m e n t  e x p e c ta t io n s  p e r  e x p o r t  b a r r e l  o f  o il vs. e n d  o f  y e a r  m a r k e t  p r ic e s
Year Expectation price 
per barrel 
suggested by the 
Executive in the 
budget bill
us$
Expectation price per 
barrel 
approved by the 
Chamber o f Deputies 
in the Ley de Ingresos
us$
Average 
m arket price 
per barrel at 
year's end
us$
Percentage o f difference 
between the expectation 
in the Federal Budget and 
m arket price at year's end
%
1998 NA 15.50 10.18 -34.3
1999 NA 9.25 15.57 68.3
2000 15.50 15 24.79 65.2
2001 18 18 18.61 3.3
2002 17 15.5 21.52 38.9
2003 17 18.35 24.77 34.9
2004 20 20 31.05 55.3
2005 23 23 42.71 85.7
2006 31.5 36.5 53.05 45.3
2007 42.5 42.8 61.63 44
2008 46.9 49 89.38* 82.4
* Until May 2008
Sources: Constructed by the author with In iciativas de Ley de Ingresos 2000-08; Ley de Ingresos 2000-08; 
Cuenta de la Hacienda Publica 2001-08; S ecretarla de Energla, through Internet: 
http://sie.energia.gob.mx/sie/, PEMEX, and www.pemex.com, consulted May 24th 2008.
E m pirica l ev idence  fro m  an In te rn a tio n a l M o n e ta ry  Fund S tudy (B a rne t &  V ivanco, 2003: 148) 
show s th a t o il prices have e x trem e  and u n p re d ic ta b le  flu c tu a tio n s , as th e y  d o n 't  have a w e ll 
d e fin e d  average o r "n o rm a l"  price  to  w h ich  th e y  regress a fte r th e  boom s o r busts have e lapsed. 
M o re o v e r, c u rre n t o il prices do n o t necessarily  convey in fo rm a tio n  fo r  fo re ca s tin g  prices ove r 
th e  long  te rm  o r p re d ic t th e  occurrence  o f a nega tive  shock.
The Law o f Fiscal C oo rd in a tio n  estab lished  th a t ce rta in  revenues w o u ld  n o t be p a rt o f th e  poo l 
o f resources tra n s fe rre d  to  subna tiona l a u th o r it ie s  via p a rtic ip a c io n e s  (Ram o 28). These 
inc luded  a d d itio n a l taxes on o il e xpo rts  and u n expec ted  revenues th a t  re su lt fro m  h ig h e r-tha n - 
budge ted  o il prices (A rt. 2, paragraph 3). This clause in th e  law  crea ted  an annua l d ispu te  
b e tw e e n  th e  o p p o s itio n  in Congress and th e  V ice n te  Fox g o v e rn m e n t. In th e  tim e s  o f 
p re s id e n tia lism , as th e  resources fro m  th e  o il su rp lus w e re  n o t cons idered  in th e  Law o f Fiscal 
C o o rd in a tio n , th e ir  a llo ca tio n  depended  on th e  c r ite r ia  set by th e  Executive. For decades, th e  
M in is try  o f  Finance d e te rm in e d  th e  expected  price and th e  C ham ber o f D epu ties  fo llo w e d  its
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guidelines. After the end of presidentialism, not all the areas subject to Executive discretion had 
been replaced by an institutional mechanism. These sources of income, such as the oil surplus, 
became focal points of political dispute. The opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies tried 
to establish a higher price for the forecast of the average price per barrel of Mexican oil, or to 
guarantee a larger share of the oil surplus for state governments. Meanwhile, the federal 
government aimed to fix a more conservative estimate of the oil's price and prevent state 
governments from getting a larger share from a potential non-budgeted surplus. The opposition 
parties tried to obtain more resources to distribute among the subnational authorities governed 
by their respective parties.
M ore recently, the positive price differential between budgeted and actual amounts has created 
an unbudgeted surplus. Once the projected price is fixed in the Income Law (Ley de Ingresos) by 
both chambers of Congress, the deputies decide how to distribute the potential revenues 
derived from a positive differential between projected and observed oil prices.
During the budget approval process of 2005, there was an unprecedented clash between the  
two Chambers of Congress over predictions of the price per barrel. The Chamber of Deputies 
ignored the government's proposal to set the expected price at US$23 and settled it at US$27. 
This 17% increase was the highest variation ever enacted by the deputies over the oil price 
forecast presented by the Finance Ministry in the income bill. As the revenue side of the budget 
is discussed and approved by both chambers, once the deputies changed the price of oil, the 
Senate received the income bill for its final approval. Before its enactment as a law, the senators 
reversed the price change incorporated by the deputies and reduced the price per barrel to  the  
original figure (US$23) set by the Finance Ministry.
The deputies complained about the lack of coordination between the chambers, but they did 
not have the legal capacity to overturn the Senate's decision. According to Pemex estimates 
over the volume of exported oil for 2005, 1.8 million barrels per day,17 each dollar variation in
17 The yearly  production  com prises th e  365  ca lendar days.
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the price per barrel represented 7,095 million pesos a year (£ 114.2 million). As the deputies 
raised the benchmark price and the size of the financial pool to be distributed among the states, 
they accepted that the subnational authorities would not receive additional resources if the oil 
price rose above the benchmark.
State governors had a special interest in the oil surplus. As they are extra-budgetary revenues, 
governors have more margin of freedom to allocate the unexpected pool of resources. In 
reference to the extra-budgetary revenues, Schiavo-Campo stated, "The amount of 
expenditures that are not included (in the budget) increases the risk of corruption and waste... 
In some countries, revenue from natural resources is treated more as a contribution to  the 
purse of the president or to a political slush fund or 'black box' than as a contribution to the  
government budget. Secrecy about revenues from oil resources and their uses is still common. 
In some developing countries in the 1970s, revenues from commodity boards w ere used to  set 
up a parallel budget, which was not submitted to any scrutiny. Including these revenues and 
expenditures in the budget is a prerequisite to improving transparency and governance. 
(2007:56-65)."
In most states, surplus appropriations do not require the approval of the local Congress and are 
merely reported at the end of the fiscal year. So, the oil surplus revenue has poor oversight and 
accountability. If oil revenues and government expenditures can be hidden in off-budget funds 
and shielded from democratic control, voters and their representatives are unable to hold the  
government accountable for its performance (Von Hagen, 2007:37). Minxin Pei describes the 
Chinese, with words that could well describe the situation in Mexico: "Off-budgeted revenues 
have become a preferred form of predation for two im portant reasons: discretion and opacity... 
(off-budgeted revenues were) spent at the discretion of local authorities with no central 
supervision" (2008:143).
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The Mexican federal Congress imposed the condition that the oil surplus transfers ought to be 
spent only on infrastructure projects. However, federal authorities did not have any legal 
capacity to oversee the way the oil surplus was spent by subnational governments. The federal 
authority had to believe that the information presented by state governments was true and that 
subnational accountability infrastructure would be solid enough to guarantee the oversight of 
non-budgeted revenues.
4.5.1 The oil surplus from  cause o f conflict to a new budget law
The first priority for the allocation of the oil surplus is to cover non-budgeted governmental 
expenses that might occur during the fiscal year.18 In the case of an oil surplus and a higher than  
expected government deficit, the additional oil revenues would help keep the federal deficit 
aligned with the forecast in the budget. From 2000 to 2006, once these unexpected government 
costs were paid, the remainder of the surplus revenue was distributed according to the  
guidelines set by the majority of the deputies in the budget decree. W ith a lack of permanent 
rules to regulate the process, the Chamber of Deputies had to  harmonise conflicting interests 
over the use and allocation of the oil surplus. As subnational authorities cannot levy taxes on 
natural resources situated within their jurisdiction, their share of the oil wealth depends on the  
budget decisions made by the Chamber of Deputies. The unprecedented political leverage of 
state governors manifested itself in increased and successful demands over the distribution of 
the oil wealth.
In each budget, the Congress had to decide the share of the oil surplus that was saved and the  
part that would be spent. The percentage of distribution of the eventual surplus was integrated 
into the annual federal budget. The federal budget for FY 2000 created the Fondo de 
Estabilizacion de los Ingresos Petroleros (Stabilisation Fund of Oil Revenues, FEIP), with the aim 
of improving fiscal equilibrium if the oil price fell US$1.5 below the fixed reference price.
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Originally, the total withdrawals from the fund were limited to 50% of the assets at the end of 
the previous year.
However, in 2002, the rules were changed to allow full compensation for shortfalls, so the  
resources from the fund could be fully drawn down in a single fiscal year. In years with higher- 
than-expected revenues, a share of the surplus was to be allocated to  build up the fund. Every 
year, the government proposed an allocation percentage to the FEIP in the budget bill, but the  
deputies decided whether or not they would accept the government's recommendation.
In 2000, with the fresh memory of the 1998 negative fluctuation in oil prices, the Chamber of 
Deputies allocated 40% of the potential surplus to the FEIP, and the remaining 60% to service 
public debt (See Figure.4-4). There is a consensus in public finance literature that the best 
available practice for investing a budget surplus is to pay off debt and not to  use it to  cover 
recurrent expenditures. From 2001 to 2005, the oil surplus share allocated to the Stabilisation 
Fund was gradually reduced, from 40% in 2000 to 33% in the 2001 budget. From 2003 to 2005, 
the transfers to the Stabilisation Fund were reduced to 25% of non-budgeted revenues. The oil 
surplus allocation for public debt service was also reduced from 60% in 2000, to  33% in 2001  
and 2002, then to 25% from 2003 to 2006.
The biggest winners of the redistribution of the oil surplus were the state governments. As 
shown in Figure 4-4, in 2001, 34% of the surplus was allocated to infrastructure projects in 
Mexico's southern states. This share grew to 50% in 2003, and the surplus was made available 
to all state authorities. During Vicente Fox's government, the regional political forces that 
benefited from decentralisation increased their demands for a larger share of the oil wealth. At 
the same tim e, the high political profile of state governors gave them  better lobbying 
capabilities to pressure Congress for a more decentralised distribution of oil revenues. For 2005, 
the budget included a prescription that 50% of the oil surplus ought to be reinvested in Pemex
18 For exam ple, g o vern m en t subsidies fo r e lectric ity  gen era tio n  becam e m ore  expensive w ith  an unexpected  rise in 
th e  price o f na tura l gas.
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fo r  in fra s t ru c tu re  b u ild in g 19 and th e  re p a y m e n t o f  th e  c o m p a n y 's  d e b t. (See F igures 4 -5 , 4 -6 , 4 - 
7, 4 -8 , 4 -9 , 4 -1 0  and  4 -11 ).
F igu re  4 -4  D is tr ib u t io n  c r ite r ia  fo r  o il su rp lu s  re ve n u e s  in th e  F edera l B u d g e t 2 000
B udget Bill A pp ro ved  Budget
N o t included in th e  Budget Bill
■ Stcbilizatioi Fund of Oil IncomefSFO ) i~o service pcblc debt
Source: Budget Bill and Budget Decree fo r 2000 Budget (A rt. 35, Sec. E), and Fiscal Responsibility Law.
F igure  4 -5  D is tr ib u t io n  c r ite r ia  fo r  o il su rp lu s  re ve n u e s  in th e  F edera l B u d g e t 2001
Budget Bill A pp ro ved  Budget
m
,
34% 33%
■ sroi 33%
■ To improve financial balance of public sector ■ 5FOI ™
■ To improve financial balance of oublic secto-
■ To promote programsand infrastructure 
investment h die south and southeast*
*H y d ro -in fra s tru c tu re , d rin kab le  w a te r , sew erage  in th e  
least d e ve lo p e d  regions and in th e  oil p rod uc ing  areas. This 
surplus can n o t be a llo ca ted  to  cu rre n t exp en d itu re .
Source: Budget Bill and Budget Decree for 2001 Budget (Art. 31, Sec. F), and Fiscal Responsibility Law.
19
At th e  end o f V icen te  Fox's go vern m en t, P em ex's level o f ca p ita lisa tion  w as close to  zero.
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Figure 4-6 Distribution criteria for oil surplus revenues in the Federal Budget 2002
F igu re  4 -7  D is tr ib u t io n  c r ite r ia  fo r  o il su rp lu s  re ve n u e s  in t h e Federa l B u d g e t 2003  
Budget Bill Approved Budget
■  To imp rove financial balance of public sector
■  To prom ote programs and infrastructure 
investment in the south and southeast*
The w o rd in g  o f th e  a rtic le  is an exact copy o f th e  
ap p ro ved  budgets  o f 2 0 0 1  and 20 0 2 .
50%
ISF0I
■ To improve the financial balarceof the public sector
■ Infrastructure investmentin states and municipalitiesaccordingto the 
percentages ufciivlr ibution o f the pdrltipac io iiesrepo ileJa t the end o f the 
yeai of 2001
Source: B udget Bill and B udget D ecree fo r  2 0 0 3  (A rt. 21, Sec. J), and B udget and Fiscal R esponsib ility Law.
34°o34<N>
Budget Bill Approved Budget
i To im p ro v e  financial b a la n c e o f public sector iTo  im prove  financial b a la n c e o f public sector
■ To prom ote programs and infrastructure 
investm entin the south and southeast*
The w o rd in g  o f th e  a rtic le  is an exact copy o f th e  
a p p ro ve d  b u d g e t o f 20 0 1 .
■  To prom ote programs and infrastructure 
investmentin the south and southeast*
The w o rd in g  o f  th e  artic le  is an exact copy o f th e  
ap p ro ved  b u dg et o f 20 0 1 .
Source: B udget Bill and B udget D ecree fo r  2 0 0 2  (A rt. 19, Sec. J), and B udget and Fiscal R esponsib ility Law.
34°o
■  SFOI
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Figure 4-8 Distribution criteria for oil surplus revenues in the Federal Budget 2004
Budget Bill Approved Budget
33%
33%
iSFOI
i T o  im p r o v e  th e  fin a n c ia l b a la n c e o f  th e  
p u b lic  s e c to r
T o  p r o m o te  p ro g ra m s  a n d  in fra e s tru c tu re  
in v e s tm e n t th a t  g e n e ra te s  e m p lo y m e n t
i T o  im p ro v e  th e  fin a n c ia l b a la n c e  o f  th e  
public sector
In fra s tru c tu re  in v e s tm e n t  in s ta te s  a n d  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  accor d in g  to  th e  
p e rc e n ta g e s  o f  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  
p a r t id p a c io n e s  r e p o r te d  a t th e  m o s t  
r e c e n t  C u e n ta  P ublic  a
Source: Budget Bill and Budget D ecree fo r  2 0 0 4  (A rt. 23 Sec. J), and B udget and Fiscal R esponsib ility Law.
Figure 4-9 Distribution criteria for oil surplus revenues in the Federal Budget 2005
B udget Bill A p p ro ved  Budget
50°/o
■  S F O I
ISFOI
i To im provethe financial balanceof the public sector
Investm entexpenditure in PEMEX and its subsidiary 
companies
ISFOI
i To im provethe financial balanceof the public sector
i Investm entexpenditure in PEMEX and its subsidiary 
companies
Source: B udget Bill and B udget D ecree fo r 2 0 05  B udget (A rt. 21 , Sec. J), and Fiscal R esponsibility Law.
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Figure 4-10 Distribution criteria for oil surplus revenues in the Federal Budget 2006
Budget Bill Approved Budget
■ SFOI
■ To im provethe financial balanceof the public sector
■ Investm entexpenditure in PEMEX and its subsidiary 
companies
■ SFOI
■ To im prove the financial balanceof the public sector
■ Investm entexpenditure in PEMEX and its subsidiary 
companies
Source: Budget Bill (A rt. 22 , sec. J) and B udget D ecree fo r 2 0 0 6  Budget (A rt. 25 . sec. F), Fiscal R esponsib ility Law.
In March 2006, the Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law w ere approved and the distribution of 
oil surplus revenues was constrained to be as article 19 sec. IV, which establishes the  
distribution criteria as shown in Figure 4-11.
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Figure 4-11 Distribution criteria for oil surplus revenues in the Federal Budget 2007 and 2008*
■  Stab ilization  Fund o f State's Revenues
■  S tab ilization  Func fo r  In fra e s tr jc tu re  In v e s tm e n tin  PEM EX
■  In fra s tru c tu re  in ves tm e n t in states an d  m unic ipa l ties accord ing  to  th e
percentages c f  d is tr ib u tio n o f the partic ipaciones r e p o r te d a t  th e  m o st recen t 
C uenta  Publica
■"Budget Bill and Federal Bill have rem a in ed  th e  sam e fo r th ese  years.
Source: B udget Bill and B udget D ecree fo r 2 0 0 7  and 2 0 08  Budget, and Fiscal R esponsib ility  Law.
The whole budget dispute of 2005 left the impression that there are still indeterm inate areas of 
the law which Mexico's democracy needs to codify. Should expectations over the price of oil be 
fixed by the technocrats in the Ministry of Finance or the politicians in Congress? Can the Senate 
overrule a fiscal revenue decision of the Chamber of Deputies? W hat is the best allocation for 
surplus oil revenues?
In the form er political system, these uncertainties were resolved by the authority of the  
President. Today the presidential institution has neither the political influence nor the legal 
m andate to settle these disputes. The emergence of these uncharted and unprecedented 
disputes in Mexico's political system reveals the multiple spheres that w ere covered by the  
umbrella of the m etaconstitutional powers of the president. Every arena that form erly was 
encompassed under the president's decision-making authority has been replaced by two
■  SFOI
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alternatives: an institutional solution accepted by all political forces, or open conflict where the 
interests of each party seek to impose a short term  solution.
In order to  resolve the disputes over the oil price forecast and the oil surplus distribution 
between the federal and state governments, in March 2006, the Federal Congress approved a 
new law to establish a legal fram ework for the draft and approval of the budget: Ley Federal de 
Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria (Federal Law of Budget and Financial Responsibility). 
As shown in Figure 4-11, the new law created a fixed formula to forecast oil prices20 and defined 
a fixed distribution for non-budgeted oil surpluses:
a) 25% to a Stabilisation Fund for state revenues.
b) 25% to a Stabilisation Fund for the Infrastructure Investment of Pemex.
c) 40% to a Stabilisation Fund for Oil revenues.
d) 10% to Infrastructure investment in states and municipalities.
The new legal fram ework for the federal budget made the rules clearer for all the political 
actors involved in the debate, and approval of the government's revenue and expenditure. The 
Executive was forced to define transparent criteria for the oil price forecast. A legal formula of 
distribution of the oil surplus helped to reduce tensions during the process of budget 
negotiation. In the decentralisation process as well as in the allocation of oil surplus, clear 
formulas for the distribution of resources became an institutional mechanism to reduce political 
conflict and provide state treasuries with more predictable forecasts of the federal transfers.
In 2004, states received an oil surplus bonus that represented, on average, 3.8% of their original 
budget for that fiscal year. Unpredictable revenues from non-renewable resources can be 
misused or otherwise subject to poor governance. In some states, the extra-budgetary revenues 
help to "release" budgeted resources originally allocated for infrastructure projects and there is 
no federal oversight of the final destination of the "released" resources. For example, if the 
state government had a budget allocation to build a bridge, the oil surplus revenue will have
20 The fo rm ula  is based on an average o f th e  m o nth ly  price o f M exican  oil fo r th e  previous te n  years and th e  
expected fu tu re  price fo r th e  next th re e  years o f W est Texas Oil on th e  N ew  York Stock Exchange.
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covered the costs of the public works project and "released" the funds originally appropriated 
for the bridge. These unbudgeted funds increase the risk of duplication of expenditure or capital 
investments that do not take into account the impact on future recurrent expenditure (Davis & 
Ossowski, et. al. 2003:280).
IMF (2007:52) research suggests a preference for institutional schemes that allow "unified 
control" over expenditure, preventing the existence of a parallel set of expenditure allocations 
that are financed by a separate pool of resources from those approved by the legislature. The 
double budget, one depending on congressional approval, the other subject to the fluctuation in 
oil prices, may obscure the priorities of state and municipal spending. The risks of inefficient 
expenditure and misemployment of funds increases when they are treated as off-budget 
expenditures.
The federal government, through the Ministry of Finance, tried to  increase the transparency and 
accountability of the budgeted and non-budgeted resources transferred to subnational 
authorities. In theory, state governments present information about infrastructure projects to 
be funded with the surplus. However, the ex post accountability of the outcomes of the 
investments depends of the state Supreme Audit Institutions. The audit and supervision of the  
investment projects is performed by the state comptroller and the local SAIs. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, in several states these institutions do not have the basic 
infrastructure to perform the supervision of state finances.
4.6 Conclusion
The oil revenues and a share of the federal budget have become a mechanism to  supply public 
goods to beneficiaries in circumscribed political jurisdictions. This kind of targeted clientelistic 
spending through the federal budget is different from other democracies, because of the 
absence of congressional re-election. The lack of re-election does not create an incentive to 
target expenditures within the deputy's own constituency. A special characteristic of Mexico's
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clientelistic expenditure patterns is that legislators are not promoting targeted expenditures to  
benefit their own constituencies, but rather their party's strongholds through the state 
governments. Governors have become the real patrons through the particularistic spending 
provided by the deputies.
For state governors, oil surplus revenues have a key political appeal: they are considered non­
budgeted revenues, so the local congresses do not have a say in their allocation. The state 
legislatures can carry out ex post facto  oversight of the expenditure, although the rigor or laxity 
of these audits varies from state to state. As the oil surplus revenues allocated to the  
subnational governments are not integrated into state and municipal budgets, local Congresses 
does not have an ex ante control over expenditure allocations. In some cases, the ex post audit 
of non-budget resources can happen tw o years after the resources have been spent.
The transformation of Mexico's political system implied an enforcement of O'Donnell's vertical 
and Horizontal Accountability upon the political figure of the president. The challenge of the  
new political order in the afterm ath of the transition to democracy is to guarantee the  
enforcement of both vertical and Horizontal Accountability, despite the de facto  powers of 
subnational authorities. The metaconstitutional powers of state governors undermine the  
formal checks and balances that are stated in the law. The fifth chapter of the dissertation 
focuses on tw o elements of subnational Horizontal Accountability: heterogeneity in the  
contents of budget information and the distinct capacities of state Supreme Audit Institutions to 
perform the ex post budget accountability.
&
250
CHAPTER 5
Budget Accountability at Subnational Level: 
an Empirical Analysis
251
CHAPTER 5 BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY AT SUBNATIONAL LEVEL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 5 BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY AT SUBNATIONAL 
LEVEL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The federalism in some countries tends to allow the existence of local powers often no less delegative 
and unaccountable than the central one, among which intricate power relations exist that often 
partake of a rather unabashedly instrumental utilisation o f legal rules.
Guillermo O'Donnell (1999:41)
Chapter 5 will analyse the heterogeneity of budget accountability in the Mexican states through 
tw o elements in the subnational budgeting cycle: the contents and information of the budget 
decrees approved by the state legislatures, and the institutional capabilities of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAI) in each state. The diverse disclosure practices in the budget decrees and the  
institutional design of the subnational SAIs will be used to answer the question of what 
subnational budget accountability looks like in the afterm ath of presidentialism and 
decentralisation.
Budget accountability provides a platform from which to analyse the legal and institutional 
diversity of subnational political systems in contemporary Mexico. For Snyder, (2001:94) 
political and economic reform processes can "have varied effects across the territorially-defined  
subunits of a political system." Through the subnational comparative method, it is feasible to 
appreciate the complexity and diversity of political change across a national territory. Budget 
accountability at state level in Mexico contributes to support Snyder's claims of the diverse 
consequences of a process of economic and political change. The heterogeneous accounting 
criteria in budget documents and the institutional diversity of SAIs show the wide-ranging 
effects of democratisation on Horizontal Accountability.
Mexican states offer a diversity of political contexts that produce a wide range of accountability 
outcomes. In several cases, the informal customs of the local political system, like vote buying practices 
in state congresses, determine the success or failure of institutions for Horizontal Accountability. In the 
case of Baja California Sur, the sate fulfilled the formal norm to publish an annual budget, however the
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budget is compressed in a single paragraph with no tables or additional information to disaggregate the 
allocation of public expenditure. Chapter 5 shows that a research limited to the formal sphere of 
Horizontal Accountability does not necessarily reflect the practical dynamics of the political system. The 
enforcement of Horizontal Accountability is constrained both by de jure and de facto realms.
The chapter will analyse a recent Constitutional reform, approved in May 2008, which sets the  
legal foundation to start a process for the homogenisation of state accounting systems. The 
Constitutional reform needed a secondary law to set the fram ework for a gradual 
transformation of subnational budgeting systems. In recent history, Mexico has had five 
experiences of modernisation that were initiated at federal level and then "trickled down" to 
reform the states' institutional order: 1) state commissions for human rights (local 
ombudsmen); 2) subnational bureaus in charge of organising elections (local versions of the  
Instituto Federal Electoral); 3) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); 4) An ongoing reform, 
approved in M ay 2008, to homogenise budget accounting in states and municipalities and 5) 
another reform in process, which aims to create basic common standards for Supreme Audit 
Institutions at state level.
The local ombudsmen and the enactment subnational FOIA1 were institutional changes forced 
upon state authorities through two Constitutional reforms in 1992 and 2002 respectively. 
Through the Constitutional amendment, all state governments followed the institutional path 
set by the federal Congress. The second experience of modernisation from above was the  
creation of autonomous institutions to organise elections and perform vote-counting at 
subnational level. Though, this reform was not based in a Constitutional reform, but in a 
political agreement between the leaders of the three main political parties (PRI, PAN and PRD) 
signed in 1995. The accord established the compromise to prom ote electoral reforms at the  
subnational legislative assemblies that will incorporate the criteria of the am endm ent approved 
previously in the federal Congress.2 The three reforms mentioned in this paragraph were an 
acknowledgement that the states would not be capable of performing a homogeneous process 
of modernisation. The federal institutions had serious doubts about the governors' drive to
1 Lopez Ayllon (2 006 ) provides a detailed  study o f th e  history o f M exican  FOIA ta  fe d era l and state  level.
2 Lujam bio (1 995 ) o ffers  a general analysis o f this e lectora l re fo rm .
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change the status quo within their states. As a consequence of these doubts, they forced a 
reform  upon subnational governments.
The fourth and fifth cases of modernisation from above are directly linked to the subject of the  
chapter and the dissertation. In September 2007, the Federal Congress approved a 
Constitutional reform  in order to promote budget homogenisation and a redesign of Supreme 
Audit Institutions at state level. The reasons to promote budget homogenisation will be 
analysed in the following pages. The impact of the constitutional reform upon the state SAIs will 
be analysed on the second part of this chapter.
5.1 Budget homogenisation
After the constitutional am endm ent published on May 8th 2008, the new wording of Article 73 
reads: "The Congress has the power... to approve legislation related to governmental budgets 
that will provide a norm for public accounts and a homogeneous form at of financial 
information, of revenue and expenditure, for the federal, state, municipal and Mexico City 
governments, in order to guarantee its harmonisation at national level."
The present author's original research for this chapter was used by members of the Federal 
Congress as an argument to promote the standardisation of subnational budgets. The 2008  
constitutional am endm ent will give Congress the authority to homogenise the disclosure criteria 
and contents of state and municipal budgets. The details of the am endm ent are yet to be 
defined, in a secondary law that has to be approved by May 2009, and then states will have to  
approve their own legislation to adapt their current fram ework to the new federal mandate. At 
least two or three years will have to pass (by 2010 or 2011) until subnational governments 
adhere to a common standard for the contents and specificity of budget information.
This Constitutional am endm ent was aimed at reducing the discretional and uneven disclosure of
subnational budgeting data. In a similar fashion to the Freedom of Information constitutional
amendment, the secondary law will aim to provide a benchmark for the classification and
semantic categories of state and municipal budgets. However, the approval of the
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Constitutional am endm ent does not automatically imply that the new laws will be enforced at 
state and subnational level. The success of other examples of modernisation from above does 
not guarantee that the legislative aim to homogenise budgeting disclosure will not be watered  
down in the draft and enforcement of secondary legislation.
Schedler (1999:339) provides an explanation of why these initiatives should be forced upon 
state authorities: "By legal necessity, all paths of institutional creation pass through the offices 
of top state officials and, in this sense, accountability-promoting reforms cannot come from  
anywhere else than 'from above.' There is no way to ignore or bypass the centres of state 
power. Unless they consent to institutionalise 'self-restraint/ the road to Horizontal 
Accountability is blocked." Under the structure of a federal constitutional system, with three  
different tiers of sovereign authority, the only path to impose a modernisation from above was 
through a change in the Constitution.
March and Olson (1995:180) argue that "Proper accounting procedures for any particular 
agency depend on the procedures used by others. A particular accounting procedure gains 
legitimacy by becoming conventional practice in many agencies. The legitimacy of accounting 
procedures evolves over tim e by a co-evolutionary process of diffusion between several 
agencies." The "contagion" of this legitimising process of accounting procedures can happen in 
tw o circumstances: 1) when there is a centralising authority that can impose the legitimacy of 
new accounting systems, or 2) when there is a "race to the top" among several entities or 
government authorities to improve the quality and controls of the accounting mechanisms. 
Through constitutional reform, Mexico's federal Congress gained the authority to legitimise new  
accounting rules and criteria of classification. The absence of a "race to the top" to improve 
subnational budget accountability triggered an imposed modernisation from the federal 
Congress. The measure was a move to "re-centralise" regulation over the documents that 
define the allocation of public expenditure.
Due to problems involving the existence of funds outside the budget, information gaps, data 
inconsistencies, and accounting systems that are not amenable to  internal and external audit,
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Mikesell proposed that "the accounting systems and standards should be prescribed by the  
central government, to ensure comparability and to improve transparency ( 2 0 0 7 : 3 2 ) Mexico's 
decision to homogenise budget criteria at subnational level is not an isolated example in federal 
countries. In 1969, Germany approved the Law on Budgetary Principles to uniform budgetary 
standards across levels of government. According to Spahn (2001:144), these uniform principles 
included specific rules "regarding the preparation of the budget, accounting and the rendering 
of accounts including the classification of the budget."
Mexico will engage in a process of transition from a system where subnational budgets lack 
homogenous standards to a model that aims to establish a minimum set of rules to make 
budget accounting practices uniform. The Federal Congress will determ ine a pattern of 
disclosure that should be followed by executives and congresses at state level. The states will 
have to relinquish their prerogative to set their unique and peculiar budget standards in order 
to abide by the national budget regulation.
The 2003 OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database shows that out of 38 
countries surveyed, in nine (including Mexico)3, national and subnational governments do not 
use common standards and each authority decides on its own budget classification (See Table 
5.1). In the near future, once the constitutional reform is enacted, Mexico will join the group of 
18 countries where the national authorities establish the budget classification and accounting 
rules.
3 The o th e r e ig ht countries are  A rgentina , C anada, Finland, Japan, N ew  Zealand, S w ed en , Tu rkey  and th e  U n ited  
States.
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Table 5-1 Is there a common standard for budgeting 
for national and subnational governments?
Answers Total Percentage of 
all countries
Percentage of 
OECD countries
Yes, national and subnational governments have the same 
budget classification and accounting rules, set by the 
national government.
18 47.3 % 36
Yes, national and subnational governments have the same 
budget classification and accounting rules, set by external 
bodies.
0 0 0
No, national and subnational governments do not use 
common standards. The standards for the subnational 
levels are set by the national government.
11 28.9 % 32
No, national and subnational governments do not use 
common standards. Each authority decides on its budget 
classification.
9 23.6 % 32
Source: Through In te rn e t h ttp : //w w w .o e c d .0 rg /d o c u m e n t/6 l / 0 ,2 3 4 0 ,e n _ 2 6 4 9 _ 3 4 1 1 9 _ 2 4 9 4 4 6 1 _ l_ l_ l_ l ,0 0 .h tm l; 
consulted June 10 th 2007 .
5.1.1 Literature review of rankings
Before the analysis of the Budget Information Index, here is brief review ori the literature on 
rankings. The proliferation of indexes, rankings or scorecards has produced tw o generations of 
analytical approaches to study the methodologies and shortcomings of these instruments. The 
first generation focus on the methodological challenges and risks that inherent to the  
measurement systems. The second generation uses the previous critiques to forge a process of 
incentives and quality controls to raise the methodological robustness of future rankings (Hood, 
Dixon, et.al., 2008a:298).
As part of the first generation of ranking analysis, Gormley and W eim er argue that these 
instruments encourage accountability to external audiences and provide valuable feedback to  
services providers (1999:1). Though, the authors acknowledge the methodological challenges 
and constant tradeoffs in the design of the scorecards. Gormley and W eim er also analyse the 
pathological incentives of organisations, whose performance is measured by scorecards. The 
typical examples of these perverse incentives are the schools that stop teaching certain subjects 
and adapt their curricula to elevate their position in the rankings.
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One of the problems with rankings is that they aim to fulfil a double role as mechanisms of 
communication and policy instruments. Besangon acknowledges this dual perception of the  
measurement instruments for governance as a "shaming mechanism" and a standard "to 
indicate where policy might prove most effective (2003:2)." In his critique of Transparency 
International, Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Galtung (2005:1) defines the index as a 
"formidable instrument in raising awareness". However it also highlights that the "principal flaw  
is that it is a defective and misleading benchmark of trends. Initially set up to encourage reform, 
the CPI cannot answer the basic question: 'After four years, are these reforms making any 
difference?'" (Galtung, 2005:12). The CPI is an excellent mechanism to set an advocacy agenda 
in the public opinion, but it does not throw  any light in the policy options to tackle the problem  
associated with corruption. Galtung structures his analysis around seven failures of the CPI.4 In 
his closing argument, the author recommends that the CPI should no longer be published in its 
present form.
McGillivray (1993:189-190) criticises the UN Human Development Index (HD!) because it adds 
few  new insights to a ranking of per capita income. The HDI aims to measure welfare with more 
complex dimensions that the income variable. The HDI is a composite index of four indicators: 
life expectancy, literacy, educational attainm ent and GDP per capita. McGillivray criticism 
highlights a problem with the HDI methodology, because it does not achieve its objective of 
differentiate Human Development from per capita income or its other three components taken 
individually. McGillivray provides a series of suggestions which can improve the index in aspects 
of weights, composition and comparability (1993:189-191).
The second generation of analysis sets off from the fact that the use of rankings will not end in 
the foreseeable future. In consequence, there is a need for incentives to measure and improve 
their methodologies. Based on the work of Gormley and W eim er, Hood and Dixon (2008a:298) 
developed a method to rate 14 international rankings according to three criteria of validity and
4 1. Only Punishing th e  Takers, no t th e  Givers or A betters; 2. Irregu lar and U ncontro lled  C ountry Coverage; 3.
Biased Sam ple: M o re  Than 90%  o f th e  W o rld  is Missing; 4 . Im precise and S om etim es Ig noran t Sources; 5. Far Too  
N arro w  and Im precise a D efin ition  o f C orruption ; 6: Does no t M easu re  Trends: C annot R ew ard G enuine Reform ers; 
7: Guilty by Association - Aid C onditionality .
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three of reliability. The authors define validity as a metric "that captures what it intends to 
measure, while reliability broadly means that a metric will produce consistent results when 
repeated (2008a:298)." Hood and Dixon initiative could have a positive repercussion improving 
the methodological quality of ranking mechanisms, as it apply the logic and competitive 
incentives of the benchmark systems to strengthen the validity and reliability of the ranking 
exercises.
5.2 The challenge of measuring budget transparency in Mexico
The analysis of budget transparency in Mexico is a novel exercise in academic research. The 
secrecy and lack of clarity of budget information was one of the characteristics of Mexico's 
presidentialism. The absence of detailed information over government spending was an 
additional source of power and influence of the Executive office. Until 1997, the President did 
not have legal or political pressures to clarify the opaque presentation of budget information. As 
other vices of Mexico's political system, the lack of budget transparency at federal level trickled 
down to subnational authorities. Until a few years ago, it was impossible to construct a Budget 
Transparency index, because there was not enough information to design the ranking. The 
emergence of multiparty representation in the federal and state congresses promoted different 
degrees of openness in budget transparency, which allowed the first steps of research on the  
topic.
As discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, the first transparency indexes presented in 
Mexico reported on the national budgets in five Latin American countries5 (Hoffbauer & 
Guerrero, 2002) and were based on a perception survey completed by 792 continental experts 
on budgeting.
For this dissertation, I designed the first Budget Transparency Index for Mexican States based on 
the actual contents of the budget decrees for the FY of 2003. The BTI had the aim of examining 
w hether Mexican states had homogeneous disclosure criteria for the construction of their 
budgets.
5 A rgentina , Brazil, Chile, M exico , and Peru.
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The effort was useful as a first approach to the challenge to build a Budget index for Mexican 
States. However, the instrument was limited to just 25 questions. The questionnaire om itted  
im portant information on subnational public finances such as the disclosure of specific transfers 
to  municipalities in each state, or the distinction between local and federal revenues. Another 
shortcoming of the Budget Index of 2003 was that each question had an identical weight in the 
final result of the Index. Giving the same value to each answer of the questionnaire simplified 
the methodology of the Index, but gave matching importance to very different aspects of 
budgeting: e.g., the disclosure of the budget to the State Electoral Commission received the  
same weight as the disaggregated information of the financial transfers to municipalities.
The exercise of the Index in 2003 functioned as the base for a new Index based on an 
instrument with 43 questions and a new methodology that will be explained in the following 
section. As the 2003 and 2008 indexes use different instruments and methodologies, it is not 
possible to make a valid comparison between them However, some of the information that was 
gathered during the 2003 exercise is still useful for analysing the changes in specific state 
budgets during the last five years (2003-2008).
5.3 Budget Information Index
In his essay on the execution of local budgets, Thurmaier (2007:272) states: "democratic 
accountability for budget execution depends on the quality of the initial budget documents. The 
budget document presents the spending plans that will be monitored during budget execution. 
A budget document that lacks sufficient detail and is not structured programmatically makes it 
difficult for citizens —  even legislators —  to effectively monitor budget execution."
Based on a similar claim to Thurmaier's argument, I designed the Budget Information Index (Bll), 
based on the initial budget decrees approved by the 31 state congresses and Mexico City
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Legislative Assembly for the FY 20086. The Index has the objective of assessing the diverse 
criteria for budget data disclosure in Mexican states. As will be shown, each local government 
develops its own procedures to convey and break down the information on how and by whom  
public money is spent.
The first step to construct the Bll was examining the 2008 state budgets in order to address the  
type of information they included. The exercise was focused on finding the best disclosure 
practices of state budgets. If a state budget decree presented more specific information or 
disaggregated financial data, this type of information was used as a benchmark to measure the  
other state budgets. For example, if a state provided detailed information about the public 
resources allocated to finance political parties, that elem ent would became a benchmark to  
measure all the states.
The second step was designing an instrument to collect information and compare the budgets in 
a systematic way. The instrument contained 43 questions and was based on the best practices 
of the 32 budgets in terms of information specificity, as identified during the first stage of 
construction of the Index. Once the instrument was designed, it was used to analyse the 32 
subnational budgets for the year 2008.
6 The budget decree do cum ents w ere  collected fro m  th e  1st to  th e  20 th  o f M a rch  2 0 0 8 .
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5.3.1  The ten categ o ries  a n d  the questions o f  the B l l
The instrument was divided into ten categories7, which intended to address the level specificity 
of budget information in different state institutions and domains of public finance. Four of these 
categories are derived from a basic budgeting question: which state institutions are in charge of 
government spending. Possibilities are Legislative and Judicial Branches, State Autonomous 
Institutions, Executive Branch, Transfers to municipal governments. Despite the heterogeneous 
criteria for disclosing comprehensive information, 95% of state budgets decrees have in 
common a gross category to present the expenditure allocation of the three branches of 
government, the Autonomous Institutions and the transfers to municipalities. As each of these 
categories includes a different number of state entities or government offices, there are a 
different number of questions in each category. Though, there are uneven numbers of 
questions in each category, weighting process for each category, controls these differences.
Regarding this group of categories, the item Transfers to municipal governments' is related to 
the power of some governors to administer, for their convenience, the flow of resources from  
state coffers to the ayuntamientos. The financial opacity of state governors towards municipal 
presidents reproduced the informational asymmetries between the Federal Executive and 
subnational governments. This informational asymmetry is based in lack of clear and timely  
information about the amount of resources that ought to be transferred to municipalities.
The other four categories of the Bll (Budget management, Government employment, Public 
debt management and State government subsidies and transfers) include financial and 
nonfinancial information regarding the allocation and administration of government 
expenditure. The questions in each category are derived from the common structure of the 
budget decrees and the benchmark of best disclosure practices that resulted from  the 
examination of the 2008 state budgets. For example, the majority of the states budgets 
disaggregate the payments for state public debt, but only a subset differentiates the funds
7 For th e  individual score in each category, see A ppendix 5.
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allocated to principal and interest. The number of questions in each category reflects the level 
of detail or specificity of these sections of the state budgets.
From this group of categories, I had special interest in the information regarding Government 
Employment, specifically the number of people working in state bureaucracies. As analysed in 
chapter 4, government jobs could be used as a deliverable good in a clientelistic exchange 
between the patron and its political base. W ith no tenured positions, the status of government 
workers is tied to the political faith of their patron, or in the absence of re-election, to the  
results of the incumbent party, chapter 4 explained that there are only consistent figures of 
state government workers for the years 2005 and 2006, derived from data of the National 
Bureau of Statistics. In this regard, budget documents could be an alternative source for 
mapping the scale of government employment at subnational level. However, just one third of 
the states provide data about government employment in their budget decrees. The systematic 
disclosure of the number of workers becomes a crucial piece of information in the case of states 
which have an explosive growth in payroll expenses in the afterm ath of decentralisation.
The category of Federal transfers was included in the Bll because of their importance in 
subnational finances. As shown in chapter 3, on average 91% of state expenditure comes from  
federal transfers. The number of questions in this category reflects the different pools of 
resources and federal subsidies that benefit state treasuries.
The Internet Accessibility of budget documents is the last category of the Bll. The category 
determines if states have different disclosure criteria for the availability of budget documents. 
The ten categories and their respective questions are:
Legislative and Judicial Branches
1. Is there a line item for the Local Congress included in the state budget?
2. Is there a line item for the Local Supreme Audit included in the state budget?
3. Is there a line item for the Judicial Powers included in the state budget?
4. Is there a line item for the Electoral Justice Tribunal included in the state budget?
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State Autonomous Institutions8
5. Is there a line item for the State Electoral Institute (electoral organ) included in the state 
budget?
6. Is the public financing for Political Parties disaggregated from the Electoral Institute 
budget?
7. Is the public financing for each political party disaggregated?
8. Is there a line item for the State's Human Rights Commission included in the state 
budget?
9. Is there a line item for the Transparency and Access to Information Institute (or 
equivalent bureau) included in the state budget?
Executive Branch
10. Is there a budget line item for each Ministry of the Executive Government?
11. Is the Executive Power's expenditure disaggregated by program?
12. Does the budget disaggregate the media-relations expenses of the state government?
13. Does it disaggregate contributions for a contingency fund to respond to natural 
disasters?
14. Are the amounts destined to Government Public Trust Funds disaggregated?
15. Does the budget specify maximum amounts for direct assignment, invitation and bidding 
of private contractors?
State government subsidies and transfers
16. Does the budget disaggregate the allocation of government subsidies?
17. Does the budget establish criteria or a methodology for approving new subsidies or trust 
funds?
18. Does the budget disaggregate government subsidies to charity organisations?
19. Does the budget disaggregate government subsidies to organisations of agricultural 
producers?
Budget management
20. Does the budget present criteria for salary increases of government workers?
21. Does it establish criteria for the reallocation of public expenditure within budget items?
22. Does the budget establish criteria for the management of extra-budgetary revenues?
23. Does the budget establish criteria for the management of savings or non-spent 
resources?
24. Does it define or use a thesaurus for budget line items?
8 These organisations w e re  created  as a consequence o f th e  process o f institu tio nal change im posed fro m  th e  
fed era l au tho rities  upon state  governm ents. They o p e ra te  outside th e  stru ctu re  o f th e  th re e  branches o f 
G o vernm ent, bu t receive resources fro m  th e  state  budget.
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Public debt management
25. Does the budget disaggregate the state public debt?
26. Does the budget disaggregate the principal and interest service payments?
27. Does the budget disaggregate pending payments from previous FYs?
28. Does the budget disaggregate loans to government by banking institutions?
Government employment
29. Does the budget establish the number of people working in the state government?
30. Does it distinguish between unionised and non-unionised government workers?
31. Does the budget establish the number of teachers on the state payroll?
32. Does the budget present a salary tabulator for mid-range and high government 
authorities?
33. Does the budget define the unionised and non unionised school teachers?
34. Does the budget have a tabulator of teachers' salaries?
Transfers to municipal governments
35. Does the budget present the amount of resources transferred to municipal 
governments?
36. Does the budget disaggregate the resources transferred to each municipality in the  
state?
Federal transfers
37. Does the budget disaggregate the resources for the Seguro Popular (Popular Health 
Insurance) transfers?
38. Does the budget disaggregate the resources for the Alianza para el campo (Agricultural 
subsidies) transfers?
39. Does the budget include estimates and disaggregated data of the 8 funds that comes 
from Ramo 33?
40. Does it disaggregate the devolution of federal taxes?
41. Does it disaggregate locally generated income from federal transfers?
Internet Accessibility of Budget Documents
42. Is the budget available on the State Congress' website?
43. Is the Ley de Ingresos (Income Law) on the State Congress' website?
Each of these questions formed a dummy variable (where "1" equals yes, and "0" no). Thus, the  
index was formed by 43 variables grouped in the same ten categories that were used in the  
instrument to collect the information. To produce the Index, each category was measured on a 
0 to  10 scale. The ten categories were composed of a different number of variables. The weight 
of each variable results from dividing the maximum value of the category (10) by the num ber of
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variables within the category (See Table 5.2). The formula below shows the construction of the 
Bll:
10 n%
B" = h
te=i j = i
W here: 
k = category
nk = number of questions/variables in category k 
Xj = 0 if the answer to question/variable i is "no"
1 if the answer to question/variable i is "yes"
The overall Bll score is the sum of the weight of the variables in the ten categories. The Index 
scale is from 0 to a maximum of 100, in the given case that a state budget has the maximum  
result in all ten categories. The results of the 43 questions, distributed in their respective 
categories, were represented in a 43X32 database. In case that the budget contained the  
information relevant to the question, a column in the database specified the Article or section 
of the budget where the information was found.
Table 5-2 Methodology of the Bll
Category
Number of 
variables per 
category
Weight of each 
variable 
according to 
the category
Maximum value 
of the category
1. Legislative and Judicial Branches 4 2.5 10
2. State Autonomous Institutions 5 2.0 10
3. Executive Branch 6 1.7 10
4. State government subsidies & transfers 4 2.5 10
5. Budget management 5 2.0 10
6. Public debt management 4 2.5 10
7. Government employment 6 1.7 10
8. Transfers to municipal governments 2 5.0 10
9. Federal transfers 5 2.0 10
10. Internet Accessibility of Budget Documents 2 5.0 10
TOTAL 43 - 100
Source: Constructed by th e  au thor.
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This binary scoring system has advantages over more complex systems: 1) Results are 
replicable; 2) results are accessible and reliable because they could easily prove the absence or 
presence of budget information; 3) results are valid to dem onstrate the average achievement in 
a state in terms of budget information specificity. Another advantage of the overall index is that 
it effectively discriminates among states with high levels of achievement in budget information  
specificity, and those with low scores.
The Bll is subject to measurement errors. However, I assume they are marginal, because the  
main source of error for the Bll could be generated by the data collection process. Specifically, 
there might be coded errors because data was captured once. To reduce and quantify this kind 
of errors it would be necessary to train a team  of coders to construct several versions of the  
data base. Though, the binary scoring system reduces the possibility of misinterpretation in the  
data collection process, in comparison with more complex instruments with a wider range of 
options.
The budget decrees for 2008 are the single source of information from where the data was 
collected to construct the Bll. These documents represent 100% of the information contained in 
the state budget decrees for 2008, which constitutes an elem ent of validity for the Bll. 
Regarding the Mexican states or units of analysis of the Bll, I collected data for each of the  
whole 31 states and Mexico City. In this regard, the Bll is a census, so the error attributed to the  
variance of data by state does not apply.
It is im portant to emphasise that the Bll is not a transparency index. From the results presented 
in Figure 5-1, it is not possible to infer that one state has more budget transparency than 
another. Alt and Dreyer-Lassen, (2003:5) created a fram ework to evaluate the transparency of 
budget documents. The authors specified four characteristics of procedural transparency:
1) The number of separate documents one must study to access budget information; 
transparency decreases as the number of separate documents increases. 2) The possibility for 
outsiders to perform an independent verification of the data presented in the budget. 3) The
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use or avoidance of opaque and arbitrary language vs. applying generally accepted accounting 
standards. 4) The provision of explicit justifications of the data and explanations contained in 
the budget.
Characteristics 2 and 3 of Alt and Dreyer-Lassen are relevant for the study of subnational 
budgets in Mexico. Neither an individual researcher, nor the federal government, is capable of 
making an independent verification of the budget data of state governments. Regarding 
dimension 2, subnational budget information is created and audited9 by state institutions that 
are at risk of control by the power of local Executives. W ith respect to dimension number 3, as 
described in the following pages, states coined their own arbitrary language to classify their 
budget categories and apportion line items. W ithout a common set of definitions for the 
meaning of budget categories, it is almost impossible to systematically compare the degree of 
transparency of the different states. The Bll compares the budget contents and information 
disclosed by one state with the information presented by its peers. The Bll draws a distinction 
between the different budget disclosure standards, but does not verify the certainty of the data 
contained in state budgets. The index does not assume that budget information is consistent or 
truthful, but it is feasible to compare the criteria and items disclosed through the information.
Figure 5-1 presents the results according to the questionnaire and the methodology of the Bll. 
Durango has the highest mark on the Bll with 69.5 out of a maximum of 100 points. The national 
average is 46.5 points. Baja California Sur got zero, the lowest possible score, due to the fact 
that its 2008 state budget decree was composed of a single paragraph article, which established 
the total amount of resources for the fiscal year (6.5 billion pesos) w ithout accompanying tables 
to explain the distribution of resources among the different state branches and government 
bureaus. The budget decree of Baja California Sur did not disclose information that allowed an 
answer to any of the 43 questions of the instrument.
9 State S uprem e A ud it Institutions will be analysed in th e  second p art o f th e  ch apter.
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F igure  5-1 R esults o f  th e  Bll
D urango 
Sinaloa 
G uerre ro  
A guasca lien tes 
N ayarit 
Jalisco 
D is tr ito  Federal 
M exico  C ity 
Chihuahua 
M ore los 
Zacatecas 
Colim a 
Yucatan 
Nuevo Leon 
Campeche 
N ationa l 
Chiapas 
Puebla 
H ida lgo  
San Luis Pctosf 
Tabasco 
Q u in tana Roo 
Coahuila 
Sonora 
S tate  o f M exico  
M ichoacan 
T laxcala 
Veracruz 
Q uere ta ro  
T am au lipas 
G uana jua to  
Oaxaca 
Baja C a lifo rn ia  Sur
— i—  
10 20 30 4 0
— i—
5 0 6 0 7 0
—i 
8 0
Source: C onstructed by th e  a u th o r w ith  data fro m  th e  q u es tio n n a ire  on th e  2 0 0 8  state budgets
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F igure  5-2 In te rv a ls  c o n s tru c te d  w ith  th e  B ll s ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n
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In o rd e r  to  b o o s t th e  d iffe re n c e s  a m o n g  s ta te  Bll re s u lts , I c o n s tru c te d  in te rv a ls  fro m  th e  Bil 
s ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n  o f  12 .8  (See F igure  5 -2 ). These in te rv a ls  d o n 't  re la te  to  m e a s u re m e n t e rro rs . 
A lth o u g h , th e y  a re  n o t c o n fid e n c e  in te rv a ls , th e y  i l lu s tra te  th e  p lace  a s ta te  occup ies  in te rm s  o f  
th e  o th e rs  (m e a n ), g iven  th e  d is p e rs io n  o f  th e  w h o le  se t o f  d a ta . Th is exe rc ise  c o m p le m e n ts  
re su lts  o b ta in e d  th ro u g h  th e  Bll ra n k in g  (see F igure  5 .1 ), s ince  it  re m a rks  d iffe re n c e s  a m o n g  
s ta tes . A c c o rd in g  to  th is  exe rc ise , i t  is p o ss ib le  to  d is tin g u is h  th re e  g ro u p s  o f  s ta tes . The f ir s t  se t 
is fo rm e d  by Baja C a lifo rn ia  Sur, Oaxaca and G u a n a ju a to , w h ic h  have  th e  lo w e s t in te rv a ls  in th e  
Bll and  a re  b e lo w  th e  to ta l m ean . The second  g ro u p  is th e  m o s t p o p u la te d  o n e  and is p laced  
a ro u n d  th e  m e a n . The 26 s ta te s  in th is  g ro u p  o b ta in e d  scores b e tw e e n  36 and 62 Bll p o in ts  (+ /-
12.8) and in th is  exe rc ise  th e y  p e r fo rm  in a s im ila r  w a y . G u e rre ro , S ina loa  and D u ra n g o  b e lo n g  
to  th e  th ird  se t. Th is g ro u p  had th e  h ig h e s t scores in th e  ra n k in g .
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5.4 H e te ro g en eo u s B udget In fo rm atio n  in  M exican S ta tes
The different grades of the Bll show the multiple criteria for budget disclosure in Mexican 
states. In the process of analysing the subnational budgets for answering the Bll questionnaire, I 
found additional elements to support the claim that state budgets are designed with widely 
varying standards. In the following pages, I will address the relevant issues and particular cases 
regarding examples of budget heterogeneity. The particular examples of budget heterogeneity 
will be addressed through the following seven points:
5.4.1 Heterogeneous legal structure of State budget decrees.
5.4.2 Idiosyncratic language to establish budget items.
5.4.3 Transparency and opacity in transfers to municipalities.
5.4.4 Budgets of the State Legislatures and Judicial Powers.
5.4.5 Discretionary management of expenditure and non-budgeted revenues.
5.4.6 Communication expenditures and public resources for political parties.
5.5.7 The Budget in Jalisco: Backward Modernisation.
5.4.1 Heterogeneous legal structure o f State budget decrees
A simple exercise to show the heterogeneous legal structure of Mexican state budgets is to  
compare the number of articles contained in each budget decree. Figure 5-3 shows the number 
of articles in the state budgets on the horizontal axis, and the number of states on the vertical 
axis. In the future, once the secondary legislation in budget harmonisation is enacted, states 
will tend to have less variability in the number of articles in the budget decree and a more 
homogenous legal structure. The graph shows that one state budget has between 1 and 10 
articles, while the right side of the figure shows that 2 states (Aguascalientes and Puebla) have 
over 100 articles in the internal structure of their budget decrees.
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Figure 5-3 Legal s tru c tu re  o f  bu d g e t decrees
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N um ber o f articles in the  budget decree 2008
Source: Constructed by the  au tho r w ith  data from  2008 state budgets.
5.4.2 Opaque language to establish budget items.
The d iv e rs ity  o f  s ta te  budgets is n o t lim ite d  to  th e ir  legal s tru c tu re , b u t also app lies  to  th e  use o f 
language to  ca tegorise  g o ve rn m e n t revenues and e xp e n d itu re s . Tables 5.3 and 5.4 are a b r ie f 
“ d ic tio n a ry "  o f b udge t te rm s  in M exican  sta tes. Table  5.3 show s h o w  six d if fe re n t s ta tes c lassify 
th e  tra n s fe rs  fo r  th e  Seguro Popu lar, th e  system  o f hea lth  insurance  fo r  th e  peop le  w h o  w o rk  in 
th e  in fo rm a l econom y. The Seguro P opu la r is a g o v e rn m e n t p ro g ra m  th a t is financed  by b o th  
fe d e ra l and s ta te  go ve rn m en ts  th ro u g h  a b ila te ra l ag re e m en t. As it is show n  in Table 5.3, s ta tes  
cou ld  classify th e  fed e ra l tra n s fe rs  to  th e  p rog ram  as revenue  o r  e xp e n d itu re , each acco rd ing  to  
its u n iq ue  sem an tic  d e fin itio n s .
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Table 5-3 Classification of the Seguro Popular 
according to the budget of selected states (2008)
State Located in the Language definition
Chiapas Budget Decree Social Security System for Health
Chihuahua Income Law Federal Transfers
Sinaloa Income Law Federalised Resources
Veracruz Income Law Other apportions from the federation
Sonora Income Law Federalised Resources transferred 
through agreement
Guerrero Budget Decree Solidarity apportion to the state's Social Security System 
for Health
Source: Constructed by th e  a u th o r w ith  data fro m  s ta te  budgets, 2 0 08 .
Table 5.4 gives the results of an identical exercise, but with the program Alianza para el Campo, 
which provides subsidies for agricultural producers. In six different states, the subsidy program  
is referred to six different names. The federal programs Seguro Popular and Alianza para el 
Campo are just two examples of the use of opaque and arbitrary language in subnational 
budgets.
Table 5-4 Classification of the Alianza para el Campo 
according to the budget of selected states (2008)
State Located in the Language definition
Chihuahua Income Law Federal transfers
Coahuila Income Law Agreements
Nayarit Budget Decree Programs and Agreements
Nuevo Leon Budget Decree Transfers for investment
Sinaloa Income Law Federalised resources
Guerrero Budget Decree Budget apportions from agreements
Source: Constructed by th e  au th o r w ith  da ta  from  state budgets, 20 08 .
5.4.3 Transparency and opacity in the transfers to municipalities
Despite the fact that the federal Law of Fiscal Coordination establishes penalties for governors 
who withhold resources from municipalities, the enforcement is weak and state executives still 
have wide room to administer municipal transfers according to their own convenience. The Law
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of Fiscal Coordination determines that 20% of the participaciones transferred to the states have 
to go to municipal governments, but the governors and local congresses can define the  
distribution among the municipalities of their respective states. As was described in chapter 3, 
governors can change the apportionment formulas to benefit certain municipalities. Grindle 
(2007:99) remarks that the main responsibility of a municipal president is to guarantee the flow  
of funds from the state government to the ayuntamientos. One of reasons why state governors 
still hold a grip over municipal transfers is the lack of accountability about when and how much 
is transferred to the ayuntamientos.
The 2008 questionnaire showed that all states, with the exception of Baja California Sur, 
presented budget information regarding the total pool of resources available for municipalities. 
However, just 7 states and Mexico City presented the detailed formulas and amounts of 
resources to be transferred to specific municipalities and delegaciones.10 In these states, the 
municipalities have a clear financial horizon as they have sufficient data about the resources 
transferred from the states. In the other 25 states, municipalities could be subject to arbitrary  
disclosure policies of the state government. The weak Horizontal Accountability in the transfer 
of resources from state to municipalities resembles the arbitrary financial power of the  
President over subnational governments during the form er political system. The informal 
powers of governors overshadowed the formal regulation that aims to transparent transfers to 
municipalities.
5.4.4 Budgets o f the State Legislatures and Judicial Powers
In 2003, all Mexican states, with the exception of Colima, disclosed the funds allocated to their 
respective congresses and tribunals. Article 5 of Colima's budget decree for 2003 stated that 
there would be transfers of funds for "182 million pesos (£9.1 million) assigned to Programs, 
Private and Public entities, civic and welfare associations. These organisations include the  
Legislative and Judicial Powers." No other part of the document provides a disaggregated
10 The delegaciones  a re  th e  equivalen t to  m unicipa lities in M ex ico  City.
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account that explains the distribution of resources among philanthropic institutions and 
government powers. The 2003 Colima budget gave the same treatm ent to the Legislative and 
Judicial branches as to CSOs and charity organisations. For 2008, the Colima state budget 
disaggregated the budget for each of its state powers.
According to the budget decrees for 2008, the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City and the  
Congress of the State of Mexico are the best-financed local legislatures in the country, with 964  
million and 1,104 million respectively (£46 million and £52  millions respectively). These 
resources are equivalent to the combined budgets of the congresses in Baja California, Jalisco, 
Nuevo Leon, Puebla, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi and Sonora. If the budget of the Legislative 
Assembly of Mexico City were to be distributed among the 66 members of the legislature, each 
would receive 14.6 million pesos (£697,484) during the fiscal year. These figures make the  
expenditure per legislature member in the Mexico City Assembly almost the same as that of the  
federal deputies, who would receive, if distributed per capita, 15.8 million pesos in 2008  
(£752,388).
5.4.5 Discretionary management o f expenditure and non-budgeted revenues
In 2003, the Quintana Roo state budget gave the governor an equivalent of the federal secret 
pool of 12.5 million pesos (£625,000) for pagos imprevistos (unexpected expenses or 
unpredictable payments) and as such cannot be specified in the budget of state government 
agencies (Art. 18). These funds are part of the pool for salary rises, so it can be expected that 
they were used to complement the income of the governor's associates. As there are no 
homogeneous semantic categories to classify budget items, it is impossible to know if other 
states have equivalent secret pools of resources misclassified or hidden behind various labels. 
For 2008, Quintana Roo's budget did not include a line item for pagos imprevistos.
In 12 out of 32 subnational governments, the budget fails to specify any kind of disclosure, audit
or accountability mechanism to report the non-budgeted revenues, including unexpected
profits derived from the oil exports. In the budgets for 2008 from 32 subnational governments,
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just three states (State of Mexico, Guanajuato and Zacatecas) specified a role for the state 
congresses in the ex ante  control of non budgeted revenues. Article 30 of the Guanajuato 
Budget decree establishes that in the given situation that non budgeted revenues exceed 7.5%  
of total expected revenues, the local Congress should authorise the apportions. In the case of 
the State of Mexico, the local legislature would have to authorise any apportion of non 
budgeted revenues if they exceed 2% of total revenues.
For the years 2003 and 2008, Zacatecas is the only subnational government which presents in its 
budget decree a criterion for the ex ante control of non-budgeted revenues. For 2008, the state 
Executive can allocate the non-budgeted revenues if they are below 5% of the total state 
revenues determined in the Income Law. If the percentage is higher than 5% but lower than 
10%, the state Executive has to report to the local Congress before its apportion. If the surplus 
revenues are higher than 10%, the Congress must give its approval before any expenditure. 
Every three months, the governor of Zacatecas is required to report to Congress on the flow and 
use of unbudgeted revenues.
However, the management of non budgeted revenues in Zacatecas is an example of the  
heterogeneity in budget information, not only between different states, but in the same state in 
different years. In 2003, the Zacatecas budget had a more restricted ex ante control over non- 
budgeted revenues. In that year, the state Executive could use the unbudgeted revenues only if 
they were below 2% of the budget approved by the Congress. If the extra revenues were higher 
than this percentage, the Congress would have the power to decide upon its allocation.
Five years later, in 2008, the governor gained a margin of discretional management of resources 
equivalent to 5% of the total state budget. Zacatecas' management of non-budgeted revenues 
shows that the budget standard is not consistent across accounting periods (Mikesell, 2007:32). 
The aim of Mexico's federal government to homogenise the subnational budget documents 
might bring more stable criteria in the disclosure and accounting standards of subnational public 
expenditure.
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In 2008, the three states where the local Congresses had a role in the ex ante allocation of non- 
budgeted revenues have different distribution of power inside the legislature. In the State of 
Mexico, the party that holds the governorship, the PRI, is the second force in the local Congress 
with 30% of the seats. In Guanajuato, the ruling party, PAN, has a com fortable majority with 
64% of the seats in the local Congress. In Zacatecas, the ruling PRD is the first force in Congress 
with 43% of the seats.
There is no obvious relationship between the distribution of forces in the local Congress and 
checks and balances of non-budgeted revenues. During 2008, in 15 states the party of the  
governor did not hold the majority in Congress and in consequence the approval of the state 
budget requires certain political bargaining. In only tw o of these 15 states, State of Mexico and 
Zacatecas, does the Congress have a role in the apportioning of state resources. From 18 states 
where the party of the governor holds more than 51% of the seats in the state Congress, only in 
Guanajuato does the legislature have a say in the ex ante  distribution of the revenue surplus.11
According to a study by the Ministry of Finance, for the 2005 fiscal year, Aguascalientes, Colima, 
Jalisco and Puebla failed give an account of the non-budgeted revenues in their reports of the  
cuenta publica, so their respective congressional SAIs were unable to perform ex post audits of 
the additional revenues. In the case of these four states, there is no financial accountability of 
non-budgeted revenues, either at the beginning or the end of the budgeting process. According 
to the ASF, from 2003 to 2007, state governments received 95 billion pesos from  non-budgeted 
oil revenues.
For Rubin (2007:148): "Where corruption may be a severe risk, the budget should include as 
many programs and resources as possible. Programs and resources left out of the budget are 
often nearly or completely invisible. They create tempting opportunities for cronyism, 
patronage hiring, overpayments and unaccounted fees. National governments that are engaged 
in decentralising efforts may not fully trust their local governments. To compensate, they may 
impose extra reporting requirements to ensure that local governments are complying with
11 In fo rm atio n  o b ta in ed  th rough th e  In te rn e t fro m  th e  w e b  pages o f s tate  congresses.
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rules.... In this case, a form at that highlights the legal fram ework underlying the budget may be 
desirable even if the impression at the local level is that the national government is still calling 
the shots." For Von Hagen (2007:32): "The budget should not allow policy makers to hide 
expenditures or to use them for purposes other than those stated in the executive's budget 
proposal and authorised by the legislature."
The 2008 budget of the State of Mexico does not hide non-budgeted revenues, but disguises the  
real size of the public debt. After a FY is over, usually there are still pending payments from the 
previous budget cycle. All states classify the pending payments as a subsection of public debt, 
since the government has the legal requirement to pay. However, in its 2008 budget, the State 
of Mexico had the singular accounting practice of including the pending payments under the 
category of government revenues. The possibility of disguising payment obligations as 
government revenues or the weak accountability for non budgeted oil revenues in subnational 
governments are among the important catalysts to promote homogenised budgets in the three 
levels of government.
5.4.6 Communication expenditures and pubiic resources fo r  political parties
For 2008, 17 states specified "social communication" expenditures in their budgets. The gastos 
de comunicacion is the budget term  for expenditure in contracting of media advertising that 
publicises the achievements and policies of the state governments. In 2007, the federal 
Congress approved a reform to prohibit the image, voice or name of the any elected executive 
(President, governors or Municipal presidents) to appear in the promotional campaigns of the 
different levels of government. The prohibition was a response to a national trend in political 
advertising, where especially state governors appeared on TV commercials, using the  
government campaign as a mean of personal promotion. In 2008, the state of Nuevo Leon 
acknowledged in its budget the largest financial apportionm ent for social communication 
expenditures with 114.6 million pesos. However, due to the lack of clarity in the language and 
classification of state budget data, it is impossible to ensure that other states do not have even 
higher apportionments for media advertising.
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In the 2003 budgets, just 6 states and Mexico City disaggregated the information of resources 
allocated to political parties. For 2008, the figure w ent down to 5 states. Three states12 and 
Mexico City disaggregated the information in 2003, but did not disclose it for the ir 2008 
budgets. These changes show that subnational governments can change their disclosure 
budgeting criteria w ithout any further explanation. In 2008, Sinaloa was the only state that 
disaggregated the budget transfers to each political party (See Table 5.5).
Table 5-5 Public Resources allocated to Political Parties in the state of Sinaloa (Pesos 2008)
Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) 18,400,224
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 21,887,474
Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) 4,576,908
Partido del Trabajo (PT) 2,294,976
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM) 1,699,476
Convergencia (PC) 1,703,868
Alternativa Socialdemocrata (ASD) 1,330,608
Partido Nueva Alianza (NA) 1,330,608
Total government finance to political parties in 53,224,142
the state of Sinaloa
Source: Sinaloa S tate Budget 2008.
5.4.7 The Budget in Jalisco: Backward Modernisation
Since 2001, the Finance Ministry in the State of Jalisco has transformed the formats of the  
budget document. The change consists in organising the budget information around the  
compromisos (commitments) made by tw o governors from the PAN, Francisco Ramirez Acuna 
(2001-2006) and Emilio Gonzalez Marquez (2007 ongoing) during their electoral campaigns. For 
the budget of 2003, the Jalisco budget document provided information about the objectives of 
expenditure allocation, although without specifying which government agency was in charge of 
using the resources. For example, the budget showed that the Commitments fo r  Human 
Development received 1300 million pesos (£65 million, 2003), but it was impossible to know the  
amount allocated to the Education Ministry.
12 S tate o f M exico , N ayarit and Zacatecas.
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For the 2008 state budget, Jalisco included the item of Unidad Presupuestal por Objeto del 
Gasto. This budget jargon is untranslatable to English, but specifies which bureau or 
government entity is responsible for the budget apportionment. From 2003 to 2008, the budget 
decree of Jalisco has evolved to answer one of the most basic questions of government financial 
accountability: which institution is in charge of spending public money.
The main issue with Jalisco's budget is that since the year 2001, it has violated the constitutional 
principle of Division of Power. In the 2008 budget, the governor's com m itm ent of Impulso al 
Desarrrollo Democratico (Impulse for democratic development) mixes the resources allocated to  
a government ministry, the local Congress and the autonomous electoral state commission. In 
the text of the document, the legislature and an autonomous state institution have joint 
responsibility to fulfil the com mitment of the Jalisco governor.
The examples presented in the section above illustrate particular cases of how state 
governments design their budgets according to uncommon accounting standards. The budget 
decrees represent the ex ante controls of the legislature upon the expenditure decisions of state 
governments. These financial documents, which contain the forecasts of government revenue 
and expenditures, represent the first step in the accountability of the budgeting cycle. At the  
end of this process are the state Supreme Audit Institutions, which have the aim of verifying the  
completeness and accuracy of government financial transactions at the end of the fiscal year. If 
budget decrees represent the beginning of the budget process, the state SAIs are the  
organisations at the last stage of the accountability of government expenditure.
5.5 Supreme Audit Institutions at the State Level
Chapter 3 described that the two largest sources of revenue for state governments were the
funds transferred through the Ramo 28 (Aportaciones) and Ramo 33 (Participaciones) of the
federal budget. Ramo 33  is classified as federal resources labelled to cover the expenses of
education, health services, municipal infrastructure and other government programs
transferred to state authorities. Ramo 28  consists of the devolution of federal taxes that were
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collected in the states. One of the key differences between the two pools of resources is that 
Ramo 33  is categorised as federal funds, while Ramo 28  is considered as state funds. This 
different classification implies that the resources of Ramo 33  can be audited by federal 
institutions, the Secretaria de la Funcion Publica and the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion. In 
contrast, funds from the Ramo 28  can only be audited by state internal comptrollers and the  
congressional Supreme Audit Institutions.
The decentralisation of public funds in Mexico over the past decade has transformed patterns of 
public spending (See chapters 3 and 4). In 1990, 66% of the total budget was in the hands of the  
central government, and the local authorities used the remaining 34%. Today the ratio is 
reversed, with governors and municipal presidents controlling 57% of total government 
expenditure and the Federal Government the remaining 43%. The decentralisation process has 
expanded the budgets of governors and municipalities.
According to Article 46 of the Law of Fiscal Co-ordination {Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal), state  
Congresses, through their audit supporting agencies, have the responsibility of overseing the  
allocation of these resources. The 31 state congresses and the legislative assembly of Mexico 
City each have a technical bureau dedicated to supervising the financial accountability of the  
three branches of government and the municipalities. The state Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAIs)13 do the audit work at the end of the budget cycle, once the public money has been 
spent. SAIs are the last accountability mechanism in Mexico's budget cycle. According to a 
report of the ASF for the fiscal year 2001,14 local governments failed to clarify 85% of the  
irregularities in state accounts, requested by the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion.
Following the same pattern as that of state budgets, each state in Mexico has had its own legal 
fram ework and design for congressional supporting agencies that perform an external audit.15 
In 1999 and 2000, legal reforms at federal level for the creation of the ASF triggered a cascade
13 S tate laws use d iffe re n t nam es fo r th e ir  respective au d it bureaus. This ch apter w ill use S ubnational A ud it 
Institutions (SAI) as a generic nam e.
14 ASF, In fo rm e  Sobre la  Cuenta Publica del 2 0 0 1 , (2 003).
15 O th er fed era l countries like Australia and th e  U nited  States have a s im ilar m odel, w h e re  each state d e te rm in es  
its ow n a u d it requ irem ents  and has its ow n institu tional design fo r th e  SAI.
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of changes in state laws. In the spring of 2000, the state of Zacatecas published a new law to  
redesign its Supreme Audit Institution. During the same year, Veracruz, Campeche16 and 
Nayarit17 followed with a new normative fram ework to strengthen their respective 
congressional bureaus for external audit. By April 2008, 26 state congresses had created such a 
new normative fram ework for the institutions in charge of the oversight of public accounts. In 
the last decade (1998-2008) just five states18 have declined to  enact new laws regarding their 
SAI19 (See Table 5.6). Ten years after the enactment of the Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la 
Federacion (Law of Superior Fiscalisation o f the Federation, LFSF), 23 states have given 
constitutional recognition to the local SAI.
Table 5-6 Dates of Legislation for SAIs at the state level
State Date of Publication of the Law
Aguascalientes 19/IV/81 Amended 26/06/99
Baja California 28/IV/04 Amended 14/09/2007
Baja California Sur 25/11/02
Campeche 29/VI/00
Coahuila 27/VI/07
Colirna 16/VI 1/88
Chiapas 18/VI 11/01 Amended 04/XI/2004
Chihuahua 23/VI 11/2007
Mexico City 8/02/99 Amended 21/02/07
Durango 15/XI1/01
Guanajuato 07/XI/03 Amended 29/04/05
Guerrero 30/X/02 Amended 28/XII/2007
Hidalgo 29/XII/06
Jalisco 15/XI 1/03
State of Mexico 29/VI 1/04 Amended 19/12/2006
Michoacan 27/111/03 Amended 21/XI/2007
Morelos 11/VI 11/03 Amended 31/05/2006
Nayarit 21/X/00 Amended 04/VII/2007
Nuevo Leon 18/VI 11/06
Oaxaca 23/VI 11/95
16 C am peche re fo rm ed  its s tate C onstitution, bu t did no t publish a specific law  to  regu late  th e  oversight functions  
and responsibilities o f th e  SAI, which w e re  in teg rated  in th e  in ternal law  o f th e  Congress.
17 These fo u r states enacted  th e ir  laws to  regu late  th e ir  respective SAIs, even  b e fo re  th e  fe d era l Congress ap proved  
th e  secondary law  o f th e  ASF in D ecem b er 2000 .
18 Aguascalientes, Colim a, Oaxaca, Sinaloa and Sonora.
19 As it w ill be rep o rted  at th e  end o f th e  ch apter, in M a y  2 0 0 8  a constitu tion al re fo rm  forced all s tate  congresses to  
m odify th e ir  legislation in o rd e r to  s trengthen th e  political in dep end ence  and a u to n o m y o f th e ir  SAI.
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State Date of Publication of Law
Puebla ll /V /0 1
Queretaro 22/111/06 Amended 07/IX/07
Quintana Roo 16/XII/03 Amended 14/12/2005
San Luis Potosi 
Sinaloa 
Sonora
23/IV/03
31/111/97
13/11/85
Tabasco 29/IV/03
Tamaulipas 12/XII/01 Amended 31/05/2007
Tlaxcala 6/XI/01 Amended 01/09/2004
Veracruz 26/V/00 Amended 21/XI/06
Yucatan 30/111/04 (approved)
Zacatecas 30/111/00 Amended 28/08/2007
Sources: Com piled by th e  a u th o r w ith  data from  state  legislation and Figueroa, 20 08 .
In the eyes of the Federal Congress, this cascade of reforms in state SAIs was not enough to 
guarantee the political independence of these organisations. In the same process of legal 
am endm ent that aimed to homogenise budget documents and procedures at subnational level, 
the Federal Congress established in the Constitution that state SAIs should have three common 
characteristics:
1) The head of the state SAI shall be approved by a 2 /3  majority of the local 
Congress.
2) The head of the SAI will have a minimum tenure of 7 years.
3) The head of the SAI should have at least 5 years of experience in 
government audit.
The next part of the chapter will make both a de jure  and de facto  analysis of the SAI in the  
afterm ath of the constitutional am endm ent to reform state SAIs. The following pages will 
provide a descriptive analysis of the design and capabilities of state SAIs before the 2008  
constitutional reform. The analysis is based in two surveys applied to the SAIs. The first survey 
was applied from March to October 2003, the second from October 2007 to April 2008. Both 
surveys aim to provide information for a descriptive analysis of the legal fram ework and 
institutional capabilities of the Subnational Audit Institutions.
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The 2003 survey benefited from the cooperation of the Centro de Investigation para el 
Desarrollo A.C. (CIDAC) and the daily Reforma of Mexico City. Both organisations gave me 
institutional support to organise a census of the 32 legislative audit offices in Mexico. In 2003, I 
was a postgraduate student with no institutional support, and none of the state SAIs responded 
to my request. Three months after sending the census questionnaire by courier mail and email 
and not receiving a single answer, it was obvious that the SAIs bureaucracies were reticent to  
answer any inquiries about their performance or the internal organisation of the institution. 
However, thanks to the support of a newspaper with national influence, the staff of the SAIs 
showed more will to cooperate with the census.
The 2003 empirical research was the first academic effort to measure the institutional 
capabilities and the legal design of subnational SAIs in Mexico. Despite the fact that 
decentralisation increased the financial relevance of subnational governments, legislative audit 
offices at state level were absolutely ignored by Political Science analysis. Before this 
dissertation, there was no academic research on local accountability institutions in Mexico.
The 2003 census was based on 16 questions (See Appendix 5.1) to assess the institutional 
capabilities and performance of each SAI. The census is divided into 4 sections: 1) Budget; 2) 
Human Resources; 3) Audits, 4) Sampling. The survey was completed in October 2003. However, 
5 out of 32 subnational SAIs never replied to the request to participate in the survey. The 
institutions in charge of budget accountability in states and municipalities were not used to  
rendering accounts of their performance to academic or journalistic research. Additional 
information about the institutional design of the SAIs was obtained through a review of the legal 
fram ework of each audit supporting-agency of the state congresses.
The 2007-08 survey was designed and applied in collaboration with Alejandra Rios Cazares, then 
researcher at the Center for US-Mexican Studies at the University of California in San Diego. It 
was based on 44 questions, divided in five sections: I) Legal Framework II) Institutional 
organisation, III) Operational Issues IV) Audit Impact and V) Relationship with Congress. For 
2 00 8 ,1 0  out of 32 SAIs never replied after six months of written and oral requests. From the 10
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that did not reply to the census, 5 states were governed by the PRI, 3 by the PRD and 2 by the  
PAN. Regarding the hegemony of the governor's party in Congress, in 5 states it had more than 
51% of the seats. In the other 5 states the governor's party did not have control over the  
congressional majority.
5.5.1 Tenure and appointment o f the Director o f the SAIs
The appointment of the head of the SAI through a simple or a two-thirds majority is not a minor 
issue under the structure of Mexico's party system. A two-thirds majority forces a consensus 
between at least two political forces, because it is highly improbable that a single political party 
will control 66% of votes in a state Congress.20 The Constitutional am endm ent published in 2008 
will force all states and the Federal District to appoint the head of the SAI by a two-thirds  
majority in all state congresses and the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City. As seen in Table 
5.7, 20 states already have a legal fram ework that demands a two-thirds majority to appoint the 
head of the state SAI; four states require a simple majority and seven states do not specify how 
the Congress will choose the leader of the audit institution.
Table 5-7 Election processes and tenures of the audit institutions heads in Mexican States
State Elected by (proportion of the assembly)
Aguascalientes Undefined
Baja California 2/3 of the Assembly
Baja California Sur Undefined
Campeche 2/3 of the Assembly
Chiapas 2/3 of the Assembly
Chihuahua Undefined
Coahuila 2/3 of the Assembly
Colima Undefined
Mexico City 2/3 of the Assembly
Durango 2/3 of the Assembly
State of Mexico 2/3 of the Assembly
Guanajuato 2/3 of the Assembly
Guerrero Simple majority
Hidalgo Simple majority
20 In 2008, Baja California Sur is th e  only s tate w h e re  a single political party, th e  PRD, contro ls m o re  th an  66%  o f th e  
votes in th e  state congress.
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State Elected by (proportion of the assembly)
Jalisco 2/3 of the Assembly
Michoacan 2/3 of the Assembly
Morelos 2/3 of the Assembly
Nayarit 2/3 of the Assembly
Nuevo Leon 2/3 of the Assembly
Oaxaca Undefined
Puebla 2/3 of the Assembly
Que retaro Simple majority
Quintana Roo 2/3 of the Assembly
San Luis Potosi Undefined
Sinaloa Undefined
Sonora Simple Majority
Tabasco 2/3 of the Assembly
Tamaulipas 2/3 of the Assembly
Tlaxcala 2/3 of the Assembly
Veracruz 2/3 of the Assembly
Yucatan Undefined
Zacatecas 2/3 of the Assembly
Source: Constructed by th e  au th o r on th e  basis o f s tate laws.
However, the two-thirds majority legal design can be bent through some of the vices of 
Mexico's political system. In an interview with me, the PRD Senator from Tabasco, Arturo 
Nunez, stated that the current head of his state SAI (Francisco Jose Rullan Silva) was appointed 
because the PRI Governor bribed the PRD deputies in the state Congress (Nunez, 2008). Even 
the most advanced institutional design for Horizontal Accountability could not prevent this 
corrupt practice in Mexico's subnational politics. I could not find any additional proof to  
corroborate Senator Nunez's accusation. However, other testimonies collected for the  
dissertation indicate a very real risk of vote-buying practices in state congresses.
W ithout giving a specific example, the form er Ministry of Interior, Jorge Carpizo, talked about 
the same problem: "A governor has many means, especially economically speaking, which allow  
him to coerce members of the Congress from the opposing party. This is the way many 
governors are operating, even when their party doesn't have the majority in the Congress and 
you could think that the power would be balanced. In reality, they do have the majority because
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they are able to force, not all, but many opposing representatives, which gives the governor the  
guaranteed majority of the seats" (Carpizo, 2008).
The form er Comptroller General, Gregorio Guerrero Pozas, said in an interview: "Governors 
name their auditors and their accountants and they operate under the governor's control. This 
means that there is no guarantee that the institution is independent, and I believe this is a very 
delicate m atter in the states. W hat people used to criticise about the central federal 
government, where the president controlled one or more institutions of this kind, is now  
happening in some states" (Guerrero Pozas, 2008).
Arturo Nunez stated that the control of the PRI governor over the Tabasco state SAI resulted in 
frequent and detailed audit checks on the municipalities governed by the PRD. In an interview, 
the form er local PAN deputy of the state of Sinaloa, Alma Alcaraz, described a similar problem: 
"The SAI (of the state of Sinaloa) allowed the municipalities governed by the PRI to divert 
government funds to pay for (PRI) party activities, but if the PAN was governing the municipality 
the SAI would perform an audit on every nail and pencil in the ayuntomiento" (Alcaraz, 2008). 
Deputy Alcaraz was President of the Oversight Commission in the Congress of Sinaloa (1999- 
2001) in charge of the state SAI, however she complains that the Audit Institution did not share 
the findings of its audits: "As president of the Commission of Vigilance, I never got anything. It's 
regarded as normal to conceal and not reveal anything" (Alcaraz, 2008).
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000:135) identified the fact that accountability failures exist 
because of political capture or bureaucratic corruption. Their assumption is that local 
authorities are more prone to capture because factors like the degree of voter awareness, the  
cohesion of special interests, the electoral system and its competitiveness. One of the biggest 
challenges in the study of Mexico's subnational politics is the fact that equivalent legislations 
can produce very different outcomes due to the particularities of the subnational political 
systems. A Congress with a plural representation of political parties could mean an operating 
check and balance of government power in one state, and an opportunity for corruption in its 
neighbour. The federal Congress can change the Constitution to force states to appoint the head
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of the SAI through a two-thirds majority vote, but in some states they can not stop the governor 
from  winning a majority vote through the illicit use of public resources.
The example of vote-buying practices shows that the efficiency of Horizontal Accountability 
might be subject to the vigour of vertical accountability and the informal practices of the 
political system. The theory of Horizontal Accountability and its practical institutional 
enforcem ent could become an em pty shell that does not reflect the inner workings of the  
political system. The challenge to forge Horizontal Accountability institutions in the context of a 
demobilised society, weak citizenship awareness and fragile media oversight opens the door for 
additional research questions. Further studies should proceed from the fact that HA institutional 
performance is constrained both by de jure  and de facto  mechanisms. A research limited to the  
formal sphere of HA is in itself incomplete. In the effort to  introduce Horizontal Accountability 
mechanisms into subnational government structures, the federal Congress's legislation to  
homogenise the design of SAIs also considered a minimum tenure of seven years for the heads 
of the audit institutions. The tenure of its leader is one factor that determines an Al's degree of 
institutional autonomy from the Legislative, the Executive and the electoral cycles. The longer 
the tenure, the stronger the shield against political pressures from the six-year period of the 
governor's elections and the three-year congressional term .
In countries with a long democratic tradition, tenure is longer than seven years21. The ASF has 
an eight-year term  for the Auditor Superior, with one possible re-election. In 2003, the SAI of 
just tw o states, Guerrero and Nuevo Leon, matched the tenure of the head of the ASF. In 2007, 
a legal am endm ent in the state of Coahuila increased the tenure of the head of the SAI from 6 
to 8 years. From 2003 to 2008, the average tenure of the head of the state SAIs increased from  
3.75 years to 4.45 years. However, six out 31 states and the Federal District had audit legislation 
in place that already satisfied the new requirements of a seven year tenure demanded in the  
2008 Constitutional amendment. In four Mexican states, the law does not establish the length 
of the Comptroller's tenure, so the heads of the Al can be discharged at any tim e (See Table
21 The C om ptro lle r G eneral o f th e  U nited States has a 15 ye ar te n u re . In Canada th e  A u d ito r G eneral has a 10 year  
te n u re .
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5.8). Currently (July, 2008) in 22 states, the Comptroller General's tenure is equal to or shorter 
than the governor's six year term . In the period from 2003 to 2008, 7 states promoted legal 
reforms to extend the tenure of the head of the state SAI, but in six cases the new tenure was 
still under the six-year time frame of a governor's period.
Table 5-8 Tenure of the heads of the state Supreme Audit Institutions 2003 and 2008
State Years of tenure 
of the Comptroller 
General 2003
Years of tenure 
of the Comptroller 
General 2008
ASF (National) 8 8
Guerrero 8 8
Nuevo Leon 8 8
Chiapas 7 7
Tabasco 7 7
Campeche* 6 6
Coahuila 6 8
Puebla* 6 6
Sonora* 6 6
Tlaxcala* 6 6
Veracruz* 6 6
Quintana Roo* 5 5
Aguascalientes* 4 4
Mexico City* 4 5
Durango* 4 4
Michoacan* 4 4
Nayarit* 4 4
Tamaulipas* 4 6
Zacatecas* 4 4
Baja California* 3 4
Baja California Sur* Undefined Undefined
Colima* Undefined Undefined
Guanajuato* 3 5
Jalisco* 3 4
State of Mexico* 3 4
Morelos* 3 4
Queretaro* 3 3
Yucatan* Undefined Undefined
Chihuahua* Undefined Undefined
Hidalgo* Undefined 7 years
Oaxaca* Undefined Undefined
San Luis Potosi* Undefined 4 years
Sinaloa* Undefined Undefined
*S ta tes  th a t w ill requ ire a legal re fo rm  in o rd e r to  ab ide to  th e  constitu tional a m e n d m e n t o f 2008 . 
Source: Constructed by th e  a u th o r on th e  basis o f state  legislation fo r s tate  SAIs.
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In a pioneering study of the topic, Jorge Manjarrez states in his Ph.D. thesis that from 1985 to  
2001 only 25% of the heads of the Al completed their legal tenures. The 2008 survey (Pardinas 
& Rios Cazares, 2008) shows a divergence between the tenure established in the law and the  
actual permanence of the head of the SAIs in 17 states.22 The average permanence of the  
im m ediate form er head of the SAI was 28 months, although according to the legal fram ework  
the average tenure should have lasted 53 months. From the 17 states, the form er head of the  
SAI completed the tenure established in the law in only four cases (Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro  
and Zacatecas).
Under the 2008 constitutional amendment, the states are able to prohibit or allow the re- 
election of the head of the SAI. Currently, three states do not specify if the head of the SAI can 
be re-elected, five states and Mexico City do not allow re-election, and 23 states do allow re- 
election. However the re-election of the head of the SAI has been rare. Pardinas and Rios 
Cazares show that from 22 states that answered the survey, only in three cases had the head of 
the SAI been re-elected.
For Pope (2000:76): "To be effective, any external auditor must be immune from pressures from  
the clients or institutions being audited. The Auditor-General's clients are the Legislature or 
Parliament, and the public officials entrusted with public expenditure. Unfortunately, the  
Auditor-General's office can be particularly vulnerable to pressure from its clients if, as in the  
majority of cases, the Executive: 1) Appoints the Auditor-General; 2) Determines the resources 
allocated to the Auditor-General's office; 3) Determines staffing levels and classifications and is 
responsible for overall financial management and administration through the M inister of 
Finance."
Pope's argument highlights the fact that the opportunities of influence that lead to institutional 
capture are not limited to the figure of the head of the SAI, but also to the human and financial 
resources available to the SAI.
22 From 20  states th a t answ ered th e  survey, 17 rep ly to  th e  question: "For h o w  long had th e  last th re e  heads o f th e  
SAI rem a ined  in th e ir  posts?"
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5.5.2 Human and Financial Resources fo r  Accountability Enforcement
The human and financial resources of each audit bureau vary widely from one state to another, 
a disparity that is reflected in unequal capabilities to perform the accountability objectives.
For example, the budget of the SAI of the state of Jalisco, the best financed during 2007, was 
131.1 million pesos (£7.7 million) —  an amount higher than the sum of the budgets for the SAIs 
of seven other states during the same year. (Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Colima, 
Campeche, State of Mexico, Morelos and Nayarit). At the other extrem e is the SAI of the state 
of Baja California Sur, which received 7.9 million pesos in the same period. As Table 5.7 shows, 
the State of Mexico occupies the last place of SAI spending in per capita terms (SAI 
budget/num ber of inhabitants), investing only 1 peso per inhabitant. In the other hand, 
Quintana Roo invests 57 pesos, Colima 35 and Tlaxcala 31. The National SAI invests 7.5 pesos 
per inhabitant.
Table 5-9 Per capita budget allocated to SAI in 2007
State Mx. Pesos per inhabitant
Quintana Roo* 57.0
Colima 35.5
Tlaxcala* 31.1
Baja California 27.7
Tabasco 27.5
Campeche 27.4
Zacatecas 23.6
San Luis Potosi* 22.3
Coahuila 22.1
Queretaro 21.6
Chiapas 20.9
Mexico City 20.6
Veracruz 19.6
Jalisco 19.5
Sonora 18.1
Chihuahua 17.4
Nuevo Leon 16.8
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State Mx. Pesos per inhabitant
Nayarit 16.5
Hidalgo 16.5
Puebla 16.3
Baja California Sur 15.5
Guerrero 14.4
Morelos 12.3
Aguascalientes 11.4
Durango 10.4
Guanajuato 9.8
ASF (National) 7.5
Oaxaca 7.2
Sinaloa 5.5
State of Mexico 1.0
Michoacan **
Tamaulipas * *
Yucatan * *
*  20 08 , * *  S tates th a t  did no t answ er th e  qu estion naire  and do no t break d o w n th e  data o f th e  Al in th e  state  
Budgets. Source: S tate budgets 2 0 0 7 -2 0 0 8 , Q uestionnaire  to  th e  SAIs.
The size of an SAI's budget does not by itself guarantee that there will be better oversight of the  
public's money; however, an institution that lacks the resources to hire and train a team  of 
auditors can make only a very limited contribution to the verification of government financial 
transactions.
The budget of the SAI depends on the political will of the state congress. The percentage of its 
budget that each congress allocates to the Al gives an idea of the importance that the various 
elected assemblies assign to the task of accounting for public resources. At the federal level, the  
Congress gave 10.3% of its resources in 2008 to the ASF (see Table 5.8). Victor Infante, a federal 
deputy from the PAN, said in an interview: "The truth is, we behaved very stingily with the ASF, 
because every peso we give to them  we take from the congressional budget (Infante, 2003)." At 
state level, the lowest percentages of congressional budgets allocated to the Al are found in 
Morelos (8.5%), Baja California Sur (8.4%) and State of Mexico (1.4%). In contrast, Chiapas and 
Baja California allocated 60.9% and 50.1% of the programmed expenditure of the local 
legislature (see Table 5.8).
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Table 5-10 Percentage of congressional budget allocated to SAI in 2007
State %
Chiapas 60.9
Baja California 50.1
Coahuila 45.9
Veracruz 44.2
Puebla 40.6
Hidalgo 33.2
San Luis Potosi* 33.0
Jalisco 31.5
Nuevo Leon 28.1
Chihuahua 28.0
Quintana Roo* 23.8
Colima 22.0
Zacatecas 21.7
Sonora 20.8
Tlaxcala* 20.3
Campeche 19.5
Tabasco 19.5
Mexico City 18.6
Que retaro 18.4
Guanajuato 15.7
Oaxaca 14.1
Guerrero 14.0
Durango 12.3
Nayarit 11.5
ASF (National) 10.4
Sinaloa 10.2
Aguascalientes 9.0
Morelos 8.5
Baja California Sur 8.4
State of Mexico 1.4
Michoacan NA
Tamaulipas NA
Yucatan NA
*  2008
NA: States th a t did no t an sw er th e  q u estio n n a ire  and did no t d isaggregate th e  
data o f th e  Al in th e ir  Budgets. Source: C onstructed  by th e  au tho r.
The Veracruz SAI reduced its budget dependency on the state Congress through an 
"accountability tax." The State Law for Financial Oversight (Articulo 8 Ley de Fiscalizacion)
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establishes that the Al will keep five pesos out of each thousand invested in public works by 
state and municipal governments. The increase in costs as a result of this special tax could be 
compensated for by the savings resulting from improved supervision over the allocation of 
contracts and the construction of public works.
5.5.3 The budgets o f the SAI vs. Internal Comptroller
All the state governments have high-ranking bureaus for internal audit. In 18 out of 32 states, 
these are at cabinet level. These 18 states have reproduced the structure of the federal 
government, with the Secretana de la Funcion Publica (form er Secodam) fulfilling the mission of 
internal comptroller. The "double whammy" (Hood, 2005:16) model for accountability that 
combines the original internal audit bureaus of the Executive with the new audit bureaus of the 
Congress has been reproduced in several states.
Table 5-11 compares the budgets of the state SAIs and the local equivalents of the SFP for 2007. 
The table is limited to data from 28 states and the Federal District, because information was not 
available in the 3 budgets of the remaining states. Of the 28 cases examined in Table 5.9, 17 
states and the Federal District allocated higher budgets to the comptroller's office than to the  
congressional SAI, even though the form er is responsible only for auditing the accounts of the  
Executive while the latter must perform financial oversight of all three branches of government 
and the municipal authorities.
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Table 5-11 Resources allocated to the State SAIs and the Internal Comptroller of the Executive 
_____________________ Branch (Millions of pesos 2007)_____________________
State SAI budget Budget Comptroller of the executive
Aguascalientes 12.1 21.3
Baja California 78.7 39.1
Baja California Sur 7 9 12.0
Campeche 20.7 26.3
Chiapas 89.8 113.1
Chihuahua 56.3 31.0
Coahuila 55.2 66.0
Colima 20.2 82.2
Mexico City 179.8 272.0
Durango 15.8 23.5
Guanajuato 48.0 95.0
Guerrero 45.0 21.5
Hidalgo 38.6 15.3
Jalisco 131.8 68.2
State of Mexico 13.5 147.8
Morelos 19.8 20.6
Nayarit 15.7 21.8
Nuevo Leon 70 6 64.0
Oaxaca 25 4 77.7
Puebla 87.9 147.8
Que retaro 34.4 43.5
Quintana Roo* 64 7 45.0
San Luis Potosi* 53.7 42.5
Sinaloa 14.4 35.1
Sonora 43.3 66.4
Tabasco 54.8 86.1
Tlaxcala* 33.2 31.1
Veracruz 139.2 122.2
Zacatecas 32.3 66.4
* ln fo rm a tio n  fo r FY 20 0 8  fo r th ose states th a t did no t present th e  SAI in fo rm a tio n  in th e ir  budget fo r  FY 
2 0 07 . NOTE: M ichoacan , Tam aulipas and Yucatan did no t break dow n th e  in fo rm atio n  fo r  th e  SAI in th e ir  
budgets and did no t answ er th e  qu estion naire  provided.
Sources: Constructed by th e  a u th o r w ith  s tate  budget decrees and q u estion na ire  to  th e  SAIs.
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5.5.4 W hat percentage o f the budget is audited?
Accountability agents do not pretend to supervise everything. In this sense, the aim of 
accountability must allow for imperfect information. If every government transaction were 
transparent, there would be no need for holding anybody accountable (Schedler, 1999:20). As 
audits can hardly ever be all-inclusive, SAIs use a sampling approach, although the samples 
should be selected on the basis of a model and must specify a high enough sample size to  
provide a clear idea of the controls over financial management.
A key measure of the performance of the Al in a state or a country is the size of the audited 
sample relative to the total budget. The Al uses a representative sample to do its audits; in 
OECD countries, the size of the sample varies between 5% and 9% of the total budget.23 In 
Mexico, there is no public data available for calculating this ratio. In the 2003 questionnaire, the 
heads of the SAIs were asked to establish "the percentage of expenditure audited with respect 
to the total public expenditure of the state (excluding the payments of the state public debt)."
When asked the same question, the ASF acknowledged that the audited sample it uses is 1.9%  
of total federal spending. In 2001, the SAI of the state of Chiapas reported that the size of the  
audited sample was 4.8% of fiscal revenues of the local executive branch. From the replies of 
the 25 SAIs that answered the questionnaire, Nayarit reported an audit sample amounting to  
8.2% of the state budget, including the accounts of the municipalities. In the rest of the cases, 
three responded that they did not have available information and 19 SAIs gave data that 
exceeded the range established by the OECD and the ASF. On average these states reported  
that they audit 50% of the state expenditure —  a figure that is too high to be believable. The SAI 
of the state of Quintana Roo answered in 2003 that this data was confidential.
In the 2008 survey, from the 15 states that answered the question of the percentage of the  
audited sample with respect of the total expenditure, the average figure was 46%, relatively
23 OECD, Results o f th e  survey on Budget Practices and Procedures, 
h ttp ://o c d e .d y n d n s .o rg / Consulted M a y  20th  2 0 05 .
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similar to the 50% average in the 2003 questionnaire. Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, 
Jalisco, Puebla and Veracruz responded that the size of the sample was 60% or above of the  
total budget. The most modest sample was 10.8 for Mexico City. Due to the lack of transparency 
and the dubious credibility of the answers, the census of 2003 and 2008 to the SAIs do not 
provide solid information to know with certainty the percentage of funds that are audited in 
Mexican states and municipalities.
5.6 Conflicts between the ASF and state governments
Article 79 of the Constitution establishes the right of the ASF to exercise vertical oversight of 
federal transfers to states and municipalities. This precept presumes that the federal entity has 
the capacity to supervise the finances of autonomous subnational governments. However, the  
wording in the Constitution and some contradictions in secondary laws leave ample room for 
political conflict and judicial interpretation. Article 2 of the law that regulates the SAI (Ley de 
Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion) determines that all subnational governments are subject 
to the oversight authority of the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion. In contrast, Article 49 of 
the law, which determines the fiscal relationship between the different levels of government 
(Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal) states that each of the 32 subnational SAIs had the responsibility to 
perform the ex post audit of state and municipal governments.
In Article 33, the LFSF states that the ASF will "propose procedures of coordination with state 
congresses and the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District" to collaborate in the oversight 
of federal funds of Aportaciones (Ramo 33) transferred to local governments. The ASF can 
establish agreements with each local SAI to organise the audit procedures between the two  
institutions. Three states (Guanajuato, Michoacan and Tabasco) include in their constitutions 
the prerogative to establish cooperation agreements between their local SAIs and similar audit 
bureaus that might help to accomplish the financial oversight of government funds. When the  
audits give indication of some irregularity attributable to the state or municipal authorities, the 
ASF will proceed to demand the recovery of funds, and impose sanctions. It could also request 
penal or civil investigations to punish wrongdoings (LFSF, Arts. 33, 34 and 35).
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The ASF has denounced the current legal fram ework for not allowing a strict audit process. 
Article 4924 of the Law of Fiscal Co-ordination establishes that once appropriations from the 
federal government are transferred, they can only be overseen by state congresses and that 
once the local governments have received the federal funds they should be registered as state 
revenues. The only legal window for the ASF to pursue the audit of decentralised expenditure is 
to sign cooperation agreements with the state SAIs, although the state congresses are not 
forced to endorse the agreement. Even when the agreem ent is signed, the ASF does not have 
the legal or political means to enforce it.
The federal fram ework requires that audit agreements be negotiated and accepted by the state 
political forces. Absolute audit power of the ASF over subnational finances could potentially 
lead to a constitutional controversy in the Supreme Court. Political negotiation between the ASF 
and the state powers has thus far been the path for resolving conflict between the different 
levels of government; however, the accountability outcomes have not favoured the interests of 
the ASF.
From the Cuenta Publica of 2001, the ASF found inconsistencies in the audits of 291 million 
pesos (£14.5 million) transferred to the states for social expenditure.25 The states provided 
evidence to clarify 15% of this sum (£742,000) within the period established by the law (ASF, 
2003).26 According to the ASF report, the states showed financial, administrative and accounting 
anomalies accounting for 30 cents out of each peso approved in the federal budget. Out of 724 
irregularities, state governments gave satisfactory answers to 151. Out of 32 local governments, 
only Hidalgo and Sonora answered the full requests of the ASF. At the opposite end of the  
spectrum is the state of Chihuahua, the budget of which showed anomalies of 58.7 million 
pesos and provided proof of 1.6 million, or 2.7% of the to ta l.27
24Ley de C oo rd ination  Fiscal, th rough In te rn e t: h ttp : //w w w .c d d h c u .g o b .m x /le y in fo /p d f/3 1 .p d f  
Consulted M a y  2 0 th 20 04 .
25 The d istribu tion  o f decentralised funds th ro ug h  th e  budget is analysed in ch ap te r 3.
26 ASF, In fo rm e  de Solventacion de Observaciones de la  Cuenta Publica  de 2 0 01 .
27 R eform a, O cto b er 2 7 th 2003.
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The ASF has requested a change in the text of the LCF to increase the powers of the federal 
congress in the oversight of decentralised funds to the states. In addition, the ASF has requested 
a constitutional reform of Article 115, which defines the autonomy of municipal governments to 
organise the administration and audit of their own funds. As of April 2008, the Congress had not 
accommodated the request for legal reform to increase the powers of the ASF. Frequently, 
deputies and senators have strong political links with local governors, and it is not in their 
political interest to increase the powers of the federal audit bureau at the state and municipal 
level.
In January 2004, the government of the state of Oaxaca and the local Congress rejected an audit 
from the ASF, claiming that it would violate the Ley de Coordinacion Fiscal and the state's 
sovereignty. The leader of the local congress stated that "the local SAI cannot audit the 
expenses of the President of Mexico, so the ASF cannot audit the expenses of the Oaxaca 
governm ent."28 This level of political confrontation is rare between the state governors and the 
ASF, but other governors and local congresses have subtle ways of obstructing the ASF without 
receiving much attention from the media. The ASF and the Chamber of Deputies decided to  
present a Constitutional Controversy against the Executive and Legislative branches of Oaxaca. 
In August 2006, a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court affirmed that the ASF had authority  
to perform an ex post audit over federal transfers to finance decentralised public services 
though Ramo 33.
The Supreme Court ruling empowered the ASF to oversee federal subsidies to  subnational 
governments. The audit and oversight is performed through the common efforts of the federal 
and the 32 subnational SAIs. The results of the audit of the Cuenta Publica 2005 gave evidence 
of the asymmetric performance of audit bureaus at federal and subnational level. From 33 
audits, the ASF made financial recoveries of 57.7 million pesos, while the recovery of 252 
subnational SAIs audits was zero pesos.
2*Apro, January 27 th 2 0 0 4 , th rough In te rn e t
h ttp : //w w w .p ro c e s o .c o m .m x /n o tic ia .h tm l? n id = 213 63& ca t= 2  consulted S ep tem b er 7 th 2 0 07 .
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows that each state used its sovereign authority to design and categorise its 
budget apportionments according to its own singular criteria. During the first years of Mexico's 
transition to democracy, the heterogeneous accounting systems at subnational level increased 
budget opacity and hindered the efforts to oversee the allocation of subnational expenditure. 
Mullins (2007:213) defends the diversity of subnational budget accounts, but with a word of 
caution: "Local budget systems, processes, and structures within and among nations reflect 
historical tradition and diversity in culture, capacity, national governance, and institutions. Thus, 
no single model of local government budgeting is best."
This chapter shows that the main problem with Mexican state governments is that "the 
historical traditions" and political culture reflected in budget documents are the legacy of 
presidentialism, characterised by weak accountability and lack of transparency. Preserving 
"historical tradition and diversity in culture" has come at a high cost in the realm of budget 
administration. The asymmetry of budget information between the governors and the 
respective state congresses is a deja vu from the times of presidentialism. The state legislatures 
have limited knowledge of budget expenditure allocations. The future legislation that will aim to  
homogenise subnational budgeting is expected to create a common vocabulary and a 
systematised typology to reduce the information gap on expenditure appropriations.
Schedler (1999:15) distinguishes two kinds of accountability answers provided by the 
government: 1) justifications for "the validity and reason to take a certain course of action" (the 
argumentative dimension) and 2) data or hard facts (the informational dimension). The 
informational dimension of accountability is, for example, financial data presented according to 
pre-established expectations or standards of disclosure, accuracy and classification. In the 
current circumstances, Mexico's state governors do not provide hard financial data under a 
criterion that is understood by members of subnational congresses or ordinary citizens. With 
opaque budgets, the informational dimension provides misguided or incomplete answers.
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In a federal constitutional system, the adjustment of institutions to their political environments 
is further complicated by the fact that they must adjust to the multiple-layer environments of 
each level of government (March and Olson, 1995:221). In Mexico, state and municipal 
institutions must adapt to the new democratic environment at both the federal and subnational 
levels. This multiple adaptation process results in an interaction of regional political practices 
and institutions.
The structure of the "national political system provides the fram ework in which organisations 
function and in which all policies are carried out" (Rodriguez, 1997:6-7); however, the national 
system's influence over regional political systems is very diverse. In the case of Mexico's 
subnational political systems, it is difficult to find a common narrative that explains patterns of 
behaviour towards the evolution of accountability institutions. Each state reacts differently to  
the pressures of the evolving environment. State electoral institutions have developed more 
quickly and in a more coordinated manner than budget accountability institutions. The 
institutional reforms in the ASF have marked the path towards a modern scheme of democratic 
accountability, although these changes did not manifest themselves homogeneously in most of 
the state audit bureaus.
The legal fram ework for budget oversight and the institutional resources of each subnational 
SAI have set the accountability standards for each state. These standards of budget 
accountability aim to prevent the waste or misappropriation of government finances for 
political or personal gain. For Kearns (1996:69) these standards have to be enforced by an 
outside oversight agency with the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance. With low 
legal standards of accountability or weak institutions to enforce them , it is impossible to limit 
the arbitrariness of political power.
In several states, the governor preserves the habits and informal powers of the form er Mexican 
presidentialism. Some state congresses have fulfilled their mission to counterbalance the power 
of the governor, while in others the checks and balances necessary for a true division of power 
do not exist. Control over the state's institutions and the decentralisation or spending has given
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the governors an enormous margin of political and financial power, while the organisations in 
charge of the financial oversight lack the human and financial resources and proper institutional 
autonomy to do their jobs. This conclusion suggests that Mexican democracy has a weakness in 
the institutions in charge of financial accountability.
In recent years, several states have made efforts to modernise the institutional fram ework of 
their Audit Institutions. However, in the eyes of the Federal Congress, the effort of 
modernisation has not been enough, or sufficiently homogeneous. For the fifth tim e in 20 years, 
the federal Congress has used its authority to impose reforms over the political and 
administrative structures of the states. In the afterm ath of Mexico's transition to democracy, 
the federal Congress strengthened the mechanisms of Horizontal Accountability upon the  
Mexican president. Through the 2008 Constitutional Am endm ent to harmonise budgeting 
standards and strengthen subnational SAIs, the Congress enforced the mechanisms of 
Horizontal Accountability upon the state governors.
I have been writing regularly for the newspaper Reforma since 2004. Occasionally, I w rite  about 
issues of accountability and may have made myself known to members of Congress. When the  
Legislative Branch was discussing the contents of the secondary law, I was invited by the deputy 
Alma Alcaraz (PAN) to present a summary of the findings of this chapter in a conference held in 
the Chamber of Deputies in July 2008. This talk was my only role in the legislative debate 
regarding the law to enforce budget harmonisation in Mexico's subnational governments. By 
the tim e of the presentation, the current version of the thesis was basically ready for 
resubmission. Given the time line of events, it is unlikely that my role in the congressional 
debate would have caused an "observer effect". I have a sceptical optimism regarding the faith 
of the recent budget harmonisation reforms in Mexico: It is one thing to reform the  
Constitution, and quite another, to approve an enabling secondary law and a very different 
thing to change the reality on the ground.
&
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"Although they provide important elements o f order 
in the changing scene o f politics, 
political institutions themselves also change. 
The processes of change include the mundane, 
incremental transformations o f everyday life 
as well as the rarer metamorphoses 
at breaking points o f history" 
March-Olsen 1995:166
Mexico's transition to democracy was an historical process with very particular characteristics, 
due to the unique features of the political system. In contrast with other democratic transitions in 
Latin America or Eastern Europe, Mexico's construction of a plural party system did not imply the 
destruction of the former regime and its political institutions. There was no sudden collapse of the 
previous order, nor was there a collective demand for a new constitutional framework. The legal 
foundations of presidentialism were not challenged by any serious propositions for alternative 
models (Lujambio, 1995:11-12).
Democratisation in Mexico involved a shift of power from the Federal Executive to the Congress 
and the subnational authorities. The transition from a metaconstitutional presidentialism to a 
constitutional presidency enforced new accountability mechanisms upon the Executive figure. 
The creation of a more effective Supreme Audit Institution and the new legal fram ework for the  
approval of the federal budget empowered the Horizontal Accountability of the Executive to the  
Legislative Branch. Through the decentralisation of the federal budget, based on clear formulas 
for expenditure allocation, the President began to render financial accounts to state governors 
and municipal presidents.
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Democratisation has largely undermined the arbitrary financial power of Mexican 
presidentialism. It has reduced discretionary criteria in the allocation of the federal budget and 
improved federal expenditure accountability. Before the emergence of a plural political system, 
expenditure decisions were made by a small number of players within the President's circle. 
Under the new political system, the President's expenditure decisions are constrained by the  
emergence of new political players in Congress and limited resources due to the  
decentralisation of expenditure.
The unintended result of decentralisation was to make additional financial resources available 
to state and municipal office holders, who did not have effective institutional mechanisms to  
enforce budget accountability. The arguments in favour of decentralisation claim that it helps to 
improve the delivery of public services and reduces the inefficiencies of centralised systems. But 
to achieve an increase of efficiency in spending, subnational governments must m eet certain 
conditions and basic levels of administrative development. Institutions and norms that 
guarantee budget accountability are one of these prerequisites for gains in efficiency.
The disparity of accountability environments at the state and municipal levels in Mexico has 
influenced the outcome of decentralisation. This dissertation highlights some of the risks of a 
decentralisation process that disregards the importance of budget accountability. W ithout 
adequate institutions for financial accountability at the local level, the decentralisation process 
may not lead to an improvement of efficiency in subnational expenditure.
Regarding taxation, Mexico's policy makers acknowledged the differences between the 
administrative and revenue collecting capacities of states and municipalities. Since there are 
wide regional disparities among Mexico's subnational governments, the federal authority  
undertook the administration and collection of tax revenues. However, on the expenditure side 
of public finances, the decentralisation process treated all states and municipalities as if they
305
DECENTRALISATION AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TWILIGHT OF
MEXICAN PRESIDENTIALISM
had equivalent capacities for the management and accountability of public spending. Mexico's 
expenditure decentralisation was treated not as a process where subnational entities built 
administrative capacities in parallel to the absorption of new responsibilities, but as an already 
taken decision where states and municipalities had to absorb their new tasks, regardless of 
w hether they were ready or not.
The concept of accountability is so foreign to the Spanish language and the national political 
culture that tw o of the most influential dictionaries of political science, published in Mexico, do 
not have an entry for the term .1 It is thus perhaps not surprising that Mexico's transition to  
democracy overlooked the challenges of accountability at the subnational level and focused 
mainly on the creation of institutions to guarantee the credibility of the electoral process.
W ith the tw ilight of presidentialism, the areas of decision that had been overshadowed by the  
metaconstitutional powers of the Executive had to be reformed with norms and institutions that 
would fill the vacuum of authority. W ith regard to budget accountability, the most relevant 
reform was the creation in 1999 of a new Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), to strengthen the  
auditing functions of the Federal Congress. During the 70 years of Mexican presidentialism, the 
existing SAI, the Contadurfa M ayor de Hacienda, was undermined by its legal design and the  
political weakness of Congress. The untrammelled powers of the president were antithetical to  
autonomous institutions that existed outside his area of influence. Metaconstitutional 
presidentialism was able to flourish because state institutions, isolated from Executive 
pressures, did not exist.
The transformation of the Contaduria M ayor de Hacienda (CMH) into the Auditoria Superior de 
la Federacion (ASF) was part of the process of institutional reinforcem ent of the Chamber of 
Deputies. The CMH had institutional inadequacies that hampered its accountability mission. The
1 Bobbio, N. and M atteu cc i, N., Diccionario de politico, [M exico: Siglo XXI, 2 0 0 0 ] and B aca-O lam endi, L., Lexico de la  
politico, [M exico : FLACSO-FCE, 20 00 ] do no t have an en try  fo r  "accountab ility ."
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form er SAI did not have the technical autonomy to decide the subjects, scope and timing of its 
audits. Every year, the CMH had to present its program of government auditing to the approval 
of the Chamber of Deputies. The CMH was legally incapable of directly accusing or sanctioning 
bureaus or public servants who might have committed a wrongdoing. Moreover, its audit 
capacity was limited to the administrative structure of the federal Executive, and it had no 
authority to  oversee the expenditure of the Congress, the Judicial Branch or other autonomous 
state institutions.
In contrast with the powers of the form er CMH, the ASF has autonomy to decide all issues 
regarding the government audit. The creation of the new SAI gave the ASF legal capacity to 
impose direct sanctions on public servants who might have broken the law. The new fram ework  
of the SAI widened the scope of its oversight capacity to all federal powers and institutions. The 
ASF has greater margins of institutional autonomy. However, it still receives orders from the  
Oversight Committee of the Chamber of Deputies to perform certain audit work. The best way 
to prevent the interference of political parties into its oversight activities is to grant 
constitutional autonomy to the ASF, meaning that Mexico's SAI would evolve from a 
congressional supporting agency to an audit bureau independent from all state branches, as is 
the Contraloria General de la Republica in Chile. A comparative analysis of independent SAIs is a 
provocative premise for further academic research into accountability institutions in Mexico.
The creation of the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion set an example for equivalent 
institutions at the subnational level. The creation of the ASF helped to trigger a critical mass for 
institutional reform in some states, while in others the example was ignored. In general, the  
modernisation of accountability institutions at the federal level did not trickle down to  
subnational governments during the first decade (1997-2007) of a divided Congress in Mexico. 
However, a constitutional amendment published in M ay 2008 gave a minimum common ground 
for the homogenisation of state SAIs. The amendment established that the heads of all state
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SAIs ought to have a minimum tenure of 7 years and they should be elected by a 2 /3  majority in 
the state congress.
This dissertation provides an analysis of the general situation of state SAIs before the enactment 
of the Constitutional amendment. The study of SAIs at subnational level in Mexico shows the  
mixed results of democratisation across territorial units, with equivalent constitutional 
hierarchy. In some states, accountability accompanies electoral democracy, while in other 
regions, the presence of a credible and functioning electoral system coexists with weak audit 
institutions. The performance of Mexico's subnational governments supports the claim that the 
presence of a credible and functioning electoral system does not guarantee the existence of 
governmental accountability.
In O'Donnell's terms, vertical accountability, in its electoral dimension, does not guarantee the 
enforcement of mechanisms for Horizontal Accountability. From a theoretical perspective, the  
concept of Horizontal Accountability has to take into account, how informal political practices 
could shape and erode the de facto  framework for rendering accounts. If the weaknesses of 
subnational audit institutions is a by-product of the democratisation process, this research 
shows the unevenness (O'Donnell, 1999:139) of democratic change in Mexico. Even within the  
same region, discrepant accountability environments arise between neighbouring states.
The structure of the "national political system provides the fram ework in which organisations 
function and in which all policies are carried out" (Rodriguez, 1997:6-7). However, the influence 
of the national political system over regional political structures is far from homogenous. In the  
case of Mexico's subnational political systems, it is very difficult to find a common explanation 
for patterns of behaviour towards the evolution of accountability institutions. Each state reacts 
in different ways to the pressures caused by changes in the national political system. Due to the  
modernisation promoted by the Federal government and the main political parties, state
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electoral institutions were modernised in a faster and more homogeneous manner than budget 
accountability institutions.
Accountability, clientelism and decentralisation
W ith the decentralisation of spending and improved budget accountability, the federal 
government reduced its capacity to engage in pork-barrel strategies and use of federal cash 
transfers as a tool of political control. The end of presidentialism was reflected in diminished 
capability to allocate client-based budgets, yet this was not the end of political clientelism in 
Mexican politics but rather the beginning of its decentralisation.
Within the context of a declining presidential role, the interaction of democratisation and 
decentralisation gave way to an unprecedented degree of political and financial autonomy for 
subnational governments. For the first time, governors owed their political power to the polls 
and not to their personal relationship with the president. Moreover, the financial stability of 
state treasuries no longer depended on the political will of the federal government. On these 
grounds, state governors began to pursue their own political agendas with disregard for federal 
priorities. The President became accountable to the Congress and to regional political forces, 
while some state governors remained accountable to no one.
This decentralisation of political and financial power has produced mixed results in terms of 
welfare improvement for the population. In some cases, decentralisation has created incentives 
to use public resources for political purposes. The premise that decentralisation leads to 
efficiency gains assumed that governors and municipal presidents would not use the new pool 
of resources for different objectives than maximising the welfare of society. Fakin and 
Crombrugghe (1997:8) note that the decentralisation of expenditure may imply the expansion
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of a state's bureaucracy, and that in many cases greater resources have produced "an 
unnecessary increase in staff members." This thesis provides empirical evidence in support of 
Fakin and Crombrugghe's argument through its analysis of the payroll growth of state and 
municipal governments in Mexico from 2001 to 2006. The obscenely large salaries of top 
municipal officials are another unexpected negative effect of Mexico's decentralisation.
During the Government of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the transition to a constitutional 
presidentialism left some crucial areas of policy making unchanged. The issues and institutions 
that had been the subject of presidential influence, but were left untouched by institutional 
reform, became casus belli for political confrontation: Does the president have veto power over 
the federal budget? W hat share of the oil export surplus should be saved and w hat share 
allocated for subnational spending? Who determines the expected price of an export barrel of 
oil, a variable needed to forecast public revenues? To solve the recurrent political conflict 
related to budget negotiation, these questions were answered through the intervention of the  
Supreme Court and a new legal fram ework for the budget process. A Supreme Court verdict 
determined that the President had veto power over a section or the whole budget approved by 
the Chamber of Deputies. The calculation to forecast the oil price and a formula for the  
distribution of the oil surplus were established in a new budget law approved in 2006.
Improved accountability and the reduction of discretionary criteria in the budget allocation 
process undermined the financial basis of Mexican presidentialism. The loss of political power 
reduced the president's ability to use public resources for political gain. One of the questions 
that drove this research is w hether state governors are also willing to relinquish the  
discretionary powers that come with their office. Through the institutional strength of their 
respective audit bureaus, each state gives a different answer to this question.
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During the first decade of Mexico's transition to democracy, there was no intention of the  
federal authorities to promote the strengthening of accountability institutions in state 
governments. The reform of accountability institutions was left to the will or neglect of local 
authorities. However, the Federal Congress decided to impose a modernisation of state SAIs 
from  above, as it had done previously with subnational ombudsmen's offices and the states' 
electoral commissions. The 2008 constitutional am endm ent will homogenize the de jure  design 
of state SAIs. However, it is plausible to expect that de focto  political factors will still play a 
relevant role in the capability and performance of state SAIs.
In several states, governors have preserved the habits and informal power of the form er 
Mexican presidentialist system. In some states, governors are unaccountable to local 
legislatures and municipalities in a similar way as the President was unaccountable to the  
federal Congress and subnational governments. Control over the state's institutions and 
spending decentralisation gave the governors enormous margins of political and financial 
capacity. The form er supporting actors of Mexico's ancient regime have become central players 
of the new political system.
W ith their new political leverage, state governors pressure the federal Congress to increase 
budget transfers to their regions. As a result, the federal deputies have become the most 
important "tax base" for subnational governments, as their lobbying efforts in Congress are 
rewarded with sizeable increases in their non-earmarked budgets. The financial accountability 
of subnational expenditure is one of the pressing issues of Mexico's young democracy.
The debate over the transition to democracy focused mostly on the construction of institutions 
that would build the credibility of the electoral process. The old institutions in charge of 
preparing the polls and counting the votes did not fulfil the needs of a modern multiparty  
competitive system. A similar phenomenon is at work in the majority of those institutions
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charged with maintaining accountability at the local level: they do not answer the expectations 
of transparency and performance required of a modern democracy. The 2008 constitutional 
am endm ent to homogenise budgeting formats and standardise some features of the state SAIs 
is an aim to strengthen the accountability of subnational authorities. The practical enforcem ent 
of this new legal framework ought to be a catalyst for further research. The 2008 Constitutional 
am endm ent shows that Mexico is still adjusting its laws and institutions to the demands of an 
evolving political system.
&
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C h ap te r 2- Com parison o f in s titu tio na l design o f SAIs in designated countries
Political
system Presidential
Semi
Presidential
Parliamentary
Country USA Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
■
France Spain Canada UnitedKingdom
.....■ ... ■. , - WKmmmmmm
Official
name
Government Auditoria Tribunal Contraloria Auditoria Court des Tribunal de Office National
Accountability General de Contas General de Superior Comptes Cuentas of the Audit Office
of the Office de la da Uniao la de la Auditor
SAI Nacion Republica Federacion General
Comptroller A Presidente Comptroller Auditor The Court The Court Auditor Comptroller
General President do General Superior of Accounts of General and Auditor
of the Tribunal de la has one Accounts is General
AGN and de Contas Federacion Premier run by 12
IBB six da Uniao President, members
1 1 1 ! AuditorGenerals
(Tribunal
of
8
Presidents
and a
Prosecutor.
Accounts of Chamber The
of the 
Union is 
composed
and more 
than 200 
magistrates
members 
of the 
Court vote
Title of of one to choose a
the President candidate
Head of and 8 to be
the SAI
■111
Ministers) President 
of the 
Court for a 
three year 
term,then 
the winner 
of the 
internal 
vote is 
appointed
, , . by the
King.
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Political
system Presidential
Country
The President 
from a list 
presented by 
Congress, then 
ratification by the 
Senate and the 
House of 
Representatives.
Appoin-
,e d by
3 Auditors 
General are 
appointed by 
the Senate and 
3 by the 
Chamber of 
Deputies. The 
President of 
the AGN is 
appointed by 
the opposition 
party with 
highest
representation 
in the Congress 
and ratified by 
a joint
resolution of 
both Chambers' 
minority party.
The 9
members of 
the court 
select one of 
their peers 
to be
President of 
the Tribunal 
for one year. 
The
President, 
with the 
approval of 
the Senate, 
appoints 
one-third of 
the
magistrates; 
the other 
two thirds 
are selected 
by both 
Chambers of 
the
Congress.
The
President 
with Senate 
ratification.
Mexico
Two-thirds 
majority of 
the
Chamber of 
Deputies 
from a 
three-name 
list
provided by 
the
Oversight 
Committee 
of the
Chamber of 
Deputies.
Semi 
Presidential
France
Parliamentary
MMMMi
Canada
The Court is 
presided 
over by a 
Premier 
president, 
appointed 
by a decree 
of the 
Council of 
Ministers, 
and enjoys 
security of 
tenure.
The
members of 
the Courts of 
Accounts are 
appointed, 
six by the 
Congress of 
Deputies, six 
by the 
Senate by a 
3/5 majority 
in both 
Chambers 
and then 
validated by 
the General 
Courts. The 
Prosecutor is 
directly 
appointed by 
the
Government
in
accordance 
to the law of 
the
Ministerio
Fiscal.
The Prime
Minister
with
parliament
ary
approval.
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Political
system Presidential
Country USA
—m m  
15 years
f M H H i  
8 years
with the 
possibility 
of re-
election.
Joint
resolution 
of the 
Congress 
I;' and the 
I  President.
Dismissed
by
The
Ministers 
have life 
tenure. They 
retire when 
they reach 
70 years old 
or after 30 
years of 
service with 
full pay.
No term limit. 
Once
appointed the 
CG cannot be 
dismissed, but 
must resign 
when he is 75 
years old.
Semi
Presidential
> France
Parliamentary
8 years
with
possible
ratification
for a
second
term.
Life tenure 10 years
Spain Canada
The
members 
of the 
Court 
have
tenure of 
9 years.
United
The
appointmen 
t of the 
C&AG is 
"without 
limit of 
time".
Joint They can The Chamber Two-thirds Cannot be They can Majority The C&AG
resolution only be of Deputies majority of dismissed. only be vote of can only be
of both removed has to put the removed both removed
Chambers from their forward an Chamber of from their Chambers from office
of the post by a accusation of Deputies posts by a of the by HM The
Congress judicial constitutional decision Parliamen Queen on
decision that transgression of the t recommend
proves and the General ation of
serious Senate Courts. both Houses
misconduct. validates or 
rejects the
of
Parliament.
accusation.
Political
system
Country
Presidential
USA
Both
Chambers
of
Congress
Semi 
Presidential
a m i
To both
Chambers
of
Congress.
Final
decisions
are
published in 
the official 
newspaper.
Congress 
and the 
Executive
Oversight 
Committee 
of the 
Committee 
of the
Chamber of 
Deputies
Parliamentary
. United 
Canada
The Cour des
comptesis
independent
of both the
legislative
and
executive 
branches of 
government, 
although it 
sends its 
reports to 
the
Parliament 
and the 
President.
The
Tribunal
de
Cuentas
presents
its
reports 
to the 
General 
Courts.
The The House
Chamber of 
of Commons
Commons
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1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
APPENDIX
i -  D em o cra tisatio n  and D ecentra lisation  T im e lin e
Dem ocratisation D ecentralisation
-Presidential elections: Carlos Salinas of the PRI 
wins under suspicion of fraud, but loses a 2 /3  
majority in Congress, which is necessary for 
Constitutional changes.
-For the first tim e, an opposition party wins a 
State government (PAN in Baja California).
Social Development Agreements are established 
to coordinate PRONASOL under Ramo 26.
State transfers in the  Fiscal Coordination Law are 
increased from  17.3% to 18.1%.
-PAN wins Chihuahua in the governor's 
election.
-Creation of Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) as 
an independent institution.
-A redesign of the Supreme Court shields the 
juries from presidential influence.
-Ernesto Zedillo from  the PRI wins the 
presidential election.
-Electoral Reform, which allows public and 
private funds and media access to all parties. 
The Reform guarantees the IFE autonomy from  
the Executive.
-In term ediate elections: PRI loses control of 
51% of the Lower Chamber.
-For the first tim e, local elections took place in 
DF, the PRD wins local legislature and the city 
government w ith Cuauhtemoc Cardenas as first 
elected mayor.
-PRI is defeated in presidential elections after 
71 years by PAN's candidate Vicente Fox.
-The Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF) 
began oversight functions as the federal SAI.
-The enactm ent o f decentralisation of 
educational resources and responsibilities to 
state governments.
-Share of state transfers in the Fiscal 
Coordination Law is settled at 20%.
-65% of Ramo 26  decentralised to  municipalities.
Creation of Progresa, a conditional cash transfer 
antipoverty program where financial transfers 
w ent directly to  individuals.
Progresa reduces the margins of clientelism of 
the Federal Government.
-Ramo 33  is included in the Federal budget to 
substitute for Ramo 26 to distribute earmarked 
resources to local authorities via a formula 
system.
-New funds are included in Ramo 33 to finance 
the transfer of new responsibilities to state 
governments.
-The Auditoria Superior de la Federacion replaces 
the Contaduria M ayor de Hacienda.
-The ASF has a legal mandate to oversee the 
transfers of Ramo 33.
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2002
2 00 3
2 00 4
200 5
200 6
200 7
-Interm ediate elections: 
majority in Congress.
No party gets the
Struggle for the distribution for budgeted and no 
budgeted resources between the federal 
government and the states.
(See chapter 4 of this dissertation).
President Fox veto the federal budget.
(See chapter 4 of this dissertation).
-PAN's candidate, Felipe Calderon, wins 
presidential elections by a small margin against 
PRD's candidate Andres Manuel Lopez 
Obrador. PRI is the third political force in 
Congress
Constitutional Reform to homogenize the budget 
classification o f states and municipalities. The 
secondary legislation to enact the constitutional 
reform will have to  be approved by 2009 (See 
chapter 5 of this dissertation).
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C hapter 3- The O usting o f governors, 1 93 4 -20 05
N A M E STATE YEAR
1. G onzalo  V azqu ez Vela
Lazaro C ardenas (1 9 3 4 -1 9 4 0 )
V eracruz
2. M a n u e l O rtiz Tabasco
3. R afael V illarea l Tam aulipas
4. Salvador Saucedo Colim a
5. Cesar A layola Yucatan
6. G abrie l R. G uevara G u errero 19 35
7. Carlos Real Durango
8. M e lc h o r O rteg a G u ana juato
9. M a n u e l Paez Sinaloa
10. Ram on Ram os Sonora
11. Jose Luis Solorzano S tate o f M e x ico
1 2 . Fernando Lopez Yucatan
13. Severino Ceniceros Durango
1 9 36
14. G u ille rm o  R ebolledo V eracruz
15. V icto rico  Grajales Chiapas
16. G abrie l Leyva Sinaloa 19 37
17. Refugio B ustam ante M o re los
18. S aturn ino  Cedillo San Luis Potosi 19 38
19. M a te o  H ernan dez San Luis Potosi
M a n u e l A vila  C am acho (1 9 4 0 -1 9 4 6 , Last P re s id e n t w ith  M il ita ry  O rig in )
1. M ig ue l A lem an V eracruz
1 9 4 0
2. Javier Rojo G om ez Hidalgo
3. A lb e rto  F. B erber G u errero
4. Reynaldo Perez San Luis Potosi 19 41
5. Pedro Rodriguez Triana Coahuila
6. M a n u e l Santillan Tlaxcala 1 9 4 4
7. Ernesto H idalgo G uanajuato 19 4 6
M ig u e l A lem an  (1 9 4 6 -1 9 5 2 , First C iv ilian  P re s id e n t)
1. N iceforo  G u errero G uanajuato
2. Juan Esponda Chiapas
3. E dm undo Sanchez Oaxaca 19 47
4. M a rce lin o  Garcia Barragan Jalisco
5. Hugo Pedro G onzalez Tam aulipas
6. Jesus C ato rena G u ana juato
7. Paz Faz Riza Coahuila
8. A ve lard o  L. R odriguez Sonora 19 4 8
9. Ricardo A inslie Coahuila
10. A do lfo  Ruiz C ortines V eracruz
11 . A gapito  Pozo Q u e re ta ro
19 49
12. Jose M a ria  M e n d o za M ichoacan
13. Jose G onzalez Yucatan 19 51
14. M a n u e l M a yo ra l Oaxaca 1 9 52
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N A M E STATE YEAR
1. Ignacio M o ro n es
A d o lfo  Ruiz C ortin es (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 8 )
N uevo Leon 19 5 2
2. Enrique Perez Arce Sinaloa
1 9 53
3. To m as M a re n te s Yucatan
4. A le ja n d ro  G om ez M a g an d a G u errero 19 5 4
5. Jose A guilar y M a ya G u ana juato
6. M a n u e l B artle tt Bautista Tabasco
19 55
7. Oscar Soto C hihuahua
8. A lfonso Corona Rosal Hidalgo
9. M a n u e l M a yo ra l H ered ia Oaxaca 1 9 5 8
1. M a n u e l A lvarez
A d o lfo  Lopez M a te o s  (1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 4 )
San Luis Potosi 1 9 5 9
2. Raul C aballero  A b u rto G u errero 1 9 6 0
3. A n to n io  Nava Castillo Puebla 1 9 6 4
1. Juan Gil Preciado
G ustavo D iaz O rd az  (1 9 6 4 -1 9 7 0 )
Jalisco 1 9 6 4
2. E nrique D upre Durango 1 9 6 6
1. V ic to r Bravo Aguja
Luis E cheverria  A lvarez (1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 6 )
Oaxaca
2. M a n u e l Sanchez V ite Hidalgo 1 9 7 0
3. Carlos Galvez B etanco urt M ichoacan
4. Eduardo E lizondo N uevo Leon 1 9 71
5. R afael M o re n o  V alle Puebla 1 9 72
6. G onzaio  Bautista Puebla 19 73
7. Israel N og ued a O te ro G u errero
8. O to n ie l M iran d a Hidalgo 1 9 7 5
9. Carlos Biebrich Sonora
1. Jorge Rojo Lugo
Jose Lopez P o rtillo  (1 9 7 6 -1 9 8 2 )
Hidalgo 1 9 7 6
2. Jorge de la Vega D om inguez Chiapas
1 9 7 7
3. M a n u e l Z a ra te  A qu ino Oaxaca
4. S alom on G onzalez Blanco Chiapas 1 9 8 0
5. Oscar Flores Tapia Coahuila 19 81
6. Juan Sabines G u tie rrez Chiapas 1 9 8 2
M ig u e l de la M a d r id  H u rta d o  (1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 8 )
1. G raciliano A lpuche Pinzon Yucatan
1 9 8 4
2. Enrique Velasco Ibarra G u anajuato
3. Oscar O rnelas Chihuahua 19 8 5
4. A lfred o  del M a zo S tate o f M ex ico 1 9 8 6
5. F lorencio Salazar M a rtin e z San Luis Potosi
1 9 8 7
6. Enrique G onzalez P edrero Tabasco
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N A M E STATE YEAR
Carlos Salinas de G o rta ri (1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 4 )
1. Enrique A lvarez del Castillo Jalisco
2. Fernando G u tie rre z  Barrios Veracruz
3. Luis M a rtin e z  V illicana M ichoacan
19 88
4. X icotencatl Leyva Baja California 1 9 89
5. M a rio  Ram on B ete ta S tate  o f M ex ico 19 9 0
6. V icto r M a n zan illa  Shaffer
7. Ram on A gu irre  V elazquez
8. Fausto Zapata
Yucatan  
G u ana juato  
San Luis Potosi
19 91
9. Salvador N em e Castillo
10. G u ille rm o Cosio V idaurri
11. Beatriz Paredes Rangel
12. G enaro  Borrego
13. Eduardo V illasenor
14. G onzalo  M a rtin e z  Corbala
15. P atrocinio G onzalez G arrido
Tabasco  
Jalisco 
Tlaxcala  
Zacatecas  
M ichoacan  
San Luis Potosi 
Chiapas
1992
16. Dulce M a ria  Sauri Yucatan 1993
17. E lm ar S etter Chiapas 19 94
Ernesto Ze d illo  Ponce de Leon (1 9 9 4 -2 0 0 0 )
1. Eduardo Robledo Rincon Chiapas
2. Emilio C hauyffet C hem o r S tate o f M exico
19 95
3. Ruben Figueroa A lcocer
4. Socrates Rizzo
G u errero  
N uevo Leon
19 9 6
5. M a rio  V illan u eva Q u in tana Roo 19 99
V ic e n te  Fox Q u esad a (2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6 )
1. A ndres M a n u e l Lopez O b rad o r M exico  City 2 0 05
(R einstated  in p o w er a fte r  
tw o  w eeks)
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C hapter 5- Bll scores fo r each category
State
1.
Legislative 
& Judicial 
Branches
2. State 
Autonomous 
Institutions
3.
Executive
Branch
4. State 
Government 
Subsidies & 
Transfers
5. Budget 
Management
6. Public Dept 
Management
7.
Government
Employment
8. Transfers to 
Municipal 
Governments
9. Federal 
Transfers
10. Internet 
Accesability
BUDGET
INFORMATION
INDEX
Durango 10.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 7.5 0.0 10.0 6.0 10.0 69.5
Sinaloa 10.0 10.0 6.7 5.0 6.0 5.0 33 10.0 10.0 10.0 66.0
G uerrero 10.0 4.0 8.3 5.0 10.0 7.5 33 5.0 10.0 10.0 63.2
Aguascalientes 5.0 8.0 8.3 75 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 6.0 10.0 62.3
Nayarit 10.0 6.0 6.7 5.0 6.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 59.7
Jalisco 7.5 6.0 5.0 10.0 4.0 7.5 8.3 5.0 6.0 10.0 59.3
Mexico Gty 10.0 6.0 6.7 25 6.0 5.0 33 10.0 6.0 10.0 55.5
Baja California 10.0 4.0 6.7 0.0 4.0 7.5 6.7 10.0 6.0 10.0 54.8
Chihuahua 10.0 6.0 8.3 0.0 4.0 2.5 83 5.0 10.0 10.0 54.2
Morelos 10.0 8.0 10.0 0.0 4.0 2.5 33 10.0 4.0 10.0 51.8
Zacatecas 10.0 6.0 5.0 25 8.0 7.5 0.0 SO 6.0 10.0 50.0
Colima 7.5 6.0 6.7 5.0 2.0 10.0 1.7 5.0 6.0 10.0 49.8
Yucatan 7.S 6.0 6.7 2.5 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 47.7
N uevo Leon 10.0 6.0 10.0 0.0 4.0 5.0 33 5.0 4.0 10.0 47.3
Campeche 5.0 6.0 6.7 5.0 6.0 2.5 SD 5.0 6.0 10.0 47.2
Chiapas 10.0 6.0 10.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 8.0 10.0 46.0
Puebla 10.0 6.0 5.0 2.5 6.0 0.0 33 10.0 2.0 10.0 44.8
Hidalgo 10.0 6.0 3.3 25 6.0 2.5 33 5.0 6.0 10.0 44.7
San Luis Potosi 7.5 8.0 3.3 5.0 6.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 43.3
Tabasco 10.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 43.0
Quintana Roo 10.0 6.0 6.7 0.0 4.0 S.O 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 42.7
Coahuila 10.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 6.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 8.0 10.0 42.5
Sonora 5.0 4.0 6.7 0.0 8.0 2.5 33 5.0 8.0 10.0 42.5
State of Mexico 7.5 6.0 8.3 0.0 8.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 2.0 10.0 41.8
Michoacan 7.5 6.0 5.0 2.5 6.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 40.5
Tlaxcala 7.5 6.0 8.3 2.5 2.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 39.8
Veracruz 7.5 6.0 5.0 25 0.0 2.5 33 5.0 8.0 10.0 39.8
Queretaro 75 6.0 3.3 0.0 4.0 2.5 00 10.0 6.0 10.0 39.3
Tamaulipas 7.5 4.0 S.O 0.0 6.0 2 5 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 36.0
Guanajuato 7.5 6.0 3.3 0.0 4.0 2.5 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 34.3
Oaxaca 5.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 6.0 25 0.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 27.8
Baja California Sur 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean .......8 20...... ........ 5.75....... ..... 6.20..... .......2. SC....... .......S 19...... 3.98 2.50 6.09 6.06 9.69 46.48
Standard deviation 2.31 1.95 237 2.91 2.43 2.36 2.90 2.45 2.12 1.77 12.80
la
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Interview
1. Aguayo, Sergio Human Rights Activist and Transparency 
Advocate
V -2 5 -2 0 0 8
2. Alcalde Virgen, Moises PAN local deputy in the state of Mexico 
(2003-2006)
V I-3 0 -2 0 0 8
3. Alcaraz, Alma PAN local deputy in the state of Sinaloa 
(1999-2001)
V III-2 0 -2 0 0 8
4. Alvarado Jose, Antonio Former Federal Director of Budget 
Planning (1994-2000)
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5. Barrio, Francisco PAN, Municipal President of Ciudad 
Juarez (1983-1986), Governor of 
Chihuhua (1992-1998) Secretary of 
Secodam (2000-2003)
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6. Bonilla, Javier Undersecretary of the Minister of 
Health (1994-2000)
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7 . Carpizo, Jorge Former Member of the Supreme Court, 
Minister of Interior (1994)
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8. Chavez Presa, Jorge Director of the Public Debt 
Management, Ministry of Finance 
(1994-1996)
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9. Colmenares, David Minister of Finance of the State of 
Oaxaca (PRI, 1986-1992)
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10. Cordera, Rolando PSUM, Federal Deputy (1982-1985) V I-1 6 -2 0 0 8
11. Fuentes, Benjamin High Ranking Official at the Auditoria 
Superior de la Federacion.
V III-2 2 -2 0 0 8
12. Garcia Villa, Juan Antonio PAN, Federal Deputy, President of the 
Oversight Commission (1994-1997)
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13. Gershenson, Antonio PSUM, Federal Deputy (1982-1985) V II-0 1 -2 0 0 8
14. Gonzalez de Aragon, 
Arturo
Auditor General, Head of the ASF, 
(2001-2009)
V III-2 2 -2 0 0 8
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15. Granados, O tto PRI, Governor o f Aguascalientes (1992- 
1998)
VIII-19-2008
16. Guerrero Pozas, Gregorio Former C om ptro ller General (1999- 
2001)
VI-23-2008
17. Handam, Fauzi PAN Deputy (1997-2000) VII-18-2008
18. Ibarra, David M in is te r o f Finance (1979-1981) VIII-28-2008
19. M ariani, Rene* A ud ito r General o f the  state o f Veracruz 
(2000-2006)
IV-30-2008
20. M unoz Ledo, Porfirio PRD, Leader in the  Chamber o f Deputies 
(1997-2000)
1-27-2008
21. Nunez, A rtu ro PRD, Senator (2006-2012) VII-10-2008
22. Paoli, Francisco Jose PAN, Deputy (1997-2000) VII-15-2008
23. Prieto, G uillerm o Undersecretary o f Finance (1976-1986) VII-14-2008
24. Rodriguez de la Gala, 
T irzo **
A ud ito r General o f the  state o f 
Campeche (1994-2004).
VII-31-2008
25. Romerc Hicks, Juan Carlos PAN M in is te r o f Finance o f the  State o f 
Guanajuato (1995-1999)
VIII-18-2008
26. Roque Villanueva 
H um berto
PRI Leader in the  Chamber o f Deputies 
(1994-1997), PRI Chairman (1997-1999)
VI-16-2008
27. Silva Herzog, Jesus M in is te r o f Finance (1981-1986) V-26-2008
28. V illareal, Rosendo M unicipal President o f Saltillo (1991- 
1993)
26-11-2008
All in terv iew s w e re  m ade face to  face in M exico  City, unless o therw ise  indicated . *Q u es tio n s  w ere  sent 
by em ail and th e  answers w e re  presented  in w ritte n  fo rm . * * ln te rv ie w  m ade by te lep h o n e .
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